In the Interest of J.B., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1500
Filed December 3, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.,
Minor Child,

E.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Matthew Schuling,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Whitney A. Estwick of Estwick Law, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Ivan E. Miller, Red Oak, attorney and guardian ad litem, for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and

Ahlers, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights

to her child, born in 2023.1 She challenges the statutory grounds authorizing

termination and whether termination is in the child’s best interests.2

Our review in termination-of-parental-rights cases is de novo. In re L.B.,

970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We follow a three-step process of determining

whether (1) the State has established a statutory ground for termination under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1); (2) the State has established that termination of

parental rights is in the children’s best interests after applying the framework in

section 232.116(2); and (3) a permissive exception under section 232.116(3)

should be applied. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).

We do not address any steps not challenged by a parent. Id.

1 The parental rights of the putative father and any unknown father were also

terminated. No father appeals.
2 The mother’s petition on appeal makes a passing reference to an argument that

the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable
efforts to facilitate reunification. But a reasonable-efforts challenge is not
preserved for our review unless the parent raises the issue to the juvenile court
prior to the termination trial. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002)
(requiring a parent challenging the adequacy of services raise the challenge to the
juvenile court “at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at
later review hearings”). Here, the mother never challenged the adequacy of the
services provided prior to the termination trial, so her argument is not preserved
for our consideration. See id.
The mother’s petition on appeal also refers to the permissive exceptions to
termination in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2025). However, it is the parent’s
burden to prove that an exception applies, In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76
(Iowa 2018), and the mother never advocated for application of any permissive
exception at the termination trial. Accordingly, any claim she attempts to raise
regarding application of a permissive exception is not preserved for our
consideration. See In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc)
(concluding that a parent asserting application of an exception under
section 232.116(3) must raise the issue to the juvenile court before the parent is
permitted to argue the issue on appeal).
3

The juvenile court found grounds for termination supported under

section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). When the juvenile court terminates on multiple

grounds, we can affirm based on any ground supported by the record. Id. We

elect to focus on section 232.116(1)(h), which permits termination of parental rights

upon clear and convincing evidence that (1) “[t]he child is three years of age or

younger”; (2) “[t]he child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance”;

(3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of a parent for at least

six of the last twelve months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody

of the parent at the present time. The mother only challenges the last element.

Following our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child

could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.

See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time”

as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean at the time of the termination hearing).

The family came to the attention of the department when the child was born with

THC in his system and again following reports that the putative father domestically

abused the mother in the presence of the child. Then the department learned that

a relative took the child to the hospital due to bruising and physical marks on the

child’s body. That incident prompted the State to petition for adjudication of the

child as in need of assistance, which the juvenile court granted. The mother

pleaded guilty to child endangerment relating to the underlying events and was

placed on probation. She was charged with operating while intoxicated in August

2024 for driving with methamphetamine and THC in her system. And then she

tested positive for methamphetamine when tested by her probation officer in

October. In the subsequent probation-revocation proceeding, her probation was
4

modified to require her to reside at a residential correctional facility (RCF). She

remained there at the time of the termination hearing and hoped to be discharged

by September 2025.3 Because the RCF would not permit the child to reside with

her, that fact alone prevented the child from being returned to the mother’s custody

at the time of the termination trial—a point the mother concedes in her petition on

appeal when she argues only that the child could be “eventually placed back in the

[mother]’s home.”

Even if the mother’s placement at the RCF did not prevent custody being

returned to her, we would still conclude that the child could not be safely returned

to the mother. She has serious substance-use issues that remain unresolved. She

began using methamphetamine when she was just thirteen years old.4 And she

has not demonstrated the ability to remain sober for any meaningful period outside

a custodial setting. Even while in the structured setting of the RCF, the mother

admitted to “huffing dusters” to get high a week before the termination trial.

We agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely returned

to the mother at the time of the termination hearing, satisfying a statutory ground

for termination under section 232.116(1)(h).

Still, the mother argues that termination is not in the child’s best interests.

When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the

child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and

growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs

of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Given the mother’s lack of progress and

3 The termination trial was held on July 17.
4 The mother was thirty-six years old at the time of the termination hearing.
5

historical inability to keep the child safe, we agree with the juvenile court that

termination is in the child’s best interests.

Moreover, the child’s foster care placement already adopted two of his

siblings and are interested in adopting him as well. See id. § 232.116(2)(b)

(allowing the court, in assessing the child’s best interests, to consider “whether the

child has become integrated into the foster family” and “whether the foster family

is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family”). The

child is doing well with the foster family. See id. And terminating the mother’s

rights is a necessary step before the foster family can adopt the child and

permanently integrate him into their family with his siblings. We find termination of

the mother’s rights to be in the child’s best interests.

We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental

rights.

AFFIRMED.