State of Iowa v. Joshua Kelly Uranga

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0498
Filed March 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Joshua Kelly Uranga,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Kristen Formanek, Judge.
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APPEAL DISMISSED
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Jacob Heard of Iowa Defenders, PLLC, Clive, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Joshua Uranga appeals his conviction following a plea of guilty. His
sole challenge on appeal is that the district court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss based on a violation of the speedy-indictment rule under Iowa Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a). After our review, we dismiss Uranga’s
appeal.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In early November 2024, law enforcement filed a criminal complaint
against Uranga, accusing him of the theft of property of over $500. A warrant
issued for his arrest. As Uranga was confined in the Story County Jail on an
unrelated charge, a detainer was placed on Uranga. Uranga then filed three
waivers of initial appearance; two of those waivers were filed on November
20, and the third was filed on December 5.

After the first two waivers of initial appearance, the district court
entered an order indicating the court “would not accept a waiver of an initial
appearance until the defendant has turned himself in on the new arrest
warrant and is booked into the Polk County Jail.” Following the filing of the
third waiver, the district court scheduled an initial appearance for December
13 and ordered the Polk County Sheriff’s Department to transport Uranga
from the Story County Jail to Polk County. The arrest warrant was served on
Uranga and the court conducted an initial appearance with Uranga in Polk
County. After the initial appearance, Uranga filed a waiver of counsel.

On January 10, 2025, the State filed a trial information charging
Uranga with theft in the third degree—enhanced, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(3) (2025). On January 13, Uranga moved to
dismiss, alleging a speedy-indictment violation. The court denied that

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motion. Uranga requested discretionary review by our supreme court. While
that discretionary review was pending, Uranga renewed his motion and filed
other motions asserting various theories he believed warranted dismissal.
The district court denied all pending motions. On March 6, our supreme
court denied Uranga’s application for discretionary review. Uranga again
moved to dismiss. At a status conference, the court denied the motion to
dismiss.1 Uranga then entered a guilty plea, waived his right to file a motion
in arrest of judgment, and requested immediate sentencing. Uranga was
sentenced to thirty days of incarceration, with credit for thirty days served;
fined $430, which was suspended; ordered to pay victim pecuniary damages;
and assessed court costs, which were waived due to a finding of inability to
pay category B restitution. Uranga appeals, alleging the district court erred
by denying his motion to dismiss based on a speedy-indictment violation.

Before we reach the merits of Uranga’s appeal, we must determine
whether we can hear it. Our supreme court has held that a guilty plea waives
all defenses and challenges not intrinsic to the voluntariness of the plea. State
v. Hanes, 981 N.W. 2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2022). “A guilty plea puts a lid on the
box and presumably concludes a case.” Id. (citation omitted).

In apparent recognition of this procedural roadblock, Uranga asserts
that he entered a conditional guilty plea, which reserves the right to appeal
from a guilty plea. Accordingly, we turn first to the issue of appellate
jurisdiction.

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Uranga filed a second application for discretionary review of the March 12 order
denying the motion to dismiss, which was denied by our supreme court on April 9.

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II. Appellate Jurisdiction

A defendant’s right to appeal is governed by Iowa Code section 814.6.
As provided by statute, a defendant may be granted an appeal as follows:
1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:

a. A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:

(1) A simple misdemeanor conviction.

(2) An ordinance violation.

(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This
subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class “A” felony
or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.

b. An order for the commitment of the defendant for insanity or
drug addiction.

2. Discretionary review may be available in the following cases:

a. An order suppressing or admitting evidence.

b. An order granting or denying a motion for a change of venue.

c. An order denying probation.

d. Simple misdemeanor and ordinance violation convictions.

e. An order raising a question of law important to the judiciary and
the profession.

f. An order denying a motion in arrest of judgment on grounds
other than an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

3. A conditional guilty plea that reserves an issue for appeal shall only be
entered by the court with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
defendant or the defendant’s counsel. An appellate court shall have
jurisdiction over only conditional guilty pleas that comply with this section
and when the appellate adjudication of the reserved issue is in the interest
of justice.

Iowa Code § 814.6.

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Section 814.6 does not define “good cause,” but our supreme court has
defined it broadly. In State v. Damme, the court stated that “good cause” in
section 814.6 means “a legally sufficient reason.” 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa
2020). And “[w]hat constitutes a legally sufficient reason is context specific.”
State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021). The court has also stated
that a defendant asserts a legally sufficient reason and establishes good cause
to appeal as a matter of right by asserting a claim on appeal for which an
appellate court potentially could provide relief. See id. at 108–09.

“In determining whether a defendant has asserted a claim on appeal
for which an appellate court potentially could provide relief, [the appellate
courts] do not assess the merits of the claim.” State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d
866, 869 (Iowa 2022). Rather, the court determines “whether the claim is of
the type for which an appellate court could provide relief.” Id. “On direct
appeal from a guilty plea, Iowa’s appellate courts could potentially provide
relief where the defendant preserved error for appeal or where the defendant
need not preserve error for appeal.” Id.

The supreme court has recognized a defendant establishes good cause
to appeal by asserting a challenge to a sentencing hearing or sentence because
a defendant need not preserve error to assert such claims on appeal. See State
v. Jordan, 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021); State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129,
134 n.1 (Iowa 2021); Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105. But a defendant who asserts
only a claim or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot establish
good cause to appeal as a matter of right because Iowa’s appellate courts are
without authority to provide relief on such claim or claims. See Iowa Code
§ 814.7; Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109–10 (“The defendant has no right to
assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and this
court has no authority to decide a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

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on direct appeal.”). Our supreme court has also determined that if an
appropriate warning is not included in the motion in arrest of judgment
advisory, “the defendant’s failure to timely file a motion will not preclude a
plea challenge on appeal.” State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 536 (Iowa 2024).

III. Conditional Plea of Guilty under Iowa Code section 814.6(3)

Uranga asserts that he entered a conditional guilty plea, and therefore,
we have jurisdiction to address the merits of his appeal. We disagree. Our
supreme court has addressed conditional guilty pleas and determined “that
appeals from conditional guilty pleas are limited to the specific ruling
reserved in the conditional plea agreement joined by the State and approved
by the district court.” State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 495 (Iowa 2025).

Uranga did not reserve his plea as conditional. A conditional plea must
be joined by the State and approved by the district court. See id. Such was not
done here. There is not a written guilty plea in the appellate record, and on
our review of the transcript, there is no mention of the reservation of any
issue for appeal in the oral colloquy. And Uranga does not point this court to
anywhere in the transcript where he believes the reservation was located.

Rather, Uranga’s argument hinges merely on the allegation that he
“believed” he was reserving the same. But based on case precedent and a
plain reading of the statute, a mere belief does not satisfy the specific
statutory requirements for the reservation of a conditional guilty plea.
Uranga has failed to establish that he entered a conditional plea of guilty. And
because a conditional guilty plea is “limited to the specific ruling reserved in
the conditional plea agreement joined by the State and approved by the
district court,” we have nothing to review. Id. “The right to appeal is
statutory.” Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 534. “It is our duty to reject an appeal not

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authorized by statute.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Iowa 2021)
(citation omitted). Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss Uranga’s appeal.2

APPEAL DISMISSED.

2
Uranga also asserts that he has good cause to appeal because the advisory
regarding the motion in arrest of judgment was insufficient. We agree that the advisory
given by the district court was insufficient concerning the right to file a motion in arrest of
judgment. A defendant must be advised at the time of their plea that the failure to
challenge the plea by filing the motion within the time provided prior to sentencing
precludes a right to assert the challenge on appeal. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d at 535–36. If this
language is not included in the advisory, the defendant’s failure to timely file a motion in
arrest of judgment will not preclude a plea challenge on appeal. Id. But Uranga’s
jurisdictional challenge on the motion in arrest of judgment language appears to be a red
herring, as he is not challenging his guilty plea. His sole challenge on appeal is to the pre-
plea motion to dismiss.

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