Beverly Henry v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0680
Filed January 28, 2026
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Beverly Henry,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Scott J. Beattie, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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James T. Munro of Munro Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Jeffrey Peterzalek, Assistant Attorney
General, Eric H. Wessan, Solicitor General, and Patrick C. Valencia,
Deputy Solicitor General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal arises from the tragic fate of a horse named Laney. Laney
was entered in a championship show at the Iowa State Fairgrounds. Laney
was fatally injured in a stall that failed to hold. This appeal turns not on
causation or duty, but on whether the proper defendant received timely
notice under Iowa’s tort claims statute. And because the law—unlike Laney’s
enclosure—is tightly fastened, it requires the correct party be served before
time runs out. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Henry asserts that on September 13, 2022, she rented and used a stall
on the Iowa State Fairgrounds to hold her horse, Laney. Henry was showing
Laney in the Breeder’s Halter Futurity Championship, a horse show held at
the Iowa State Fairgrounds. Henry claims the stall was not fully secured,
causing a severe injury to Laney’s leg resulting in the horse needing to be
euthanized.

Henry filed her original petition on August 23, 2024, and named the
Iowa State Fair Authority (the Fair Authority) and the Breeder’s Halter
Futurity as defendants. Henry served the petition and the original notice on
the Fair Authority’s director of human resources on September 4, 2024. In
her petition, Henry cited Iowa Code section 670.2 (2024) of the Iowa
Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). The statute of limitations on this
action passed on September 13, 2024.

On September 23, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office appeared on
behalf of the Fair Authority and moved to dismiss, arguing that the State of
Iowa was the proper party defendant. The Fair Authority also asserted that
the suit should be dismissed because the IMTCA did not apply. Instead, the

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Fair Authority argued the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), Iowa Code chapter
669, applied, and the Fair Authority is considered a state agency for the
purposes of chapter 669.1

On October 3, 2024, Henry filed a motion for leave to amend her
petition to substitute the State as the party defendant instead of the Fair
Authority.2 The district court granted Henry’s motion, and Henry filed her
amended petition on November 8 naming the State as a defendant. On
November 15, Henry served the State through service on an authorized
delegate in charge of the tort claims division at the attorney general’s office.

The State moved to dismiss on the basis that Henry failed to sue the
State within the applicable statute-of-limitations period. Henry resisted,
arguing that her amended petition related back to the original petition, and
that the Fair Authority and the State were the same entity for the purposes
of tort. She also asserted the State had proper notice of the suit because the
attorney general’s office argued the State was the proper party.

1
We assume that jurisdiction exists here. Henry’s tort-claim form she was
required to send to the State Appeal Board is absent from the record. However, no party
argues that the ITCA imposes a requirement that the district court petition must plead
compliance with claim form process. See Iowa Code § 669.6. Moreover, at the hearing on
the second motion to dismiss on January 21, 2025, counsel for the Fair Authority asserted
that: “[Henry] filed a tort claim. . . in March of 2023 and then through that process, at
least according to my notes, in May of 2023 the claim was denied and then it wasn’t until
August 23 of 2024 that a petition was filed.” Given that the Fair Authority’s counsel
expressly stated on the record that the proper claim form was filed, we assume for
jurisdictional purposes that the tort-claim form was filed with the State Appeal Board and
was statutorily compliant.
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Henry did not request an amendment to clarify that she was bringing an action
under the ITCA instead of the IMTCA and never amended her petition accordingly.

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The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that
the Fair Authority and the State are two distinct entities for the purposes of
tort, and the State did not have notice of Henry’s suit before the statute of
limitations passed. Henry filed a motion to reconsider, which the State
resisted. The district court denied Henry’s motion to reconsider and this
appeal follows.

SCOPE OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss for errors
at law. Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 2021).

ANALYSIS
Henry argues that the district court erred in granting the State’s
motion to dismiss. Henry challenges the district court’s finding that there is
a legal distinction between the Fair Authority and the State, and that service
on the Fair Authority does not satisfy the notice requirements for the State.
Henry also challenges the district court’s finding that her amended petition,
which was filed after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations,
failed to relate back due to lack of proper notice.

I. The Fair Authority and the State as Distinct Legal Entities.

Henry claims the district court erred in holding that the Fair Authority
and the State are legally distinct entities. Henry argues that because the Fair
Authority and the State are not distinct entities, proper service on the Fair
Authority constitutes proper service on the State. She claims the naming of
the Fair Authority instead of the State was a simple misnomer. We disagree.

Tort actions brought under the ITCA must be brought against the
State, not a state agency. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 207 N.W.2d 1,

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2 (Iowa 1973). Indeed, Iowa Code section 173.1 defines the Fair Authority as
a public instrumentality and it is generally not considered an agency of state
government. But the Fair Authority is considered a state agency for the
purposes of tort under chapter 669: “[T]he authority is considered a state
agency and its employees state employees for the purposes of
chapter[] . . . 669.” Iowa Code § 173.1. Based on that, the Fair Authority and
the State are distinct entities. Thus, the Fair Authority—like any other state
agency—is immune from tort actions for the purposes of the ITCA, and the
State is the proper party. Iowa Code § 669.16.

Henry asserts that when she named the Fair Authority instead of the
State in her initial petition, it was a misnomer. For that reason, Henry argues
she should be allowed to freely amend her petition after the statute of
limitations expired to substitute the State for the Fair Authority.

“A substitution occurs when the wrong party is named, and the court
must replace the wrong party with the correct party.” Reyes v. Int’l Van Lines,
Inc., 9 N.W.3d 793, 798 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Parties cannot be substituted
once the statute of limitations expires. Id. But a misnomer can be corrected
after the statute of limitation expires if a plaintiff can show the correct party
was served—albeit by the wrong name. Id.

As noted above, the Fair Authority and the State are distinct legal
entities. Consequently, service on one is not service on all. Because the wrong
party was served—regardless of how it was named—Henry’s mistake was
more than a mere misnomer, it was an attempt to substitute a party not
previously served before the statute of limitations ran. Such is expressly
disallowed. Id.

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Henry analogizes her situation to Reyes v. International Van Lines, Inc.
to make her argument. See generally 9 N.W.3d 793 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Her
reliance is misplaced. In Reyes, we found the district court correctly allowed
Reyes to amend his petition to correct a misnomer after the statute of
limitations expired. 9 N.W.3d at 800. That decision was due to Reyes having
originally served the correct party under the defendant company’s trade
name. And both named corporate defendants in Reyes had the same registered
agent. Id. However, having the same registered agent, who was actually
served, is different than not serving the Iowa Attorney General’s Office at
all—as required by section 669.4(4)—notwithstanding the attorney general
representing both parties.

The State and the Fair Authority have different registered agents for
the purposes of notice and service. The State’s registered agent is the
“attorney general or the attorney general’s duly authorized delegate in
charge of the tort claim division.” Iowa Code § 669.4(4). The attorney
general or their authorized delegate must be served for the State to be put on
notice of suit under the ITCA. Id. The Fair Authority’s registered agent is its
own officer, clerk, or secretary. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.305(13). This differs from
Reyes, where the same man was the registered agent for the misnamed party
and the correctly named party. 9 N.W.3d at 796.

When Henry named the Fair Authority as the defendant in her initial
petition, the correct party was not before the district court. But that was not
fatal to her case despite the Fair Authority and the State operating as distinct
legal entities. What was fatal to her case was her lack of notice to the State
before the statute of limitations expired. The district court did not err in its
finding that the Fair Authority and the State are legally distinct entities

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requiring separate notice. Henry’s service on the Fair Authority did not
satisfy the notice requirements to the State.

II. Relation Back.

Henry argues that if the Fair Authority and the State are separate legal
entities, she should have been allowed to substitute the State for the Fair
Authority after the statute of limitations expired because the amended
petition related back to the original filing.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5) provides that an amendment
changing the party sufficiently relates back to the original pleading if:
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the
party, the party . . . has received such notice of the institution of the action
that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits,
and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
the party.

Under Rule 1.402(5), relation back depends on four factors:
(1) The basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the
original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such
notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that
party must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning
identity, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the second
and third requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed
limitations period.

Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1993). “[W]hen the
relation back rule is applied to amendments that add a defendant, we strictly
adhere to the clear language of the rule and have refused to extend the notice
period beyond the time for commencing the action.” Est. of Kuhns v. Marco,
620 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 2000).

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For Henry’s amended pleading to relate back to her original filing, she
must show that the State had notice that it was the proper party to the suit
before the statute of limitations period expired. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(5).
The notice requirement under the ITCA is clear: “A suit is commenced
under this chapter by serving the attorney general or the attorney general’s
duly authorized delegate in charge of the tort claims division by service of an
original notice.” Iowa Code § 669.4(4).

Henry did not serve the attorney general or the attorney general’s duly
authorized delegate with original notice within the statute of limitations
period. Rather, Henry served the original petition on the Fair Authority’s
director of human resources on September 4, 2024, nine days before the
statute of limitations expired on September 13. Henry did not serve the
attorney general’s authorized delegate with the amended petition until
November 15, over two months after the statute of limitations period expired.

Henry argues that the State knew or should have known it was the
proper party because the attorney general’s office represents both the Fair
Authority and the State. However, Henry’s argument would, in effect,
collapse the Fair Authority and the State into a single legal entity for the
purposes of notice. As established above, the State and the Fair Authority are
distinct legal entities. We disagree with Henry’s theory that service on the
Fair Authority satisfies Iowa Code section 669.4(4)’s clear service and notice
requirements for the State. Under that logic, a plaintiff could sue any entity
represented by the attorney general’s office and claim that section 669.4(4)’s
notice requirements for the State were satisfied. Filing suit against a state
agency does not satisfy section 669.4(4)’s requirement of “serving the
attorney general or the attorney general’s duly authorized delegate in charge
of the tort claims division by service of an original notice.”

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Finally, Henry makes the argument that service of her amended
petition was proper and timely under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.302(5)
and 1.402(5), and the district court therefore erred in granting the State’s
motion to dismiss.

Rule 1.302(5) provides: “If service of the original notice is not made
upon the defendant, respondent, or other party to be served within 90 days
after filing the petition, the court, upon motion or its own initiative after
notice to the party filing the petition, shall dismiss the action without
prejudice . . . .” Henry asserts that because the district court granted her
motion to amend on October 23, 2024, and because Henry served the
attorney general’s authorized delegate on November 15, eighty-four days
after the filing of the original petition, the State was properly served.

Rule 1.302(5) does not, however, provide an avenue for Henry to avoid
the requirements of Rule 1.402(5), which provides that notice be given
“within the period provided by law for commencing the action . . . .” Iowa
Code section 669.13 provides a two-year statute of limitations for claims
under the ITCA. Henry was required to serve notice to the State by
September 13, 2024. Henry did not properly serve the State until
November 15. Henry’s compliance with Rule 1.302(5) does not exempt her
claim from the statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court did not err
in finding that Henry’s amended petition did not sufficiently relate back to
her original filing.

CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court did not err in granting the State’s
motion to dismiss. The State and the Fair Authority are distinct legal entities
for the purposes of tort, and Henry failed to properly serve the State prior to

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the expiration of the statute of limitations. Further, Henry’s amended
petition did not relate back to her original filing as she could not show the
State had notice that it was the proper party to the suit before the statute of
limitations expired.

AFFIRMED.

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