CourtListener 4498342•State of Iowa v. Mark Anthony Howard
Gesamter Gesetzestext
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1366
Filed May 16, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARK ANTHONY HOWARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mary E. Howes,
Judge.
Mark Howard appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty plea
to assault causing injury. AFFIRMED.
Sharon D. Hallstoos of Hallstoos Law Office, Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Mark Howard appeals his sentence for assault causing bodily injury, a
serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and .2(2) (2017).
Amandalyn Granvold, Jennifer Antenor, and Tiffany Caruthers were out
together having drinks on March 19, 2017. They were confronted at the bar by
Howard, who was in a relationship with Caruthers. The women left the bar and
walked back to Caruthers’s vehicle. Howard confronted them, shouted at them,
and hit Antenor in the left side of her face. There were no marks or injuries to
Antenor’s face. Granvold attempted to intervene, and Howard struck Granvold in
the face with a closed fist, breaking her nose.
As a result of the encounter, Howard was charged with assault causing
bodily injury to Granvold. He also had other pending criminal charges including
one charge of domestic assault, third or subsequent offense in one case; and in
another case, three charges—possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine;
failure to affix a drug tax stamp as a habitual offender; and conspiracy to create,
deliver, or possess with intent to deliver crack cocaine as a habitual offender.
Howard entered a written guilty plea to assault causing bodily injury to
Granvold. He accepted the minutes of evidence as substantially true and
acknowledged a plea agreement existed “as evidenced by a memorandum of plea
agreement which I have signed.”1 The district court held a hearing at which it
acknowledged the written plea agreement, which provides that
1
The memorandum of plea agreement signed by Howard included the case numbers of
all three cases noted above. The agreement indicated Howard would plead guilty to
possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine without the habitual offender status and
3
[Howard] will plead guilty to count I in cause ending in 923, which is
possession of crack cocaine, . . . and in the SRCR he would plead
guilty as charged to assault causing bodily injury . . . . At sentencing,
the State will move to dismiss Counts II and III in felony cause ending
923 and will dismiss FECRO 383374 at [Howard’s] costs.
The court also noted it was an “open plea, which means that the State is free to
make any recommendation.” Howard acknowledged that was his understanding
of the plea agreement.
A combined sentencing hearing was held. Howard was represented by
separate counsel for the felony and misdemeanor cases. The attorney on the
felony case, Jack Dusthimer, acknowledged that a presentence investigation
report (PSI) had been prepared and made available to counsel, Howard had read
it, and there were no substantive changes or corrections. Dusthimer asked that
Howard receive probation. Ryan Beckenbaugh, counsel on this misdemeanor
case, then stated:
I will join and echo most of—actually, all of Mr. Dusthimer’s
comments, and I would put emphasis on the needs identified. Two
of them are that Mr. Howard needs a substance abuse evaluation
and mental health evaluation. Like [Dusthimer] said, those could be
provided here, but there are also things Mr. Howard needs to help
get himself better, and then, I would just point out that I think it’s
significant that he responded to one of the needs identified already
by going out and getting this job at Rustic Ridge. I think that shows
a willingness to address some outside input from the PSI author and
try to follow up on the recommendation.
The State recommended that the court impose concurrent sentences of
incarceration but did not specify an amount of time.
the State would dismiss the other two counts in that case and the domestic-assault charge
in the third case.
4
First, the district court recognized Howard’s remorse and believed it to be
genuine. The district court then acknowledged it had reviewed Howard’s PSI,
which indicated Howard had completed a risk assessment. The court also noted
Howard’s extensive criminal history and his “problem” in not “be[ing] able to
successfully complete any probation in any of the cases that you have convictions.”
Those unsuccessful probations were discussed by the court. The court also noted
Howard’s “rough childhood,” stating, “[A]nd though that stinks, and I feel bad for
you for that, . . . you’re an adult now, and you’re [twenty-eight], and you can make
your own choices.” In addition, the court acknowledged that Howard was currently
employed. The court then stated,
I do believe based on the things I’ve mentioned—your previous
criminal history and the fact that you haven’t been able to
successfully complete any terms of probation in the past—that
incarceration is the best option both to—I agree with the PSI and the
State—both to provide maximum rehabilitation for you and protection
of the community.
The district court sentenced Howard to an indeterminate term of incarceration not
to exceed ten years on the felony conviction2 and a one-year term on the
misdemeanor conviction. The court reopened the record to reflect that it had
run the sentences concurrent, so the SR case wouldn’t add any more
time to what you’re serving, but I forgot it’s a year sentence. The
felony is an indeterminate term, but I misstated what your sentence
is on your SR. It’s one year, 365 days, to run concurrent with your
ten years in FECR381923.
On appeal, referring this court only to the last statements and the written
judgment, Howard argues that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
2
Howard’s appeal from the ten-year sentence imposed on his felony conviction is decided
by this court in a separate opinion filed today. State v. Howard, No. 17-1352, 2018 WL
___ (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018).
5
him in this case without considering the “minimal essential factors” described in
State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) (citation omitted).
The record of the combined sentencing hearing cannot be ignored and
belies the claim. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. See State v. Formaro,
638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption
in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the
consideration of inappropriate matters.”).
AFFIRMED.
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