State of Iowa v. Rochelle Jean Ogden Sziber

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0679
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROCHELLE JEAN OGDEN SZIBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Tabitha Turner, Judge.

The defendant appeals the denial of her motion in arrest of judgment.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. Buller, J., takes

no part.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Rochelle Ogden Sziber argues the district court abused its discretion when

the court denied her motion in arrest of judgment and request to withdraw her guilty

plea. On February 5, 2024, Sziber signed and filed a waiver of rights and written

guilty plea for two charges—harassment in the first degree, an aggravated

misdemeanor, and domestic abuse assault in the first degree, a simple

misdemeanor. In her written guilty plea, Sziber checked the box asking the court

to sentence her immediately, which also stated, “In doing so, I understand that I

am waiving my right to challenge this guilty plea and waive my right to a fifteen-

day delay between the time the court accepts my guilty plea and the time the court

conducts sentencing.” Yet, nearly a month after filing her guilty plea, Sziber moved

in arrest of judgment, asking the court’s permission to withdraw her plea and

claiming “undersigned counsel provided her with inaccurate information when

making her decision to plead guilty, which she relied upon and resulted in a

material defect in her guilty plea.” Sziber also asserted her innocence.

At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the district court denied her motion

in arrest of judgment before proceeding directly to sentencing. The district court

imposed a suspended prison sentence and one year of probation; the term of

probation differed from the two-year term enumerated in the plea agreement.

Sziber filed an application for discretionary review, which the Iowa Supreme Court

denied on May 13. She appeals. Because we do not have jurisdiction, we dismiss

this appeal.
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Standard of Review.

We review the denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002). Reversal is

appropriate “only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly unreasonable

or untenable.” Id.

Right of Appeal.

Our first step is to consider if we have jurisdiction over this appeal. As the

State argues, Sziber’s challenges relate to her plea, not her sentence. And in

2019, our legislature amended Iowa Code section 814.6(1) to disallow appeals

from final judgments when a defendant pled guilty to a crime other than a class “A”

felony unless “the defendant establishes good cause.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)

(2024). Thus, it is Sziber’s burden to establish good cause for the appeal to go

forward. See State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 151 (Iowa 2021) (“Under section

814.6(1)(a)(3) . . . the defendant bears the burden of establishing good cause for

the appeal to go forward.”); see also State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa

2021) (“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea

when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”

(citation omitted)). Failing to identify a sentencing challenge, Sziber asserts that

she has good cause to appeal because her plea was not voluntary, knowing, or

intelligent. But our supreme court has already rejected the request to “expand the

concept of good cause [to] hold that a claim that a plea is not intelligently or

voluntarily made constitutes good cause to appeal as a matter of right.” Tucker,

959 N.W.2d at 153. So this argument fails.
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In another attempt to overcome the good-cause hurdle in front of her, Sziber

relies on State v. Wilbourn and its progeny and argues that line of case law

establishes we have jurisdiction for this appeal. 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022).

In Wilbourn, the supreme court concluded the defendant “met the good-cause

requirement to proceed with his direct appeal challenging his sentence.” Id. And

once the defendant had established good cause, the court

declin[ed] to parse or bifurcate the specific sentencing errors alleged
when determining good cause. An appellate court either has
jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not. Once a defendant
crosses the good-cause threshold as to one ground for appeal, the
court has jurisdiction over the appeal. . . . We generally do not do
partial dismissals of criminal appeals—such a procedure would be
unwieldy and burdensome—and we do not believe the legislature
directed us to follow such an approach in Iowa Code section 814.6.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Sziber contends that because the district court gave

her a more favorable sentence, she can piggyback that variance to meet the good

cause requirement.1 “Good cause” in section 814.6 means a “legally sufficient

reason” and by definition that means “a reason that would allow a court to provide

some relief.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. We are aware of no authority

establishing that a more favorable sentence is a defect in the sentencing procedure

requiring some relief, and Sziber provided none. And, as noted above, Sziber does

not actually challenge her sentence on appeal. She focuses on the plea made, so

she cannot “cross[] the good cause threshold” as it relates to her more favorable

sentence. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66. Thus, as section 814.6(1)(a)(3) mandates,

Sziber is not allowed an appeal as a matter of right from her guilty plea that

1 The written guilty plea terms recommended a two-year suspended sentence with

two years’ probation, along with other requirements. It also set out specific factual
findings under each count.
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involved crimes other than class “A” felonies. See State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141,

147 (Iowa 2003) (“[T]he right to appeal is purely statutory . . . .”).

Discretionary Review.

We note that Sziber makes an undeveloped request for discretionary

review. Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f) also allows defendants to seek discretionary

review from the denial of a motion in arrest of judgment on grounds other than

ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Scott, No. 20-1453, 2022 WL

610570, at *4 (Iowa Ct App. Mar. 2, 2022) (allowing discretionary review of the

plea proceeding where defendant alleged his incompetency made his plea

involuntary). Sziber requests that we grant discretionary review of her motion-in-

arrest-of-judgment challenge.

Iowa R. App. P. 6.106(2) provides that the supreme court may grant

discretionary review upon a determination that “(1) substantial justice has not been

accorded the applicant, (2) the grounds set forth in rule 6.104(1)(d) for an

interlocutory appeal exist, or (3) the grounds prescribed in any statute allowing

discretionary review exist.” Here, Sziber applied to our supreme court for

discretionary review of the denial of her motion in arrest of judgment; that request

was denied.

At the hearing on the motion in arrest of judgment, the district court stated

that it could not find a defect in the plea proceeding and pointed to the detailed

written plea agreement that Sziber had signed. See Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 581

(“We . . . will reverse only if the ruling [denying the motion in arrest of judgment]

was based on reasons that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.”). On top of

that, in her written plea agreement, Sziber waived the right to challenge her plea
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agreement through a motion in arrest of judgment. In State v. Damme, language

in the plea agreement that was like that found here constituted substantial

compliance with the requirements of Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(a)

and 2.8(2)(d)). 944 N.W.2d 98, 107–08 (Iowa 2020). As the Damme court noted:

The provisions [in the written plea] plainly state that she must file a
motion in arrest of judgment to attack the validity of her guilty plea
proceeding and listed the proper filing deadlines. As such, the
written guilty plea “conveyed the pertinent information and
substantially complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d).” The
written guilty plea made Damme aware of her right to file a motion in
arrest of judgment, and she waived that right.

Id. at 108 (internal citation omitted). Sziber did not develop a justification for

discretionary review, and we will not take on that task for her. See, e.g., Hyler v.

Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996). We are not inclined to grant

discretionary review here.

Thus, we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of Sziber’s challenge to the

denial of her motion in arrest of judgment.

APPEAL DISMISSED.