Rodrigues v. Shapley

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-FEB-2026
08:03 AM
Dkt. 118 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

LAVERNE S. RODRIGUES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ANUSUYA SHAPLEY, Defendant-Appellant, and
YMAAS LLC, and ALLAN YOZA, Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOE DEFENDANTS, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PUNA DIVISION
(CASE NO. 3DRC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, and McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

This appeal stems from a landlord-tenant dispute in
which the trial court awarded summary possession to Plaintiff-
Appellee Laverne S. Rodrigues (Rodrigues). Defendant-Appellant
Anusuya Shapley (Shapley), self-represented, appeals from the
Judgment for Possession and the Writ of Possession, both entered
on August 15, 2023, in the District Court of the Third Circuit,
Puna Division (District Court).1/
On May 14, 2021, Rodrigues filed a complaint for
summary possession of certain real property she owned (the
Property) against Shapley and Defendants-Appellees YMAAS LLC
(YMAAS) and Allan Yoza (Yoza) (collectively, Tenants).
Rodrigues alleged that Tenants "have broken" the parties' written
rental agreement by, among other things, modifying the Property's

1/
The Honorable Jeffrey A. Hawk presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

plumbing, electrical wiring, and physical structure without
obtaining proper permits under Hawai#i County Code chapters 5A,
D, and F. She further alleged that these actions violated Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 521-51, -52, and -72.
On November 5, 2021, Shapley, self-represented, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint (Motion to Dismiss), purportedly
on behalf of both herself and YMAAS. Then, on February 21, 2022,
before the Motion to Dismiss was heard, YMAAS, which was then
represented by counsel, filed an answer, counterclaim, and demand
for jury trial.2/
On February 28, 2022, the District Court "noted [that
the] demand for jury trial was filed on 02/21/22 and [the] matter
will now be pursued under [circuit court case no.] 3CCV-22-54[.]"
On October 24, 2022, the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit
remanded Rodrigues's summary possession claim to the District
Court.
On December 1, 2022, the District Court dismissed the
summary possession claim as against Yoza because he had not been
served within the required time.
On January 17, 2023, Rodrigues filed a motion to amend
the complaint, which was heard and granted by the District Court.
Rodrigues filed a First Amended Complaint on March 29, 2023.
Trial on the summary possession claim was held by the
District Court on July 14 and August 11, 2023. At the end of
trial, the District Court stated, in relevant part:

I'm ready to rule. I'm going to go ahead and grant the
summary possession based on the credible testimony that I've
heard and the exhibits, reviewing the exhibits and taking
judicial notice of Hawaii County Code Subsection 5, 5(d) and
5(e), as well as [Rodrigues's counsel's] two trial
memorandums.
. . . .

. . . [Construing HRS §§ 521-51 and 521-69]: If the
tenant is in immaterial [sic] noncompliance with Section
521-51, the landlord upon learning of any such noncompliance
and after notifying the tenant in writing of the
noncompliance and allowing a specified time not less than

2/
Shapley filed a separate answer and demand for jury trial on
April 7, 2022.

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ten days after receipt of notice for the tenant to remedy
the noncompliance, that person may terminate the rental
agreement and bring a summary proceeding for possession of
the dwelling unit or any other proper proceeding, action, or
suit for possession if the material -- if the tenant is in
immaterial [sic] noncompliance with 521-51(1).

So I'm finding that the tenant did not comply with the
applicable building and housing laws materially affecting
the health and safety by adding the un-permitted toilets,
adding an un-permitted kitchen, dumping gray water into the
yard, running sewer pipes over the floor. There was never
any cure despite years of ability to do that.

The rent does not matter in this case. The bills do
not matter. The mold does not matter. There was a material
breach of the existing contract that was caused by the
tenants, Shapley and YMAAS, by doing the renovations without
the permits.

So pursuant to HRS 521-51, 521-69, I'm going to grant
the eviction. Plaintiff is to prepare the order granting
the summary possession, writ of possession, and judgment for
possession. It will be effective forthwith.

The Judgment for Possession and the Writ of Possession
were subsequently entered.
On appeal, Shapley appears to contend that the District
Court: (1) lacked jurisdiction because the parties' rental
agreement "function[ed] as a management agreement with an intent
to purchase" and was exempt from the requirements of HRS Chapter
521, the Residential Landlord-Tenant Code; (2) should have
dismissed the case after dismissing Yoza because of the court's
inability to provide relief; (3) ruled based on "extraneous
matters" such as "permitting for property improvements"; (4)
ruled based on "inadequate evidence" and Defendants' failure to
secure permits, which "falls solely within the province of the
property owner"; (5) took Rodrigues's testimony as credible
"without sufficient corroborating evidence" and despite her
"significant financial interest in the outcome" and her "pattern
of dishonesty"; (6) exhibited bias in referring to "past cases
and comments from past tenants regarding Defendant's property
management style"; and (7) based the judgment on a
"misrepresentation" in Rodrigues's trial memorandum.3/

3/
Shapley's points of error have been restated and condensed for
clarity. We note that Shapley's opening brief fails to comply in numerous
material respects with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
28(b)(4) and (7). In particular, Shapley fails to provide: (1) a "concise
(continued...)

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After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Shapley's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Shapley contends that "[t]he nature of the
agreement, although labeled a 'Rental agreement,' was never
intended for lessees to reside on the [P]roperty, instead
functioning as a management agreement with an intent to purchase,
thus falling outside the jurisdiction of the District Court's
summary proceedings under the tenant landlord code."
Shapley's November 5, 2021 Motion to Dismiss asserted
in part that the parties' rental agreement reflected the Tenants'
intent to purchase the Property and that "some" of the issues in
the case "involve title to the [P]roperty." To the extent that
Shapley was attempting to raise a defense that involved title to
the Property, however, it does not appear that her related
declaration met all of the requirements of District Court Rules
of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 12.1.4/

3/
(...continued)
statement of the points of error" (emphasis added), as required by HRAP Rule
28(b)(4); (2) a statement of "where in the record the alleged error[s were]
objected to or the manner in which the alleged error[s were] brought to the
attention of the court[,]" as required by HRAP Rule 28(b)(4)(iii); and (3)
"citations to the . . . parts of the record relied on[,]" as required by HRAP
Rule 28(b)(7). In addition, the argument section is conclusory and often
difficult to discern. Shapley's "failure to comply with HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) is
alone sufficient to affirm the circuit court's judgment." Morgan v. Planning
Dep't, Cty. of Kauai, 104 Hawai#i 173, 180, 86 P.3d 982, 989 (2004) (citing
Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai #i 408, 420, 32 P.3d 52,
64 (2001)). Nevertheless, we have "consistently adhered to the policy of
affording litigants the opportunity 'to have their cases heard on the merits,
where possible.'" Morgan, 104 Hawai#i at 180-81, 86 P.3d at 989-90 (quoting
O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 77 Hawai#i 383, 386, 885 P.2d 361, 364
(1994)). We thus address Shapley's arguments to the extent discernible.
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DCRCP Rule 12.1 provides:

Pleadings. Whenever, in the District Court, in
defense of an action in the nature of an action of trespass
or for the summary possession of land, or any other action,
the defendant shall seek to interpose a defense to the
jurisdiction to the effect that the action is a real action,
or one in which the title to real estate is involved, such
defense shall be asserted by a written answer or written
motion, which shall not be received by the court unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the defendant, setting forth
the source, nature and extent of the title claimed by
defendant to the land in question, and such further
particulars as shall fully apprise the court of the nature
(continued...)

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In any event, Shapley did not establish that there was
a purchase agreement. In its ruling at the end of trial, the
District Court stated: "There are two leases in evidence, No.
47, the ten-year lease which ends December 21st of 2027; No. 49
-- Exhibit 49 is a second lease which ends December 21st of
2022." Both documents are entitled "Rental Agreement," identify
the "TENANTS" as YMAAS, Yoza and Shapley, and include terms for
"RENT" and "OCCUPANCY." With respect to occupancy, both
documents indicate a "Fixed Rental Agreement" – Exhibit 47, for a
period of ten years, and Exhibit 49 for a period of five years,
with an option to renew for an additional five years. Both
documents also state: "Tenant intention is to purchase the
[P]roperty." The latter statement, however, which does not
specify any terms of sale, is not an enforceable agreement. See
Globalmart, Inc. v. Posec Hawai#i, Inc., No. 28249, 2012 WL
1650697, at *7 (Haw. App. May 10, 2012) (mem. op.) (agreements to
agree are unenforceable). And Shapley points to no evidence in
the record that otherwise established that the parties entered
into a purchase agreement.
Shapley also failed to establish that the parties'
rental agreement was exempt from the requirements of HRS Chapter
521. That chapter "applies to rights, remedies, and obligations
of the parties to any residential rental agreement wherever made
of a dwelling unit within this State."5/ HRS § 521-6 (2006)
(emphasis added). Here, both versions of the parties' rental
agreement (see supra) evidenced a residential rental agreement of
a dwelling unit within Hawai#i, and Shapley points to no evidence
that shows otherwise. Shapley did not establish that any of the
exclusions in HRS §521-7 applied – in particular, that she
occupied the Property under a "bona fide contract of sale" or as

4/
(...continued)
of defendant's claim.
5/
Under HRS § 521-8 (2006), "'[r]ental agreement' means all
agreements, written or oral, which establish or modify the terms, conditions,
rules, regulations, or any other provisions concerning the use and occupancy
of a dwelling unit and premises"; "'[d]welling unit' means a structure, or
part of a structure, which is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by
one person or by two or more persons maintaining a common household, to the
exclusion of all others."

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"the prospective purchaser after an accepted offer to purchase
. . . ." §521-7(3), (8) (2006). Shapley argues that she was not
intended to reside on the Property, but that would not render HRS
Chapter 521 inapplicable, as the rental agreement established
terms concerning the use and occupancy of the Property, including
Shapley's right to occupy the Property.
On this record, we conclude that the District Court had
jurisdiction over Rodrigues's summary possession claim under HRS
§ 604-5(a) (2016).
(2) Shapley contends that the District Court should
have dismissed the case after dismissing Yoza "because of the
court[']s inability to provide relief, since the occupants at the
property were under leases signed by [him] . . . ."
Shapley's argument is conclusory, lacks supporting
legal authority, and relies on factual assertions without
supporting references to the record. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(4),
(7). To the extent Rodrigues sought summary possession of the
Property as against Shapley, she was able to obtain it. To the
extent Shapley makes unsupported factual assertions regarding
occupants of the Property, we "are not obligated to search the
record to crystalize [Shapley's] arguments[.]" Haw. Ventures,
LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 114 Hawai#i 438, 469 n.16, 164 P.3d 696, 727
n.16 (2007) (quoting Kienker v. Bauer, 110 Hawai#i 97, 104 n.12,
129 P.3d 1125, 1132 n.12 (2006)). In any event, Shapley has not
provided a sufficient record for our review of the alleged error,
as the only trial transcript she ordered was a partial transcript
of her own cross-examination and the District Court's oral ruling
at the end of trial. See HRAP Rule 10(b) (making it the
appellant's responsibility to include in the record on appeal
transcripts of the pertinent oral proceedings conducted by the
trial court); Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i 225, 230,
909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995) ("The burden is upon appellant in an
appeal to show error by reference to matters in the record, and
he or she has the responsibility of providing an adequate
transcript." (brackets omitted) (quoting Union Bldg. Materials
Corp. v. The Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw. App. 146, 151, 682 P.2d 82, 87
(1984))). We therefore disregard the asserted error. See

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Tradewinds Hotel, Inc. v. Cochran, 8 Haw. App. 256, 266, 799 P.2d
60, 67 (1990).
(3) Shapley contends that the District Court improperly
ruled based on "extraneous matters, such as permitting for
property improvements[,]" which "is not addressed in the lease
agreement and thus is not within the jurisdiction of the District
Court."
As explained above, the parties' rental agreement was
subject to the requirements of HRS Chapter 521. HRS § 521-51(1)
(2006) provides that "[e]ach tenant shall at all times during the
tenancy . . . [c]omply with all applicable building and housing
laws materially affecting health and safety[.]" (Formatting
altered.) Based on the evidence presented at trial, the District
Court found that "the tenant did not comply with the applicable
building and housing laws materially affecting the health and
safety by adding the un-permitted toilets, adding an un-permitted
kitchen, dumping gray water into the yard, running sewer pipes
over the floor." This was not an "extraneous matter" and was not
outside the court's jurisdiction.
(4)-(5) Shapley contends that the District Court ruled
based on "inadequate evidence" and Defendants' failure to secure
permits. She also argues that the District Court took
Rodrigues's testimony as credible "without sufficient
corroborating evidence" and despite her "significant financial
interest in the outcome" and her "pattern of dishonesty."
Again, Shapley's argument is conclusory, lacks
supporting legal authority, and relies on factual assertions
without supporting references to the record. See HRAP Rule
28(b)(4), (7). As discussed above, the court's finding that
Tenants failed to comply with applicable building and housing
laws materially affecting health and safety was relevant to the
summary possession claim. In any event, Shapley has not provided
a sufficient record for our review of the alleged errors, which
challenge the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.6/ See

6/
To the extent that Shapley challenges Rodrigues's credibility at
trial, we further note that "[a]n appellate court will not pass upon the trial
judge's decisions with respect to the credibility of witnesses and the weight
(continued...)

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supra; HRAP Rule 10(b); Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i at 230, 909 P.2d
at 558. We therefore disregard the asserted errors. See
Tradewinds Hotel, 8 Haw. App. at 266, 799 P.2d at 67.
(6) Shapley contends that the District Court exhibited
bias in referring to "past cases and comments from past tenants
regarding Defendant's property management style."

[W]here judicial misconduct or bias deprives a party of the
impartiality to which he or she is entitled, a new trial may
be required. However, reversal on the grounds of judicial
bias or misconduct is warranted only upon a showing that the
trial was unfair. See [Handgards], Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
743 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir.1984) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 . . . (1985). Unfairness, in
turn, requires a clear and precise demonstration of
prejudice. See Mahoney v. Mitchell, 4 Haw. App. 410, 418,
668 P.2d 35, 40–41 (1983) . . . .

Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai#i 230, 242, 891 P.2d 1022, 1034 (1995).
Here, while the District Court was explaining his
ruling, Shapley asserted, "I think you're using hearsay from
other things[,]" and referred to "your bias in other cases."
The District Court responded: "I am not. I'm telling you right
now, I have not considered any of that in my decision making."
On this limited record, Shapley has not shown that the trial was
unfair or otherwise made a clear and precise demonstration of
prejudice.
(7) Shapley contends that the District Court based the
judgment against her on a "misrepresentation" in Rodrigues's
trial memorandum, apparently inferred from the fact that the
memorandum did not include the "full county building code."
Again, Shapley's argument is conclusory, lacks
supporting legal authority, and relies on factual assertions
without supporting references to the record. See HRAP Rule
28(b)(4), (7). In any event, Shapley has not provided a
sufficient record for our review of the alleged error, and we
therefore disregard it. See supra; HRAP Rule 10(b); Bettencourt,
80 Hawai#i at 230, 909 P.2d at 558; Tradewinds Hotel, 8 Haw. App.
at 266, 799 P.2d at 67.

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(...continued)
of the evidence because this is the province of the trial judge." Porter v.
Hu, 116 Hawai#i 42, 59-60, 169 P.3d 994, 1011-12 (App. 2007) (quoting State v.
Eastman, 81 Hawai#i 131, 139, 913 P.2d 57, 65 (1996)).

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For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment for
Possession and the Writ of Possession, both entered on August 15,
2023, in the District Court of the Third Circuit, Puna Division,
are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 20, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Anusuya Shapley, Presiding Judge
Self-reprsented Defendant-
Appellant.
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
William Dean Associate Judge
(Ohana Law Firm)
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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