State v. Wilson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51359

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 2, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
SYDNEE RAYHN WILSON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Steven J. Hippler, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of fentanyl and possession of drug
paraphernalia, affirmed; order denying motion to suppress, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Garth S. McCarty, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Sydnee Rayhn Wilson appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of fentanyl
and possession of drug paraphernalia. Wilson claims the district court erred in denying her motion
to suppress. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officer Moss initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle with a suspended registration.
Officer Moss discovered from a license plate check that the vehicle’s registration was suspended
for lack of insurance and that the registered owner’s driver’s license was also suspended. The
vehicle, driven by Ryan Morgan with Wilson as a passenger, did not immediately stop but
continued for approximately three blocks before pulling over. Upon contact, Morgan and Wilson
explained that they borrowed the vehicle. Officer Moss returned to his patrol car, called for a

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drug-detection dog, checked Morgan’s and Wilson’s information through dispatch, confirmed
details about a no-contact order involving Morgan, and began preparing a citation for Morgan’s
failure to carry a driver’s license.
While Officer Moss performed these tasks, Officer Johnson arrived with his drug-detection
dog, Rico. Upon deployment, Rico exhibited multiple behaviors indicating the presence of
contraband before contacting the vehicle and giving a final alert. After the alert, officers searched
the vehicle and discovered drugs, firearms, and ammunition.
The State charged Wilson with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent
to deliver, Idaho Code § 37-2732(a); possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl), I.C. § 37-
2732(a); and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C.§ 37-2734A. Wilson moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that Officer Moss lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, unlawfully
prolonged the detention, and conducted an unconstitutional search when Rico physically contacted
the vehicle. The State opposed the motion, asserting that the stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, the detention was not unlawfully extended, Wilson lacked standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle, and the search was supported by probable cause following Rico’s alert.
The district court denied Wilson’s motion to suppress, concluding that Officer Moss
lawfully stopped the vehicle, and the duration of the stop was not unlawfully extended. The district
court further found that Wilson lacked standing to challenge the search and, alternatively, that
Rico’s general alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle before he made physical contact.
Wilson subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of fentanyl and possession of
drug paraphernalia, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The State
dismissed the remaining charge. Wilson appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,

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127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Wilson argues the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
Specifically, Wilson asserts that Officer Moss unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop, the district
court erred in finding Wilson lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, and the search
of the vehicle was unconstitutional because Rico touched the vehicle during the sniff.
A. Prolonging the Stop
Wilson claims that Officer Moss unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop by calling for a drug-
detection dog, checking whether Wilson was the protected party in a no-contact order involving
Morgan, and generally stalling to allow time for Rico to complete the sniff.
A traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it
extends beyond the time reasonably required to complete its mission. State v. Karst, 170 Idaho
219, 223, 509 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2022). Law enforcement is permitted to conduct a dog sniff during
the course of a lawful traffic stop so long as it does not add time to the overall duration of the stop.
Id. at 224, 509 P.3d at 1153. Although a drug dog sniff is not part of the mission of the stop, such
a sniff is constitutionally permissible if executed in a reasonable manner that does not infringe on
a constitutionally protected privacy interest, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005), and
does not prolong the stop, State v. Riley, 170 Idaho 572, 578, 514 P.3d 982, 988 (2022). The
critical question in determining whether a drug dog sniff unconstitutionally extended a traffic stop
is whether the sniff “prolonged or added time to the overall duration of the traffic stop.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] dog sniff does not prolong the stop where one officer
pursues the original objective of the stop while another officer conducts the dog sniff.” Id. at 579,
514 P.3d at 989. If, however, an officer without independent reasonable suspicion deviates or
detours from the mission of the stop to conduct a drug dog sniff, the stop may be unconstitutionally
delayed. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the critical question is whether the drug dog sniff
“adds time” to the traffic stop. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016). In
Riley, the Court analyzed whether conversations lasting twenty-eight seconds between officers
related to the drug dog sniff constituted deviations from the traffic stop prior to the drug dog

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alert. Riley, 170 Idaho at 579, 514 P.3d at 989. The Court held that there was no additional delay
because the drug dog alerted forty-eight seconds before the officer completed the traffic
citation. Id. Therefore, the twenty-eight seconds of deviations did not actually lengthen the stop
because, even without the deviations, the drug dog would still have alerted twenty seconds before
the completion of the citation. Once the drug dog alerts, there is reasonable suspicion to extend
the stop. Id.
The district court found that, after taking the registration from Morgan, Officer Moss
returned to his patrol car and “[a]s he got settled in the patrol car and retrieved his clipboard and
pen to prepare a citation, Officer Moss took a second or two to radio for a canine unit.” The district
court further found that Officer Moss’s request for the canine unit occurred “virtually
contemporaneously” with his initiation of the citation process and, at most, caused a “deviation of
a second or two.” While the second or two Officer Moss took to radio for a canine unit before
beginning to run the records check is an extension of the stop, the question is whether that
extension, and any others, added time to the stop. Wilson contends that the time Officer Moss
took to investigate the civil protection order was neither a normal incident of the stop nor for safety
reasons and, consequently, also added time to the stop.
The mission of a traffic stop has two pillars: (1) to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop; and (2) to attend to related safety concerns. State v. Wharton, 170 Idaho 329,
332, 510 P.3d 682, 685 (2022). Because traffic stops pose inherent dangers, officers may take
“negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete [the] mission safely,” such as asking the
driver and passenger to exit the vehicle and conducting a criminal records check. State v. Hale,
168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021).
After returning to his patrol car, Officer Moss began running the usual information checks
incident to the completion of a citation. The district court detailed, from the evidence, the various
records checks completed by Officer Moss. In the process, Officer Moss discovered the
driver, Morgan, was subject to a protection order involving a woman. The district court found that
Officer Moss credibly testified that safety concerns prompted him to conduct a thorough check of
Morgan’s criminal record and determine whether Wilson was the protected party under the no-
contact order.
Wilson argues that the scope of permissible officer safety measures envisioned in
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), is limited to criminal records and outstanding

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warrant checks of the detained person, but not on-scene investigation into other crimes and safety
precautions taken in order to facilitate such investigation. Constitutionally reasonable inquiries
“include, but are not limited to,” checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance. Wharton, 170 Idaho at 332, 510 P.3d at 685 (emphasis added). Safety precautions also
include ordering occupants to exit the stopped vehicle and warrant checks on passengers. Id. at
335, 510 P.3d at 688. Wilson argues that Officer Moss’s research into the protection order had
nothing to do with the traffic infraction or with officer safety, and therefore the check on the
protection order was merely an investigation into a crime unjustified by reasonable suspicion.
Wilson’s attempt to limit safety concerns to officer safety is not supported by Rodriguez. Although
an officer may certainly take reasonable steps to assure his own safety during a traffic stop, the
Constitution “allows negligibly burdensome safety precautions . . . so that an officer may carry out
the traffic mission without unnecessary risks to all persons involved.” Wharton, 170 Idaho at 334,
510 P.3d at 687 (emphasis added). A records check of a protection order between occupants of
vehicle is negligibly burdensome compared to the safety concern for the “persons involved.” The
district court correctly held that determining whether Wilson was the protected party under the
protection order was not a deviation from the mission of the traffic stop. This minimal inquiry fell
squarely within the officer’s duty to attend to safety concerns. Id. Wilson’s claim that the check
was unrelated to the stop and amounted to an investigation of an unrelated crime misstates the
governing standard. While it is true that checking the protection order could have shown a separate
crime of violating a protection order, it is also true that ordinary checks of driver’s licenses, vehicle
registrations, and insurance documentation could reveal additional criminal activity. The mere
fact an officer’s actions might result in the discovery of evidence does not, on its own, remove
those actions from the legitimate scope of a traffic stop.
Finally, Wilson argues that Officer Moss intentionally delayed writing the citation and,
therefore, unlawfully extended the stop. Wilson contends that the communications between the
officers and the time Officer Moss took demonstrate that his actions were a stalling tactic in order
to facilitate the dog sniff. Wilson states that, “Although the district court’s determination of
credibility is not challengeable, the court was presented ample evidence to support Ms. Wilson’s
argument that the officers purposefully used stalling tactics to prolong the stop.” Wilson’s
argument is not supported by the record. The district court reviewed Officer Moss’s actions and

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the time elapsed. The district court held that, up to the point during the stop at which Rico alerted,
“Officer Moss credibly testified that at no time did he pause what he was doing or otherwise delay
the citation-issuing process. His [on-body video] footage together with his testimony describing
his actions during this period supports his testimony.” As Wilson acknowledges, this Court defers
to the credibility findings of the district court. State v. Bell, 172 Idaho 451, 456, 533 P.3d 1247,
1252 (2023).
Officer Moss’s check of the protection order records was not a deviation from the stop. It
was well-within the district court’s purview to conclude that Officer Moss did not purposely delay
completion of the stop, and the evidence supports that conclusion. The district court did not err in
holding that the mission of the traffic stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged.
B. Probable Cause to Search the Vehicle
Wilson claims the district court erred in finding that officers had probable cause to search
the vehicle under the automobile exception. Even assuming Wilson had standing, Wilson fails to
demonstrate error. Wilson’s arguments are indistinguishable from those made by Morgan in his
companion case. This Court rejected those arguments and held that the probable cause to search
was established through the dog sniff. State v. Morgan, 175 Idaho 334, 565 P.3d 275 (Ct. App.
2025). For the same reasons, we affirm the district court’s finding that probable cause existed to
search the vehicle in this case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusions that the traffic stop was not
unlawfully prolonged and there was probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, the district
court’s order denying Wilson’s motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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