State v. Ju

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
30-JUN-2025
07:51 AM
Dkt. 57 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

STATE OF HAWAI I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JAYDEN JU, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
HONOLULU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DCW-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Jayden Ju (Ju) appeals from the
June 28, 2023 Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order (Judgment)
entered against him by the District Court of the First Circuit,
Honolulu Division (District Court).1 Ju was convicted of a
single count of Assault in the Third Degree (Assault 3) in
violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712 (1)(a)
(2014).2

1
The Honorable Steven L. Hartley presided.
2
HRS § 707-712 provides:

§ 707-712 Assault in the third degree. (1) A person
commits the offense of assault in the third degree if the
person:

(a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another person; or

(b) Negligently causes bodily injury to another
person with a dangerous instrument.

(2) Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor
unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by
mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Ju raises a single point of error on appeal, contending
that there was not substantial evidence presented at trial to
support the District Court's conclusion that the State of Hawai i
(State) had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ju's use of
force was unjustified.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Ju's
point of error as follows:
Ju argues that the District Court erroneously concluded
that Ju's use of force was not justified as self-defense based on
the court's "misapprehension" that Ju's use of force was not
immediately necessary due to the twenty to thirty seconds between
when Ju was punched in the nose by someone wearing red and when
he used force against Paul Aquino (Aquino).
[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when
the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such
evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies
whether the case was before a judge or a jury. The test on
appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence
to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Indeed,
even if it could be said in a bench trial that the
conviction is against the weight of the evidence, as long as
there is substantial evidence to support the requisite
findings for conviction, the trial court will be affirmed.

"Substantial evidence" as to every material element of
the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person]
of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. And as trier
of fact, the trial judge is free to make all reasonable and
rational inferences under the facts in evidence, including
circumstantial evidence.
State v. Calaycay, 145 Hawai i 186, 196, 449 P.3d 1184, 1194
(2019).
It is undisputed that twenty to thirty seconds after Ju
was punched by someone wearing red, Ju walked up to Aquino (in a
Halloween crowd in Waikīkī) and punched him in the eye, which
caused Aquino pain. Aquino was wearing a red shirt. The
defense's argument rests upon the use of force being justified.
The use of force for self-protection is codified in HRS
§ 703-304 (2014) and is a defense to Assault 3. See State v.
Sanchez, 2 Haw. App. 577, 578, 636 P.2d 1365, 1366 (1981). HRS
§ 703-304 states in relevant part:

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

§ 703-304 Use of force in self-protection. (1)
Subject to the provisions of this section and of section
703-308, the use of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the
present occasion.

. . . .

(3) . . . a person employing protective force may
estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he
believes them to be when the force is used without
retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act
which he has no legal duty to do, or abstaining from any
lawful action.
HRS § 703-300 (2014) provides definitions relating to
justification, including that: "'Believes' means reasonably
believes," and "'Force'" means any bodily impact, restraint, or
confinement, or the threat thereof." "Unlawful force" is
force which is employed without the consent of the person
against whom it is directed and the employment of which
constitutes an offense or would constitute an offense except
for a defense not amounting to a justification to use the
force. Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of
this section, whether or not it otherwise is legally
effective, except assent to the infliction of death or
serious or substantial bodily injury.
Id.
"Self-defense is not an affirmative defense, and the
prosecution has the burden of disproving it once evidence of
justification has been adduced." State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai i
206, 215, 35 P.3d 233, 242 (2001). The Hawai i Supreme Court
has consistently held that the test for "[s]elf-defense to a
criminal charge contains both a subjective and an objective
prong: the defendant must believe that force is necessary, and
that belief must be reasonable." State v. Sandoval, 149 Hawai i
221, 237, 487 P.3d 308, 324 (2021).
The crux of this appeal is whether there was
substantial evidence to support the objective prong, i.e., the
District Court's finding and conclusion that, evaluating the
reasonableness of Ju's action from the perspective Ju had at the
time, it was not objectively reasonable for Ju to believe that
force was necessary.
Here, Ju initially testified, "After I got hit, I was
stumbling around. And then I seen somebody else that was wearing
red. That was that guy. And I didn't know if that was him or

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

not." Ju had been hit in the nose, but did not see who hit him;
he did not see the person's face and only saw that the person was
wearing red. It was a crowded Halloween night in Waikīkī. Later
in his testimony, Ju answered in the affirmative when his lawyer
asked him if, at the time he struck Aquino, he believed Aquino
was the one who had punched him. However, the District Court
also pointed to Ju's testimony that there was a twenty to thirty
second gap between when Ju got hit and when he saw Aquino.
Aquino was the first person Ju saw wearing red. They were
walking toward each other. They made eye contact. Ju hit
Aquino.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to
support the District Court's conclusion that Ju's belief that
force was immediately necessary was not objectively reasonable
due to the twenty to thirty second gap between Ju being hit and
Ju hitting Aquino, and that self-defense did not apply.
For these reasons, the District Court's June 28, 2023
Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, June 30, 2025.

On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Acting Chief Judge
Cindy Huynh,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge

Robert T. Nakatsuji, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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