State of Iowa v. Clinton Randolph Van Fossen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-2063
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Clinton Randolph Van Fossen,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Meghan Corbin, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Matthew J. Gannon, Davenport, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Judge.

Clinton Van Fossen 1 appeals following resentencing for multiple
offenses related to filming or photographing nude minor children. He claims
the district court mishandled a request for a hybrid in-person/electronic
resentencing hearing and abused its discretion when imposing sentence. On
review, we discern no legal error or abuse of discretion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
We summarized the facts of the offense in Van Fossen’s previous
appeal:
In early 2020, Bettendorf police received a “cybertip” from the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging “a teenage
female was being filmed, at time in a state of nudity, likely without the
knowledge of the video/recording device being present.” The internet
provider’s account information associated with the camera system led
police to Van Fossen’s residence. Van Fossen’s wife allowed police to
search the home, and officers discovered two cameras hardwired to the
ceiling disguised as smoke detectors. One of the cameras was outside of
the bedroom of Van Fossen’s college-aged daughter, A.V. The other
camera was on A.V.’s bedroom ceiling. Police also discovered notes Van
Fossen had written to A.V., detailing his interactions with her and
expressing his love for her.

Van Fossen denied knowledge of the cameras. He agreed to come
to the police station after work the next day, but he didn’t show up and
instead went home. Officers met him there with a search warrant. The only
phone Van Fossen had with him was one he had purchased that morning
before work. Police eventually found deleted nude images of A.V. from
2017, which had been recorded on a different type of camera Van Fossen
had placed in her bathroom. Police also found nude and partially nude film

Van Fossen is capitalized multiple ways in the record. In this opinion, we replicate
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how Van Fossen signed documents in the district court, correcting quotes as needed.

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and images of a young couple, J.B. and T.B., who stayed in A.V.’s bedroom
while visiting during the 2019 holiday season.

State v. Van Fossen, No. 23-0019, 2024 WL 3688513, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Aug. 7, 2024) (footnotes omitted). The county attorney charged Van Fossen
by trial information with five counts of invasion of privacy, aggravated
misdemeanors in violation of Iowa Code section 709.21(3) (2020); electronic
or mechanical eavesdropping, a serious misdemeanor in violation of
section 727.8; and preventing apprehension or obstructing prosecution, an
aggravated misdemeanor in violation of section 719.3(1). Van Fossen pled not
guilty and waived his right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial, the court
found Van Fossen guilty as charged and sentenced him to prison, with three
of the seven counts to be served consecutively.

Van Fossen appealed and a panel of this court affirmed the convictions
but remanded for resentencing after finding the district court did not
adequately set forth reasons for the consecutive sentence. Van Fossen,
2024 WL 3688513, at *9.2

Three days before the scheduled resentencing hearing, Van Fossen
filed a motion for a hybrid in-person/electronic hearing under Iowa Rule of
Remote Procedure 15.302 to allow his Florida-based son to testify. According
to Van Fossen, it was overly burdensome for his son to take off work and
travel to Davenport. As required by Rule 15.302(2), Van Fossen indicated in
his motion that he had consulted with the State and the State resisted the

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We observe that our court’s direct-appeal opinion was somewhat ambiguous on
whether we were directing the district court on remand to merely state its reasons for
imposing a consecutive sentence or instead whether we directed a plenary resentencing.
Van Fossen, 2024 WL 3688513, at *9. Neither party presses this issue on appeal. And we
do not fault the district court for conducting a plenary resentencing.

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electronic testimony. The court did not enter an order addressing the motion
before resentencing.

At resentencing, Van Fossen alerted the court to the pending motion.
The court responded: “With that motion being contested without it being set
for a hearing[,] because it was contested the court can’t rule on it. If it had
been agreed upon, we could have entered an order[,] but because no ruling
could be made[,] no Zoom was set up.” There was no further discussion on
the motion, and Van Fossen did not file a motion to reconsider or otherwise
litigate the issue.

Van Fossen presented evidence on his likelihood of recidivism from
Dr. Luis Rosell, a clinical and forensic psychologist. Purportedly relying on
an interview with Van Fossen, the trial transcripts, appellate briefs,
sentencing order, and minutes of testimony, Rosell opined that Van Fossen
was unlikely to recidivate. The court questioned Rosell’s methodology and
communicated its concern Van Fossen wasn’t forthcoming with details in his
conversation with Rosell. The court noted that Rosell’s report, which quoted
Van Fossen at length, did not mention Van Fossen had obsessively positioned
multiple cameras in various locations in his daughter’s room. The report also
suggested that Van Fossen only left the cameras in place because he thought
them defunct—contrary to the record evidence. And Rosell appeared wholly
unaware of Van Fossen’s obstruction charge and related consciousness-of-
guilt behavior.

In announcing its reasons for sentence, the court began its explanation
of reasons by considering “the seriousness of the crime, and the effect that
the crime has had upon the members of the community as well as [Van
Fossen’s] willingness to accept treatment and change.” The court also
expressly considered Van Fossen’s “demeanor,” as well as his failure to

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accept responsibility or show accountability for his conduct. And the court
noted Van Fossen had not sought counseling or any other behavioral
rehabilitation in the five years since his arrest. The court then resentenced
Van Fossen to prison, with three of the seven counts to be served
consecutively. Van Fossen appeals.

DISCUSSION
Van Fossen presents two challenges, asserting the court erred in
disposing the hybrid hearing motion and abused its discretion when imposing
sentence.

I. Hybrid Electronic/In-Person Hearing Motion

Van Fossen first argues that the district court failed to rule on his
motion for a hybrid electronic and in-person sentencing hearing. The
problem for Van Fossen is that, if he’s right, he is owed no remedy on appeal.
“We are a ‘court for the correction of errors at law,’ and we cannot correct
an ‘error’ the district court never made.” State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502,
509 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (quoting Iowa Code
§ 602.5103(1) (2022)). And to the extent Van Fossen believes the district
court failed to address an issue despite him properly presenting it, the onus
was on him to file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) or
the like to draw that alleged error to the district court’s attention. E.g., Meier
v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2002). To the extent Van Fossen
claims in his reply brief this was a sentencing error for which he was not
required to preserve error, the supreme court disagrees. See State v. Pirie, 18
N.W.3d 238, 248–49 (Iowa 2025) (holding defendant’s failure to preserve
challenge related to remote sentencing precluded appellate review; collecting
out-of-state cases holding the same). As a result, we could likely accept Van

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Fossen’s argument the court did not rule on the motion and reject his
appellate claim wholesale.

In the interests of completeness, and because we discern no basis for
reversal, we will assume without deciding error was preserved. Had error
been preserved, we would review the district court’s interpretation of the
rules of remote procedure for correction of errors at law. See Iowa R. App. P.
6.907. Because the rules set forth a list of considerations a district court must
consider and weigh, we review a ruling on a request for hybrid proceedings
for abuse of discretion. See Iowa Ct. R. 15.302(4).

On our review, and to the extent there was a ruling, we discern no
abuse of discretion. From the start, Van Fossen repeatedly mischaracterizes
the record in his brief, claiming that his motion was not contested. Yet Van
Fossen’s own motion noted the State contested it. And in its comments, the
district court emphasized the last-minute nature of Van Fossen’s request and
that it was contested by the State. This was both an accurate recitation and a
consideration encouraged by the rules. Iowa Ct. R. 15.302(4)(b), (i). We also
generally observe that trial judges have the discretion to prefer witness
testimony be delivered in-person as a matter of courtroom management,
given the advantages to the factfinder in assessing witness testimony in-
person. Cf. Iowa Ct. R. 15.404(4) (noting criminal proceedings without
witness testimony are presumed remote). In short, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to deny a last-minute contested request for
remote witness testimony at sentencing.

II. Sentence Imposed

As we understand his brief, Van Fossen also urges that the district
court abused its discretion when imposing sentence. We are not convinced.

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“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence
within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,
and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
“[O]ur task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district
court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds.” Id. at 725. To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the
burden to affirmatively show that the district court relied on improper factors
or clearly untenable reasons. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa
1998).

Van Fossen first claims the court impermissibly speculated that he
minimized, embellished, or misrepresented facts when speaking with Rosell.
We are not persuaded. If anything, we find the court’s concern that
Van Fossen minimized or was not forthright with Rosell is supported by our
independent review of the record. And we do not see anything outside the
record impermissibly coloring this finding; it is a reasonable inference to draw
from comparing Rosell’s testimony about his interactions with Van Fossen
with other record evidence, including trial evidence and the verdict. And, in
the end, the court’s comments on Rosell’s report speak to the weight the
court gave that evidence, which is a matter solely within the province of the
factfinder. It is beyond dispute that a failure to accept responsibility and lack
of remorse are proper sentencing considerations. E.g., State v. Knight, 701
N.W.2d 83, 89 (Iowa 2005).

Van Fossen next argues that the court’s sentencing decision was
untenable in three ways: he claims the court only focused on his perceived
lack of remorse, failed to impose the least restrictive punishment, and failed
to adequately consider Rosell’s report. On the first point, the court expressly

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considered the seriousness of Van Fossen’s crimes, how his crimes harmed
the victims, and his willingness to seek treatment. And the court noted Van
Fossen failed to seek counseling or any rehabilitative treatment over the last
five years. On the second, “mere disagreement with the sentence imposed,
without more, is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Pena, No. 15-0988, 2016 WL 1133807, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016).
And as to the third, we have previously held that a sentencing court need not
accept recidivism-experts’ opinions at face value. State v. Campie, No. 24-
0902, 2025 WL 1824640, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 2, 2025). Nor was the
district court required to specifically address each mitigating factor or more
lenient sentencing option when providing its reasoning. See State v. Ayers, 590
N.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Iowa 1999); State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995). Because Van Fossen failed to affirmatively show the court abused
its discretion, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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