State of Iowa v. Allen Albert Carmichael

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1443
Filed January 28, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Allen Albert Carmichael,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County,
The Honorable David Faith, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Richard Hollis, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., Buller, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Telleen, S.J.

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TELLEEN, Senior Judge.

Allen Albert Carmichael appeals from his conviction and sentence for
stalking by using a technological device. He argues insufficient evidence
supports his conviction, the district court erred in failing to give a requested
jury instruction, and the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant
him a deferred judgment. Because sufficient evidence supports Carmichael’s
conviction and the district court did not err or abuse its discretion, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Carmichael and his wife, Melinda, were in the midst of marriage
dissolution proceedings at the time of the events leading to this case.
Melinda moved out of the family home in December 2022, and Carmichael
filed for dissolution in July 2023. Following his filing of the dissolution
petition, Carmichael made many threatening comments to Melinda through
voicemail, text, and email, some of which identified her specific location:
I like targets let’s see who wins. Be careful of the people hiding in
the dark. So it’s TAG I’m it and looking for you.

Running away won’t help you moving far away might but as long as
you are around here I will know enough to find you.

[B]e ready to dance and hide better because I know you’re in
urbandale and the trailer park and I know a couple of other spots but I’m
sure you probably weren’t driving it that day but maybe.

I’m coming to Waukee, so fucking watch out. I might be lurking in
the dark.

Play with me, see what happens, let’s do it. Let’s do the
dance. . . . I ain’t got nothing fucking to lose.

Don’t make me fucking come over there and find you.

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Melinda did not know how Carmichael knew her specific locations
since she never told him. Convinced that Carmichael was stalking her,
Melinda told a friend about the interactions. Melinda’s friend told her how
to activate Apple AirTag1 notifications on her phone so that Melinda would
get notified if an AirTag was near her. On the next day that Melinda used her
car, her iPhone notified her of a nearby AirTag while she was walking to her
vehicle. Following an intensive search by Melinda and a few friends, Melinda
located an AirTag attached to the undercarriage of her car, on a support beam
under the trunk. The AirTag was lodged in a black magnetic puck which was
stuck to the beam. The AirTag was registered to Carmichael’s phone
number and did not belong to Melinda; she testified she did not own any
AirTags and had only previously heard of their existence once on the news.

Melinda contacted the police once she discovered the AirTag. She
then asked Carmichael if he had placed the AirTag on the vehicle. He denied
do so, explaining “I’ve got fucking eyes everywhere” for why he knew her
location. When contacted by a sheriff’s deputy, Carmichael admitted that
geofence data would place him at Melinda’s car late at night in Waukee
because her car was “legally half [his property].” He further admitted the
AirTag would be registered to him through Apple. Apple’s records
confirmed that the AirTag was registered to Carmichael.

The State charged Carmichael via trial information with stalking—
using technological device, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.11(3)(a)(4)
(2023). Following jury trial, Carmichael was convicted as charged. The
district court sentenced Carmichael to a ten-year prison term. The court

1
An AirTag is a tracking device developed by Apple which allows an AirTag owner
to place the AirTag in or on an object and track that object’s movements and location from
the owner’s Apple device, e.g., an iPhone.

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suspended the prison term and placed Carmichael on probation for three
years. Carmichael now appeals his conviction and sentence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors
at law. State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold
the verdict . . . if substantial evidence supports it.” Id. Likewise, we uphold
denials of motions for judgment of acquittal if substantial evidence supports
conviction.2 State v. Boleyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Iowa 1996). Evidence is
substantial if it could “convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 203
(Iowa 2022). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and accept as established all reasonable inferences tending to support it.”
State v. Gay, 526 N.W.2d 294, 295 (Iowa 1995).

“We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up).

Challenges to sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003). “An abuse of
discretion is found when the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id.

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We note that, in his brief, Carmichael separately challenges his conviction due to
(1) insufficient evidence and (2) the district court’s denial of his motions for judgment of
acquittal. Because both claims are dependent on substantial evidence supporting
Carmichael’s conviction, we will address both issues under the “Sufficiency of the
Evidence” section below.

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DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Carmichael first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction. The jury was instructed that the State had to prove:
1. On or about September 14, 2023, Mr. Carmichael purposefully
engaged in a course of conduct directed at Melinda Carmichael that would
cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to, or the death of Melinda
Carmichael.

2. Mr. Carmichael knew or should have known that Melinda
Carmichael would be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury or death to
herself.

3. Mr. Carmichael’s course of conduct caused Melinda Carmichael
to fear bodily injury or death to herself.

4. Mr. Carmichael utilized a technological device during his course
of conduct involving Melinda Carmichael.

Carmichael argues that he made no statements that would cause
Melinda to reasonably fear bodily injury or death. He addresses each email
and message in isolation, providing questionable explanations 3 for their
context without addressing the sheer volume of threatening statements. It is
further uncontested that Carmichael knew Melinda’s specific location and
flaunted that knowledge to her in texts, emails, and calls despite her having
never told him where she was. Carmichael told Melinda to “fucking watch
out” and “be ready to dance and hide” because “[he] might be lurking in the
dark,” all while reciting her specific location to her. A reasonable person

3
One such example is Carmichael’s explanation that his email informing Melinda
that he would “do what I need to do” was not a threat against Melinda but rather a
reference to his own suicide. Another example is his claim that his warning to Melinda to
“[b]e careful of people hiding in the dark. So it’s TAG I’m it and looking for you” was
simply a reference to “phone tag.”

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could conclude that Carmichael’s intention by combining those threatening
statements while taunting Melinda with his knowledge of her location was to
place her in reasonable fear of injury or death. Since Melinda would have no
reason to expect Carmichael to always know her location, a reasonable person
could feel fear from those statements.

Melinda’s reasonable fear of injury is further reinforced through her
testimony to such, which the jury was free to credit. As Melinda testified, “I
was constantly looking over my shoulder” and “I was scared for my life”
from Carmichael “blowing up” her phone, text messages, and email. At one
point Carmichael told Melinda “he was going to kill himself” and that “he
wanted [Melinda] to come over and [they] would do it together.” Melinda
felt she could not drive her car since Carmichael told her “he’s watching
[her] car.” And she even testified to a fear of staying in her own home,
choosing to room at a friend’s home for some time.

Carmichael additionally asserts that the evidence “merely
establish[es] that an AirTag tracking device was put on a vehicle, that the
AirTag belonged to [] Carmichael, [Carmichael]’s contact information, the
date the AirTag was sent to [Carmichael], and that the records Apple
provided to [law enforcement] were true and correct.” He argues that this
evidence, “without any additional context, do[es] not prove any of the
elements for the charged offense.” We disagree. Collectively, this evidence
overwhelmingly substantiates the State’s theory that Carmichael placed the
AirTag on Melinda’s vehicle to track her and provides the “additional
context” Carmichael asks us to consider.

The arguments that Carmichael presents to contest a finding that he
placed the AirTag on Melinda’s vehicle are not convincing. This includes
his claim that the photo exhibits do not clearly show what model of vehicle

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on which the AirTag was found. But Melinda testified that the AirTag was
attached to her vehicle. Further, the jury was free to discount Carmichael’s
self-serving and dubious testimony that various friends were keeping him
updated on Melinda’s location by spotting her car when it was in their
vicinity. Sufficient evidence supports Carmichael’s conviction.

II. Requested Instruction

Carmichael next argues the district court erred in failing to give his
requested jury instruction which defined a “true threat” and instructed
jurors not to convict him unless it found that his statements consistent with
that definition. A district court is required to give a requested instruction if
it states a correct rule of law as applied to the facts of the case “and is not
embodied in other instructions.” Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d
699, 707 (Iowa 2016).

Carmichael argues that defining a “true threat” would have helped
protect his First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.
While Carmichael emphasizes the importance of protecting his First
Amendment rights, he fails to explain how the instructions actually given
failed to protect that right. Speech that “an ordinary, reasonable person,
familiar with the context in which the statement was made, would interpret
as a threat” is a “true threat” not protected under the First Amendment.
State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Milner,
571 N.W.2d 7, 13 (Iowa 1997)). Indeed, Instruction 15 required that the State
had to prove Carmichael “purposefully engaged in a course of conduct
directed at Melinda [] that would cause a reasonable person to fear [her]
bodily injury [] or [her] death . . . .” Thus, because Carmichael’s requested
“true threat” instruction was embodied in Instruction 15, the district court
did not err in failing to give the requested instruction.

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III. Sentencing

Carmichael contends the district court abused its discretion in
declining to give him a deferred judgment. When the district court issues a
statutorily permitted sentence, that sentence “is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of
discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro,
638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). Carmichael argues the court failed to
account for his lack of “significant criminal history,” his “stable housing”
and employment, the unique circumstances of the crime, and his engagement
with mental-health treatment. But in its statement of reasons for the
sentence, the district explained that lack of remorse outweighed the factors
favoring a deferred judgment:
This is a difficult one, because, on the one hand, we have a presentence
investigation from the Department of Corrections that assesses that you
are at low risk of recidivism for violence and estimating that you can
successfully be supervised in the community. On the other hand, as the
State has pointed out, you have not admitted guilt. We had to go through
a jury trial, and the lack of admission does raise some concerns regarding
your ability to avoid repeating a crime that you don’t admit that you did.
In light of those competing factors, the Court is going to take the middle
ground today, which is that I am going to sentence you to prison, but I am
going to suspend the sentence. What that means is you will be a felon.
You’ll have that hanging over your head, and you will have the ten-year
sentence hanging over your head, if you commit any violations of the terms
of your probation. But I am going to accept the Department of
Corrections’ assessment that they can supervise you, and trust that you
will fully cooperate with them for your own self-interest.

“A sentencing court may properly consider a defendant’s lack of
remorse when choosing a sentence that will provide for the defendant’s
rehabilitation and protect the public from further offenses by the defendant,
so long as the court’s lack-of-remorse finding is not based on the defendant’s

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decision to stand trial.” State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Iowa 2005).
Here, the district court clarified that Carmichael’s lack of remorse raised
concerns about his chances for recidivism, which justified a sentence landing
in the “middle ground.” There was no abuse of discretion by the district
court during sentencing. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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