Javonte Devar Hines Miller v. Ashlea Kay Teter

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1879
Filed October 29, 2025

JAVONTE DEVAR HINES-MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ASHLEA KAY TETER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County,

Christopher C. Polking, Judge.

Ashlea Teter appeals the denial of her petition to modify the physical care

provisions of the decree establishing custody of the child she shares with Javonte

Hines-Miller. AFFIRMED.

Thomas L. Hillers (argued) of Hillers Legal, P.C., State Center, for appellant.

Jason Springer (argued) of Springer Law Firm, PLLC, Madrid, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Ashlea Teter appeals the denial of her second petition to modify the physical

care provisions of the decree resolving issues of child custody, support, and

visitation of the child she shares with Javonte Hines-Miller. She contends the court

erred by declining to transfer physical care of the child to her after finding that

Javonte has a history of domestic violence. Because Ashlea failed to meet her

burden of showing that she can offer superior parenting, we must affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This action concerns one child that Ashlea and Javonte share: K.A.M., who

was born in 2016. Ashlea has two older children: an eleven-year-old daughter who

lives with her and a nine-year-old son who is in her care every other weekend.

They live in Boone with Ashlea’s fiancée and his six-year-old son. Javonte lives in

Ames with his wife and their two daughters.

A. Custody Decree

In January 2020, the district court entered a decree establishing K.A.M.’s

paternity, custody, visitation, and support. The court found each party was a

suitable caretaker and granted joint legal custody, but it found that Javonte was

the child’s primary caretaker and more attentive to the child’s needs. Although the

court acknowledged the hostility between the parties and their need to improve

communication, it found that Javonte did a better job of supporting the child’s

relationship with the other parent.

Before determining physical care of the child, the district court cited its

concerns about three incidents of domestic abuse involving Javonte. The first

incident occurred in 2012, when Javonte was still in high school, and involved his
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then-girlfriend. As the court found, the incident “involved no direct physical

assault,” and Javonte was convicted of disorderly conduct rather than domestic

abuse assault. As a result, Javonte took an eight-hour assault behavior class.

The second incident occurred in 2015 during an argument between Javonte

and Ashlea. Javonte claimed that both he and Ashlea “got physical,” and Javonte

was charged with a felony. The charge was dismissed because Ashlea signed an

affidavit stating that nothing happened, she was unharmed and unafraid, and the

charge was unfair. But at the custody trial, Ashlea testified that Javonte pushed

her to the floor, pushed her over a couch, strangled her, and threw her to the

ground. Ashlea claimed she signed the affidavit because Javonte pressured her.

Though the court found that Ashlea’s description of the event was “troubling,” it

noted that Ashlea lied either in her sworn statement or at trial. It also found that

both parties “seemed to try to exaggerate the negative incidents of the other party.”

The third incident occurred in 2016 while K.A.M. was present. Javonte

claimed that he tried to leave with K.A.M., but Ashlea blocked him and spit in his

face. Javonte responded by “head butt[ing]” Ashlea. The State filed criminal

charges against Javonte, who pled guilty to domestic abuse assault and completed

twenty-six weeks of batterer’s education. He was granted a deferred judgment,

and his conviction was expunged.

The district court noted that there were no incidents of assault involving

Javonte after he completed batterer’s education for the 2016 assault. As a result,

the court found that the presumption against awarding Javonte custody had been

rebutted. The court then concluded that Javonte “otherwise seems best suited to
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meet the long-term best interests of the child” and placed K.A.M. in his physical

care.

B. First Modification Action

In June 2021, less than eighteen months after its entry, Ashlea petitioned

to modify the physical care provisions of the decree. She alleged a substantial

change of circumstances based on an incident that occurred in May 2020 between

Javonte and an ex-girlfriend. As a result, Javonte pled guilty to domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury and stalking in violation of a no-contact order in

November 2020. Javonte received a suspended sentence. The court deemed the

incident “troubling” but found it was isolated and did not constitute a substantial

change in circumstances because “K.A.M. was not present during this incident and

there was no evidence that this situation affected him in any way.”

Ashlea also alleged that Javonte failed to support and interfered with her

relationship with K.A.M. She cited Javonte’s failure to provide her with the child’s

soccer schedule or contact information for his school. Javonte disputed Ashlea’s

claim and presented testimony from two witnesses who were present during phone

conversations between Javonte and Ashlea. Although the court did not find the

parties “particularly credible during their testimony,” it found that Javonte’s

witnesses were credible. It also noted testimony regarding unfounded reports

Ashlea made to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services regarding

Javonte, which lent credibility to his claim that Ashlea was trying to create

situations to use against him in court. The court found insufficient evidence to

support Ashlea’s claim that Javonte tried to interfere with her relationship with the
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child. The court further found that although both parties could do a better job of

communicating, their issues did not have a disruptive effect on the child.

The court considered the circumstances Ashlea claimed individually, as well

as their combined effect, and found they did not amount to a substantial change in

circumstances that warranted modifying the custody decree.

Furthermore, the Court cannot find the child will receive superior care
from Ashlea vis-a-vis the current custodial arrangement. Javonte
continues to be employed, is financially stable, lives in a three
bedroom townhome and although he appears to rely significantly on
others to help with K.A.M, all of the child’s needs are currently being
met. K.A.M. does well in school and is involved in extracurricular
activities. He is described by both parties as a very happy child. Both
parents appear to be loving and supportive parents.

The court denied Ashlea’s 2021 petition.

C. Second Modification Action

Ashlea petitioned to modify the custody decree again in February 2023,

citing criminal charges filed after a January 2023 altercation between Javonte and

his now-wife,1 who was injured when he tried to remove the engagement ring from

her finger. K.A.M. was not in the home when the event occurred, but Javonte’s

two other children witnessed at least part of the incident. The criminal complaint

also alleged that Javonte pulled his now-wife by her hair, got on top of her, and

strangled her with both hands. At the modification trial, Javonte’s now-wife denied

that he strangled her, claiming that she lied to the police because she was mad at

Javonte. After viewing the evidence, the court did not find her testimony credible.

Javonte pled guilty to domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, was placed on

probation, and has since completed a batterer’s education class.

1 The two were engaged at the time. They married in July 2024.
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Although Javonte’s serial incidents of domestic abuse appeared as isolated

incidents at the time they occurred, both the custody decree and first modification

order expected that the behavior would not be repeated. Based on the 2023

incident, the court found a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. It

also found that the incidents constitute a history of domestic abuse, creating a

presumption against joint custody.

The court then turned to whether Ashlea can provide superior care. It found

no evidence that Javonte’s behavior has had a direct negative effect on K.A.M.

The court acknowledged Ashlea’s claim that K.A.M. has been aggressive when he

is in her home. But K.A.M.’s latest report card did not indicate aggression was a

problem at school, and the evidence did not show it is a problem when K.A.M. is

in Javonte’s home.

The case presents a very difficult issue, particularly in the
context of a modification action. The history of domestic abuse
behavior of Javonte creates a presumption against joint custody,
which he can rebut. There is also a heavy burden on Ashlea to show
that she can offer superior parenting. Ashlea has had stable housing
and employment for several years now, but so has Javonte. It
appears from Ashlea’s testimony that she would continue doing what
Javonte has as far as schooling and extracurriculars like football.
There is no indication from the evidence that one parent
communicates better than the other or is more supportive or not
supportive of the other parent’s relationship. The relationship of the
parents in co-parenting appears to have settled down into a
lukewarm relationship with neutral visitation exchanges (which is
better than many separated parents manage).
In three trials now before the Court, Ashlea has focused on
the flaws of Javonte. Not all of her complaints have been found
credible. But as the movant in a modification action where she seeks
a shift in physical care, she must also show that she is able to be a
superior parent. Yet, the court relatively does not know much about
her other than her employment and housing situation, and that she
apparently aims to do the same things for K.A.M. as Javonte has.
She has lived with her fiancé for four years, but the court knows
nothing about him or what he has to offer to K.A.M. other than being
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available for childcare on the nights that Ashlea works. There is a
general paucity in the record of the positives that Ashlea is prepared
to bring rather than the negatives she thinks Javonte has. She has
another child of whom she does not have primary care, and the
reason for that is unknown.
....
Essentially, based on the record, the question appears to the
court to be is Ashlea’s lack of a history of domestic abuse enough to
make her a superior parent at this time to Javonte? The court must
conclude it is not, due to her heavy burden to show superior
parenting, as this is the only factor in regard to which the court finds
evidence that she would do better than Javonte. The heavy burden
exists as the courts recognize there is a significant disruptive effect
to a child if their care arrangement of several years is changed.
While Javonte’s history of domestic abuse is a significant concern
even in the absence of proven exposure to K.A.M., the court does
not have a clear idea of what parenting strengths Ashlea would
otherwise bring that are not matched by what Javonte is doing.
The preponderance of the credible evidence is that K.A.M. is
doing well and the court does not wish to interrupt that stability.
This is not to be taken in any way as a diminishment of the
seriousness of the fact that Javonte has a history of domestic abuse.
He must finally change his behavior. The existence of this history
made this a terribly close case where it otherwise would not have
been.

The court dismissed Ashlea’s modification petition.

II. Scope of Review.

We review matters of child custody de novo. See Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949

N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). On de novo review, we examine the entire

record before us and decide anew the issues presented on appeal. Id. at 5. We

give weight to the district court’s factual findings, especially those involving witness

credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id.

III. Physical Care.

Before the court can modify child custody, the party seeking modification

must show “by a preponderance of evidence that conditions since the decree was

entered have so materially and substantially changed that the children’s best
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interests make it expedient to make the requested change.” Id. at 5 (citation

omitted). The changed circumstances must not have been contemplated by the

court when the decree was entered. Id. In addition, they must be “more or less

permanent, not temporary,” and relate to the child’s welfare. Id. (citation omitted).

If the requirement of a substantial change in circumstances is met, the court

then determines child custody. Id. Our primary concern in doing so is the child’s

best interests. Id. The goal is to place children in the environment that is most

likely to foster physical and mental health, as well as social maturity. Id. at 7.

Because physical care decisions “should be disturbed only for the most cogent

reasons,” a noncustodial parent must show an ability to minister more effectively

to the child’s wellbeing. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).

In fashioning an award of legal custody,2 Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(a)

requires that the court provide a child “maximum continuing physical and emotional

contact with both parents” and “will encourage parents to share the rights and

responsibilities of raising the child” unless doing so will cause harm. “[I]f the court

finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a rebuttable presumption against the

awarding of joint [legal] custody exists.”3 Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(b). Even though

2 Because Ashlea and Javonte never married, this case is governed by
chapter 600B (2023). But we apply the provisions of section 598.41 to custodial
determinations made under chapter 600B. See Iowa Code § 600B.40(2).
3 In chapter 598, the term “custody” is used interchangeably with “legal custody” to

mean “an award of the rights of legal custody of a minor child to a parent under
which a parent has legal custodial rights and responsibilities toward the child,” such
as “decision making affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education,
extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.” Iowa Code § 598.1(3). The
terms “joint custody” and “joint legal custody” mean that both parents have legal
custodial rights and responsibilities toward the child and neither has rights superior
to the other. Id. § 598.1(5). In contrast, the term “physical care” is used to describe
the right and responsibility to maintain the child’s home and provide for the child’s
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the statutory presumption does not apply here because Ashlea is not challenging

legal custody, the court may consider a history of domestic abuse in determining

which physical-care arrangement is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 598.41(3)(j).

Although section 598.41(3) does not expressly state that the factors listed

in that section apply to determinations of physical care, our case law states they

are relevant in determining which physical-care arrangement is in the child’s best

interest. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 2007)

(“Although Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to physical care

decisions, we have held that the factors listed here as well as other facts and

circumstances are relevant in determining whether joint physical care is in the best

interest of the child.”).

We have previously recognized domestic abuse as a factor in
determining the custodial parent. This stems from the ravaging and
long-term consequences of domestic abuse on children. A child who
grows up in a home plagued with battering can, in many significant
ways, be scarred for life. Thus, spousal abuse discloses a serious
character flaw in the batterer, and an equally serious flaw in
parenting. It also constitutes a crime. Consequently, we believe
evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given
considerable weight in determining the primary caretaker, and under
some circumstances even foreclose an award of primary care to a
spouse who batters. Domestic abuse is, in every respect,
dramatically opposed to a child’s best interests.

In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 54–55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (internal

citations and footnote omitted).

routine care. Id. § 598.1(7). And “joint physical care” means an award of physical
care to both joint legal custodial parents under which both have rights and
responsibilities toward the child, including shared parenting time, and maintaining
homes for the child without either parent having physical care rights superior to the
other parent. Id. § 598.1(4). Applying these definitions to section 598.41, the
rebuttable presumption discussed in section 598.41(1)(b) pertains to the award of
legal custody, not physical care.
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Ashlea contends the district court erred by declining to modify physical care

based on Javonte’s history of domestic abuse. She claims that requiring evidence

that a parent’s history of domestic abuse directly impacts the child effectively

nullifies the enactment of Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(b). But this argument

ignores the fact that section 598.41(1)(b) only applies to legal custody

determinations, and Ashlea did not seek modification of the decree’s provisions

granting the parties joint legal custody. Only physical care is at issue here.

As to physical care, Javonte’s history of domestic violence is a factor, see

Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j), and it is factor that weighs heavily against Javonte. But

we must still consider the larger picture in determining the child’s physical-care

placement. In deciding how much weight to give evidence of domestic abuse, we

consider the nature of the abuse, the severity, whether it was repeated, and to

whom it was directed. In re Marriage of Forbes, 570 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1997).

Historically, we weigh a parent’s history of domestic abuse most heavily in cases

when it occurred in the child’s presence. In re Marriage of Grandinetti, 342 N.W.2d

876, 879 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). But we avoid elevating any single factor “to the

point where it becomes the sole dispositive factor” as “a custody assessment

demands judges look at both the affirmative and negative attributes of each parent

and their plans for future care of the child[].” In re Marriage of Shea, No. 98-1396,

2000 WL 62941, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2000).

We turn then to the unique facts of this case. The record shows that K.A.M.

is doing well in Javonte’s care. K.A.M. has never been present during any acts of

domestic violence. More importantly, there is no evidence that any of those acts

of domestic violence have adversely affected him. The question, then, is whether
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Ashlea met her burden by showing she can offer superior care. Unfortunately, her

focus during the original custody action and both modification actions has been on

Javonte’s flaws rather than her abilities. As a result, the record showing the life

that K.A.M. would receive in Ashlea’s care is sparse compared to the evidence

showing the life Javonte is providing. With no indication of what K.A.M.’s life looks

like with Ashlea acting as physical caretaker, we have no way of determining

whether a change would make things worse for K.A.M. by taking him from a home

at which he is doing well and placing him in an unknown—and thus potentially

inferior—setting. It was Ashlea’s burden to remove that unknown and demonstrate

her superior parenting ability, but she did not meet that burden.

We also emphasize that “[o]ur decision to affirm the district court’s decision

on the physical care issue could be accurately described as ‘written in sand’ rather

than ‘written in stone.’” In re Marriage of Hager, No. 00-1916, 2002 WL 531516,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002). As the district court noted, the dearth of

evidence makes this “a terribly close case where it otherwise would not have

been.” And we echo its caution that Javonte “must finally change his behavior.”

Our decision is not an endorsement of Javonte’s actions and should not be

interpreted as such. To the contrary, we abhor his actions. But the law places the

burden of proof on Ashlea, so she must make some affirmative showing that her

care is superior. Because she failed to present the necessary evidence to meet

her burden, we must affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Ahlers, P.J., concurs; Sandy, J., dissents.
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SANDY, Judge (dissenting).

The district court found that Javonte Hines-Miller strangled and committed

other acts of domestic violence against his girlfriend in 2023—acts which, when

considered alongside his past history of domestic abuse, establish a continuing

pattern of behavior that shows no signs of change. In my view, Javonte’s domestic

violence presents a great enough threat to his child’s safety and development that

the basic display of stability presented by the child’s mother, Ashlea Teter,

demonstrates her superior ability to minister to the needs of the child.

Both our legislature4 and courts have taken a strong stance against the

scourge of domestic violence. Our supreme court has recognized that, even when

the act of domestic violence was not committed against the child, “children living

in a home with a batterer have a seventy percent chance of becoming the victim

of abuse themselves. In addition, forty percent of suspected child abuse involves

a history of family violence.” In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 153 (Iowa 2017) (cleaned

up). These risks are elevated in homes where the abuser “refuses to meaningfully

4 I find Iowa Code section 598.41 (2023) informative on this issue.
Paragraph (1)(b) provides that “if the court finds that a history of domestic abuse
exists, a rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists,” and
paragraph (2)(c) further establishes that a domestic abuse finding “which is not
rebutted, shall outweigh consideration of any other [best interests] factor.” Iowa
Code § 598.41(1)(b), (2)(c). Since we are deciding physical care rather than
custody, section 598.41 arguably does not control the disposition in this case. But
I fail to see how legal custody and physical care can be cogently separated in the
context of 598.41’s application. However, that is a question left for another day.
Section 598.41 is useful for emphasizing our legislature’s belief that domestic
abuse profoundly threatens the child. And we do look to section 598.41 in physical
care cases when deciding the child’s best interests. See In re Marriage of Hansen,
733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 2007). So I would argue that if the legisture does not
trust a domestic abuser to choose their child’s dentist, it certainly does not trust
that same abuser to care for the child on a daily basis.
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address the issues of abuse within the household.” See id. at 154. That guidance

is directly applicable to the facts of this case where Javonte has continued to

engage in abuse the previous order did not contemplate and his victim recanted

her accusations—which our supreme court has recognized is common among

victims of domestic abuse. See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 187–88

(Iowa 2016).

Javonte has a history of domestic incidents dating back to 2012. I think it

is worth emphasizing that every incident has escalated from the previous one.

Following the 2012 incident, the court found no evidence of a “direct physical

assault.” Then, in 2015, Javonte and Ashlea “got physical.” Next, Javonte “head

butted” Ashlea in 2016. The three initial incidents were taken into consideration in

the initial custody order, presumably under the belief that they would not continue.

But in 2020, Javonte pleaded guilty to domestic assault causing bodily injury and

stalking in relation to acts committed against his then-girlfriend. Now, Javonte is

accused of having pulled his now-wife, Kaylee, by her hair, climbed on top of her,

and then strangled her.

The district court concluded that

[e]ssentially, based on the record, the question appears to the court
to be is Ashlea’s lack of a history of domestic abuse enough to make
her a superior parent at this time to Javonte? The court must
conclude it is not, due to her heavy burden to show superior
parenting, as this is the only factor in regard to which the court finds
evidence that she would do better than Javonte.
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The district court was correct in its framing of the issue. Indeed the question

was, all other things being equal,5 is Ashlea’s lack of domestic abuse history

enough to make her a superior parent? The answer is yes. Following the district

court’s finding of a history of domestic abuse, Ashlea’s basic showing of stability

satisfies her heavy burden to show that she can offer superior parenting. To find

otherwise directly places the child in harm.

The notion that the child is not negatively affected because that child was

not present for some of the domestic abuse incidents (of which there were five)

and did not manifest negative effects from the violent assaults is troubling. In my

opinion it fails to recognize the insidious effect of domestic abuse on families. And

while domestic abuse is harmful to all members of the family unit, Javonte’s

escalating acts raise the question: when will the next one occur?

In In re Marriage of Brainard this court aptly addressed how a child who is

raised in a home with a habitual batterer is impacted. 523 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1994). “Children raised in homes touched by domestic abuse are often

left with deep scars, revealed in the form of increased anxiety, insecurity and a

greater likelihood for later problems in interpersonal relationships.” Id. “Moreover,

domestic abuse places children at a greater risk of being physically abused.” Id.

“It is estimated that child abuse is present in one-half of homes where spousal

abuse is present.” Id. at 615 n.2. “It is believed that about seventy percent of

batterers grew up in violent homes.” Id. “The history of family violence or abuse

5 It is important to note that no allegation was made relative to Ashlea being an

inappropriate caregiver.
15

is the most significant difference between delinquent and non delinquent youth.”

Id.

The Brainard court went on to observe that “[o]ur courts have previously

recognized that violent tendencies of a parent adversely impact on the fitness of

that parent to be the primary caretaker of a child.” Id. at 615. “Similarly, we believe

evidence of domestic abuse adversely reflects on the abusing spouse’s ability to

participate as a joint custodian.” Id.

Javonte’s home is an inappropriate primary residence for the child for no

other reason than Javonte and Kaylee’s inability to accept the reality of the

situation. Although missing from the majority opinion, the district court concluded,

“While [the child] was again not exposed to the most recent event, Javonte and

Kaylee’s two other children were. While they deny this, it is contradicted by what

Kaylee told the police the next day, and the court finds the denials not credible,

and unconvincing.” During Kaylee’s cross examination at the custody modification

trial she doubled down and testified that Javonte did not strangle her and claimed

she had lied to the police when she told them that Javonte had strangled her to the

point of almost losing consciousness. The problem? Photographic evidence taken

by law enforcement shortly after the incident shows bruising on her neck. Kaylee’s

lack of candor provides no assurance that the incident and behaviors are being

properly managed. There is a lack of accountability within the home. Self-

reflection and mature recognition of what occurred and how to move forward in a

healthy manner is lacking. Additionally, Javonte’s denial under oath that he

committed the violent acts illustrates his failure to address the seriousness of his

own actions.
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I would not penalize Ashlea for the “general paucity in the record of positives

that Ashlea is prepared to bring rather than the negatives she thinks Javonte has.”

When the “negatives” to which the district court refers are the continued acts of

repeatedly and violently beating women, the central factors of stability offered by

Ashlea are more than sufficient to show she is the superior caretaker. Instead of

crediting Ashlea for years of employment as a medical tech, living with her fiancé

in the same home for the past four years, and raising three other children in that

home, the district court dismissed those factors. I would argue these factors

display Ashlea’s superior caretaking abilities over Javonte.

It is well established law that “domestic abuse is, in every respect,

dramatically opposed to a child’s best interests.” In re Marriage of Daniels, 568

N.W.2d 51, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). It “discloses a serious character flaw in the

batterer, and an equally serious flaw in parenting.” Id.

In my opinion, the answer to the question of whether “Ashlea’s lack of a

history of domestic abuse [is] enough to make her a superior parent” is a

resounding ‘yes.’ And because the answer is yes, I respectfully dissent.