State of Iowa v. Ryan Holland Melcher

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1260
Filed January 28, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Ryan Holland Melcher,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County,
The Honorable Laura Parrish, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Buller, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Bower, S.J. Dissent by Tabor, C.J.

1
BOWER, Senior Judge.

Ryan Melcher appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated
(OWI), challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, and questioning the
voluntariness of his consent to a blood sample test. Finding his consent was
voluntary and within constitutional boundaries, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the early morning hours of February 19, 2023, Melcher was in a
single car accident, hitting a tree. Melcher sustained a wound to his forehead,
and blood covered his forehead and eyes; he called his mother to take him to
the hospital. A doctor reported the accident, and Deputy Ted Jacobsen
arrived at the hospital to investigate. Deputy Jacobsen’s interaction with
Melcher was captured on his body camera. A nurse was treating Melcher
when the deputy arrived and injected him with medication, including
morphine. The deputy spoke with Melcher, who admitted to having “three
or four” beers at a friend’s house. When the deputy asked for a preliminary
breath test, Melcher indicated he did not think he would be able to provide
the breath sample necessary to register.

The deputy then asked Melcher to provide voluntary consent for a
blood draw, but he did not invoke Iowa’s implied consent procedures.1 The
deputy, reading from a voluntary consent form, advised Melcher that he had
the right to refuse consent but, if he did, the deputy could then apply for a
warrant for his blood. The deputy then told Melcher if he provided the
sample, he could go home with his mother that night. When Deputy Jacobsen
1
In a training provided to law enforcement officers, the Allamakee County
Attorney’s office had told the officers to use this voluntary “Consent to Provide Sample”
in OWI cases. This form is separate and distinct from the legislature-created implied
consent procedure for consent in OWI cases. See Iowa Code § 321J.6 (2023).

2
asked if he would want to provide a sample, Melcher gestured slightly and
said, “sure.”

The voluntary consent form stated:
Consent to Provide Sample

I understand that I am being asked by a peace officer to provide a
sample of my breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of investigation of the
public offense of Operating While Intoxicated.

I understand that I have the constitutional right to REFUSE the
peace officer’s request.

I understand that if I refuse the peace officer’s request, he or she
may apply for a search warrant. I understand that if that application is
granted by a judge or magistrate, I will be court ordered to provide a sample
of my breath, blood, or urine.

Knowing of my lawful right to refuse to consent to provide such a
sample, I am voluntarily and willingly providing my sample to the peace
officer.

This written permission to search without a search warrant is given
by me to the peace officer(s) voluntarily and without any threats or
promises of any kind at ________M on this _____ day of
__________ 20____.

The deputy filled out the time and date on the form, then handed it to
Melcher. Melcher agreed to sign but also mentioned he couldn’t see
anything, and his mother indicated he normally wore glasses. Melcher then
signed on the appropriate line, holding the clipboard very close to his face
and without reviewing the consent form.

Melcher’s tests came back above the statutory limit for alcohol and
were positive for marijuana metabolites. Melcher filed a motion to suppress
the results, arguing his medical condition did not permit voluntary consent,
the deputy coerced the decision through promising he could go home, and

3
the search did not fall within a recognized exception to the constitutional
warrant requirement.

After a brief suppression hearing, where the court heard testimony
from Deputy Jacobsen and Melcher and admitted evidence including the
deputy’s bodycam footage, a deposition of Deputy Jacobsen (which included
a discussion of why he opted for a voluntary consent form instead of implied
consent), and toxicology test results, the district court denied Melcher’s
motion. The court determined, “Considering the totality of the
circumstances based on the record before the court, the defendant’s consent
to provide a blood sample in this matter was voluntary.”

After denial of his suppression motion, Melcher agreed to submit to a
trial to the court based on the minutes of testimony and attached documents.
The court found him guilty of OWI. Melcher appeals, contesting only the
denial of his motion to suppress.

II. Implied Consent.

Melcher argues on appeal the consent form used by the deputy
“necessarily invoked Iowa’s implied consent procedures.” If we find the
implied-consent question is not preserved, Melcher asserts the State did not
prove his consent was knowing and voluntary.

The State vigorously argues Melcher did not preserve error below by
failing to make an implied consent argument below. The State’s brief
concedes that if error is preserved, the recent supreme court case State v.
Flynn “forbids what Deputy Jacobsen did in this case,” and if we “reach[] the
merits of the implied consent issue, suppression is the correct result.” See 13

4
N.W.3d 843, 849–51 (Iowa 2024). 2 But the State argues that Melcher’s
“arguments below had not even a whisper of implied consent,” and the
district court never ruled on implied consent.

Melcher’s response asserts “it is impossible to separate implied
consent from the more general constitutional consent” and that the implied
consent procedures were inherent in his challenge to whether his consent fell
within a constitutional exception to the warrant requirement.

In analyzing actual consent as an exception to the warrant
requirement, the supreme court observed, “The Federal and State
Constitutions demarcate the outer bounds of lawful government action. But
the legislature is free to draw a tighter circle and further limit a peace officer’s
conduct. And that is exactly what the implied consent statute does.” Id. at
850. In other words, the implied consent procedures are a smaller subset
within the constitutional demarcations.

Under controlling case law at the time of the hearing, the State was
“not limited to the provisions of chapter 321J so long as the procedure

2
The supreme court had recently said, “Properly understood, chapter 321J is a
comprehensive statutory scheme to implement the consent exception to the
constitutional preference for search warrants and not a mechanism to displace the
constitutional use of search warrants.” State v. Laub, 2 N.W.3d 821, 830–31 (Iowa 2024).
Flynn then closed the loophole the deputy used here—seeking a voluntary consent around
the warrant requirement other than the implied consent procedures despite meeting the
statutory conditions for implied consent. 13 N.W.3d at 847. “[A] peace officer’s request
that a motorist submit” to testing of a bodily specimen where the section 321J.6 statutory
conditions exist “is, in fact, an invocation of chapter 321J that requires a written request
and the provision of advisories.” Id. at 848–49. “The statutory implied consent procedure
must be followed when the implied consent procedures are invoked.” Id. at 851. In other
words, if the implied-consent criteria are present—which they were here—law
enforcement must use the implied consent process or obtain a warrant.

5
utilized conforms to constitutional requirements.” State v. Frescoln, 911
N.W.2d 450, 455 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). And when law enforcement “does
not invoke implied consent, nothing precludes an officer from obtaining and
executing a search warrant for bodily specimens.” Laub, 2 N.W.2d at 829. No
one argued prior to Melcher’s appellate brief that implied consent had been
invoked—it was not mentioned in his motion to suppress, discussed at the
hearing, or addressed in the ruling. In fact, the argument in Melcher’s
suppression motion was “the officer clearly should have applied for a search
warrant.”

Without an argument to demonstrate the issue had been raised and
decided by the district court, and since the exclusivity of statutory implied
consent procedures was determined after the court’s ruling, error is not
preserved on Melcher’s implied consent theory on appeal. See Lamasters v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

III. Voluntary Consent.

While his statutory-procedures argument was not preserved,
Melcher’s constitutional argument was argued and decided below, and it
serves as the basis for our analysis.3 And even though the deputy’s conduct
does not fall within the legislature’s “tighter circle,” it may still fall within
the wider boundaries of federal constitutional constraints. See Flynn, 13
N.W.2d at 850; see also Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at 455 (explaining “the State’s
ability to obtain chemical testing is not limited to the provisions of chapter

3
Melcher’s constitutional argument still relies heavily upon implied consent
statutes and caselaw. We address the arguments to the extent we can without that lens.

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321J so long as the procedure utilized conforms to constitutional
requirements,” and “[a]dhering to the warrant requirement is the best means
upon which to conform to the constitutional protections from unreasonable
searches and seizures”); State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 509 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2025) (deciding a case based on preserved federal constitutional
arguments with a broader circle of conduct than the narrower, unpreserved
state constitutional arguments).

“Voluntary consent is one of the recognized exceptions” to the
warrant requirement, and the State must “establish voluntariness by a
preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Stanford, 474 N.W.2d 573, 575
(Iowa 1991). “We review the constitutionality of a search de novo,” which
“requires an independent evaluation of the record.” Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at
455. “We give considerable weight to the district court’s assessment of
voluntariness but are not bound by its factual findings.” State v. Baraki, 981
N.W.2d 693, 697 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).

In determining Melcher’s consent was voluntary and the search was
not unconstitutional, the court found:
Although [Melcher] was in the emergency room and being treated for
injuries to his head, there is no indication from the behaviors of the medical
personnel that his situation was emergent. The Defendant had been
transported to the emergency room by personal vehicle, not ambulance.
Neither the doctor nor the nurse was in the room for significant portions
of the deputy’s interaction with the defendant; it appeared that he had time
to complete his investigation before further medical treatment was needed.
The defendant was responsive to questions that were asked of him and
appeared to interact appropriately with the deputy and the medical
personnel. While the defendant’s speech was somewhat slurred or unclear,
the court noted that the defendant’s speech during his testimony at the
time of hearing was also somewhat slow and mumbled, suggesting that it’s
simply a normal speech pattern for him. Defendant’s mother was present
in the emergency room during the deputy’s entire interaction with him and

7
gave no indication that she was uncomfortable with the defendant’s state
of mind. The deputy’s interaction with the defendant was not overly
coercive or pressuring in any way, lasting less than twenty minutes, and it
appeared that the deputy was able to satisfactorily answer all of the
defendant’s questions regarding options for testing. The consent form was
read to the defendant, in addition to the verbal explanation by the Deputy
of defendant’s options regarding consent.

Melcher argues three points: (1) the deputy failed to fully advise
Melcher of his right to refuse testing and the potential consequences;
(2) Melcher’s consent was coerced by the deputy’s threat to get a warrant
without the legal right to obtain one; and (3) Melcher did not have the
capacity to voluntarily consent.

We reiterate that the consent and procedure used by the deputy in this
instance are no longer statutorily permissible, and our reasoning below
cannot be used to justify any alternate voluntary consent procedure used
when the implied consent conditions exist. See Flynn, 13 N.W.3d 847–49.

Failure to Advise. First, Melcher argues the deputy “did not advise
Melcher of his statutory right to refuse testing and the consequences of
such.” This argument relies on the premise Melcher faced the same
consequences as under the implied consent statutes. But the consent signed
by Melcher provided the only consequence faced was the officer’s ability to
apply for a warrant and the possibility the court would grant it, and the deputy
did advise Melcher of his right to refuse consent with the consequence of a
warrant application. Without the invocation of implied consent, Melcher did
not face the consequences provided under that statutory scheme. Melcher
knew the only consequence ahead of him if he did not consent—the deputy
applying for a warrant—and chose to sign. This argument fails.

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Coercion. Melcher next claims he was coerced into signing by the
deputy informing Melcher if he declined consent, “he would just get a
warrant and get his blood anyway.” We question whether this particular
coercion argument is preserved, as the only coercion argued below was the
deputy “telling him he could go home with his mom if he gave a sample,”
which the deputy later testified was an indication he would not be arresting
Melcher; this version was not repeated on appeal. Melcher’s appellate
argument is again based on implied-consent law, where refusal to submit to
chemical testing results in specific statutory consequences, but the officer
can no longer seek a warrant outside of specific circumstances. See State v.
Stanford, 474 N.W.2d 573, 575 n.1 (Iowa 1991). Because this voluntary
consent was not part of the implied consent schema, and a warrant was the
only consequence faced by not signing, the deputy advising of the
consequence included in the consent form signed does not constitute
coercion. The district court determined the deputy’s interaction “was not
overly coercive or pressuring in any way,” and we agree. We do not find
Melcher’s consent was coerced.

Capacity. Melcher’s last argument contends he was under the
influence of morphine and alcohol as well as a head injury, so his ability to
consent was impaired, and the State did not show he was capable of consent.
Whether an “individual was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs” is a
factor to consider in evaluating the voluntariness of consent. State v. Lowe,
812 N.W.2d 554, 572–73 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). The State counters
by arguing the deputy’s body camera video “shows [Melcher] was oriented
to time, place, and person,” he asked questions, and was able to communicate
verbally and nonverbally. The State concedes the alcohol and painkillers
“influenced Melcher,” but urges it was not a capacity-disabling condition.
And the district court—which had the opportunity to observe Melcher

9
during his testimony and compare it to his demeanor in the body-cam
footage—determined Melcher was able to interact appropriately with others,
was responsive to questions, and neither the medical personnel nor his
mother (who were present in the room) displayed any doubt of Melcher’s
capacity to consent.

We agree with the district court and the State. Despite his head injury,
alcohol use, and very late time, Melcher retained the capacity to call his
mother to bring him to the hospital. Once the deputy was there, he appeared
to understand what was going on, answered the deputy’s questions, asked
questions of his own, determined he wouldn’t give a breath test, and made
the decision to consent to the blood test. Melcher did not display a lack of
mental capacity sufficient to invalidate consent, so Melcher’s consent was
voluntary, and it falls within the bounds of our constitutional parameters. See
State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381–82 (Iowa 1994).

AFFIRMED.

Buller, J., concurs; Tabor, C.J., dissents

10
TABOR, Chief Judge (dissenting).

Because law enforcement did not obtain a search warrant for
Melcher’s blood, the State had the burden to show that he voluntarily
consented to providing a sample. In his motion to suppress, Melcher
challenged the State’s proof of his consent.4 That challenge preserved error
on both implied and actual consent scenarios. See generally State v. Flynn, 13
N.W.3d 843, 850 (Iowa 2024) (noting “false distinction between consent
given pursuant to the implied consent statute and actual consent”). And the
State concedes that if error was preserved, Flynn controls the outcome, and
suppression of Melcher’s blood test is the correct result. Given these
circumstances, I respectfully dissent. We should reverse the suppression
ruling and remand for further proceedings.

The majority decision recognizes that Flynn “closed the loophole that
the deputy used here” in obtaining Melcher’s consent to giving a blood
sample without giving the proper advisories. Yet the majority refuses to grant
the relief afforded in Flynn because Melcher did not mention “implied
consent” in his motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing.

But the suppression hearing did focus on implied consent, even if the
State avoided that term. The deputy testified: “[B]ased off of my training and
experience, you know, and the fact that [Melcher] had been involved in a
motor vehicle accident and he had admitted to drinking, I proceeded with my
OWI procedure.” These conditions described by the deputy implicated

4
Melcher alleged in his motion to suppress that the warrantless search was illegal
because he was “not in a position to consent, coupled with the coercion of the officer in
getting [his] consent.” From there, he claimed the evidence was obtained in violation of
his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

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section 321J.6(1) (2023); reasonable grounds existed for invoking implied
consent procedures. The deputy then discussed the now-discredited
“Consent to Provide Sample” form that he used to request Melcher’s blood.5
Yet any additional consent was irrelevant once the statute was triggered. See
Flynn, 13 N.W.3d at 851 (citing State v. Avery, 13 P.3d 226, 230–31 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000)).

And Melcher’s contention that the deputy should have applied for a
search warrant rather than using that form was the logical counterpoint to
challenging the validity of his consent. After all, the Constitution requires a
search warrant unless an exception applies. Here, no exception applied
because his consent was invalid.

As for the suppression ruling, the district court found Melcher’s
consent was voluntary and discussed the deputy’s method of requesting the
blood sample:
The deputy’s interaction with [Melcher] was not overly coercive or
pressuring in any way, lasting less than 20 minutes, and it appeared that
the deputy was able to satisfactorily answer all of [Melcher’s] questions
regarding options for testing. The consent form was read to [Melcher], in
addition to the verbal explanation by the Deputy of [Melcher’s] options
regarding consent.

This discussion of the deputy’s procedure echoes the error that Flynn
identified. As law enforcement did in Flynn, the deputy here invoked implied
consent without saying so. And when implied consent procedures are
invoked, law enforcement must follow statutory procedures or else the test
result is not competent. Flynn, 13 N.W.3d at 851. As its bottom line, the
district court found that Melcher’s consent was valid despite the deputy

5
That form included a reference to Melcher’s “constitutional right to REFUSE
the peace officer’s request” for a sample of his blood.

12
bypassing the requirement that he advise the motorist of the consequences
associated with refusing or submitting to chemical testing. That finding
supports Melcher’s argument that he preserved error. By finding voluntary
consent, the district court addressed the issue that Melcher asks us to review.
See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“[I]ssues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will
decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

For its preservation argument, the State relies on State v. Manna, 534
N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1995). But that reliance is misplaced. On appeal, Manna
argued that he did not consent to a search of his mouth when he complied
with an officer’s request to spit out the sunflower seeds he was chewing.
Manna, 534 N.W.2d at 643. The supreme court found Manna’s consent to
the search, “if indeed it was a search,” was voluntary. Id. at 644. But the
supreme court declined to reach Manna’s appellate argument that law
enforcement lacked reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent under
Iowa Code chapter 321J because the district court did not rule on that
statutory challenge. Id. That fact pattern is unlike Melcher’s situation.
Manna provides no guidance on whether Melcher’s constitutional challenge
to the voluntariness of his consent to chemical testing encompassed an
objection to the officer’s compliance with statutory implied consent
procedures.

But the question before us today has been addressed recently by our
supreme court. First, in State v. Laub, the court discussed the overlap
between statutory implied consent and the consent exception to the
constitutional warrant requirement. 2 N.W.3d 821, 830–31 (Iowa 2024).
“Properly understood, chapter 321J is a comprehensive statutory scheme to
implement the consent exception to the constitutional preference for search

13
warrants and not a mechanism to displace the constitutional use of search
warrants.” Id. Next, in Flynn, the court explained that the implied consent
procedures limited the conduct of peace officers beyond the boundaries set
by the federal and state constitutions. 13 N.W.3d at 851 (quoting State v.
Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“Consent to chemical
testing obtained under the implied consent statute falls under the voluntary
consent exception to the warrant requirement.”)).

In addressing this case law, the majority suggests that Flynn is
prospective only in its application. For instance, the majority reasons that
“[u]nder controlling case law at the time of the hearing, the State was ‘not
limited to the provisions of chapter 321J so long as the procedure utilized
conforms to constitutional requirements.’” 6 In finding Melcher did not
preserve error, the majority also notes that “the exclusivity of statutory
implied consent procedures was determined after the court’s [suppression]
ruling.” I disagree with the majority’s emphasis on timing. True, the supreme
court “has the power in overruling a prior decision to give the new rule only
prospective application.” State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Iowa 2000).
But nothing in Flynn suggests that it establishes a new rule or that its
application should be prospective only. What’s more, the State does not
argue for a prospective-only application of Flynn. So the chronology of Flynn
does not foreclose enforcing its principles when the accused challenges the
consent exception to the search warrant requirement.

As Melcher argues, “the implied-consent statute occupies the field as
the ‘comprehensive statutory scheme to implement the consent exception to

6
For this proposition, the majority quotes Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at 455. But Flynn
did not overrule Frescoln nor undermine its analysis of chapter 321J. In fact, Flynn relied
on Frescoln for its insights on consent to chemical testing.

14
the constitutional preference for search warrants.’” State v. Bachman, No.
23-1502, 2025 WL 1177453, at *5 (Iowa. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2025) (quoting
Flynn, 13 N.W.3d at 850–51). Because the deputy veered outside the implied-
consent statute here, the district court erred in allowing the test results into
evidence. Melcher challenged his consent on constitutional grounds, which
are interwoven with the implied consent provisions. Thus, Melcher “is not
raising a new issue on appeal, and there would be no unfairness to the State
or the district court if we consider the alleged statutory violation.” See State
v. Ness, 907 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Iowa 2018). For these reasons, we should
reverse and remand for further proceedings.

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