Gleason v. Administrative Director of the Courts

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
30-JUL-2025
06:09 AM
Dkt. 68 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

YUKI GLEASON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, STATE OF HAWAI‘I,
Respondent-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
HONOLULU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DAA-22-00010)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
This secondary appeal challenges the district court's
order affirming the administrative revocation of Petitioner-
Appellant Yuki Gleason's (Gleason) driver's license following an
arrest for operation of a vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant (OVUII). We affirm.
Gleason appeals from the January 12, 2023 "Notice of
Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment" (Judgment)
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entered by the District Court of the First Circuit (District
Court) 1 in favor of Respondent-Appellee Administrative Director
of the Courts (Director). The Judgment was entered on the
District Court's January 31, 2023 "Decision and Order Affirming
Administrative Revocation" (Order Affirming Revocation). The
Order Affirming Revocation affirmed the Director's October 31,
2022 "Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law, and
Decision" (Administrative Decision), issued following an
administrative hearing conducted by a hearing officer, to revoke
Gleason's driver's license for one year.
On appeal, Gleason challenges Conclusions of Law
(COLs) 2, 4, and 6 2 in the District Court's Order Affirming
Revocation, contending the District Court erred: (1) by ruling
that the standardized field sobriety test (SFST) was "not an
unreasonable search or seizure"; (2) by ruling that "an
inference of guilt can be inferred" from Gleason's refusal to

1 The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.

2 COLs 2, 4, and 6 stated:

2. The Court also concludes [the Director] did not
erroneously interpret the law. [Gleason] refused to take
the [SFST], which is not an unreasonable search or seizure,
nor an invasion of privacy (see State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw.
293, 303 (1984)). [Gleason]'s refusal to participate in
the SFST could be considered as an inference of a
"consciousness of guilt" (see State v. Ferm, 94 Haw. 17, 28
(2000)).

. . . .

4. Further, the Court concludes [the Director] did
not abuse its discretion.

. . . .

6. In conclusion, based upon the totality of the
circumstances, and by a preponderance of the evidence,
there was probable cause to arrest [Gleason] for OVUIII.

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participate in the SFST because the SFST constituted a search;
and (3) by finding that "probable cause existed to arrest
Gleason for OVUII[.]" 3
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve
Gleason's contentions as follows.
The record for the Administrative Decision and its
unchallenged findings reflect the following. On July 30, 2022,
at approximately 9:45 p.m., Honolulu Police Department (HPD)
Officer Mariah Ah Tou (Officer Ah Tou) came upon Gleason's
vehicle which was traveling in the same lane, about one to two
car lengths in front of the officer's vehicle; Gleason's vehicle
was "swerving" within its lane of travel, then drove over the
solid white line (on the left side of the vehicle) for about two
to three seconds, before "jerking" the wheel to correct itself
back into the original lane of travel; and Gleason's vehicle
crossed over the single broken white line with both passenger
side tires into the adjacent lane for about one to two seconds
before "jerking" back into its own lane. FOFs 1-3. Officer Ah
Tou stopped Gleason's vehicle. FOF 4. Officer Ah Tou exited
her vehicle and approached Gleason's driver's side window, where
she saw Gleason in the driver's seat; Officer Ah Tou asked
Gleason for her driver's license, registration, and insurance;
and Gleason stated that she was heading home from a graduation
party. FOFs 5-7. While interacting with Gleason, Officer Ah
Tou noted Gleason's speech was "slurred," her movement was
"slow," her eyes were "red, watery, and glassy," and there was a

3 Gleason's points of error have been restated and consolidated for
clarity.
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"strong odor of a consumed alcoholic type beverage emitting from
Gleason's breath[.]" FOF 8.
HPD Officer Dallas Pauu (Officer Pauu) arrived shortly
after the stop, and Officer Ah Tou instructed Officer Pauu to
ask Gleason if she would be willing to voluntarily participate
in the SFST. FOF 9. Officer Pauu complied and informed Officer
Ah Tou that Gleason did not respond; Officer Ah Tou then
proceeded to the driver's side of Gleason's vehicle, and Gleason
told Officer Ah Tou that she did not want to participate in the
SFST. FOFs 10-11. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
Officer Ah Tou placed Gleason under arrest for OVUII; the
officers transported Gleason to the police station; Gleason
elected to take a breath alcohol concentration test at the
station; and Gleason's alcohol concentration was 0.140 grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. FOFs 12-13, 16.
In relevant part, the Administrative Decision
concluded that: "There existed probable cause to believe that
[Gleason] operated a vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant"; and "by a preponderance of the evidence, [Gleason]
operated a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant."
Gleason sought judicial review of the Administrative
Decision to the District Court, pursuant to Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 291E-40. 4 Following a January 12, 2023 hearing,
the District Court filed its January 31, 2023 Order Affirming
Revocation, which pertinently held that the Director "did not

4 Under HRS § 291E-40(c) (2020), the "sole issues before the court"
on judicial review of an administrative decision are whether the Director:
"(1) [e]xceeded constitutional or statutory authority; (2) [e]rroneously
interpreted the law; (3) [a]cted in an arbitrary or capricious manner; (4)
[c]ommitted an abuse of discretion; or (5) [m]ade a determination that was
unsupported by the evidence in the record."

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exceed its constitutional or statutory authority"; "[t]here was
reasonable suspicion for [Gleason]'s stop"; the Director "did
not erroneously interpret the law" because an SFST "is not an
unreasonable search or seizure, nor an invasion of privacy";
Gleason's "refusal to participate in the SFST could be
considered as an inference of a 'consciousness of guilt'"; the
Director's "determination was supported by a preponderance of
the evidence in the record"; and that "based upon the totality
of the circumstances, and by a preponderance of the evidence,
there was probable cause to arrest [Gleason] for OVUII."
Gleason timely appealed.
On a secondary appeal, we review the District Court's
review of the Administrative Decision, to determine whether the
District Court was right or wrong in its decision. Gray v.
Admin. Dir. of the Court, State of Hawaii, 84 Hawai‘i 138, 144,
931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997).

(1) Gleason argues that the District Court "erred when
it ruled that the [Director] did not erroneously interpret the
law and or [sic] abuse his discretion when he ruled that SFST
are [sic] not an unreasonable search or seizure nor an invasion
of privacy."

In State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 303, 687 P.2d 544, 551
(1984), the supreme court held that the SFST did not infringe on
a "defendant's right to be secure against unreasonable searches,
seizures, and invasions of privacy." 5 The Wyatt court reasoned

5 In Wyatt, the defendant was stopped by a police officer for
driving near midnight without lighted headlamps; the officers noticed a smell
of liquor from her vehicle interior when they asked her to provide
documentation. 67 Haw. at 296-97, 687 P.2d at 547-48. When asked if she had
been drinking, the defendant admitted she had been; she volunteered that she
had just been cited for three traffic violations a few minutes prior; the

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that the "intrusion" of an SFST "only entailed a display of
transitory physical characteristics associated with
inebriation[,]" and did not involve "probing into an
individual's private life and thoughts that marks . . . a search
for concealed evidence of criminal activity." Id. at 305, 687
P.2d at 553 (citation omitted). The Wyatt court explained: "In
our view these facts and circumstances rendered reasonable a
seizure comprehending a sobriety test, though the probable cause
supporting a formal arrest may not have been present." Id.
Here, the District Court did not err by citing Wyatt
to conclude that the SFST that Gleason refused was not an
"unreasonable search or seizure[.]" The District Court was not
wrong in affirming the Administrative Decision on this basis.
See Gray, 84 Hawai‘i at 144, 931 P.2d at 586.
(2) Gleason argues that the District Court "erred when
it ruled that an inference of guilt can be inferred because
Gleason declined to voluntarily submit to a search, that is, the
performance of SFST's [sic]." She asserts that "when Gleason
invoked her fundamental right to not be searched, it was error
for the hearing officer, and the judge, to rule that using her
exercise of her right [sic] amounted to an inference of guilt."
The District Court cited State v. Ferm, 94 Hawai‘i 17,
28, 7 P.3d 193, 204 (App. 2000), when it ruled that "[Gleason]'s
refusal to participate in the SFST could be considered as an
inference of a 'consciousness of guilt.'" COL 2. This
conclusion was not erroneous.

In Ferm, this court considered and rejected the
defendant's challenge that his constitutional privilege against

officer ordered her out of the vehicle and administered the SFST, following
which Wyatt was arrested for OVUII. Id. at 297, 687 P.2d at 548.
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self-incrimination "was violated when the trial court," during
his driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor trial,
"weighed his refusal to take the [SFST] against him." Id. at
27-28, 7 P.3d at 203-04. The Ferm court reasoned that "because
[d]efendant's refusal to take the [SFST] was neither testimonial
or compelled, the fifth amendment and article I, section 10 were
not offended." Id. at 29, 7 P.3d at 205 (citation omitted).
This court explained: "In our view, the inference of
consciousness of guilt is simply that, one of many reasonable
and permissible inferences from evidence of refusal. It is not
testimony inherent in the refusal." Id. at 28, 7 P.3d at 204.
"[T]o characterize refusal as testimonial confuses reasonable
inferences with communication." Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). To be "testimonial," a response must
"convey[] information or assert[] facts." State v. Manion,
151 Hawai‘i 267, 275, 511 P.3d 766, 774 (2022) (citation
omitted).
Here, the District Court did not err by citing Ferm to
conclude that "consciousness of guilt" "could be" a permissible
inference from Gleason's refusal to participate in the SFST.
The District Court was not wrong in affirming the Administrative
Decision on this basis. See Gray, 84 Hawai‘i at 144, 931 P.2d at
586.
(3) Gleason argues that: the District Court
"performed no independent analysis of the hearing officer's
determinations"; "[r]ed or watery eyes can be based on innocent
reasons and even with imperfect driving are not sufficient to
amount to probable cause to revoke a license"; and "there isn't
enough evidence to find that probable cause existed to believe

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Gleason was either impaired or had a breath alcohol
concentration above the legal limit at the time of her arrest."
A court reviewing an agency decision does not weigh
evidence. See Gendreau v. Admin. Dir. of Courts, No.
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2021 WL 2103753, at *3 (Haw. App. May 25, 2021)
(SDO) (citing In re Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawai‘i
459, 465, 918 P.2d 561, 567 (1996)). "Probable cause exists
when the facts and circumstances within one's knowledge and of
which one has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient
in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been committed. This requires more
than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty." State v.
Maganis, 109 Hawai‘i 84, 86, 123 P.3d 679, 681 (2005) (citation
omitted).
Here, the Director found that Officer Ah Tou observed
that "Gleason appeared to be moving slowly"; Gleason's speech
was "slurred"; that an "odor of a possibly consumed alcoholic
beverage [was] coming from Gleason"; that Gleason's "eyes were
red, watery and glassy"; and Gleason was driving erratically,
"swerv[ing]" and "jerk[ing]" in and out of her lane. Based on
these findings, which could support a determination of probable
cause that Gleason committed OVUII, the District Court was not
wrong in affirming the Administrative Decision on this basis.
See Nguyen v. Admin. Dir. of Courts, NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2023
WL 2254762, at *2-*3 (Haw. App. Feb. 28, 2023) (SDO) (affirming
license revocation and probable cause finding for OVUII without
an SFST, where: defendant displayed erratic driving prior to
the traffic stop; and the arresting officer observed defendant
"was slow to respond," "had a strong odor of an alcoholic type
beverage on his breath, his gaze was fixed, his eyes were red

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and watery, his neck and face were flush red, and his speech was
garbled and slurred"); Gray, 84 Hawai‘i at 144, 931 P.2d at 586.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the January 12,
2023 Judgment entered by the District Court of the First
Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, July 30, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Kevin O'Grady,
Chief Judge
for Petitioner-Appellant.
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Christopher J.I. Leong,
Associate Judge
Deputy Attorney General,
for Respondent-Appellee.
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge

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