IDHW v. John Doe (2025-16)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52961

In the Matter of: John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: December 19, 2025
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JOHN DOE (2025-16), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the First Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Tristan Poorman, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Douglas A. Pierce, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jennifer Fegert, Deputy Attorney
General, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent.
________________________________________________

TRIBE, Judge
John Doe (2025-16) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the father of John Doe I (Child). The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
initiated a child protection action against Doe. Law enforcement declared Child in imminent
danger after his primary caregivers passed away and he was living with their son, a non-approved

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caregiver, who did not have legal custody.1 Reported concerns were that Child was exposed to
illegal drugs and living in an unsafe situation, mother was homeless and involved in substance use,
and Doe was incarcerated. After removal, a hair follicle test was conducted on Child, which tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Doe stipulated to granting custody of Child to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.
The magistrate court ordered a case plan for Doe to complete to reunify with Child. After Doe
was released on parole, paternity was established for Child, and Doe worked on his case plan. Doe
was subsequently arrested for possession of a controlled substance and has been in custody since
August 2024. Based on Doe’s arrest, the Department moved to change the permanency goal from
reunification to termination of Doe’s parental rights. The Department filed a petition to terminate
Doe’s parental rights, and the magistrate court held a termination hearing. After the hearing, the
magistrate court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a judgment
terminating Doe’s parental rights, finding that he abandoned and neglected Child and that
termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. Idaho Code § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of
due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho
383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing

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Child was raised by his fictive grandparents beginning when he was six months old.
However, his fictive grandmother and grandfather passed away, leaving Child in the care of their
son.

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evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child;
or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
III.
ANALYSIS
The magistrate court found that Doe both abandoned and neglected Child. However, Doe
only challenges the magistrate court’s finding of neglect. Because Doe does not challenge the
magistrate court’s finding of abandonment as a statutory basis to terminate his parental rights, the
magistrate court did not err in finding a statutory basis upon which to terminate Doe’s parental
rights. However, even if we consider Doe’s arguments, the statutory basis of abandonment would

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remain as an independent basis upon which termination may be granted. Because Doe does not
challenge the issue of abandonment, we will not address it on appeal.
A. Neglect
Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in its substantive finding that he neglected Child.
Doe asserts that he had a relationship with Child for his entire life, Doe did what he could, and he
“was always appropriate, even during his times of incarceration. His visits were regular, and his
conduct was proper.” Further, Doe states he was “working his case plan with success” and
progressed on all twelve of the tasks from March to June 2024.2 Doe fails to support his assertion
with meaningful argument or citation to relevant legal authority. Doe’s analysis section does not
include any specific findings of the magistrate court that were unsupported, nor does his analysis
include argument as to how the facts do not support the finding; therefore, his argument is waived.
This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to
legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). The Court, however, may address
certain narrow issues involving due process violations despite the absence of supporting, cogent
argument or citation to legal authority. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-32), 163
Idaho 536, 538, 415 P.3d 945, 947 (2018); State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 536, 164 P.3d 814, 816
(2007). For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed due process errors
affecting parents’ fundamental rights, including procedural errors and the application of an
incorrect standard of review. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at 947 (addressing
procedural error); Doe, 144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816 (addressing application of incorrect
standard).
Even if we consider the merits of Doe’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding of neglect, Doe has failed to meet his burden of showing error. Idaho Code

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In his reply brief, Doe includes a quote from Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2010-28), 151 Idaho 605, 261 P.3d 882 (Ct. App. 2011), to support his position that this Court
should consider that he could be released from incarceration soon. However, this quote is in a
section titled “Incarceration” where this Court analyzed the statutory basis for whether Doe “has
been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for a substantial period” of the child’s life.
See id. at 608, 261 P.3d at 885. Here, Doe’s rights were terminated on a different statutory
basis--neglect.

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Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section
16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian
or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to
comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department
has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen3 of the most recent twenty-two months
and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the
child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
The magistrate court found, and Doe does not contest, that he has been incarcerated for
six out of the eight years of Child’s life. The magistrate court heard testimony that Child never
lived with Doe at any time during Child’s life. The magistrate court considered that, while Doe
was doing “adequately, if not well” on his case plan, it also heard evidence at trial that, while he
was on parole, he was arrested for possession of methamphetamine. Notably, the first two tasks
of Doe’s case plan related to him abstaining from substance abuse; however, he testified that
sometimes his addiction “gets the better of [him] at some points.” The magistrate court also heard
testimony that, while Doe has been incarcerated, most of his relationship with Child has consisted
of video visits and phone calls. Doe testified that he and Child were starting to create a bond, but
Doe became incarcerated and that “it probably hurt [Child].” Doe testified that, while he was
going to be eligible for parole soon, there was no guarantee he will be released. Finally, Doe
testified that he has not had the “opportunity to be a real dad to [Child].” Substantial and competent
evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that Doe has neglected Child, as defined in
I.C. § 16-1602(31), by failing to comply with the case plan and reunification had not occurred
within the time standards of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
B. Best Interests
Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights
is in the best interests of Child. However, Doe fails to present meaningful argument and authority.

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At the time the State filed the petition to terminate parental rights, the statutory timeframe
under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) was fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months. Subsequently,
the statute was amended to twelve out of the most recent twenty-two months.

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Therefore, this argument is also waived. This Court generally does not address issues not
supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental
rights. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho at 147, 426 P.3d at 1247. The Court, however, may address
certain narrow issues involving due process violations despite the absence of supporting, cogent
argument or citation to legal authority. Doe (2017-32), 163 Idaho at 538, 415 P.3d at 947; Doe,
144 Idaho at 536, 164 P.3d at 816. Even if we review the merits of Doe’s argument, Doe fails to
establish any error.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
Doe argues that the evidence presented at trial showed “that severing the parent-child
relationship” was not necessary because Child “knows that Doe is his father, and they had a
lifelong relationship. . . . Doe and [Child] had a unique, if not a normal parent-child relationship,
and engaged in typical parent-child activities together during the visits.” However, this Court has
found termination is in the best interests of a child when the parent had “a long history of drug
addiction and criminal convictions” even when that parent “made efforts to maintain his parental
relationship . . . through frequent visits” but failed to provide the child with “the type of day-to-
day support normally associated with parenting.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2010-28), 151 Idaho 605, 611, 261 P.3d 882, 888 (Ct. App. 2011).
The magistrate court found that, although Doe appears to desire a relationship with Child,
Doe failed to establish paternity until the child protection action commenced and has failed to “be

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there for” Child for many years. Further, the magistrate court noted that, while working on the
case plan, Doe chose methamphetamine over reunification with Child, which resulted in Doe’s
latest imprisonment. Further, even when Doe was not incarcerated, he allowed Child to be raised
by others. The magistrate court heard evidence that Child began exhibiting behaviors connected
to his self-worth, vocalized anger toward Doe, and stopped participating in activities in which
Child usually wanted to participate. Child’s therapist recommended that Doe no longer have
visitation with Child. Furthermore, the magistrate court found that Child is doing well residing
with his foster parents.
Doe does not challenge any of these factual findings but argues that the magistrate court
incorrectly concluded that termination is in the best interests of Child. The magistrate court
considered both the history of Doe’s lack of involvement with Child, Doe’s failure to complete the
case plan, and Child’s improvements in foster care. The magistrate court found the foster parents
were caring and positive and that Child deserved care, consistency and stability, which Doe could
not provide. The magistrate court further found that Child deserved to have “caregivers who he
can rely on to be there for him, to care for him, and to help him grow as he enters a very critical
stage in his life.” Substantial and competent evidence supports this finding. Doe has failed to
show the magistrate court erred in finding that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s
parental rights.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe failed to challenge the magistrate court’s finding that he abandoned Child, thus, we
affirm the magistrate court’s finding that there is a statutory basis for terminating Doe’s parental
rights. Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding he neglected Child. Doe
has also failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding that it is in Child’s best interests
to terminate Doe’s parental rights. The magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental
rights is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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