State v. Simonson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51042

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 19, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JASON LOWELL SIMONSON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Steven Hippler and Deborah A. Bail, District Judges.

Judgment for possession of a controlled substance, attempted destruction and/or
alteration of evidence, and possession of drug paraphernalia, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jason Lowell Simonson appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, attempted destruction and/or alteration of evidence, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While operating a commercial truck, Simonson was stopped by law enforcement at the port
of entry for a routine regulatory inspection. Upon inspecting the truck, law enforcement did not
observe any objects underneath the truck. However, during the inspection, an officer conducted a
records check and discovered that Simonson had an active arrest warrant for a probation violation.
After confirming the arrest warrant, an officer informed Simonson that he was under arrest and

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instructed him to turn around and place his hands behind his back. As Simonson turned, officers
observed that his hands were near or inside his front pockets. Upon being instructed to put his
hands behind his back, Simonson appeared to discard an item. Officers then heard a clinking
sound near the truck’s fuel tank, and a glass pipe was observed partially underneath the truck.
After Simonson’s arrest, the substance in the glass pipe tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine residue. The State charged Simonson with possession of a controlled substance
(I.C. § 37-2732(c)), destruction and/or alteration of evidence (I.C. § 18-2603), and possession of
drug paraphernalia (I.C. § 37-2734A).
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to introduce evidence that Simonson was lawfully
arrested pursuant to a warrant for an unrelated offense at the time he allegedly committed the
charged offenses. At the motion hearing, the district court found that the arrest was relevant under
I.R.E. 404(b) to rebut any suggestion of unlawful police conduct and to support an inference that
Simonson’s knowledge of the impending arrest provided motive to discard the glass pipe. The
district court also found the evidence was admissible as consciousness of guilt. Balancing the
probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403, the district court concluded
the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, in part because the jury would be given a limiting
instruction clarifying that the arrest was for an unrelated matter and was not to be considered as
evidence of criminal disposition. The district court subsequently issued a written memorandum
decision and order granting the State’s motion. Following trial, the jury found Simonson guilty of
all charges. Simonson appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 358, 470 P.3d
1162, 1167 (2020); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012). A
trial court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to
be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v.
Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable

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to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Simonson argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence that he was lawfully
arrested pursuant to a warrant for an unrelated offense. Specifically, Simonson asserts the evidence
of his arrest pursuant to the unrelated warrant was irrelevant and the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State responds that
the district court did not err but, even if it did, any error was harmless. We hold that Simonson
has failed to show the district court erred in admitting evidence regarding the basis for Simonson’s
arrest.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits introduction of evidence of acts other than the
crime for which a defendant is charged if the probative value of the evidence is entirely dependent
upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to engage in such behavior. State v.
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185, 1190 (2009). Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act
may implicate a person’s character while also being relevant and admissible for some permissible
purpose. See State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 688-89, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281-82 (2012). A
nonexclusive list of permissible purposes is included in I.R.E. 404(b). See State v. Hairston, 133
Idaho 496, 501, 988 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1999) (noting I.R.E. 404(b) lists “several permissible
purposes” but explaining “this is not an exclusive list”). For example, the rule provides that
evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. I.R.E. 404(b)(2).
When determining the admissibility of evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), the trial court
must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence of the other acts that a reasonable jury
could believe the conduct actually occurred. If so, then the trial court must consider: (1) whether
the other acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other
than propensity; and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214,
207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009). On appeal, this Court defers to the trial court’s determination
that there is sufficient evidence of the other acts if it is supported by substantial and competent

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evidence in the record. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. In this case, Simonson does
not challenge the existence of his arrest warrant nor the legal basis for his arrest. Therefore, we
address only whether the challenged evidence was relevant and, if relevant, whether it should have
been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403.
A. Relevance
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
I.R.E. 401; State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 774, 419 P.3d 1042, 1072 (2017). Applying the
I.R.E. 404(b) framework, the district court found Simonson’s arrest was relevant to provide
context for the officers’ actions. Specifically, the district court reasoned the arrest provided
evidence of Simonson’s motive to discard the pipe based on his knowledge that it contained a
controlled substance. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the Idaho Supreme
Court’s opinion in State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 470 P.3d 1162 (2020). In Jones, the two-justice
lead opinion held that evidence of the defendant’s probationary status was relevant to explain why
officers conducted a search of the defendant. Id. at 360, 470 P.3d at 1169. Applying this same
reasoning, the district court held that evidence of Simonson’s lawful arrest was relevant to provide
necessary context because, without the evidence, the jury could have been misled to believe that
officers acted improperly by placing Simonson in handcuffs and conducting a search.
Simonson argues the district court erred in its analysis because evidence of the unrelated
arrest had no relevance for either his motive for discarding the pipe or his knowledge that it
contained a controlled substance. The State argues that evidence of Simonson’s arrest is relevant
to both his motive to discard the glass pipe and his knowledge that it contained a controlled
substance. We agree with the State.
Motive is defined as something that leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 689, 273 P.3d at 1282. Simonson’s awareness that he was about to be
searched incident to arrest provides a reason to discard the pipe to avoid its discovery. That same
awareness also supports the inference that Simonson knew the pipe contained methamphetamine
or another controlled substance, which is the reason he threw it under the truck. As the district
court aptly noted: “There would be little reasons for [Simonson] to discard the glass pipe absent

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both his impeding search incident to arrest and knowledge that the pipe contained residue of
methamphetamine or some controlled substance.”
Accordingly, the evidence of Simonson’s arrest was relevant under I.R.E. 401 for the
permissible purposes of establishing both motive and knowledge. Simonson has failed to show
the district court erred by determining that evidence of his unrelated arrest was relevant to the
permissible purposes of establishing knowledge and motive.
B. Prejudice
Under the second step of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis, the district court was required to
determine whether the probative value of the challenged evidence was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in making this
determination given their ability to assess the evidence within the context of the trial. Grist, 147
Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. The trial court’s balancing of the probative value of the evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of
discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011).
Simonson argues that the district court failed to properly weigh the probative value of the
arrest evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. According to Simonson, the arrest evidence
had minimal probative value because the State could have established motive and knowledge
through less prejudicial means. The State responds that the district court correctly considered the
probative value of the evidence and cured any potential prejudice by limiting the State’s inquiry
about the arrest and by giving a limiting jury instruction.
The district court, in both its oral findings and written ruling, considered the probative
value and potential prejudice of the evidence. The district court found that the evidence carried
“significant probative value,” particularly in explaining the legal basis for the officers’ actions
during the search and in supporting permissible inferences related to both Simonson’s motive to
discard the pipe and his knowledge of its contents. To minimize the risk of unfair prejudice, the
district court: (1) limited the State’s reference to the arrest as one based on an “unrelated minor
offense” without “any mention of the underlying offense giving rise to the warrant”; and (2) gave
a limiting instruction that advised the jury:
Evidence was introduced that the defendant was arrested on an outstanding
warrant for a minor unrelated matter. As you were instructed at the time of its
admission, such evidence if believed is not to be considered by you to prove the

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defendant’s character or that the defendant had a disposition to commit crimes.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purposes of proving
the defendant’s motive, knowledge and to provide a legal basis for the arrest.
We presume that the jury followed the district court’s instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451,
454 (Ct. App. 1996). The district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the weighing
required by I.R.E. 403 as part of the second step of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis and in determining
that the probative value of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
Simonson has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting limited
evidence that he was arrested pursuant to a “warrant for a minor unrelated matter.” Because we
conclude that Simonson has failed to show error in the admission of the challenged evidence, we
decline to address the State’s alternative harmless error argument.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Simonson has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
evidence of his unrelated arrest pursuant to a warrant. Therefore, Simonson’s judgment of
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, attempted destruction and/or alteration of
evidence, and possession of drug paraphernalia is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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