State of Iowa v. Matthew James Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1463
Filed August 9, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW JAMES WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tom Reidel, Judge.

Matthew Williams appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty plea

to three charges. SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR

RESENTENCING WITH DIRECTIONS.

Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Matthew Williams pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary; domestic abuse

assault by impeding air/blood flow; and domestic abuse assault, second offense;

in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.6A(1), 708.2A(2)(d), and 708.2A(3)(b)

(2021), respectively. The court sentenced him to indeterminate terms of

incarceration not to exceed five years on the burglary charge, two years on the

domestic-abuse-assault charge, and two years on the second-offense domestic-

abuse-assault charge. The court ordered the sentences on the domestic-abuse-

assault charges to run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the sentence

on the burglary charge, resulting in a total term of incarceration not to exceed

seven years.

Williams appeals. He contends the State breached the plea agreement, he

was not afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea when the court refused to be

bound by the terms of the plea agreement, and the court failed to provide reasons

for imposing consecutive sentences.1

Williams first argues the State breached the parties’ plea agreement by

failing to advocate for concurrent sentences. Our review of criminal sentences is

for correction of errors at law. State v. Patten, 981 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 2022).

Vacating a sentence is warranted when the record shows either an abuse of

1 A defendant must establish good cause to appeal following a guilty plea to a

crime other than a class “A” felony. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Because Williams
challenges his sentence and the procedure of the sentencing hearing rather than
the guilty plea itself, he has established good cause. See State v. Boldon, 954
N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021) (finding good cause when there is a claimed breach of
the plea agreement and a challenge to the sentence).
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discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure. Id. Breach of a plea agreement

is a defect that warrants vacation of a sentence. Id.

We begin by reviewing the terms of the plea agreement. Those terms are

set forth in a memorandum of plea agreement filed with the district court. Pared

to its essence, the agreement included charging concessions, with the State being

obligated to dismiss multiple charges. It also included limited sentencing

concessions. The agreement called for an “open plea”—which we interpret as

“open sentencing,” meaning each party was free to argue for whatever sentence

the party deemed appropriate—with the limitation that the State was confined to

recommending concurrent sentences.

With the State’s obligation to recommend concurrent sentences in mind, we

turn to the statements made by the State at the sentencing hearing. When called

upon to give the State’s recommendations, the prosecutor gave this statement and

answer to the court’s request for clarification:

Your Honor, in [the burglary case], the State is recommending
incarceration for a term not to exceed five years. That is in line with
the [presentence investigation report], and the State believes that the
term of incarceration is appropriate based upon the defendant’s
criminal history and his age, his unwillingness, even though he pled
guilty, to accept responsibility for his crime.
In the [presentence investigation report], he states that he
came through a back door at the Dollar General, when in reality he
actually stayed inside of the building and waited until it closed. So
he was in one of the rooms in the business while one of the workers
was closing up.
He also states that he was just hungry. He was homeless.
He stole seventy packs of cigarettes. There’s food in the Dollar
General, so if he was hungry, then that would have been an
opportunity to get food. So he’s not being honest in the way that he
is recalling the series of events.
At the time, he also—I believe he picked up a charge in Illinois.
It may have been before this, but there was a burglary that he was
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on probation for in Rock Island, and he was participating in drug court
at the time that he actually got these new charges in Iowa.
So he was given probation and was put in—placed in drug
court in Illinois, and instead of taking that opportunity and getting
himself cleaned up and straight, he decided to come to Iowa and
commit additional crimes.
So for those reasons, Your Honor, the State believes that a
prison sentence would be in the best interests of the public, and it
appears that it may be in the best interests of the defendant, and I’m
sure he’ll disagree, but it appears he needs to have some serious
drug treatment and he also needs an opportunity to complete his
[Iowa Domestic Abuse Program (IDAP)] and other substance abuse
treatment that he’s probably in need of.
In [the domestic-abuse-assault-by-impeding-air/blood-flow
case], the State is recommending a term of incarceration not to
exceed two years, and the reason we think that that’s appropriate in
this case is that the defendant has a history of domestic violence
against others, and then this victim, who is his wife and happens to
be here today, she would like to have an opportunity to speak.
Again, he was on probation in Illinois and he was on pretrial
release from the state of Iowa in the burglary case when he assaulted
his wife multiple times. She reported two of the incidents in which
she was slapped, kicked—excuse me—slapped, punched. He head
butted her in one of the incidents. I can’t remember which one, but
she had to go to the hospital. She had a huge goose egg on her
forehead.
And based on his criminal history, again, his domestic
violence cases, he violated the no contact order in past cases, he
violated the no contact order in this case, it took him months and
months to complete IDAP. He was revoked from probation multiple
times because he did not complete IDAP in his 2015 conviction for
domestic abuse assault.
And then there was a domestic abuse assault case in 2007 in
Jefferson County, Iowa, where he was held in contempt because he
failed to complete the [batterers’ education program (BEP)] class.
THE COURT: But that charge was amended to just assault
and not domestic abuse assault; is that correct?
PROSECUTOR: I believe so, Your Honor, but he was still
ordered to do the BEP class, so it may not be a domestic abuse
assault conviction, but he was held in contempt for not completing
the [BEP] in that case.
He has a pending—he has a warrant right now for violating
the terms of his probation. I would assume that is because of the
charges that he has in Iowa. So the State believes that two years—
an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years is
appropriate in [the domestic-abuse-assault-by-impeding-air/blood-
flow case].
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And then in the [domestic-abuse-assault-second-offense
case], the State would recommend a suspended sentence, and that
the cases—or the terms of incarceration be run concurrently, the
minimum fines. And I believe the court already addressed the
dismissal of [a fourth case covered by the plea agreement].
Whenever the court deems it appropriate, the victim . . . would
like an opportunity to speak on these matters. Thank you.

Our standards related to determining whether the State has failed to honor

a plea agreement are based on the fact that such agreements are “akin to

contracts.” State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). As

a result, when prosecutors bind themselves to make a sentencing

recommendation, they must do more than simply inform the court of their

promise—they have the obligation to actually fulfill it. Id. Because of that

obligation, violations of either the terms or spirit of the agreement require vacation

of the sentence. Id. Fulfilling the obligation to make a specific sentencing

recommendation requires “giving some reason in support of that

recommendation,” which must be more than “pa[ying] cryptic lip service” to the

agreement. Id. at 557; see also State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Iowa

1999) (“It is clear that the State’s promise to recommend specific sentences to the

court requires the prosecutor to present the recommended sentence with his or

her approval, to commend these sentences to the court, and to otherwise indicate

to the court that the recommended sentences are supported by the State and

worthy of the court’s acceptance.”).

Here, the prosecutor agreed to make a recommendation for concurrent

sentences. But, while the words “terms of incarceration be run concurrently” were

technically spoken, they were spoken almost as an afterthought after a lengthy

litany of negative details about Williams. Further, no reason was given in support
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of the recommendation either before, during, or after the listing of negative details.

See Davis, 971 N.W.2d at 557 (requiring “some reason” to be given in support of

a sentencing recommendation). The State points out that the prosecutor’s listing

of negative details was appropriate to support the State’s request for incarceration.

But Williams is not claiming error based on the listing of negative details, so we

agree with the State that there was nothing intrinsically inappropriate about the

prosecutor’s recitation of negative details. The problem is that the recitation was

coupled only with a perfunctory statement of the State’s recommendation for

concurrent sentences with no reason given in support of the recommendation—a

reason the prosecutor was required to give. See id. Without giving a reason for

it, the recommendation did not “indicate to the court that the recommended

sentences [were] supported by the State and worthy of the court’s acceptance.”

Horness, 600 N.W.2d at 299. As a result, the State breached the plea agreement,

Williams’s sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing

before a different judge, with the prosecutor obligated to honor the plea agreement.

See Davis, 971 N.W.2d at 558 (“The remedy for the State’s breach is ‘resentencing

by a different judge, with the prosecutor obligated to honor the plea agreement and

sentencing recommendation.’” (quoting State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 181 (Iowa

2015))).

As resentencing has been ordered, it is unnecessary to address Williams’s

claim that the court erred by failing to give reasons for imposing consecutive

sentences. But we do need to address Williams’s final challenge—that he was not

afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea when the court refused to be bound

by the terms of the plea agreement.
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This issue is complicated due to the parties using a plea-agreement form

that was not fully completed. The final paragraph of the plea-agreement form

consisted of one sentence that reads, “Concurrence of the Court to this Agreement

is/is not a condition to the acceptance of the plea.” This sentence clearly calls for

an option to be selected, but neither the “is” nor the “is not” option was chosen.2

Any uncertainty caused by this failure to select an option was negated by the

district court’s order approving Williams’s guilty plea. In that order, the district court

found that the parties’ plea agreement conditioned Williams’s guilty plea on the

court’s willingness to be bound by the agreement. The order also deferred the

court’s decision whether to be so bound until it received the presentence

investigation report, as the court was entitled to do. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(2)

(“[T]he court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to

acceptance or rejection until receipt of a presentence report.”).

The State did not and does not challenge the court’s order finding the pleas

to be conditioned on the court’s concurrence, so we give effect to that order and

treat the plea agreement as being so conditioned despite the ambiguity in the plea

agreement itself. Because the court’s concurrence was so conditioned and the

plea agreement capped the State’s sentencing recommendation at concurrent

sentences, the court was prohibited from imposing a sentence greater than

2 We take this opportunity to note that this is not the first time we have seen parties

neglect to choose one of the options with this form. Given the layout of the form,
we understand that it would be easy to overlook the need to select an option
because the need to select an option is not highlighted in any fashion. Because
failure to choose one of the options creates uncertainty for the parties, the district
court, and the appellate court, we encourage parties that use this form to modify it
to make the need to choose one of the options more apparent or to be more diligent
in the use of the current form to make sure an option is chosen.
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concurrent sentences without informing Williams of its refusal to follow the plea

agreement and giving Williams the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. See

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(4) (“If . . . the court refuses to be bound by or rejects the plea

agreement, the court shall inform the parties of this fact, afford the defendant the

opportunity to then withdraw defendant’s plea, and advise the defendant that if

persistence in a guilty plea continues, the disposition of the case may be less

favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.”). On

remand, the new judge presiding over resentencing must comply with Iowa Rule

of Criminal Procedure 2.10(4). That is to say, if the judge intends not to be limited

to concurrent sentences, the judge must inform the parties of this fact, give

Williams the opportunity to withdraw his pleas, and advise Williams that if he

persists in his guilty pleas, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to

Williams than contemplated by the plea agreement.

In conclusion, we vacate Williams’s sentences and remand for resentencing

before a different judge, with the prosecutor obligated to comply with the terms of

the plea agreement. In conjunction with resentencing on remand, the new judge

shall ensure compliance with rule 2.10(4) as discussed in this opinion.

SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING WITH

DIRECTIONS.