Brian Hager v. M & W Welding, Inc., Colton Beals, Jacob Rhoades and Benjamin Andrew Guy St. Lawrence

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0778
Filed July 2, 2025

BRIAN HAGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

M & W WELDING, INC., COLTON BEALS, JACOB RHOADES and BENJAMIN
ANDREW GUY ST. LAWRENCE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monroe County, Crystal S. Cronk,

Judge.

Brian Hager appeals several district court rulings that improperly denied him

the opportunity to present a hostile work environment claim to a jury. REVERSED

AND REMANDED.

Clinton Luth (argued) and Benjamin Bergmann of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Alison F. Kanne (argued) of Wandro, Kanne & Lalor, P.C., Des Moines, for

appellees.

Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
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SANDY, Judge.

Was a hostile work environment claim pled? The answer to this question

leads to the resolution of this appeal. Brian Hager appeals two rulings of the district

court that effectively deprived him of the opportunity to present a hostile work

environment claim to a jury. He contends he sufficiently pled a hostile work

environment claim in his petition. Thus, he argues the district court erred by

denying his request for jury instructions on that claim. Alternatively, he asserts the

district court abused its discretion in denying his pretrial motion to amend his

petition and motion to conform to proof to “add” a hostile work environment claim.

Because we conclude Hager’s petition sufficiently pled a hostile work

environment claim, we conclude the district court’s ruling on his pretrial motion to

amend improperly denied him the opportunity to move forward to trial with such a

claim. Accordingly, we find Hager is entitled to a new trial on a hostile work

environment claim. And because we find this issue to be dispositive, we do not

reach Hager’s alternative arguments.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In March 2021, Hager was hired as a painter at M&W Welding,

Inc. (M&W)—a small welding shop in Moravia that specializes in building hay

trailers. Colton Beals is the owner and primary operator of M&W. When he was

initially hired, Beals and his coworkers were unaware that Hager identifies as a

black man. Hager is biracial, testifying at trial that he is “black and white.”

According to Hager, upon discovering his race, Beals and two of his

coworkers began engaging in a consistent and pervasive pattern of harassment.

Shortly after discovering his race, Beals allegedly told Hager that his lips were big
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because he “was sucking on [his] mother’s gorilla nipples.” Not long after making

this remark, Beals purportedly began referring to Hager’s children as “[f]ucking

n***lets.” Hager also alleged that Beals once pointed a firearm at him and said,

“[h]ow about you get back to work, you fucking n****r.”

According to Hager, two of his coworkers gradually began to join in on the

harassment. One of his coworkers—Jacob “Tanner” Rhoades—allegedly

frequently referred to Hager as a “fucking n****r” and called his children “half-

breeds.” Another co-worker—Benjamin St. Lawrence—allegedly frequently

referred to Hager as a “n****r.” As Hager explained at trial, “It’s like they were

comfortable with it—like, comfortable throwing that word out freely.” He also

claimed that Beals and his coworkers made sexually explicit and racially

insensitive comments about his wife, who is white. Hager claimed that he reported

his discomfort with the alleged harassment “multiple times” to Beals, but his

complaints fell on deaf ears. In fact, he alleged that Beals defended his, Rhoades,

and St. Lawrence’s use of racial slurs and epithets, referring to this language as

“shoptalk” or “guy talk.”

But the alleged harassment went beyond just the use of racial slurs,

epithets, and derogatory remarks targeted at Hager, his wife, and children. Hager

purported that his coworkers would frequently throw things at him while he was

working. Additionally, his coworkers allegedly destroyed his workstation and

protective equipment numerous times while he was employed with M&W. One

day, when Hager left his workstation to go to the bathroom, he allegedly returned

to find a swastika painted on his workstation. Further, he claimed Beals once made

him paint the symbol of the Schutzstaffel—the infamous Nazi paramilitary group—
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on a customer’s trailer. When the customer picked up the trailer, Hager asserted

that Beals told the customer he had “the n****r paint it.”

Due to the alleged daily harassment he was subjected to at M&W, Hager

would often leave work early and search for reasons to call in sick. He also claimed

to experience anxiety attacks at work that were attributable to the harassment. In

December 2021, Hager began exploring the possibility of filing a legal complaint

against M&W with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.1 On December 16, he met

with Beals and discussed his displeasure with the working environment at M&W.

A few days later, on December 20, he was terminated by Beals via voicemail.

Beals claimed at trial that he terminated Hager because he discovered Hager had

attempted to allegedly bribe several employees to testify for him and against the

company in a legal action.

On October 3, 2022, Hager filed a civil petition naming M&W, Beals,

Rhoades, and St. Lawrence as individual defendants. Of importance, many of the

factual allegations discussed above were contained in the petition. Against each

defendant, he asserted explicit2 claims of race discrimination, disability

discrimination, and retaliation under Iowa Code chapter 216, as well as a claim for

defamation. Against M&W and Beals, he asserted a common law retaliatory

discharge claim. Against Beals, he asserted an assault claim. And finally, against

Rhoades and St. Lawrence, Hager asserted a claim for aiding and abetting a

1 One of the discriminatory actions alleged in the complaint Hager filed with the

Iowa Civil Rights Commission was “harassment.”
2 By explicit, we mean these claims were pled as a separate counts under separate

headings.
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violation of chapter 216. Of relevance to this appeal, Hager’s petition did not

include a separate explicit count for a hostile work environment claim.

In June, the district court entered an order setting trial for April 9, 2024. On

March 29, eleven days before trial, Hager filed a set of proposed jury instructions.

In his proposed jury instructions, Hager included four instructions that related to a

hostile work environment claim. On April 2, the defendants filed a response to

Hager’s proposed jury instructions, arguing that his proposed instructions relating

to a hostile work environment claim should be struck and omitted because he

“chose not to plead causes of action for workplace harassment/hostile work

environment either by a co-worker or by a supervisor.”

In response, Hager filed a pretrial motion to amend his petition to add a

hostile work environment claim on April 7. The defendants filed a resistance to

this motion, again arguing that Hager never pled a hostile work environment claim.

Prior to trial commencing, the district court addressed the issue of Hager’s pretrial

motion to amend.3 In advocating for granting the motion to amend the petition,

Hager’s counsel argued:

Your Honor, I believe that our motion and our resistance
speak for themselves. However, there are a few points that I do want
to address.
First of all, it is our contention, and it is according to Iowa’s
rule of pleading the case, that a hostile work environment claim has
always been part of Mr. Hager’s claims against Beals and the other
defendants.
As noted in our resistance, in order to state a claim clear
enough for an opponent, all that’s required is to identify all the prima
facie elements.
As noted, paragraphs 16 through 21 of our initial petition
served in October 2022 lay out the framework of an objectively

3 During a discussion on his motion to amend, Hager agreed to voluntarily dismiss

his claims of disability discrimination and defamation against all defendants.
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severe, pervasive, and hostile work environment. Paragraph 22
identifies that our client complained of this on a weekly basis
therefore providing notice of the hostile work environment, and the
remaining paragraphs noted in our resistance lay out the other
elements of a hostile work environment claim.
This is all that is required to raise the issue and make it part
of the packet of claims that Mr. Hager has advanced against the
defendants in this case.
It was only on April 2nd, during preparation of jury
instructions, that Defendants first raised the legal theory that a hostile
work environment claim had never been [pled]. This came about
when they objected to the jury instructions that we submitted on
March 29, including a hostile work environment instruction.
Based on that late-coming theory of defense, we were sort
of put on the horns of a decision. Either we can go ahead and file a
Motion to Amend and allow the defendants an opportunity pretrial to
attempt to resolve the issue, or we can—and still can—amend our
petition at the end of evidence to conform with the proof submitted.

In response, counsel for the defendants argued:

First of all, I would say this is not a late-coming theory of
defense. We have always been aware that’s there never been a
claim for a hostile work environment, and that is how we prepared
our defense.
Using the words in the petition does not mean that they
asserted a claim for a hostile work environment. There are different
defenses that we would make. There are different avenues that we
would have explored in discovery, and the elements that they’re
required to prove are different.
It requires pervasiveness. It requires Mr. Beals to have
known about it and not to have done anything about it. Just because
some of the facts are similar between these two different claims does
not mean that they alleged a claim for a hostile work environment.
This is not a late-coming theory of defense.
In fact, this came up when—I was surprised when I saw the
plaintiff’s proposed jury instructions for a hostile work environment,
and I said, “You don’t have a claim for hostile work environment.”
That appears to be the first time the plaintiff actually realized that
they didn’t have a claim for a hostile work environment.
The law is clear, Your honor. In the reply that I filed this
morning, the Iowa Supreme Court has conclusively ruled that racial
discrimination and a hostile work environment are quote,
“fundamentally different claims.” And because they are
fundamentally different claims, they cannot shoehorn this claim in on
the eve of trial and try to say, “Well, they’ve known about it.” Well,
we haven’t, and we would have done different things in our defense
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had we known that they were actually intending to bring a claim for
a hostile work environment.

Ultimately, the district court sided with the defendants, ruling that the motion to

amend was untimely and would cause prejudice to the defendants because claims

of race discrimination and a hostile work environment are “fundamentally different.”

The rest of Hager’s recognized claims proceeded to trial. During trial, the district

court heard extensive testimony from Hager, Beals, Rhoades, St. Lawerence, and

several other coworkers of Hager during his employment at M&W.

At the close of evidence, Hager again moved to amend his petition to

conform to the proof to add a hostile work environment claim. In advocating that

this motion be granted, counsel for Hager asserted:

We have, through the testimony of Mr. Hager and through
the testimony of Mr. Beals, demonstrated all the elements of [a]
hostile work environment claim.
In fact, I copied them from Defendants’ brief. The elements
were: was the defendant subjected to offensive conduct, the conduct
was unwelcome, the conduct was based on the plaintiff’s race or
color, the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive that a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find his work
environment to be hostile or abusive, at the time the conduct
occurred and as a result of such conduct, Mr. Hager believed his
work environment was hostile or abusive; Mr. Beals knew or should
have known the conduct; and that he failed to take steps to correct
the situation and/or prevent the offensive conduct from occurring.
This has been proven up through Mr. Hager’s testimony and
almost all of the elements through Mr. Beals testimony.
We move to amend to conform with the evidence.

The district court denied Hager’s motion to amend his petition to conform to the

proof, stating, “I’m not going to allow that amendment. Those are different claims

with different elements, and it would be prejudicial to the defense to allow that

amendment at this time.” Consequently, a marshalling instruction for a hostile

work environment claim was never presented to the jury. Ultimately, Hager’s
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claims of race discrimination and retaliation against each defendant, aiding and

abetting against Rhoades and St. Lawrence, common law retaliatory discharge

against M&W and Beals, and assault against Beals were submitted to the jury.

The jury returned not guilty verdicts on each claim.

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

Our standard of review for refusal to give a requested jury instruction is for

“correction of errors at law.” Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707

(Iowa 2016). We review the district court’s denial of a party’s motion to amend,

including a motion to amend to conform to the proof, for an abuse of discretion. In

re Est. of Workman, 903 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 2017); Holliday v. Rain & Hail

L.L.C., 690 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 2004).

III. Analysis

A. Error Preservation

Before reaching the merits of Hager’s contention that the district court erred

in denying his request for a jury instruction for a hostile work environment claim,

we pause to consider whether he preserved error on this issue. The defendants

claim that he did not. Although they acknowledge Hager submitted proposed jury

instructions covering a hostile work environment claim, they note he never

objected to the instructions given to the jury at trial. Consequently, they believe

Hager failed to preserve error. See Olson v. Sumpter, 728 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa

2007) (“[E]rror in jury instructions is waived if not raised before closing arguments

are made to the jury.”).
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Hager believes he did preserve error on this issue. He claims the district

court ruled on his proposed instructions, and “likewise made any further objection

futile by refusing to allow [him] to even make a claim for a Hostile Work

Environment.” He claims this is so because “the District Court ruled—incorrectly—

that [he] had not pled a hostile work environment claim.” In his view, this effectively

constituted a ruling that he was not entitled to hostile work environment jury

instructions. Thus, he contends “it would have been futile to repeatedly request

jury instructions on a hostile work environment” when the district court “made it

clear” he would not be entitled to such instructions. In such situations, he asserts

no additional action is required to preserve error. We find Hager’s argument more

persuasive, although for slightly different reasons.

To begin, we disagree with Hager that the district court explicitly ruled on

his proposed jury instructions relating to a hostile work environment claim. We find

no support for this contention in the record. But more importantly, while Hager

frames this issue as an inappropriate refusal to give requested jury instructions by

the district court, we believe the thrust of his argument is that the district court

effectively determined that he had never pled a hostile work environment claim. In

other words, the issue is not that Hager did not receive jury instructions for a hostile

work environment, it is that his hostile work environment claim was effectively

dismissed by not allowing the claim to move forward. For this reason, defendants

rule 1.9244 error preservation argument is inapplicable. During arguments at the

4 Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.924 provides that, “before arguments to the jury

. . . , all objections to giving or failing to give any instruction must be made in writing
or dictated into the record, out of the jury’s presence, specifying the matter
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beginning of trial on his motion to amend his petition, Hager expressly argued that

he had properly pled a hostile work environment claim.

By denying Hager’s pretrial motion to amend his petition, the district court

effectively ruled that he had never pled a hostile work environment claim. In ruling

on Hager’s pretrial motion to amend his petition, the district court noted the

“fundamentally different” elements of a racial discrimination claim and a hostile

work environment claim. The court also stated that it would be prejudicial to the

defendants to allow him to amend his petition to add a hostile work environment

claim.

The import of these statements is that they indicate the district court

believed a hostile work environment claim had never been pled by Hager. 5

Consequently, we conclude the district essentially ruled that a hostile work

environment claim had never been pled when it ruled on Hager’s motion to amend.

See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) (“If the court’s ruling

indicates that the court considered the issue and necessarily ruled on it, even if the

reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse,’ the issue has been preserved.” (citation

omitted)). Thus, because we believe Hager is arguing the district court improperly

determined that he never pled a hostile work environment claim, we believe he

preserved error on this issue.6

objected to and on what grounds.” After that, such objections may not be “asserted
. . . or considered on appeal.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924.
5 The district court made similar statements when it ruled on Hager’s motion to

conform to the proof.
6 Even if we considered Hager’s argument on this issue to truly be a jury instruction

argument, we would still conclude that he preserved error. By denying his pretrial
motion amend, the district court effectively ruled that a hostile work environment
claim had never been pled. In order to receive a jury instruction, the jury instruction
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B. Merits

As discussed above, we interpret Hager’s jury instruction argument to really

be an argument that the district court erred in determining that he never pled a

hostile work environment claim. Hager contends “Iowa Courts do not require a

particular form or format for civil actions.” He argues all that is required is a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a

demand for the judgment for the type of relief sought.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.403(1).

He contends Count I of his petition (“Race Discrimination”) set forth all of “his

claims based on his race.” He argues paragraphs sixteen through forty-eight of

his petition, which were incorporated under Count I, clearly set forth the basic

elements of a hostile work environment claim. Thus, he claims he “expressly pled

a hostile work environment claim by any measure of Iowa’s pleadings rules.”

The defendants counter that Hager only included a race discrimination claim

in his petition. The defendants repeatedly note throughout their briefing that a

hostile work environment claim is fundamentally different than a race

discrimination claim. They note that the two claims require a plaintiff to prove

different elements. Piggybacking off this last point, they also assert the defenses

for a race discrimination claim are much different than the defenses applicable to

a hostile work environment claim. Defendants contend that allowing Hager to

must provide the applicable law. See Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa
1994) (noting jury instructions must state the law applicable to the case). If a court
determines that a claim has never been pled, such a claim would not be the law
applicable to the case. Thus, it would be futile for a party to request a jury
instruction on such a claim. In situations such as this, where the district court
determines a claim was never pled at the outset of trial, we cannot fault a party for
not requesting a jury instruction before the case is submitted to the jury.
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inject a last-minute hostile work environment claim would have prejudiced them

because they would have defended the case differently had they known such a

claim had been asserted since the inception of the case. We disagree.

To begin our analysis, it is helpful to discuss the distinction between race

discrimination claims and hostile work environment claims brought under the Iowa

Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The ICRA prohibits employers “to discharge any

employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for

employment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual

orientation, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employee.”

Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (Supp. 2025). To establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination under the ICRA, Hager must show “(1) he was a member of a

protected group; (2) he was qualified to perform the job and was performing

satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.” Gordon v. Wells Fargo

Bank-Nat’l Ass’n, No. 20-0447, 2021 WL 2135187, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26,

2021). “Each discrete discriminatory act or event is separately actionable.”

Farmland Foods, Inc., v. Dubuque Hum. Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 741

(Iowa 2003).

However, our supreme court stated over twenty years ago that “claims of

hostile work environment are fundamentally different.” Id. “Unlike discrete acts of

discrimination, they involve repeated conduct and are based on the cumulative

impact of separate acts.” Id. To establish a hostile work environment claim under

the ICRA, “the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she belongs to a protected group;

(2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was
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based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the harassment affected a term,

condition, or privilege of employment.” Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741,

746 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). “Additionally, if the harassment is perpetrated

by a nonsupervisory employee, the plaintiff must show the employer ‘knew or

should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.’”

Farmland Foods, 672 N.W.2d at 744 (quoting Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217

F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 2000)). The harassment alleged must be sufficiently

“severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an

abusive working environment.” Rheeder v. Gray,___ N.W.3d. ___, ___, 2025 WL

1599759, at *7 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted).

As there is no dispute that Hager pled a racial discrimination claim under

the ICRA, we turn to the question of whether he also sufficiently pled a hostile work

environment claim. To aid in our analysis, we briefly recount some general

principles regarding Iowa’s pleading standards. “Iowa is a notice pleading state.”

Terrace Hill Soc’y Found. v. Terrace Hill Comm’n, 6 N.W.3d 290, 296 (Iowa 2024)

(citation omitted). Under the notice pleading standard, the “petition need not allege

ultimate facts that support each element of the cause of action.” Id. (citation

omitted). A plaintiff is also not required to identify a specific legal theory in their

petition. Id.; see also Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685,

686 (Iowa 1987). “However, a petition must contain factual allegations that give

the defendant fair notice of the claim asserted so the defendant can adequately

respond to the petition.” U.S. Bank v. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 2009)

(cleaned up). “The ‘fair notice’ requirement is met if a petition informs the
14

defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Hager sufficiently pled a hostile

work environment claim. While it is not a model of clarity, when his petition is read

in its entirety, it is evident that he is attempting to assert a hostile work environment

claim against the named defendants. Hager’s petition has detailed factual

allegations covering the basic elements of a hostile work environment claim. His

petition indicates that he is a black man, that he was subjected to unwelcomed

harassment by the defendants, that the harassment was motivated by his race,

and that he was denied “pay raises and promotions” based on the racial

harassment he allegedly experienced. These factual allegations correspond

directly to the prima facie elements of a hostile work environment claim. See

Boyle, 710 N.W.2d at 746.

It is true that Hager’s petition did not set out a separate heading/caption for

a hostile work environment claim. But as Hager correctly points out, “[n]o technical

forms of pleadings are required” under our rules. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(2)(a). And

a petition should not be defined by the labels it uses, “but is required to be read in

light of the allegations and legal ramifications contained within the four corners.”

Roush v. Mahaska State Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2000). Hager’s detailed

factual allegations alerted the defendants of the claim’s general nature and the

events giving rise to the claim. Thus, it satisfied the “fair notice” requirement under

our pleading standards. See U.S. Bank, 770 N.W.2d at 354. If the defendants

were unsure of every claim Hager was asserting in his petition, they had ample
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opportunity over the course of this case to file a motion for a more specific

statement. They declined to do so.

Ultimately, we find Hager’s petition sufficiently pled a hostile work

environment claim. The district court, to the extent its rulings on his pretrial motion

to amend found otherwise, were in error. Thus, we conclude Hager is entitled to

a new trial on a hostile work environment claim because the district court

improperly denied him the opportunity to move forward to trial with such a claim.

IV. Conclusion

In short, we conclude the district court’s ruling on Hager’s pretrial motion to

amend his petition erroneously deprived him of the opportunity to have his hostile

work environment claim tried to a jury. His petition sufficiently pled a hostile work

environment claim under Iowa’s notice pleading standards. Because of the district

court’s error in denying him the opportunity to move forward to trial on a hostile

work environment claim, Hager is entitled to a new trial on this issue. We

accordingly remand for a new trial on his hostile work environment claim. And

because we find this issue dispositive, we do not reach Hager’s alternative

arguments regarding his pretrial motion to amend and motion to amend to conform

to the proof at the close of evidence.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.