State of Iowa v. Ralph Gilbert Webb II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0455
Filed April 29, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Ralph Gilbert Webb II,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County,
The Honorable Charles C. Sinnard, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Angela L. Campbell and Madalyn Elizabeth Grask of Dickey, Campbell, &
Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

A family dispute led to a fight between two couples: Meranda and
Dillon Horton, and Sherry Sheridan and Ralph Webb. The Hortons testified
that Webb assaulted them, while Sheridan and Webb denied that any contact
occurred. Crediting the Hortons’ testimony, the jury found Webb guilty of
assault causing bodily injury to Meranda.1 Webb appeals that conviction,2
challenging the district court’s rulings that excluded his request to admit
video evidence and denied his motions for substitute counsel and a new trial.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Sherry Sheridan and her daughter own a house together, which has
made their relationship “very strained,” according to Sheridan. When her
daughter was out of town in June 2024, Sheridan went to the house with her
fiancé—Ralph Webb—to take pictures for her attorney. Meranda Horton
and her husband, Dillon, were there house-sitting for Sheridan’s daughter.

While Sheridan was in the garage, Meranda came out of the house and
yelled at her “to get the F out.” Sheridan refused, and an altercation broke
out between the two women. Webb, who was standing nearby, heard the
commotion and ran into the garage.

Meranda testified that when Webb came in, he struck her on the back
of the head, briefly knocking her unconscious. She recalled lying in the fetal

1
Because they share a last name, we refer to the Hortons by their first names.
2
The jury also found Webb guilty of simple misdemeanor assault against Dillon.
However, Webb’s appeal challenges only the conviction for assault causing bodily injury,
and so we limit our review accordingly. Our supreme court denied Webb’s separate
application for discretionary review of his simple-misdemeanor-assault conviction.

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position and feeling as though she was “being attacked,” although she could
not remember whether Webb was hitting or kicking her. Meranda screamed
for her husband. Dillon testified that when he went into the garage, he saw
Meranda on the floor behind a pickup with Webb standing over her. Dillon
yelled at Webb, who started chasing Dillon around the garage. As Dillon was
running away, Webb hit him on the side of the face. Dillon—who was not
armed—threw his hands up to avoid fighting with Webb. But Webb
continued to swing and lunge at him until the Hortons made it back into the
house.

Webb and Sheridan remembered the fight differently. Webb testified
that when he ran into the garage, he saw “blood all down the front of”
Sheridan. He stepped in to separate Sheridan and Meranda. As he did so,
Webb testified that he heard Meranda yell for Dillon. When Webb turned
around, he saw Dillon coming towards him while reaching back for
something—like “he was trying to pull a gun.” Webb testified that he “took
a swing” at Dillon and chased him back into the house. But he denied making
contact with Dillon. Webb also testified that Meranda’s story was
“absolutely untrue.” He maintained that “[s]he was not on the floor. I did
not hit her to knock her on the floor. . . . I absolutely did not put a finger on
Meranda Horton.” Sheridan supported Webb’s story, testifying that he
“did not have physical contact with either” of the Hortons.

But Deputy Ryne Little, who investigated the incident, testified that
Meranda had “about a 2-inch goose egg” on the back of her head, along with
bruises on her arm, elbow, and leg. Meranda told him that her injuries were
from Webb. Dillon also had a couple of scratches above his lips, which he
thought were from Webb. After reviewing video from a motion-activated
camera in the garage, the deputy charged Webb with two counts of assault

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causing bodily injury. A jury found him guilty as charged for the count
involving Meranda and guilty of simple assault against Dillon.

On appeal from his conviction for assault causing bodily injury, Webb
claims the district court abused its discretion in excluding a video exhibit of
the altercation between Sheridan and Meranda that he offered at trial. He
also claims the court erred in denying his mid-trial request for a new attorney
and in denying his motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.

II. Standard of Review

Webb’s challenges to the district court’s exclusion of evidence, as well
as to the court’s denial of his motion for substitute counsel and motion for
new trial, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Helmers, 753
N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 2008) (evidentiary ruling); State v. Martin, 608
N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 2000) (substitute counsel); State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d
686, 706 (Iowa 2016) (new trial).

III. Analysis

A. Exclusion of Evidence

During the cross-examination of Meranda, defense counsel sought to
admit a video showing the altercation between Sheridan and Meranda that
occurred before Webb entered the garage, where the women were pushing
and hitting one another. Defense counsel offered the exhibit to impeach
Meranda’s testimony and to suggest that her injuries may have resulted from
that altercation rather than from Webb. The State objected, arguing that the
video’s prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value.

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The district court sustained the objection, explaining:
The Court does find that it is somewhat relevant to help the defense
establish a separate cause to some of the injuries to the proffered witness—
[specifically] the portion of that exhibit starting with where the defendant
enters into the garage and proceeds over to the witness and the other party.
The Court does find that the portion of the proffered exhibit prior to the
defendant entering the garage which shows the altercation between the
two women would be overly prejudicial, or its prejudice would
substantially outweigh its probative value, in that the defendant was not
there to witness it and in that it may mislead or distract the jury causing
them to—I guess—impute determination of who may have started the
initial altercation.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 allows the court to “exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Whether evidence should be excluded under this rule depends
on a two-part test: “First, we consider the probative value of the evidence.
Second, we balance the probative value against the danger of its prejudicial
or wrongful effective upon the triers of fact.” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d
792, 807 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). “Because the weighing of probative value
against probable prejudice is not an exact science, we give a great deal of
leeway to the trial judge who must make this judgment call.” State v. Newell,
710 N.W.2d 6, 20–21 (Iowa 2006).

Webb contends the court abused its discretion in this balancing
process because the video “would have directly contradicted Meranda
Horton’s testimony and demonstrated her lack of credibility.” He also
argues the video would have shown that Meranda “sustained her injuries
during her altercation with Sheridan and not from Webb.” But Webb does
not explain what content in the video contradicted Meranda’s testimony.

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And, as Webb recognizes, both Meranda and Sheridan testified about their
altercation before Webb entered the garage. Meranda also acknowledged on
cross-examination that some of her scratches and bruises could have come
from the fight with Sheridan.

Against this backdrop, we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s ruling—which did not exclude the video in its entirety. The part that
the court allowed into evidence showed Webb entering the garage while
Meranda and Sheridan were still engaged with one another. The court
reasonably concluded that allowing the earlier footage—depicting events
Webb did not witness—could confuse or mislead the jury by shifting its focus
to the altercation between the two women. That issue was irrelevant to
whether Webb later assaulted the Hortons. See Lacey, 968 N.W.2d at 808
(concluding the court correctly found that text messages between the
defendant and victim “risked misleading or confusing the jury and
improperly shifting its focus to [the victim’s] own conduct—conduct that
was already well established by other evidence presented to the jury”).
Considering the “wide discretion” afforded to the court under rule 5.403,
we cannot conclude its decision to exclude the video of the fight between
Meranda and Sheridan “was clearly untenable or unreasonable under the
circumstances presented.” Id.

B. Request for Substitute Counsel

Webb next challenges the district court’s denial of his request for new
counsel during his trial. “To justify the appointment of substitute counsel,
a defendant must show sufficient cause.” State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774,
778 (Iowa 2001). “Sufficient cause includes a conflict of interest,
irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between
the attorney and the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Webb claims the

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last two grounds are at issue, arguing that “it should have been obvious to
the court at the time of [his] request for new counsel that there was an
irreconcilable conflict and a complete breakdown in communication between
Webb and his trial counsel.”3 We disagree.

On the irreconcilable-conflict ground, Webb argues that he “lost all
trust in his trial counsel and felt like he was being deprived of the ability to
present a defense.” During a break on the first day of trial—while defense
counsel was crossing the State’s second witness—Webb explained to the
court that he was “very concerned” about counsel’s cross-examination: “I
had a lot of questions for cross-examination that were specific to the deputy
and didn’t feel they were being addressed.” Webb was also concerned that
his attorney had not pointed out that “the wounds on Mr. Horton are on the
opposite side of his face from the hand I throw the punch with.” And he was
upset that the video showing the altercation between Sheridan and Meranda
was not admitted into evidence. In sum, Webb told the court: “I feel like I’m
just getting slaughtered out there and I’m not being represented correctly to
defend myself.”

The district court addressed each of those issues, as did defense
counsel. The court pointed out that counsel had questioned the deputy
“about which side the injuries were on in relation to the punch” and while
“that may not have been explored as fully” as Webb wanted, “there are
certain strategic considerations that attorneys have as far as questions they

3
The State argues that error was not preserved because “Webb never made a
formal motion” but instead just “discussed concerns about counsel.” “Despite the lack
of a formal motion, this court will liberally construe statements and writings made by a
defendant when they intend to request substitute counsel.” State v. Corron, No. 23-2029,
2025 WL 548374, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025). We accordingly reject the
State’s error-preservation argument and proceed to the merits.

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make and then how they try to decide to argue that evidence to the jury at a
later time, sometimes in a closing argument or summation, and where they
put emphasis on that.” With respect to the video, the court noted that
counsel had offered it into evidence but the court had ruled that only part of
it was admissible: “And it’s not because [defense counsel] didn’t ask for it.
It’s because the court has legal foundations or reasons for ruling that way.”
The court also told Webb that “strategy and timing play a key role” with
many of the concerns Webb raised and that it was counsel’s job “to tell your
story in the manner that’s most effective.”

As Webb recognizes, “general frustration and dissatisfaction with
defense counsel” is insufficient cause for substitution of counsel. State v.
Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 506 (Iowa 2007). “[A] defendant has no right to an
attorney who will docilely do as . . . told or to a ‘meaningful relationship’ with
appointed counsel.” United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.
2002) (internal citations omitted). This record does not show an
irreconcilable conflict but Webb’s general frustration with adverse elements
of the trial—a matter that “naturally attends this type of proceeding and the
circumstances” Webb was in. State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 279 (Iowa
1997).

Webb argues the same concerns show a complete breakdown in
communication. He contends that because he was “scared and confused”
about counsel’s trial strategy, he established that “counsel had minimally
communicated with Webb and had not involved him in the preparation of the
case they would present at trial.” But defense counsel explained that he and
Webb had extensive discussions about the video evidence—which was
Webb’s main complaint—and when it should come in. And the court
informed Webb that based “on the record already made, while it might not

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be as much as you want, he appears to be setting the stage for certain
arguments that support what you want to get out there.” Webb seemed
reassured, responding: “Fair enough.”

Under this record, we find that Webb failed to prove a complete
breakdown in communication. To meet that burden, Webb needed to “put
forth evidence of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or
evidence that he had such minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful
communication was not possible.” State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 752
(Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). Webb’s complaints do not rise to that level.
Instead, they “suggest more generally a distaste for his attorney’s methods
than a real communication issue.” State v. Hagenow, No. 22-1958, 2024 WL
2042137, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024). We accordingly find no abuse
of discretion in the court’s handling of Webb’s concerns about his attorney,
especially considering its timing in the middle of the trial.4 See Jefferson, 574
N.W.2d at 270 (noting that “[d]isruption to the trial process” is a valid factor
for the trial court to consider).

C. Motion for New Trial

Finally, Webb challenges the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing
that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7). A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence
when “a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue
or cause than the other.” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa

4
Since we have determined that Webb failed to establish either an irreconcilable
conflict or complete breakdown in communication, we do not address the separate
prejudice inquiry. See State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995) (noting that to
succeed on a challenge to the denial of substitute counsel, “[a] defendant must ordinarily
show prejudice, unless . . . counsel has a conflict of interest”).

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2006) (cleaned up). “A district court should only grant a motion for new
trial in the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily
against the verdict rendered.” State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 243 (Iowa
2018) (cleaned up). This is not such a case.

Meranda testified that Webb knocked her unconscious, and Dillon
testified that when he ran into the garage, he saw Webb standing over her.
Neither Meranda nor Dillon had any injuries before the encounter, but
afterward, a responding deputy observed a “goose egg” on Meranda’s head,
“consistent with some type of physical assault.” The video exhibit offered
by the State shows Sheridan and Webb behind a parked vehicle in the garage
when Dillon runs in. Meranda cannot be seen—consistent with her
testimony that she was on the ground.

Webb contends that his testimony was more credible than the
testimony from the Hortons and was corroborated by Sheridan, who testified
that she did not see Webb touch Meranda during the altercation. He also
points to alleged discrepancies—such as whether Meranda’s hair clip was
broken or whether she could have stood up seconds after being knocked
unconscious —but these minor details do not outweigh the physical injuries
observed by witnesses and law enforcement.

To be sure, this is not a case in which the evidence overwhelmingly
favors one side. But it’s also not a case in which “a greater amount of
credible evidence” supports Webb’s version of events. Shanahan, 712
N.W.2d at 135. Because the evidence was “such that different minds could
arrive at different conclusions,” the district court did not abuse its discretion

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in declining to disturb the jury’s findings and denying Webb’s motion for
new trial. Id.

AFFIRMED.

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