In the Interest of J.H., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0657
Filed April 29, 2026
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In the Interest of J.H., Minor Child,
J.H., Minor Child,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County,
The Honorable Joseph McCarville, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jonathan Law of Mumma & Pedersen, Jefferson, attorney and guardian ad
litem for appellant minor child.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A sixteen-year-old juvenile attacked her ex-boyfriend, repeatedly
hitting his face with a full can of hard iced tea. The victim—also a minor—
suffered a broken jaw that was wired shut for nearly three months. After a
hearing, the juvenile was adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act that
would have been willful injury resulting in serious injury if she were an adult.
See Iowa Code §§ 232.2(13)(a), 708.4(1) (2024). And the juvenile court
ordered the juvenile to pay restitution totaling $19,131.50 to the victim and
his family. The juvenile appeals the restitution order arguing that it “lack[s]
substantial evidentiary support.” Because substantial evidence supports the
court’s findings, we affirm the restitution order.

I. Appellate Jurisdiction and Form of Review

Before considering the merits, we address the State’s challenges to our
jurisdiction over this appeal. First, the State contends that the juvenile failed
to file a notice of appeal of the restitution order that she now challenges.
We disagree. The restitution order was entered on March 18, 2025, thirty-
five minutes after the court entered the disposition order. See Iowa Code
§ 232.52(3)(a) (authorizing a restitution order to “be the sole disposition or
. . . included as an element in other dispositional orders” in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding). Thirty days later, the juvenile filed a timely notice
of appeal specifying that she appeals “from the final order entered in this case
on the 18th day of March 2025, and from all adverse rulings and orders
inhering therein.” The restitution order meets that description—it is a final
order entered on the specified date. It matters not, as the State highlights,
that the disposition order could also meet that description because the
juvenile does not challenge any aspect of that order. The juvenile only tries

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to challenge a single order that matches the description specified in the notice
of appeal that she filed. She properly appealed the restitution order.

Second, the State argues that the juvenile has no right to appeal from
a restitution order and was required to petition for a writ of certiorari. The
State relies on statutes governing appeals from criminal sentences and review
of criminal restitution orders. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (granting “[r]ight
of appeal . . . from . . . [a] final judgment of sentence”); id. § 910.7(5)
(“Appellate review of a district court ruling under this section [providing for
district court hearings on restitution during a defendant’s probation, parole,
or incarceration] shall be by writ of certiorari.”); id. § 910.3(10) (“A
permanent restitution order entered after the time of sentencing shall only be
challenged pursuant to section 910.7.”). But these statutes do not govern
appeals from juvenile delinquency proceedings which, while analogous in
many ways, are legally distinct from criminal proceedings.1

The right to appeal final orders in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is
granted by Iowa Code section 232.133(1), which provides: “An interested
party aggrieved by an order or decree of the juvenile court may appeal from
the court for review of questions of law or fact.” See In re J.J.A., 580
N.W.2d 731, 734–36 (Iowa 1998) (interpreting section 232.133(1) to decide
whether entry of a consent decree in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is

1
Nothing in the text of sections 910.3 or 910.7 says that they apply to dispositional
orders requiring a juvenile to pay restitution under Iowa Code section 232.52(2)(a)(2).
Neither does section 232.52(2)(a)(2) say that it is subject to the restitution procedures
established for criminal cases in chapter 910. And section 232.52(3)(a) suggests the
opposite—that a juvenile restitution order is a juvenile dispositional order governed by
chapter 232 the same as any dispositional order. See Iowa Code § 232.52(3)(a) (“An order
under subsection 2, paragraph ‘a’, may be the sole disposition or may be included as an
element in other dispositional orders.”).

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appealable as a matter of right and reaffirming that “appealability depends on
whether the juvenile court order is found to be final” rather than
interlocutory (cleaned up)); Iowa R. App. P. 6.103(1) (defining “final orders
and judgments,” with exceptions not relevant here, as all those “involving
the merits or materially affecting the final decision”). The statute expressly
carves out some juvenile delinquency orders—those “adjudicating a child to
have committed a delinquent act”—as being unappealable “until the court
enters a corresponding dispositional order.” Iowa Code § 232.133(1). But the
restitution order here is not such an unappealable adjudicatory order.

This restitution order—entered thirty-five minutes after the main
disposition order—is final rather than interlocutory. It finally resolves the
merits of the juvenile’s payment obligation to the victim and his family.
Cf. J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d at 734–36 (holding that entry of a consent decree in
juvenile delinquency proceeding was not final); In re W.D. III,
562 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 1997) (holding that an order directing filing of
termination petition in child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding was not final
because it “did not dispose of all the issues in [the] case, and it did not
conclusively adjudicate the rights of the parties”). After its entry, the order
could be enforced. And nothing in the order suggested further court action
was needed to finalize the issue. Cf. In re Long, 313 N.W.2d 473, 476–77
(Iowa 1981) (reasoning that mention of another hearing weighs against
finality because “[a] ruling is not final when the trial court intends to do
something further to signify its final adjudication of the case,” including
“[w]hen a ruling specifically provides for subsequent entry of a final order”
(cleaned up)). Indeed, the order itself warned in bold print: “Any party who
wishes to appeal from this order must file a notice of appeal pursuant to Iowa
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Failure to comply with the time deadlines will
result in the loss of the right to appeal and the dismissal of an appeal.”

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The juvenile properly sought review of the order by appeal rather than
certiorari.2 We thus have appellate jurisdiction.

II. Substantial Evidence for the Restitution Award

After adjudicating a juvenile to have committed a delinquent act, the
court may enter a dispositional order “prescribing,” among other things,
“[r]estitution consisting of monetary payment or a work assignment of value
to the victim.” Iowa Code § 232.52(2)(a)(2). In sync with that authority,
victims are separately granted “the right to recover pecuniary damages, as
defined in section 910.1,” and that right “includes” that “[a] judge may
require a juvenile who has been found to have committed a delinquent act to
compensate the victim of that act for losses due to the act.” Iowa Code
§ 915.100(1), (2)(b). We thus look to the definition of “victim” and
“restitution” in section 910.1 to review a restitution order in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding. See In re D.R., No. 21-0276, 2022 WL 2826008,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022).

Under section 910.1, a victim is defined broadly—with some wrinkles
related to insurers not applicable here—as “a person who has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the offender’s criminal activities.” Iowa
Code § 910.1(11). And restitution is also defined to include “pecuniary
damages,” which as relevant here “means all damages . . . which a victim
could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same
facts or event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering,
mental anguish, and loss of consortium.” Id. § 910.1(6), (10).

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Even if this order were not final, we are uncertain that certiorari would be the
alternative. The supreme court previously granted discretionary review under Iowa Rule
of Appellate Procedure 6.106 of a restitution order entered in a nonfinal consent decree.
See In re D.T., No. 22-0088, 2023 WL 3089874, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023).

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Although we generally review juvenile delinquency proceedings
de novo, the parties agree—consistent with many unpublished decisions of
our court—that we review a restitution order in a delinquency proceeding for
corrections of errors at law. See In re J.S., No. 13-0174, 2013 WL 5291959,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2013); see also, e.g., D.R., 2022 WL 2826008,
at *1; In re N.H., No. 21-1111, 2022 WL 244863, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 2022); In re T.L., No. 19-0770, 2020 WL 1879587, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2020). Under that standard of review, “[w]e will affirm unless
the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support or the court has not
properly applied the law.” T.L., 2020 WL 1879587, at *1 (cleaned up). And
“[e]vidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as
adequate to reach a conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, the State submitted a statement claiming $27,431.48 in
pecuniary damages, a supporting spreadsheet prepared by the victim’s
mother, and the testimony of the victim’s mother explaining the claim. That
amount included $17,100 for the minor victim—$9,600 in lost wages for his
twelve weeks off work and $7,500 for his lost hay crop. 3 It also included
$7,201.94 for the victim’s mother for her expenses, including airfare and lost
wages (the mother had used up her paid time off ), for three multi-day visits
from her home in Texas back to Iowa where the victim lived—two of which
were around the victim’s surgeries. 4 And it included $3,129.54 for the
victim’s grandmother for lost wages and mileage for driving the victim to

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The lost wages were calculated at $20 per hour for forty hours per week. The
hay-crop loss for one cutting on fifteen acres was calculated at $10 per hay bale for an
estimated 750 bales.
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Each of the airfares varied and each stay was of different durations, so the
calculated lost wages varied too. In total, the mother claimed $1,931.94 for airfare and
$5,280 in lost wages, calculated at rates of $34 per hour and $51 per hour for overtime.

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appointments and surgeries roughly an hour away in the Des Moines Area—
both at times when the mother was back in Texas and when she was present
for the surgeries.5 The spreadsheet and the mother’s testimony detailed how
she calculated each of the amounts, including a full schedule of the
appointments and surgeries. But she did not submit other supporting
documentation, explaining under cross-examination that probed her lack of
documentation that “my e-mail got hacked so I’m locked out until April 4th.
I can get back into my e-mail and I’m willing to provide that to the Court.”

The court ordered the juvenile to pay $19,131.50 in restitution—the
victim’s lost wages, all the amount claimed by his mother, and the
grandmother’s lost wages. It declined to award the lost-hay income claimed
by the victim or the mileage claimed by the grandmother, reasoning:
No evidence was presented regarding the net vs. gross income, nor did [the
mother] testify regarding mitigation efforts, such as hiring a neighboring
farm[er] to harvest the hay. The Court finds a $7,500 loss on fifteen acres
of hay ground for one cutting excessive and unsubstantiated and therefore
denies this claim of restitution. All the other restitution claims, while not
well documented with time sheets and travel receipts, seem reasonable.

The juvenile does not challenge that a minor victim’s lost wages or the
lost wages and other expenses of a minor victim’s parents or grandparents
would all be appropriately recoverable in a restitution order in a case like this.
Indeed, she concedes that we have already “held that costs incurred from lost
wages by a parent’s caretaking of a minor child can be recoverable in
restitution orders.” N.H., 2022 WL 244863, at *3. But she argues that the
restitution here is not supported by substantial evidence because it is not

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The damages claimed for the grandmother included $799.98 in mileage for six
trips to West Des Moines for appointments and three trips to downtown Des Moines for
surgeries. And it included $2,329.56 in lost wages, calculated at rates of $43.14 per hour
for six five-hour trips for the appointments and three day-long trips for the surgeries.

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supported by sufficient documentation of the lost wages or airfare costs. And
she claims “it is not reasonable that [she] has been ordered to compensate
both the mother and grandmother for time missed for” two of the victim’s
surgeries and some of his appointments, and “[n]o evidence was presented
why it was necessary for both . . . [to] take time off from work to take [the
victim] to those appointments/surgeries.” We disagree.

The mother’s sworn testimony and her detailed spreadsheet itemizing
all the expenses and showing her work on the calculations was substantial
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that the victim, his
mother, and his grandmother suffered the claimed pecuniary damages. Of
course, the court could have decided not to believe the mother’s testimony
and spreadsheet summary without additional documentation. But on
substantial-evidence review we will not second-guess the court’s implicit
credibility determination. And the level of detail—with specific numbers and
explanations of the calculations, lends credibility that the figures were
accurate and not merely estimates without a factual basis.6

The State argues that the juvenile’s second argument—questioning
the need for both the mother and grandmother to take time off work for some

6
Unlike State v. Jauregui, No. 20-0629, 2021 WL 1663598, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 28, 2021), on which the juvenile relies, this is not a case where the documentary
evidence conflicted with the parent’s testimony—showing that she received paid time off
for days for which restitution was sought and raising serious doubts about whether paid
time off was also used on days for which documentation was missing. Here, the mother’s
undisputed testimony showed that she had used up all her paid time off and was not paid
for any of her absences. Neither was her spreadsheet or testimony mere conjecture that
guessed at the lost wages and airfare. Cf. State v. Morris, No. 19-1104, 2020 WL 4207399,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2020) (holding that witness’s testimony that he “guess[ed]”
the amount of bills, and “had not prepared for the hearing,” “failed to recall the total
amount or produce documents” was not substantial evidence supporting restitution).

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of the victim’s appointments and surgeries—is not preserved because she did
not raise the issue in the juvenile court. If she had done so, the State could
have presented further evidence specifically addressing the need. But she
neither cross-examined the mother about the issue nor made any argument
against the restitution request on this basis.

Yet even assuming that the argument is preserved, the evidence
supports a finding that both the mother and grandmother’s claims were
appropriate. For starters, the schedule of appointments and surgeries and the
mother’s travel schedules shows that many of the grandmother’s lost wages
were claimed for days when only she—and not the mother—could take the
victim to his medical care. But even for the other days, the evidence shows
that the grandmother drove the mother and victim. After all, the mother had
flown to Iowa from Texas. So a factfinder could reasonably infer that she did
not have a car to drive the victim alone. The court’s restitution award is
supported by substantial evidence.

AFFIRMED.

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