Connor v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50240

SUZANA MARIE CONNOR, )
) Filed: February 10, 2025
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Suzana Marie Connor, Boise, pro se appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Suzana Marie Connor appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of her petition
for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Connor argues the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the underlying criminal case, Connor pled not guilty to felony DUI, Idaho Code §§ 18-
8004, 18-8005(9).1 The case was set for trial on February 27, 2013. The State filed a motion for
leave to file an information part II alleging a persistent violator sentence enhancement, and a
hearing was set for January 15, 2013. Connor failed to appear at the hearing and a bench warrant
was issued. At a subsequent pretrial conference, Connor again failed to appear for the hearing.

1
At the time of Connor’s arrest, the statute was Idaho Code § 18-8005(9), however it is
currently I.C. § 18-8005(6).
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Connor’s attorney indicated that he did not have any contact with Connor and that he would file a
motion to withdraw, which the district court granted.
Connor was arrested on the bench warrant in 2018. Represented by new counsel, Connor
filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging the blood draw was obtained without consent or a
warrant and was, therefore, unconstitutional based on Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
The State objected to the motion, arguing that it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion
as untimely. Ultimately, Connor pled guilty to one count of felony DUI, and the State agreed to
dismiss the persistent violator enhancement.
Connor filed a direct appeal, arguing the district court erred by denying her motion to
suppress. Connor admitted that her motion was untimely, and that she had absconded, but believed
that since McNeely was decided during her absence, the application of a procedural time rule
should not limit her ability to challenge a constitutional issue. This Court rejected those arguments
in an unpublished opinion. State v. Connor, Docket No. 47006 (Ct. App. May 22, 2020).
Connor filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Connor’s pro se petition asserted two
claims that initial trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to file a motion to
suppress pursuant to the rule announced in McNeely; and (2) instructing her to leave the country
until the law changed. The district court held that trial counsel could not have been ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress based on McNeely as it was not decided until after Connor
absconded and the deadline to file a motion to suppress had passed. Further, the district court
determined Connor’s claim that trial counsel encouraged Connor to abscond was unsupported by
admissible evidence. The district court entered judgment summarily dismissing Connor’s petition
for post-conviction relief. Connor appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Sheahan v. State, 146
Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions of law, we exercise free
review. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

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III.
ANALYSIS
Connor argues the district court erred by summarily dismissing her petition for post-
conviction relief. Connor claims that her trial counsel had knowledge of the McNeely decision on
January 9, 2013, but failed to file a motion to suppress. Additionally, Connor argues that trial
counsel’s instruction to her to leave the United States until the law changed prejudiced her case.
The State argues the claims are without merit and Connor failed to allege a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
As an initial matter, Connor’s brief fails to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6),
which states, “The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
transcript and record relied upon.” The Supreme Court held that it relies “solely on the parties to
ground their appeals in relevant argument and authority.” Dorr v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, 171 Idaho
306, 309, 520 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2022). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as those
litigants represented by counsel. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585
(2009). Pro se litigants are not excused from abiding by procedural rules simply because they are
appearing pro se and may not be aware of the applicable rules. Id. The argument section of
Connor’s brief provides no citation to the record on appeal as to either of her appellate claims.
This Court will not search the record on appeal for the necessary citations or arguments. See
Dickenson v. Benewah Cnty. Sheriff, 172 Idaho 144, 150, 530 P.3d 691, 697 (2023). Connor’s
claims are, therefore, waived.
Nonetheless, Connor’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 p.3d 536, 544 (Ct. App.
2009). For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to prevail, the petitioner must show that the
attorney’s performance was deficient, and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d
504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish deficiency, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s
representation was below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231
(Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that,

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but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome would have been different. Aragon, 114
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231. A reasonable
probability is a probability necessary to undermine the confidence in the outcome. State v. Dunlap,
155 Idaho 345, 383 313 P.3d 1, 39 (2013). This must be more than a merely conceivable likelihood
of a different result. Id.
Connor argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claim that trial counsel was
deficient for not filing a motion to suppress2 based on McNeely. The State argued that trial counsel
could not have filed a motion to suppress based on the ruling in McNeely that would have been
timely given that the McNeely decision was not issued until April 2013.
Connor’s argument that trial counsel knew of the McNeely decision to timely file a motion
to suppress is incorrect. The trial in this case was set for February 27, 2013. A pretrial conference
was scheduled for February 5, 2013. Connor did not appear and absconded as of the February 5,
2013, hearing. According to Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d), absent good cause shown or for excusable
neglect, a motion to suppress must be filed within twenty-eight days of the plea or seven days
before trial, whichever is earlier.3 In this case, even if counsel could have filed seven days before
trial, the McNeely decision was not issued until April 7, 2013. Connor mistakenly relies upon the
date oral argument was conducted in McNeely, January 9, 2013. Pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), Connor’s
motion to suppress would have to have been filed before McNeely was issued. Her trial counsel
could not be deficient for failing to file a motion based on a ruling that did not exist at the time.
Lastly, Connor claims that her trial counsel was ineffective for advising her to flee the
country until the law changed. The State argues that Connor provided no evidence for this claim.
The district court is not required to accept either petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Downing, 136 Idaho

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Connor additionally argues that trial counsel could have filed a motion to suppress alleging
an illegal arrest without probable cause, an illegal blood draw contamination, and an illegal blood
draw per the Supremacy Clause because she is a member of a sovereign Indian tribe. These
arguments were not raised below and are unsupported by evidence in the record.
3
In felony cases, motions under Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) must be set for hearing within
fourteen days after filing or forty-eight hours before trial, whichever is earlier. Thus, it is
inaccurate that trial counsel could have filed a placeholder motion to suppress while Connor was
absconding, “preserving” her right to litigate the motion six years later, as such a motion could not
have been set for hearing in a timely fashion absent a showing of good cause or excusable neglect.
Willfully absconding for six years is neither good cause nor excusable neglect.
4
at 371, 33 P.3d at 845. The district court found the allegation that trial counsel advised Connor to
leave the country until the law changed was a conclusory allegation, unsupported by admissible
evidence. The district court also noted that the claim lacked any plausibility. We agree. Because
Connor’s claim is bare, conclusory and unsupported by the evidence, she has failed to show the
district court erred in summarily dismissing her amended post-conviction petition.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Connor has failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of her ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Therefore, the judgment of the district court summarily dismissing
Connor’s amended petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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