State of Iowa v. Cody Wess Minenga

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1214
Filed January 28, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Cody Wess Minenga,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County,
The Honorable Steven J. Holwerda, Judge.
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CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED AND
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
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Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., Langholz, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Chicchelly, P.J.

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CHICCHELLY, Presiding Judge.

Cody Minenga appeals his convictions and sentences for operating
while under the influence and carrying weapons while intoxicated. On appeal
he argues (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and
(2) the sentencing court abused its discretion by considering his criminal
history and by failing to give reasons for running Minenga’s sentences
consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm Minenga’s convictions, but we
vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In June 2023, an officer with the Newton Police Department observed
a speeding vehicle and stopped the vehicle after it ran a stop sign. The officer
approached the vehicle and found Minenga driving. Minenga smelled of
alcohol and had watery eyes and slurred speech. Suspecting Minenga was
intoxicated, the officer had him exit his vehicle.

Officers administered a series of field sobriety tests to Minenga. First
was the horizontal gaze nystagmus which showed Minenga exhibiting
involuntary reactions consistent with having used alcohol. Second was the
walk-and-turn test where Minenga was unable to walk in a straight line,
falling off the path several times. Third was the one-leg-stand test which
Minenga did not complete because he was unable to maintain his balance. As
a result of his performance, Minenga was arrested for operating while under
the influence.

When Minenga was being searched, officers found metal brass
knuckles in his pocket. The arresting officer took Minenga to the Jasper
County Jail and invoked implied consent to test under Iowa Code

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section 321J.6 (2022). Minenga refused to take a breath test to determine the
alcohol concentration in his system.

The State charged Minenga with operating while under the influence
in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 and carrying weapons while
intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4C(1)(b). The matter
proceeded to a jury trial where Minenga was convicted as charged. The
district court sentenced Minenga to 365 days in custody on the operating
while under the influence conviction and to ninety days on the weapons
conviction, set to run concurrently with each other; but the court ran those
sentences consecutively to a sentence in a separate case. Minenga now
appeals.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Minenga challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both
convictions. 1 We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for
correction of errors at law, giving high deference to the verdict. State v.
Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023). In doing so, “[w]e view the
evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable
inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Ortiz, 905
N.W.2d 174, 180 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence exists
when the evidence ‘would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is

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Within his sufficiency argument, Minenga also argues that he is entitled to a new
trial because the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. We review that
claim under a different set of standards than a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See
State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). But Minenga never filed a motion for a
new trial based on the weight of the evidence in district court. So the issue is not
preserved for our review. See State v. Kucharo, No. 22-1881, 2024 WL 2842307, at *1 n.1
(Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024); State v. Kramer, No. 16-2048, 2018 WL 346454, at *7 (Iowa
Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018).

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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 219
(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). We discuss each conviction in turn.

I. Operating while Under the Influence

We first address Minenga’s argument that there was insufficient
evidence supporting his conviction for operating while under the influence.
The jury was instructed that the State had to prove that (1) on or about
June 2, 2023, Minenga operated a motor vehicle; and (2) at the time,
Minenga was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
alcohol and drugs. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a). The term “operate” was
defined as “immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in
motion and/or has its engine running.” The jury was further instructed that
a person who has consumed alcohol is “under the influence” if one or more
of the following is true:
1. His reason or mental ability has been affected.
2. His judgment is impaired.
3. His emotions are visibly excited.
4. He has, to any extent, lost control of bodily actions or motions.

Minenga argues there is insufficient evidence that he was intoxicated.
We disagree. The arresting officer testified that Minenga “smelled of a
consumed alcoholic beverage.” And he observed Minenga’s eyes as
“watery” and his speech as “slowed, slurred, and mumbled.” Additionally,
officers administered field sobriety tests to Minenga. The officer testified to
each indication of Minenga’s intoxication, and the jury was able to observe
Minenga’s performance of these tests in the officer’s body-worn camera
footage. And the jury was instructed that they could “consider a refusal [to
give a breath sample] in reaching [its] verdict.” So the jury could have
inferred Minenga’s intoxication from his performance on the field sobriety
tests, the officer’s observations of him, and his refusal to consent to the

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breath test. There was overwhelming evidence of Minenga’s guilty, so we
affirm

II. Carrying weapons while intoxicated

Next, Minenga argues there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for carrying weapons while intoxicated. To prove this charge, the
State had to prove (1) Minenga was under the influence of drugs and alcohol
(2) at the time he carried a dangerous weapon or had a dangerous weapon in
his immediate access. See Id. § 724.4C. He challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of each element, but we have already concluded there was sufficient
evidence of Minenga’s intoxication. So, we confine our discussion to the
second element.

The jury was instructed:
A “dangerous weapon” is any instrument or device designed
primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human or animal, and
which is capable of inflicting death upon a human being when used in the
manner for which it is designed.

See Iowa Code § 702.7. At the outset, we agree with the State that brass
knuckles are “an instrument or device designed primarily for use in inflicting
death or injury upon a human being or animal” as a matter of law. See id.;
State v. Tusing, 344 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Iowa 1984) (“It is obvious that brass
knuckles fulfill the first part of this test; unlike a revolver or a knife, which
could be used for target shooting or to peel an apple, there is only one purpose
for brass knuckles, and that is to inflict injury, presumably upon a human
being.”). So, we proceed to the second part of the dangerous weapon test.

We also find there is sufficient evidence that the brass knuckles in this
case are capable of inflicting death upon a human. Our analysis is based “on
the design and construction of the particular set of brass knuckles.” See id.

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at 254–55. But “the actual intent of the user is not the issue in deciding
whether an instrument or device is dangerous.” Id. at 255 (cleaned up). The
arresting officer testified that he discovered a set of brass knuckles in
Minenga’s pocket. He described the brass knuckles as made of metal. And
in his experience, he had encountered individuals hit by brass knuckles like
those Minenga possessed who “had a severe injury that would be consistent
with being struck with some sort of metal object.” The jury was able to
observe the brass knuckles, and based on the officer’s testimony could have
determined they were a dangerous weapon.

Because we find substantial evidence supports both of Minenga’s
convictions, we affirm.

SENTENCING
Finally, we address Minenga’s arguments regarding sentencing. He
argues the district court erred when it (1) referenced his prior conviction for
operating while under the influence and (2) failed to explain its reasons for
running his sentences consecutive to a sentence in another matter.

First, Minenga argues the district court’s reference that this was his
“fourth offense lifetime” for operating while under the influence. We
disagree that this amounted to an improper sentencing factor. The district
court was required to consider a number of factors including “the nature of
the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity
of the offender, and the chances of reform.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d
720, 725 (Iowa 2002). Consideration of Minenga’s three prior convictions
for the same offense was relevant to his propensity and changes to re-offend.
So, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court considering these prior

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offenses. See State v. Radtke, No. 23-2103, 2024 WL 3887239, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Aug. 21, 2024).

Second, Minenga argues the district court failed to explain its reasons
for running his sentences consecutive to a sentence imposed in another
matters. The State concedes that the district court failed to give reasons for
running the sentences consecutively. We agree that neither the district
court’s explanation of reasons during sentencing nor the written sentencing
orders contains an explanation for consecutive sentences. So, we vacate
Minenga’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

CONCLUSION
Because we find that Minenga’s convictions were supported by
substantial evidence, we affirm both his convictions. But the district court
failed to explain why it ran Minenga’s sentences consecutively, so we vacate
his sentences and remand for resentencing.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED AND
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

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