Alivonta Deneil Turner v. Ariana Elizabeth Garrels

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0895
Filed September 4, 2025

ALIVONTA DENEIL TURNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

ARIANA ELIZABETH GARRELS,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher Bruns,

Judge.

A father appeals the district court’s custody order granting the mother

physical care and sole legal custody to their child. AFFIRMED.

Alivonta De Neil Turner, Cedar Rapids, self-represented appellant.

Thomas J. Viner of Viner Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Telleen,

S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
2

TELLEEN, Senior Judge.

Alivonta Deneil Turner appeals the district court’s custody order granting

Ariana Elizabeth Garrels physical care and sole legal custody to their child. In

addition to arguments regarding the custody and physical care issues, Turner

argues that Iowa Code section 610.1 (2022), which provides the fee for ordering

the transcript of the district court proceedings cannot be deferred, is

unconstitutional and that requiring him to pay the transcript fee violates his

constitutional rights. Because Turner has waived all issues he has raised on

appeal,1 we affirm the district court’s order.

1 Turner also filed a “motion to take judicial notice and supplement the record”

during the pendency of this appeal. Although we are permitted to take judicial
notice on appeal, see State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa 2013),
Turner does not identify how Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.801 would
authorize supplementing the record with the documents he seeks to introduce.
And, in his motion, he does not describe those documents’ relevance to this appeal
beyond broad, conclusory assertions that the interceding events depicted in those
documents “interfere[d] with [his] lawful visitation rights,” “reinforced a pattern of
unequal treatment and judicial bias,” displayed “misuse of judicial power,” and
“demonstrate the chilling effect on a self-represented father.” We accordingly deny
Turner’s motion.
Additionally, we note that Turner quoted at least one nonexistent case in his
judicial-notice motion. It thus appears that Turner may have misused an artificial
intelligence tool when preparing the motion. So we once again “stress that self-
represented litigants and attorneys alike have a duty to independently verify the
authenticity and veracity of all sources and assertations when relying on artificial
intelligence tools to prepare trial or appellate court filings.” Luke v. State,
No. 24-1421, 2025 WL 2237311, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025). Although a
pro se litigant is not subject to the same ethical duties as an attorney, we expect
attorneys and pro se litigants to “all . . . act with equal competence.” See Kubik v.
Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In February 2022, Turner petitioned to establish custody, care, visitation,

and support over the child born of his relationship with Ariana Garrels. 2 He

requested joint legal custody and shared physical care of the child, and that

Garrels be responsible for attorney fees and court costs.

Trial was held on the petition in March 2024. In large part, that trial revolved

around questions as to whether and to what extent Turner had engaged in acts of

domestic assault against Garrels. The district court concluded that in or around

2017, “there was an assault on [Garrels] by [Turner],” Turner “made contact with

[Garrels]’s face in some sort of offensive manner,” he waved a knife at Garrels in

“a threatening manner” and “made show of” carrying a pistol, and Turner

“threatened [Garrels] with potential harm from the pistol.” Turner was arrested

following the incident with the pistol and disappeared from the child’s life for

months at a time while Garrels cared for the child.

Turner later filed the petition to establish custody, care, visitation, and

support. A temporary matters hearing was held in May 2022, and the district court

awarded Garrels physical care. Turner was granted supervised visitation, which

eventually progressed to unsupervised visitation. Following the March 2024 trial,

the district court concluded that Turner had spent much of the time under the

temporary order attempting to undermine Garrels’s role as a parent. He has also

“engaged in a campaign to intimidate [Garrels] in regard to her relationship with

2 Due to the lack of transcript in the record, we recite the facts and proceedings as

described by the district court in its written ruling and as evidenced by the filings
available in the case pleadings binder.
4

her current boyfriend” and “falsely accuse[d] [Garrels] of having sexual relations

with her current attorney.” The district court also found Turner insists that “[Garrels]

should not have [the child] at the law office where [Garrels] works” because “the

[law] office is a cultist type environment.” And during the period under the

temporary order, Turner escalated a disagreement over what swimsuit the child

should wear to the point that law enforcement was called and forced to “broker a

resolution in front of [the child].”

The district court expressly found that

there is a history of domestic abuse of [Garrels] by [Turner].
Although [Turner] has been unable to carry out further acts of
physical abuse since [Garrels] separated from him and since the
temporary orders were modified to require exchanges at the Cedar
Rapids Police Department, he did commit such acts before the
separation. Further, his behavior since the temporary orders were
issued, when he knew the court was watching, have reflected the
efforts at intimidation and control that typify domestic abuse.
Because [Garrels] has established a history of domestic
abuse, the presumption in this case becomes one of sole legal
custody to [Garrels] with visitation to [Turner].

The district court further found that the parties regularly disagree relating to

healthcare and schooling issues. The court was skeptical the parties would

improve their parenting relationship moving forward based on the “extremely

acrimonious” period under the temporary order. Thus, it concluded, “[w]hen it

comes to which parent should be awarded sole legal custody or primary care, the

approximation rule overwhelming favors an award to [Garrels].” This is due to the

fact that Garrels has always been the primary breadwinner and caretaker, and “[the

child] is doing very well under [Garrels]’s care. She is performing very well at

school other than a significant number of absences. She is relatively healthy. She

appears to be very well adjusted.”
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In April 2024, the district court awarded Garrels sole legal custody and

physical care of the child, with regular scheduled visitation granted to Turner. The

district court also assessed monthly child support against Turner and made him

responsible for court costs.

On April 30, Turner filed this appeal. In September, Garrels moved to

dismiss Turner’s appeal due to Turner’s failure to order a transcript by the August

10 deadline to do so. Turner responded to Garrels’s motion by asserting “good

cause” for the delay due to financial hardship. He also moved for waiver of

transcript costs. On October 3, our supreme court denied Garrels’s motion to

dismiss and ordered Turner to pay the transcript fee within fourteen days. Turner

responded to the supreme court order by requesting the supreme court reconsider

its denial of his request for a transcript fee waiver, broadly asserting a constitutional

guarantee to access to justice regardless of financial circumstances.

In November, the supreme court then entered an order directing that this

appeal “should proceed without preparation of the transcript,” noting that under

Iowa Code section 610.1, “the transcript fee cannot be deferred.” The supreme

court determined that “[i]n addition to any other arguments the appellant raises in

his appellate brief, the parties shall brief the issue of whether requiring payment of

the transcript violates the appellant’s constitutional rights.”

The parties subsequently filed their appellate briefs.

II. Standard of Review

We review orders involving child custody and child support de novo. Thorpe

v. Hostetler, 949 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). We also review

constitutional challenges de novo. In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 8
6

(Iowa 1997). “While we are not bound by the fact-findings of the district court, we

give them weight, especially as to credibility determinations.” Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d

at 5.

III. Discussion

Turner raises numerous issues on appeal. Several of his arguments are

limited to topic headings, and all the issues he raises contain only cursory

reference to legal authority. These two-to-three-sentence argument sections do

not sufficiently facilitate our review. Vague assertions that the district court ruling

“violates due process and equal protection” and “undermined the overall fairness

of the trial” without citation to authority or reference to the record do not

meaningfully identify findings of fact or conclusions of law with which Turner

disagrees. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8).

And “[t]o the extent he sufficiently formulates argument[s] for the first time

in his reply brief, we do not consider [them].” See Goebel v. Green Line Polymers,

Inc., No. 18-1244, 2019 WL 4678169, at *3 n.8 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2019);

Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(4) (“Issues may not be asserted for the first time in the reply

brief.”). Turner has divided his reply brief into (1) sections replying to the appellee

brief, and (2) sections setting forth his primary arguments. That approach is

contrary to our appellate rule governing reply briefs—that rule establishes that the

reply brief is meant to “reply to the brief of the appellee,” not to establish one’s

primary arguments on appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(4).

Despite his waiver of all issues, we nonetheless do our best to interpret and

address the arguments raised in the “Argument” section of Turner’s appellant’s

brief without conducting his research for him.
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A. Constitutional Violations

Iowa Code section 610.1 provides that “[t]his section does not allow the

deferral of the cost of a transcript.” Turner argues that “[b]y taxing costs to [Turner]

and requiring transcript fees” pursuant to Iowa Code section 610.1 that “he cannot

afford, the final decree effectively denies meaningful appellate review,” and

“[i]mposing full court costs on [Turner], who lacks sufficient resources, violates due

process and equal protection” under the United States Constitution. The lone legal

authority Turner cites for both of these arguments comes from M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519

U.S. 102, 111–12 (1996).

Turner fails to delineate how M.L.B. supports his position beyond that

“fundamental rights cannot be conditioned on wealth” and that “states cannot place

insurmountable financial barriers on appeals involving parental rights.” But we can

easily distinguish M.L.B. from Turner’s case. Quoting Lassiter v. Department of

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), the M.L.B. Court recognized a “narrow

category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial

processes without regard to a party’s ability to pay court fees,” particularly where

“the object of the proceeding is ‘not simply to infringe upon the parent’s interest’”

in the child, “but to end it.” 519 U.S. at 117–18 (cleaned up). The Court expressly

stated that it was answering the following question, “Does the Fourteenth

Amendment require [the State] to accord [the appellant] access to an appeal—

available but for her inability to advance required costs—before she is forever

branded unfit for affiliation with her children?” Id. at 119 (emphasis added).

Here, unlike in M.L.B., Turner was not at threat of having his parental rights

terminated. Instead the district court was tasked with assessing child support,
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custody, care and visitation over his child pursuant to chapters 600B and 598 of

the Iowa Code. And the relief Turner requests is reversal of court costs,

reassessment of child support, enforcement of the district court’s communication

orders,3 and addressal of “ethical concerns regarding Garrels’s counsel.” The

issues litigated and the relief sought by Turner fall far short of the concerns with

financial access to judicial process contemplated by the M.L.B. court.

Even if we were to determine that Turner sufficiently raised this issue, we

discern no violation of Turner’s constitutional rights by requiring him to abide by

the section 610.1 requirement to pay the cost of the district court transcript, nor in

the district court’s order that he be responsible for court costs.

B. Other Arguments

Turner argues the district court “failed to protect the child’s best interests”

and “does not sufficiently address potential emotional harm to the child from

extended alienation” by Garrels. Turner does not further describe what emotional

harm the district court failed to address, how it failed to protect the child’s best

interests, or what relief he is seeking to correct those failures. This issue is waived.

Turner next contends that “the trial court relied heavily on disputed

allegations of abuse dating to 2014 and 2017 without corroboration” and that the

3 It is unclear to us exactly what relief Turner is requesting when he asks that we

“enforce communication orders that protect [Turner]’s right to maintain a healthy
relationship with the child.” In its decree, the district court required that “[e]ach
party shall cooperate and make every reasonable effort to allow reasonable
communication by phone, Zoom, Skype, Facetime or similar video conferencing
between the other parent and [the child]” and declined to require the use of a
parenting application, recognizing that “[b]ecause the court has awarded [Garrels]
sole legal custody, the need for communications has been significantly reduced.”
We decline to further speculate what type of relief Turner expects in this respect.
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court may not “base custody findings primarily on uncorroborated hearsay.” Turner

fails to identify any specific hearsay statements, cite any part of the record, or make

any argument in support of his interpretation of the facts. This issue is waived.

Turner also takes issue with the district court imputing him with an annual

earning capacity of $31,200, arguing it “overlooked documented medical

restrictions.” He does not cite to any portion of the record supporting his claim that

he is unable to earn the income imputed or that medical conditions inhibit his

earning capacity to less than that assessed to him by the district court. This issue

is waived.

Lastly, Turner alleges that “potential conflicts of interest” exist between

Garrels and her attorney and argues the district court’s failure to address “these

issues undermined the overall fairness of the trial.” He provides no explanation for

any such alleged conflicts of interest. Turner has also waived this issue. And

contrary to Turner’s claim, the district court directly addressed his accusations of

fraternization between Garrels and her attorney, finding his attempt “to falsely

accuse [Garrels] of having sexual relations with her current attorney” to be borne

out of a desire to control and intimidate Garrels.

Because all of Turner’s arguments are waived or meritless to the extent they

are properly raised, we affirm the district court’s decree.

AFFIRMED.