State of Iowa v. Benjamin Richard Gibson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0118
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Benjamin Richard Gibson,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County,
The Honorable Adria Kester, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Mullins, S.J.
Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Benjamin Gibson appeals his conviction following a jury trial for
second-degree sexual abuse, asserting (1) insufficient evidence supported the
conviction; (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence
of prior inconsistent statements by the victim; and (3) the district court erred
by overruling hearsay objections to witness testimony concerning the
victim’s age. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

Fort Dodge law enforcement received a tip that thirteen-year-old D.C.,
a run-away from Knoxville, could possibly be staying in Fort Dodge. Two
officers travelled to the address where it was suspected D.C. could be located
and found her in bed with Gibson, who was twenty-two years old. Both
Gibson and D.C. were clothed, but D.C. did not have on any underwear. The
officers asked Gibson what he was doing in bed with a thirteen-year-old, and
Gibson replied repeatedly that he was unaware of D.C.’s age. D.C. later
testified that she could not remember everything that occurred that night.

After law enforcement removed D.C. from the residence, they
arranged for D.C.’s mother to retrieve her from Fort Dodge. D.C.’s mother
then transported D.C. to Des Moines to undergo a sexual assault
examination. D.C. reported to the examiner that she was sore in her lower
abdomen and vagina. The examination showed a hymenal abrasion which
could have been caused by intercourse. The examiner swabbed D.C.’s
breasts, anus, and vagina for DNA testing. The tests revealed the presence

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of Gibson’s seminal DNA from the vagina swab and his epithelial DNA from
the anus swab.1

Gibson was charged with second-degree sexual abuse. Just prior to the
start of trial, Gibson indicated he planned to offer pages of Snapchat
messages depicting conversations between D.C. and other men as well as
conversations between D.C. and Gibson. Gibson’s stated purpose of
introducing these records was to show statements D.C. made to other men
that she was either sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen years old. The district
court denied his request to admit the Snapchat conversations, stating
“[k]nowledge of the victim’s age is not an element of this offense” but
indicating Gibson could revisit this issue at trial. At trial, the court again
denied Gibson’s offer of the Snapchat messages. Despite the court denying
the admission of the messages, the court permitted Gibson’s counsel to
question D.C. about her age but not about her prior inconsistent statements.

Following trial, Gibson was convicted as charged. He was sentenced
to a twenty-five-year period of incarceration with a mandatory seventy
percent minimum. Gibson now appeals his conviction.

II. Analysis

(A) Whether there was Sufficient Evidence to Support the
Conviction.

“We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors
at law and will uphold the jury’s verdict if it is supported by substantial
evidence.” State v. Kieffer, 17 N.W.3d 651, 655 (Iowa 2025). Evidence is

Seminal DNA indicates the presence of an individual’s semen while epithelial
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DNA indicates the DNA was left by touching.

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substantial if it “is sufficient to ʻconvince a rational fact finder the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citation omitted). When
determining if evidence is substantial, “we view the evidence ʻin the light
most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Jury instructions, when
not objected to, become the law of the case for purposes of appellate review
for sufficiency-of-evidence claims.” State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671
(Iowa 2020).

The jury was instructed the State had to prove the following elements
of sexual abuse in the second degree: “1. On or about January 24, 2024,
Benjamin Gibson performed a sex act with D.C.” and “2. The Defendant
performed the sex act while D.C. was under the age of 14 years.” The jury
was further instructed:
“[S]ex act” means any sexual contact:

1. By penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus.

2. Between the mouth of one person and the genitals of another.

3. Between the genitals of one person and the genitals or anus of
another.

4. Between the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or anus
of another person.

5. By a person’s use of an artificial sex organ or a substitute for a
sexual organ in contact with the genitals or anus of another.

You may consider the type of contact and circumstances
surrounding it in deciding whether the contact was sexual in nature.

Gibson argues that there was insufficient evidence that he engaged in
a sex act with D.C., asserting the determination there was sexual contact was
mere “speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” See State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d

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149, 158 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). Gibson points to D.C.’s statements
to law enforcement where she denied having sexual contact and her later
testimony that she could not remember the entire night she spent with him.
He asserts that because of these statements, there is insufficient evidence to
show how the abrasion of D.C.’s hymenal tissue occurred, or how his DNA
was transferred to her.

Although D.C. did not confirm that sexual contact between her and
Gibson happened, there is substantial evidence that such contact occurred.
See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Iowa 2018) (“Direct and
circumstantial evidence are equally probative.” (citation omitted)). Law
enforcement found D.C. and Gibson in bed together. D.C. reported that her
lower half was sore, she had white vaginal discharge, and it was found that
she had an abrasion on her hymenal tissue. Gibson’s seminal DNA was found
from swabs of D.C.’s vagina, and his epithelial DNA was found from swabs
of her anus. This evidence was substantial and thus sufficient to establish the
conviction of second-degree sexual abuse as per the jury instructions (stating
a “ʻsex act’ means any sexual contact . . . [b]y penetration of the penis into
the vagina or anus . . . [or] [b]etween the finger or hand of one person and the
genitals or anus of another person”). There was sufficient evidence to
convince the jury that Gibson is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Kieffer,
17 N.W.3d at 655.

(B) Whether the District Court Erred in Excluding D.C.’s Prior
Communications Regarding Her Age.

We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings “for abuse of
discretion.” State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022). “A district
court abuses its discretion when it bases its decisions on grounds or reasons

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clearly untenable or to an extent that is clearly unreasonable or if it bases its
conclusions on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (cleaned up).

Gibson asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying
admission of evidence that D.C. stated to others on Snapchat that she was
older than fourteen, which contradicted her trial testimony that she was
thirteen at the time of the incident. Gibson argues that the denial of this
evidence violated his rights to due process and a fair trial. See State v.
Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 586–87 (Iowa 2021). The district court denied the
evidence because it determined the Snapchat conversations were irrelevant.2

The State contends that the Snapchat evidence is inadmissible
hearsay. In Iowa, hearsay is defined as “a statement that: (1) [t]he declarant
does not make while testifying at a current trial or hearing; and (2) [a] party
offers into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(1)–(2). Here, the Snapchat statements
were made by D.C. outside of trial, and Gibson argued their admission was
for the purpose of disproving an element of the crime—that D.C. was under
the age of fourteen. Accordingly, the evidence was offered “for the truth of
the matter asserted” and was inadmissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.802. And even
though the Snapchat evidence showed inconsistent statements from D.C.
regarding her age, the statements were not made “under penalty of perjury
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding” so the evidence was not exempt from
the prohibition against hearsay. Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(1)(A).

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Although the district court’s reasoning for denying admission of the Snapchat
records was based on relevance, we may review the decision and apply “a different
rationale than relied on by the district court.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 184
(Iowa 2016).

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Gibson alternatively contends that D.C.’s prior inconsistent
statements do not fall under the prohibition against hearsay because they
were to be offered for impeachment purposes. See Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d
526, 531 (Iowa 2003). While this assertion is correct, it is unclear how the
potential impeachment would affect D.C.’s credibility. D.C. never testified
that a sex act occurred, and that determination by the jury was based on other
circumstantial evidence. There was also substantial evidence confirming
D.C.’s actual age. So, even if the district court erred in disallowing the
evidence for impeachment purposes, it would amount to harmless error
because of the “overwhelming evidence of [Gibson’s] guilt.” See State v.
Flores, 2 N.W.3d 287, 292 (Iowa 2024) (“The State overcomes the
presumption of prejudice [from erroneous exclusion of evidence] if it can
establish that there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”
(citation omitted)).

Further, if Gibson’s intention was to submit the evidence to show he
was unaware of D.C.’s actual age, the Snapchat records are irrelevant. For
evidence to be relevant, it must have “any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence” and that “fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.401(a), (b). Because
second-degree sexual abuse when applied to a child is a strict liability offense,
ignorance of D.C.’s age is not “of consequence in determining the action.”
Id.; State v. Lampman, 345 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 1984) (stating “sexual
abuse of a child . . . is a strict liability offense”). It follows that mistake of fact
is not a defense. See State v. Tague, 310 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1981). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Snapchat records
were irrelevant.

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(C) Whether the District Court Erred in Overruling Gibson’s
Hearsay Objections.

Gibson asserts that testimony from Officer Zachary Colin and
registered nurse Katherine Scott concerning D.C.’s age constituted
inadmissible hearsay. We review the court’s admission of hearsay evidence
for correction of errors at law. State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 202
(Iowa 2020).

During trial, Gibson objected to questions about D.C.’s age and the
court overruled the objections, allowing both witnesses to testify that D.C.
was thirteen at the time of the incident. Beginning with Officer Colin’s
testimony, counsel asked, “[h]ow old was the runaway?” to which Colin
answered, after the overruled objection, “[t]hirteen years of age.” There
were no additional questions regarding how Colin learned of D.C.’s age.
Gibson argues that Colin could only have learned of D.C.’s age from an out-
of-court declarant, which would qualify as inadmissible hearsay. Iowa Rs.
Evid. 5.801, 5.802.

When an “out-of-court statement is used to prove something other
than the truth of the matter asserted, such as responsive conduct, the
statement may be admissible as nonhearsay.” State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d
590, 603 (Iowa 2021). “Generally, an investigating officer may explain [their]
actions by testifying as to what information [they] had, including its source,
regarding the crime and the criminal” without violating the rule against
hearsay. State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Iowa 2011). But, “if an
investigating officer specifically repeats a victim’s complaint . . . it is likely
that the testimony will be construed . . . as evidence of the facts asserted.” Id.
(cleaned up).

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Officer Colin stated the information was provided to him prior to
investigating the location of D.C. The information about D.C.’s age was
related to the purpose of locating her and was pertinent to the eventual
charge against Gibson. Colin did not repeat a victim’s complaint nor any
other impermissible out-of-court statement. See id. We find the district court
did not err in overruling Gibson’s hearsay objection to Colin’s testimony
about D.C.’s age.

Gibson also challenges a statement by Scott, who was the treating
nurse at Blank Children’s Hospital that performed the sexual assault
evaluation on D.C. When asked about D.C.’s age on direct examination,
Scott referenced her medical report and answered that D.C. was thirteen
years old. One exception to the rule against hearsay is a “[s]tatement made
for medical diagnosis or treatment.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(4). A statement “for
medical diagnosis or treatment” includes statements “made for—and []
reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id. r. 5.803(4)(A).
D.C.’s age was certainly pertinent to her treatment, especially for medical
determinations about what is typical for someone her age. Accordingly,
Scott’s testimony regarding D.C.’s age falls under an exception to hearsay.
See id. We find the district court did not err in overruling Gibson’s objection
to Scott’s statement about D.C.’s age.3

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Even if we were to find the district court’s ruling in error, which we do not, the
objectionable testimony was cumulative to other evidence in the record, which was not
objected to, such as D.C.’s own testimony about her age on January 24, 2024, as well as
the information concerning D.C.’s age contained in the body-cam footage, also not
objected to by Gibson. “In considering whether the admission of hearsay is reversible
error, we have held that notwithstanding the presumption of prejudice from the admission
of such evidence, the erroneously admitted hearsay will not be considered prejudicial if
substantially the same evidence is properly in the record.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6,
19 (Iowa 2006).

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III. Conclusion.

We conclude sufficient evidence exists in this record to support the
conviction. We also find no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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