State of Iowa v. John Dudley Davis IV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0808
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John Dudley Davis IV,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Robert J. Richter, Judge.
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CONVICTION AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED FOR ENTRY
OF NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
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Stuart G. Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

John Davis appeals his conviction for assault causing injury in violation
of Iowa Code section 708.2(2) (2024), asserting he was not adequately
advised of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and that he did not
enter his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Upon our review, we
affirm the district court’s ruling regarding Davis’s guilty plea and remand
with instructions for entry of a nunc pro tunc order to correct the sentencing
order.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

After threatening his mother with a machete, Davis was arrested and
charged with domestic abuse assault while displaying a dangerous weapon.
Davis entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty to a lesser
charge of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon. The parties jointly
recommended that the district court grant Davis a deferred judgment and
place him on probation for two years. Before the sentencing hearing, the
court alerted the parties by written order that it was not inclined to follow the
agreement.

At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that the plea agreement was
not binding on the court. The court asked defense counsel as to whether he
had discussed the non-binding nature of the plea with Davis. Counsel
responded that he had spoken with Davis and that Davis desired to proceed
with sentencing. After accepting Davis’s guilty plea, the court asked Davis if
he had any questions, and Davis said “no.”

The district court rejected the agreed-upon sentence and sentenced
Davis to 184 days in jail, with 180 days suspended, and two years of probation.
The sentencing order filed later that day incorrectly recited that Davis was

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convicted of assault causing bodily injury rather than assault while displaying
a dangerous weapon. Davis appeals.

II. Analysis.

A. Good Cause for Appeal

Davis asserts that he was not adequately informed of his right to file a
motion in arrest of judgment. We generally review guilty plea challenges for
correction of errors at law. State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016).

Ordinarily when a defendant wishes to challenge a guilty plea the
defendant “must first raise the challenge in the district court by filing a timely
motion in arrest of judgment.” State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 535 (Iowa
2024). “Failure to timely file a motion in arrest of judgment in the district
court usually precludes appellate review of alleged plea defects.” Id. But a
defendant must be advised
during the plea proceedings, as required by [Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure] 2.8(2)(d), that challenges to the plea must be made in a motion
in arrest of judgment and that the failure to challenge a plea by filing a motion
within the time provided prior to sentencing precludes a right to challenge on
appeal.

Id. (citation omitted); accord Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d), 2.24(3)(a)–(d).

Davis did not file a motion in arrest of judgment. But the advisory in
Davis’s written plea employed the same language that our supreme court
found inadequate in Hightower. 8 N.W.3d at 535–36. So, “[b]ecause the
advisory was not sufficient, it [does] not preclude appellate review of
[Davis’s] challenges to [his] plea.” Id. at 536. Davis has good cause to appeal
despite the lack of a motion in arrest of judgment, as in Hightower.

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B. Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent Nature of the Plea

Davis argues the district court improperly accepted his plea because it
was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.8(2)(b) (noting “[t]he court shall not accept a guilty plea without
establishing that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a
factual basis”).

We interpret Davis’s argument to be that because the court failed to
advise him that he could withdraw his guilty plea, the plea agreement was
binding under rule 2.10(3)(b)(1). Alternatively, he contends that if the plea
was non-binding, then the plea was not entered into voluntarily and
intelligently because he should have been advised that if the court did not
accept the plea agreement, he could withdraw his plea. As for relief, Davis’s
brief does not request a specific remedy. We assume for the purposes of his
appeal that he is attempting to withdraw his plea.

To successfully withdraw his guilty plea, Davis must overcome Iowa
Code section 814.29, which states, “If a defendant challenges a guilty plea
based on an alleged defect in the plea proceedings, the plea shall not be
vacated unless the defendant demonstrates that the defendant more likely
than not would not have pled guilty if the defect had not occurred.” But Davis
failed to cite section 814.29, which is the vehicle to obtain the relief available
to him. Nor does Davis argue that he “more likely than not would not have
pled guilty if the defect had not occurred.” Iowa Code § 814.29. Accordingly,
the claim is forfeited. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A
party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party does not include the issue in
its main brief. A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make
an argument in support of the issue.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
State v. Evans, No. 23-0558, 2024 WL 4039571, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4,

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2024) (“Because [the defendant] makes no claim that she would not have
pleaded guilty if she had been informed that the court could impose
consecutive sentences, we affirm her guilty pleas.”).

We turn to the district court’s written sentencing order. The record
shows that Davis pled guilty to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon
pursuant to section 708.2(3). The sentencing order incorrectly recites that
Davis pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury under section 708.2(2).
Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions to enter a nunc
pro tunc order to correct the above error. See State v. Cole, 23 N.W.3d 231,
242 (Iowa 2025).

III. Conclusion.

We affirm the district court’s ruling on Davis’s guilty plea and remand
with instructions to enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct the written
sentencing order.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED FOR
ENTRY OF NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER.

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