In re Marriage of Johnson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2043
Filed December 17, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KATIE L. JOHNSON
AND MATTHEW W. JOHNSON

Upon the Petition of
KATIE L. JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
MATTHEW W. JOHNSON,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Melissa Anderson-Seeber, Judge.

Matt Johnson appeals the order modifying the decree dissolving his

marriage to Katie Johnson. AFFIRMED.

John J. Hines of JSC Legal, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellant.

Teresa A. Rastede of Klatt, Augustine & Rastede, P.C., Waterloo, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Matt Johnson appeals from the order modifying the child-custody provisions

of the decree dissolving his marriage to Katie Johnson. He contends the decree

should be modified to provide joint physical care for the parties’ children. In the

alternative, he contends the weekly visitation schedule should be modified to

increase his weekly visits to include overnights or add a second night of visitation.

Because the physical care and visitation set out in the modification order serve the

children’s best interests, we affirm and award Katie $1000 in appellate attorney

fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Matt and Katie married in 2012 and divorced in 2016. The dissolution

decree adopted the parties’ stipulation for joint legal custody of their two children

and placed the children in Katie’s physical care. Under the stipulation, Matt also

received overnight visits each Wednesday and alternating weekends.

In 2017 and 2018, Matt had mental-health and substance-use issues, which

led to criminal charges.1 In July 2018, the parties entered a joint stipulation to

modify visitation. Under the modified decree, Matt was allowed supervised visits

every Wednesday from 3 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. Matt agreed to strictly abide by a list

of safety rules, and Katie was given discretion to suspend visits if she suspected

Matt was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The parties agreed that Matt’s

visits would remain supervised until he completed three requirements: (1) engage

1 Matt pled guilty to third-degree burglary and assault causing bodily injury or

mental illness. In May 2019, the district court sentenced Matt to five years in
prison. Matt was released on parole in January 2020 and discharged from parole
in 2021.
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in regular mental-health counseling, (2) obtain a substance-use evaluation and

follow all recommendations, and (3) participate in chemical testing every sixty days

until three consecutive tests showed no drug use. The stipulation provides that

Matt’s completion of those requirements “shall be considered a substantial change

in circumstances for the purposes of modifying an Order.”2

In October 2023, Matt petitioned to modify the decree based on “successful

rehabilitation of his substance-use issues, the successful management of his

mental health and stable lifestyle he now enjoys.” He alleged that in the past year,

Katie had allowed him visitation “well beyond” what was provided in the modified

decree, including overnight visits.3 During court-ordered mediation, the parties

agreed to a new visitation schedule in which Matt is allowed unsupervised visits

from 3:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. each Wednesday plus alternating weekends.

Trial was held in August 2024, and the district court entered its ruling that

November. It found there was a substantial change in circumstances since the

2018 modification but denied Matt’s request for joint physical care based on past

volatility in the parties’ relationship. The court found the children’s best interests

are served in Katie’s physical care based on the stability she offers and the

children’s need for consistency. The court modified the decree’s visitation

schedule to formally adopt the schedule reached at mediation. It declined Matt’s

2 Although Katie allowed Matt unsupervised visits and some overnight weekend

visits after his release from prison, no evidence shows that he completed the
requirements included in the 2018 stipulation to modify visitation.
3 Katie counterclaimed to modify child support, and both parties asked the court to

establish a schedule for claiming child tax credits. Neither issue is challenged on
appeal.
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request for weekly overnight visits, granting him three non-consecutive weeks of

visitation during the summer instead.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the court’s ruling in a modification action de novo. In re Marriage

of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 332 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). “While we are not bound by

the fact-findings of the district court, we give them weight, especially as to

credibility determinations.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Physical Care.

Matt first contends that the physical-care provision of the parties’ decree

should be modified to place the children in their joint physical care. To modify the

decree, Matt had to show a material and substantial change in circumstances since

the decree was entered. See id. The district court found Matt met his burden by

showing “that he is actively in recovery and has stabilized his life.” Matt then had

to show that joint physical care serves the children’s best interests. See, e.g., In

re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007) (“Any consideration of

joint physical care, however, must still be based on Iowa’s traditional and statutorily

required child custody standard—the best interest of the child.”); In re Marriage of

Maxwell, No. 24-0893, 2025 WL 2538879, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2025)

(stating that a parent seeking to modify physical care from placement with one

parent to joint physical care must show a substantial change in circumstances and

that joint physical care is in the child’s best interests). Because the court found

Matt failed to show joint physical care serves the children’s best interests, we focus

our analysis there.
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The supreme court has listed four main factors to consider in determining

whether granting joint physical care is appropriate when both parents are suitable

caregivers. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696–99. The first factor is “stability and

continuity of caregiving,” as “past caretaking patterns” likely indicate “qualities such

as parental abilities and emotional bonds.” Id. at 696 (citation omitted). Because

“the caregiving of parents in the post-divorce world should be in rough proportion

to that which predated the dissolution,” “joint physical care is most likely to be in

the best interest of the child where both parents have historically contributed to

physical care in roughly the same proportion.” Id. at 697–98. The second factor

“is the ability of [parents] to communicate and show mutual respect.” Id. at 698.

Third, we consider “the degree of conflict between parents.” Id. The final factor,

which is particularly important “when there is a turbulent past relationship, is the

degree to which the parents are in general agreement about their approach to daily

matters.” Id. at 699.

The district court found that joint physical care is not appropriate here based

on “a history of volatility in this relationship going back many years.”

[Katie] reported to medical personnel at the birth of N.A.J., she was
scared of [Matt]. She testified that during the marriage, he would
make threats to harm her, including one time when he threatened to
murder her. He would make gestures to her which led to fear he
would strike her. [Matt] has denied ever being physically violent to
[Katie]. While these actions [Katie] described by [Matt] likely
occurred when he had not addressed his substance-use and mental-
health needs, they are the history of these parties. Due to the
domestic abuse episodes in the marriage, it is not in the children’s
best interest to grant joint physical care.

The court also found that the “stability and continuity” factor favors Katie, who has

acted as the children’s primary caregiver consistently since birth. Although the
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changes Matt has made since 2018 qualify as a substantial change in

circumstances, the court found they do not warrant overturning the parties’ original

stipulation regarding physical care.

Following our de novo review of the record, we agree that joint physical care

is not in the children’s best interests. Katie has acted as the children’s primary

physical caregiver since birth. After the parties divorced, she continued as their

caretaker during a period when Matt was largely absent from their lives. There are

also concerns about the parties’ ability to communicate and show mutual respect.

Although communication may have improved following the change in the visitation

schedule, text messages exchanged in the spring of 2024 show that tension

persists. Those messages also show ongoing conflict over the children’s activities,

which Matt perceives as encroaching on what he calls “my parenting time.” Finally,

we agree with the district court that the parties’ history weighs against awarding

joint physical care. We therefore affirm the denial of Matt’s request to modify the

decree’s physical-care provision.

IV. Visitation.

Next, we turn to Matt’s request for more visitation. Although the court

granted Matt’s request to modify the visitation schedule by adopting the schedule

the parties agreed on during mediation, it did not grant him weekly overnight visits

on Wednesday or a second night of visitation each Monday.

The showing required to modify visitation is less demanding than required

to modify physical care. See In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2009) (stating that visitation can be modified if there has been a material

change in circumstances). Again, the district court found Matt met his burden of
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showing circumstances have changed since the July 2018 decree was entered.

The question then is whether the requested modification to the visitation schedule

is in the children’s best interests. See id.

The district court found the agreement the parties reached during mediation

serves the children’s best interests and modified the parties’ decree to adopt that

schedule. But the court declined Matt’s request to increase the length of his

midweek visitation to include overnight visits. While the parties’ decree originally

provided Matt overnight visits every Wednesday, we note that the children were

not yet enrolled in school at the time. Now that the children attend school and “are

accustomed to getting to school every morning from [Katie]’s house,” the court was

concerned that changing their established routine would negatively impact their

academic performance.

Matt complains that nothing suggests that he cannot handle getting the

children ready and taking them to school on Thursdays. But this is not an issue of

means, as any capable caregiver should be able to do so. Rather, it concerns

consistency and stability. The children have a routine of getting ready for school

while in Katie’s home, and it works well as shown by the children’s school

performance. Although Matt may benefit from having an additional overnight visit

each week, we question whether sleeping at Matt’s home each Wednesday would

benefit the children and whether any benefit would offset the disruption to their

routine.

In the alternative, Matt asks for an additional four hours of weekly visitation

on another day of the week. He also asks that his summer visitation be increased

to six weeks, which he would alternate with Katie throughout the summer. For the
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same reasons that joint physical care is not appropriate, we decline to award Matt

the visitation he requests. Instead, we affirm the visitation schedule set out in the

modification order because it is in the children’s best interests.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Finally, Katie requests that we award her $10,777.50 in appellate attorney

fees. Whether to award attorney fees is a matter of discretion. Kisting, 6 N.W.3d

at 338. Although we consider the merits of the appeal and whether the party was

obliged to defend the district court’s decision on appeal, our primary consideration

is the parties’ relative financial positions. Id.

Because Katie successfully defended the trial court’s decision on appeal,

we grant her request for appellate attorney fees. But the district court found her

annual earnings are almost three times more than Matt’s. Based on the factors

stated above, we award her $1000 in appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.