State of Iowa v. Milton Andrew Bokemeyer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 24-1674
Filed January 7, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Milton Andrew Bokemeyer,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County,
The Honorable Joel Dalrymple, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED
_______________

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, J.

1
GREER, Judge.

On Milton Bokemeyer’s first appeal, a panel of our court found
insufficient evidence to support several of his convictions and concluded he
was entitled to a resentencing hearing on his three remaining convictions for
possession of methamphetamine, possession with the intent to manufacture
or deliver marijuana while in possession of a firearm, and possession of a
firearm by a felon. State v. Bokemeyer, No. 22-1988, 2024 WL 2035589, at
*2–4, *6–8 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024). Our court remanded the case to
the district court for resentencing. After the district court resentenced
Bokemeyer, he appealed. On appeal, Bokemeyer asserts the court abused its
discretion by considering improper factors and by reimposing his prior
sentence.

After reviewing the record, we find that the sentencing court did not
abuse its discretion and that Bokemeyer failed to prove a defect in the
resentencing process. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

After obtaining a tip from a woman who occasionally stayed at
Bokemeyer’s cabin and used methamphetamine with him there, the
Buchanan County Sheriff’s Office obtained a warrant to search the residence.
On July 29, 2021, deputies searched the cabin, where “they found
methamphetamine, two unprocessed marijuana plants, mushrooms, and a
firearm.” Id. at *1. Following the search, Bokemeyer was charged with
several crimes:
([I]) delivery or possession with intent to deliver more than five grams of
methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm; ([II]) failure to affix a
drug tax stamp (methamphetamine); ([III]) possession with intent to
deliver psilocybin while in possession of a firearm; ([IV]) failure to affix a

2
drug tax stamp (psilocybin); ([VI]) manufacturing marijuana while in
possession of a firearm; ([VII]) failure to affix a drug tax stamp
(unprocessed marijuana plant); ([VIII]) possession of a firearm by a
domestic-violence offender; and ([IX]) possession of a firearm by a felon.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Bokemeyer stipulated to being a
“prohibited person” and a felon for the last two charges. He also
stipulated to second-offense and habitual-offender enhancements for the
drug charges.1

Id. (cleaned up).

At trial, the jury found Bokemeyer guilty of the lesser crimes of
possession of methamphetamine and psilocybin on counts I and III,
respectively. The jury convicted him as charged for the remaining offenses.
The sentencing court sentenced him to two consecutive terms, a thirty-year
prison term for count VI and a fifteen-year prison term for count IX; all other
sentences were to be served concurrently with the forty-five-year term, with
a mandatory minimum sentence of nine years.

Bokemeyer appealed his convictions for possession of psilocybin,
failure to affix drug stamps, and possession of a firearm. Our court affirmed
counts I, VI, and IX; reversed the remaining convictions and vacated their
sentences; and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at *8. At
resentencing, the court reimposed the forty-five-year prison term with
mandatory nine-year minimum sentence. Bokemeyer appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the district court’s sentence for correction of errors at law.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). We will not disturb a
sentence unless the defendant shows an abuse of discretion or a defect in the

1
The State dismissed count V, possession with the intent to deliver hydrocodone,
because Bokemeyer possessed a valid prescription for the pills.

3
sentencing procedure. State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998).
“An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds
clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860
N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

Bokemeyer raises two claims on appeal. He argues the district court
(1) considered improper factors when determining his sentence and
(2) abused its discretion in reimposing the forty-five-year sentence. We
consider each argument in turn.

A. Improper Factors. First, Bokemeyer contends the sentencing
court considered improper factors by incorporating its reasoning from the
initial sentencing hearing, which referred to Bokemeyer’s residence as a “flop
house” for drug users. “It is a well-established rule that a sentencing court
may not rely upon additional, unproven, and unprosecuted charges unless
the defendant admits to the charges or there are facts presented to show the
defendant committed the offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. To that
end, Bokemeyer contends our supreme court should retain his case and
overrule State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 2000), which allowed a
sentencing court to consider evidence related to criminal conduct presented
at trial under a lower standard of proof at sentencing. Id. at 474–75. We
cannot accept that invitation. See State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700
(Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court
precedent.”). So, we review the improper-factor challenge to see if the
sentencing court relied upon unproven charges at the sentencing where there
were no supporting facts.

4
The same judge oversaw the trial and both of Bokemeyer’s sentencing
hearings. At the initial sentencing, the court offered the following
justifications for Bokemeyer’s sentence:
The court will impose the $430.00 fine in Counts I and III. Those
fines can’t be suspended. The court will impose the 365[-day] jail
sentence. In the Drug Tax Stamp violations of II, IV, and VII the court will
impose a fifteen-year term with a mandatory three [years]. Because the
fact that those are habitual felon enhanced, there will be no fines. Similarly
with regard to Counts VIII and IX, the court will impose a fifteen-year term
with a mandatory three years, and no fine.

The real issue is how the court will interpret Count VI and the
calculations here by way of concurrent and consecutive time. I am going
to—I recognize the law as it relates to the fact that this is a fifteen-year term
in light of the habitual felon application with no fine. Because it’s a second
offender, that doubles it, the fifteen years, with then making it a mandatory
six. The prior convictions by way of second offender triples it and can
make that upwards of ninety years with an eighteen-year mandatory
minimum. Recognizing all of that, contemplating the mitigating
circumstances in this case, the issues that you have outlined for me, the
recommendations from your attorney as well as [a previous attorney], that
I know to be an attorney but otherwise an individual of this community, I
am only going to impose a thirty-year sentence with a six-year mandatory
minimum. That said, I am going to run Count IX consecutive to this
because of the use of the firearm or the possession of a firearm and you
being a prohibited person because of your addiction, because of your prior
felony—or I should say felonies, plural. Each and every one of those bars
you from having possession of a firearm, and the possession of the firearm
in this particular scenario does warrant a consecutive term. So in sum, the
court is going to be imposing a forty-five-year sentence with a nine-year
mandatory minimum. All other counts will run concurrently with one
another.

Likewise, at the initial sentencing hearing, the sentencing court noted it
considered:
the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, your age, your
character, and your propensities or chances for reform. Again, I find this

5
to be appropriate given the nature of this offense, the repeated nature of
these offenses given the fact that this is technically your third lifetime
offense having been down this road before with regard to felony drug
offenses.

At resentencing, the State urged that the “same rationale exists [for
the sentences] as it did before for the sentencing” and asked the court to
impose the same sentence as previously ordered. Based on the record, the
sentencing court made clear that it eliminated the vacated convictions from
its consideration during the resentencing:
[c]onsistent with the Court’s reasoning in the prior sentencing the appellate
matters do not affect, I will impose a 365-day jail sentence, a thirty-year
prison sentence, and a [fifteen]-year prison sentence. Based upon the
reasons outlined in the first sentencing, I do find that the consecutive terms
of six and nine remain appropriate given the extensive prior criminal
history and the fact that this is a firearm offense.

(Emphasis added.)2 See State v. Kaye, No. 23-0216, 2025 WL 702003, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2025) (affirming a sentence where the district court
expressly disclaimed its consideration of an unproven robbery charge).

Still, Bokemeyer takes issue with the imposition of the exact same
sentence and points to the sentencing court’s comments from the initial
sentencing hearing that he contends showed consideration of improper
factors. In the initial sentencing hearing, the court stated:
Because I have imposed a consecutive term, I’m required to state on the
record why I’m imposing a consecutive term. And, again, the fact that you
are prohibited from having a firearm by way of your multiple prior felony
convictions, given the circumstances of the house, the conditions of this
residence, I should say, where all of these drugs were found, the court’s
perspective, having listened to the evidence at trial, that this is a flop house

2
The district court mistakenly said “five-year,” but later corrected itself in the
record.

6
utilized by numerous drug users within the community, the presence of
that firearm was not only illegal but extremely dangerous.

(Emphasis added.) The sentencing court did not again reference a “flop
house” in the resentencing but noted that the original sentence was still
appropriate given that this was a firearm offense and Bokemeyer’s lengthy
criminal history.

With respect to the flop house argument, Bokemeyer urges us to find
the district court’s characterization of his residence as a “flop house”3 shows
the court relied on the improper inference Bokemeyer delivered drugs to
“numerous drug users.” Bokemeyer contends there was no evidence
presented at trial to support the court’s characterization that the cabin was a
“hotel or rooming house” or that it was “utilized by numerous drug users
within the community.” Noting that the jury acquitted Bokemeyer of the
charge of delivery of methamphetamine, he argues that we should find that
“use of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates a defendant’s constitutional
rights to due process and a jury trial under both the U.S. and Iowa
Constitutions” or “[a]lternatively, the Court should use its inherent,
supervisory and administrative powers to prohibit district courts from using
acquitted conduct when determining the appropriate sentence for a
defendant.”

The court’s statement that the cabin was a flop house was not made in
reference to Bokemeyer’s delivery of methamphetamine to those visiting his
residence, which the jury rejected as a charged crime. Instead, the court
made the comment when discussing Bokemeyer’s possession of a firearm,
which was made more dangerous by the presence of drugs, and individuals

3
Meaning “a cheap low-grade rooming house or hotel.” Flophouse, Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed. 2002).

7
using drugs, at the cabin. As developed at trial, the tipster testified that
before she tipped off the deputies, she smoked methamphetamine with one
other person at the cabin, who had driven her there the day the deputies
picked her up. The tipster noted that her driver had been to the cabin before
and that he also had a drug problem, along with her and Bokemeyer. Several
photographs of the condition of the cabin with drug paraphernalia and other
controlled substances, including small baggies of methamphetamine,
scattered throughout the property were entered in evidence during the trial.
Weapons were found at the cabin. And, the investigating deputy testified the
amount of methamphetamine at the property exceeded that typically found
for personal use.

The sentencing court could consider the activity at the cabin that was
presented in the trial testimony during the sentencing. The record evidence
allowed for the inference the sentencing court made. See Longo, 608 N.W.2d
at 474–75 (“[A] sentencing judge is not required to deviate from the judge’s
own characterization of the nature of a crime committed based on sworn
testimony simply because the jury has characterized the offense
differently.”). Viewing the sentencing court’s statement in context, we
conclude the court was expressing its concern about the inherent danger
posed by having a gun at a residence where individuals were using drugs
rather than inferring the occurrence of a separate crime. See State v. Garner,
No. 22-0753, 2023 WL 2674102, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (finding
that while the district court’s statement could imply the consideration of an
unproven charge, the surrounding context showed a different intent). Finally,
“[w]e will not draw an inference of improper sentencing considerations
which are not apparent from the record,” thus we reject the argument that
the district court considered improper factors. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

8
B. Sentencing Discretion. Bokemeyer further asserts the district
court abused its discretion by reimposing the forty-five-year sentence.
“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within
the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id. at
724. When reviewing for abuse of discretion, “we do not decide the sentence
we would have imposed, but whether the sentence imposed was
unreasonable.” Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 554.

Bokemeyer does not dispute that the forty-five-year term was within
the purview of the court but contends the sentence was excessive considering
his age and rehabilitative progress. To his credit, Bokemeyer completed a
drug treatment program, along with other recovery programming, and told
the district court about other treatment options he would access upon his
release from prison. He also had been paying fines related to one of the
dismissed counts. But because the court imposed a sentence within its
discretion and Bokemeyer has not established that the court relied on an
improper factor to do so, we find the sentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in reimposing his original sentence. See State v. Schmitz,
No. 18-1776, 2020 WL 564826, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020). And as
the State noted, “although Bokemeyer’s convictions for five counts had been
dismissed in the [first] appeal, the district court originally imposed those
sentences concurrently to one another and the sentences imposed for counts
one, six, and nine remained.”

The sentencing court’s decision was not based on grounds clearly
untenable or unreasonable. See Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 554–56 (holding a
district court did not abuse its discretion when it made no changes to a
defendant’s sentence other than the removal of a vacated sentence). Given
the latitude provided to the sentencing court under our case law, we find no

9
abuse of discretion related to the sentence imposed here. See State v. Fetner,
959 N.W.2d 129, 133–34 (Iowa 2021).

IV. Conclusion.

Because we find the sentencing court did not rely on an improper
factor and did not abuse its discretion, we affirm Bokemeyer’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

10