Waipa v. Camara

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
17-JUN-2025
08:09 AM
Dkt. 136 MO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

KAMAKAILA K. WAIPA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v.
WAYLON-JIM CAMARA; COUNTY OF HAWAI#I; CARSON TRAILER,
INC.; MILTON W. CAMARA, Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOES 2-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10;
DOE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 1-10; DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1-10; DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10; and
DOE UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 1-10, Defendants,
and
DEXTER AXLE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 3CC191000121)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)
Kamakaila K. Waipa appeals, and Dexter Axle Company
cross-appeals, from the April 19, 2022 Final Judgment for the
County of Hawai#i and Dexter entered by the Circuit Court of the
Third Circuit.1 Waipa challenges the circuit court's July 23,
2021 orders granting the County's and Dexter's respective motions
for summary judgment. Dexter challenges the January 21, 2022
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Review of "Clerk's
Taxation of Costs." We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for further proceedings.

1
The Honorable Peter K. Kubota presided.
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I. BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2017, Waylon-Jim Camara was driving a Dodge
pickup truck, towing a Trailer. The Trailer's dual Axles had
been manufactured by Dexter. Camara was northbound on Hawai#i
Belt Road. He drove over a dip in the road. He felt his truck
shake. He looked in his left mirror. He saw the Trailer's
running light and tail light in the southbound lane. He realized
the Trailer coupler had disconnected from the truck ball; only
the safety chains attached the Trailer to the Dodge. He tapped
the brake. He saw the Trailer in the passenger-side mirror. It
had swung to the other side of his truck. He downshifted. He
felt his truck lift from the rear. The Trailer went under the
Dodge and flipped it onto the driver's side. The Trailer came to
rest in the southbound lane. Other drivers parked alongside the
road. People came running over to help. Then, said Camara, "the
lady in the white car came around all of the cars that was parked
and drove into the [T]railer." The lady in the white car was
Waipa.
Waipa sued Camara, the County, Dexter, and others on
April 26, 2019. Her complaint alleged that Camara, the County,
and Dexter were negligent, and Dexter was strictly liable for a
defective product. Camara's father, Milton Camara, owned the
Trailer and was later identified as a defendant. The circuit
court granted the Camaras' petition for approval of good-faith
settlement, and the claims against them were dismissed.
The County and Dexter moved for summary judgment. A
trial date had not yet been set, so discovery remained open.
Waipa moved to continue the motions to allow her to conduct
discovery, under Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
Rule 56(f). Orders granting both motions for summary judgment
and denying Waipa's HRCP Rule 56(f) motion were entered on
July 23, 2021.
The circuit court clerk taxed $5,491.27 in costs
against Waipa, at Dexter's request. Waipa moved for judicial

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review. The court rescinded the taxation of costs by order
entered on January 21, 2022. The Final Judgment was entered on
April 19, 2022. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

Waipa contends the circuit court erred by: (1) granting
the County's motion for summary judgment; (2) granting Dexter's
motion for summary judgment; and (3) denying her HRCP Rule 56(f)
request to continue the motions for summary judgment to allow her
to conduct discovery.
Dexter contends the circuit court erred by rescinding
the clerk's taxation of costs: (1) without giving adequate
reasons; and (2) in light of Dexter's HRCP Rule 68 offer of
settlement.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i 46, 55, 292 P.3d 1276, 1285 (2013).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A fact is material if proof
of that fact would establish or refute one of the essential
elements of a party's cause of action or defense. Id. at 55–56,
292 P.3d at 1285–86. The evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 56, 292 P.3d at 1286.
When (as here) the summary judgment movant does not
have the burden of proof, it has the burden to show (1) there is
no genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of
the claim or defense addressed by the motion, and (2) the
uncontroverted facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.
Ralston, 129 Hawai#i at 56, 292 P.3d at 1286. It may satisfy its
burden by either (1) presenting evidence negating an element of
the non-movant's claim, or (2) demonstrating that the non-movant
cannot satisfy its burden of proof. Id. at 60, 292 P.3d at 1290.

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Where the movant attempts to meet its burden through the latter
means, it must show that the non-movant has not placed evidence
in the record and that the non-movant will be unable to offer
evidence at trial. Id. at 60-61, 292 P.3d at 1290-91. Thus, if
discovery has not concluded, a summary judgment movant generally
cannot just point to the non-moving party's lack of evidence to
support its initial burden of production. Id.
HRCP Rule 56(f) is the proper procedure to request more
time to respond to a motion for summary judgment filed before the
discovery deadline. Ralston, 129 Hawai#i at 62, 292 P.3d at
1292. Summary judgment should not be granted when there is still
time for the non-movant to develop evidence to use at trial,
unless it would be futile. Id. at 63, 292 P.3d at 1293.
We review denial of an HRCP Rule 56(f) motion for abuse
of discretion. Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai#i 1, 9, 986
P.2d 288, 296 (1999). The requesting party must, by affidavit or
declaration, demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the
motion would enable it, by discovery or other means, to rebut the
movant's showing of no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at
12, 986 P.2d at 299. A general request for more time to complete
discovery is inadequate. Id.

B. Statutory Interpretation

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528
P.3d 217, 221 (2023). We start with the statute's language;
"implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost
obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language
contained in the statute itself." Id. "The rules of statutory
interpretation require us to apply a plain language analysis when
statutory language is clear." Id. at 149, 528 P.3d at 222.

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C. Taxable Costs

We review taxation of costs for abuse of discretion.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Greenspon, 143 Hawai#i 237, 243,
428 P.3d 749, 755 (2018). Although the award of costs is
discretionary, HRCP Rule 54(d) creates a strong presumption that
costs will be awarded, and a court denying costs must explain why
an award of costs would be inequitable unless the circumstances
justifying the denial of costs are plain from the record. Id. at
248, 428 P.3d at 760.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The circuit court did not err by granting the
County's motion for summary judgment and
denying Waipa's HRCP Rule 56(f) motion.

A plaintiff claiming negligence must show: (1) the
defendant owed a legal duty to conform to a certain standard of
conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;
(2) the defendant's breach of the duty; (3) a reasonably close
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff.
Winfrey v. GGP Ala Moana LLC, 130 Hawai#i 262, 272, 308 P.3d 891,
901 (2013).
Waipa's theory of liability against the County was
negligent failure to require that the Trailer have brakes.
Waipa's expert witness, mechanical engineer Edward K. Carrick,
opined: "When the trailer began to lose control, functioning
trailer brakes would have corrected the trailer's movement[.]
. . . With properly functioning service brakes on the trailer,
braking by Camara would have activated the trailer brakes and the
trailer would have slowed and moved back in line with the Dodge."
With this framework, we discuss each element of the tort of
negligence.
(1) The existence of a duty is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Winfrey, 130 Hawai#i at 271, 308 P.3d
at 900. Quoting Cootey v. Sun Investment, Inc., 68 Haw. 480,

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485, 718 P.2d 1086, 1090 (1986), the County argues that imposing
a tort duty under the circumstances of this case would subject it
to "unmanageable, unbearable, and totally unpredictable
liability."
In Cootey, the plaintiffs' property was flooded five
times in fifteen months. They blamed it on the development of a
subdivision mauka of their property. They sued the developer,
the engineering firm that designed the subdivision, and the
County of Hawai#i, which had granted final subdivision approval.
The trial court directed a verdict for all defendants. The
supreme court held:

The task of the government employees is to review the
development plans submitted by the owner or developer to
assess compliance with the law. While we do not condone
negligence in the performance of this task, neither do we
believe that the government employees are required to
conduct their own engineering studies to ensure the validity
and correctness of the developer's plans. To require the
County to do so would place the County as an insurer of the
adequacy of Sun Investment's plans, designs and installation
of subdivision facilities.

68 Haw. at 486, 718 P.2d at 1091 (emphasis added).
Waipa cites Hawai#i County Code (HCC) §§ 24-88 and 24-
89 (1983) as the source of the County's duty to require trailer
brakes.2

Section 24-88. Brakes on all wheels required; exceptions.

(a) Every vehicle shall be equipped with brakes acting on
all wheels except:

(1) Trailers, semi-trailers, or pole trailers of a
gross weight not exceeding three thousand
pounds, provided that:
(A) The total weight on and including the
wheels of the trailer or trailers shall
not exceed forty percent of the gross
weight of the towing vehicle when
connected to the trailer or trailers, and

2
Waipa also contends the County failed to comply with Hawaii
Administrative Rules § 19-133.2-40, concerning trailer inspections, but that
rule did not take effect until September 30, 2018, after Waipa's accident.

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(B) The combination of vehicles, consisting of
the towing vehicle and its total towed
load, is capable of complying with the
performance requirements of section 24-97.
. . . .
Section 24-89. Automatic trailer brakes.

Every trailer, semi-trailer, and pole trailer equipped
with air or vacuum actuated brakes and every trailer, semi-
trailer, and pole trailer with a gross weight in excess of
three thousand pounds, manufactured or assembled after
July 1, 1961, shall be equipped with brakes acting on all
wheels and of such character as to be applied automatically
and promptly, and remain applied for at least fifteen
minutes, upon breakaway from the towing vehicle.

HCC § 24-97 contains these relevant requirements:

Section 24-97. Performance ability of brakes.

. . . .

(c) Table of Required Brake Performance.

Classification of Braking force as a Deceleration Brake system
Vehicles percentage of gross in feet application and
vehicle or per second braking distance in
combination weight per second feet from an initial
speed of 20 m.p.h.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C-2 Combination of a 43.5% 14 40
two-axle towing
vehicle and a
trailer with a
gross trailer
weight of 3,000
pounds or less

Under Cootey, the County owes a duty to process trailer
registration applications with reasonable care. Carrick opined
that the County should have required brakes for any trailer
capable of carrying a load that, combined with the trailer's
weight, exceeds 3,000 pounds. Cootey does not support the
proposition that the County owed a legal duty to base the HCC
§§ 24-88 and 24-89 trailer brake requirements on the trailer's
gross vehicle weight rating instead of the trailer's gross

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weight.3 That is a legislative, not a judicial, function. See
Hawai#i County Charter, Art. III (2016); State v. Augafa, 92
Hawai#i 454, 470, 992 P.2d 723, 739 (App. 1999) (stating that "a
court strays far from [its] function when it directs legislative
bodies to adopt specific laws").
(2) The County did not breach its duty. The County
Department of Motor Vehicles registered the Trailer on May 5,
2000. The registered owner was Russell Acantilado, Sr. The
Trailer was not equipped with brakes. It weighed 1,780 pounds.
These facts are uncontroverted. Because its gross weight did not
exceed 3,000 pounds, the Trailer did not need to have brakes
under HCC §§ 24-88 and 24-89. The County did not breach its duty
by registering the Trailer without requiring it to have brakes.
Relying on Carrick's opinions, Waipa argues that the
County breached its duty because: (1) "Although the statutes
state 'gross weight', as applied the county should have used
gross vehicle weight rating instead"; and (2) "any trailer with
an empty weight of 1,000 lbs . . . or more must have brakes
installed as a condition of registration by the county."
Carrick's first opinion admits the County enforced the statutes
as written, which was the extent of its duty. We also note that
even if a trailer with a gross weight over 3,000 pounds had no
brakes, the County is not authorized to require that the owner
install brakes; the County's only authority is to reject the
registration application.
Carrick's second opinion was based upon the HCC § 24-97
performance requirements.4 Those performance requirements are
based on the combined weight of the trailer and its towing
vehicle. Under Cootey, the County is not required to conduct its
own engineering studies to insure compliance with performance

3
"Gross vehicle weight rating" means "the value specified by the
manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle." Hawaii Revised
Statutes § 286-201 (2020).
4
Carrick's report cited HCC § 24-88, but that section doesn't
contain performance requirements. HCC § 24-88(a)(1)(B) refers to HCC § 24-97,
which contains the performance requirements.

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requirements. There is no way for the County to know what
vehicles will be used to tow a trailer. The second opinion is
legally unsound.
(3) Even if the County shouldn't have registered the
Trailer, the registration expired on May 4, 2001. It was never
renewed. The record does not show when Milton Camara acquired
the Trailer. But Waylon-Jim Camara testified, "my dad purchased
it as a farm trailer, yeah." Camara knew the Trailer wasn't
registered and understood it could not legally be operated on a
public road. His Dodge was also unregistered, and did not have a
current safety check at the time of the accident. Yet Camara
illegally drove his Dodge, towing the unregistered Trailer, on
the night of the accident. The record contains no evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could find that the County's registration
of the Trailer was a substantial factor contributing to Waipa's
injuries seventeen years later. See Est. of Frey v. Mastroianni,
146 Hawai#i 540, 549-50, 463 P.3d 1197, 1206-07 (2020) (noting
consistent application of "substantial factor" test to determine
legal causation).
(4) HRCP Rule 56(f) (eff. 2000) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.

Waipa's HRCP Rule 56(f) motion was supported by the
affidavit of counsel. Waipa sought discovery "about the County's
registration protocols and procedures in May 2000, in connection
with the subject trailer." Waipa also wanted to redepose the
person who authenticated documents offered to support the
County's motion for summary judgment. Counsel's affidavit did
not specify what "facts essential to justify [Waipa]'s
opposition" Waipa hoped to discover, or what material facts
established by the County's evidence they would controvert. See

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Acoba, 92 Hawai#i at 12, 986 P.2d at 299 (stating that general
request for more time to complete discovery was inadequate to
support HRCP Rule 56(f) request). Under the circumstances, the
circuit court acted within its discretion by denying Waipa's HRCP
Rule 56(f) motion.

B. The circuit court erred by granting Dexter's
motion for summary judgment.

Waipa asserted (1) negligent design, (2) negligent
failure to warn, and (3) strict products liability claims against
Dexter.
(1)(a) Duty. Dexter contended it did not owe a legal
duty to Waipa. Waipa argues that Dexter had a duty to install
brakes on the Axles. Dexter did owe a duty to Waipa, but Waipa's
formulation of the duty is too narrow.

Under Hawai#i law, plaintiffs in design defect cases
may proceed on both a theory of negligence for negligent
design and a theory of strict liability in tort for
defective design.

The plaintiff's burden in a negligent design claim is
to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in not taking
reasonable measures in designing its product to protect
against a foreseeable risk of injury and the manufacturer's
negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.
With respect to a claim of strict product liability,
the plaintiff's burden is to prove (1) a defect in the
product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its
intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal
connection between the defect and the plaintiff's injuries.
Pursuant to either theory, it is the legal duty of
manufacturers to exercise reasonable care in the design and
incorporation of safety features to protect against
foreseeable dangers.

Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai#i 336, 354, 944 P.2d 1279,
1297 (1997) (cleaned up).
Under Tabieros, Dexter had a duty to take reasonable
measures in designing the Axles to protect against a foreseeable
risk of injury. "An actionable duty is generally owed to
foreseeable plaintiffs subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm
created by the actor's negligent conduct." Seibel v. City &

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Cnty. of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 253, 257, 602 P.2d 532, 536 (1979).
Here, Waipa was a foreseeable plaintiff because a negligently
designed axle, incorporated into a trailer that could be used on
a public road, could place other users of the road in danger of
harm.
(b) Breach. As to Dexter, Carrick opined:

In order to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances, the subject axles should have been
manufactured and distributed by Dexter with brakes already
installed.
. . . .

The design of the Dexter axles was below the standard of
care because neither of the axles was equipped with brakes
despite their individual GAWR[5] of 3,500 lbs.

Carrick supported his opinion by referring to Dexter's
Applications Manual, which states:

Dexter recommends that all axles be equipped with brakes.
For trailers used in commerce, the trailer axle(s) must be
equipped with brakes unless the GAWR of the trailer axle is
less than 3000 pounds and the hitch load imposed on the
towing vehicle does not exceed 40% of the towing vehicles
GVWR. . . .

. . . .
Commercial trailers must comply with the requirements of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as prescribed by
the U.S. Department of Transportation which calls for brakes
on each wheel for most applications. Consult the
regulations that pertain to the type of trailer being built.
The recommended practice for any trailer design would be to
use brakes on all axles. The use of trailer brakes can help
prolong the life of the tow vehicle brakes as well as
provide for safer operation.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Waipa, there was
a genuine issue of material fact about whether Dexter's design of
an axle, with a GAWR of 3,500 pounds, without brakes, breached
its duty to take reasonable measures in designing its axles to

5
GAWR is an acronym for gross axle weight rating. According to
Dexter's product literature, GAWR is "[t]he value specified by the vehicle
manufacturer as the load carrying capacity of the axles in a system, as
measured at the tire-ground interfaces. This includes the wheels and tires."

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protect against a foreseeable risk of injury to persons such as
Waipa.
(c) Causation. Carrick, who purports to be an accident
reconstructionist, opined that "it is much more likely than not
that proper trailer brakes would have controlled the trailer and
prevented the initial [Dodge] and [Trailer] crash, eliminating
the crash with the Toyota." Viewed in the light most favorable
to Waipa, there was a genuine issue of material fact about
whether Dexter's failure to include brakes on the Axles was a
legal cause of Waipa's injuries from the June 27, 2017 accident.
The circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on
Waipa's negligent design claim.
(2) Under Hawai#i law, "a manufacturer has a two-fold
duty to provide (1) adequate instructions for safe use of the
product; and (2) warnings as to the dangers inherent in improper
use of the product." Acoba, 92 Hawai#i at 15, 986 P.2d at 302.
"[A] manufacturer must give appropriate warning of any known
dangers which the user of its product would not ordinarily
discover." Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 66 Haw. 237,
248, 659 P.2d 734, 743 (1983).
Waipa argues that Dexter had a duty to warn trailer
manufacturers that brakes may be required depending on the use to
which the axles were put. The argument was supported by
Carrick's opinion that a warning sheet or label containing the
warning should have been distributed with the axles. That
evidence created a genuine issue of material fact about whether
Dexter, having manufactured axles without brakes, should have
warned users of its axles — such as trailer manufacturers — of
the potential need for brakes. The circuit court erred by
granting summary judgment on Waipa's negligent failure to warn
claim.
(3) To prove strict product liability, Waipa must show
(1) a defect in the Axles which rendered them unreasonably
dangerous for their intended or reasonably foreseeable use, and
(2) a causal connection between the defect and her injuries.

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Acoba, 92 Hawai#i at 16, 986 P.2d at 303. Waipa can establish a
defect using three approaches: (1) the consumer expectation test;
(2) the risk-utility test; and (3) the latent danger test. Id.
at 17, 986 P.2d at 304. "Generally, whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous is a question for the trier of fact." Id.
A product is defective under the consumer expectation
test if "it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary user of
the product would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, including reasonably foreseeable misuses."
Tabieros, 85 Hawai#i at 367, 944 P.2d at 1310. Here, Camara's
use of the Trailer equipped with the brake-less Axles was
reasonably foreseeable. There was a genuine issue of material
fact whether the Axles were defective under the consumer
expectation test.
A product is defective under the risk-utility test if
the product's design was a legal cause of the injuries and the
risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits of
the design. Tabieros, 85 Hawai#i at 367, 944 P.2d at 1310.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Waipa, Carrick's opinions
and Dexter's product literature raised a genuine issue of
material fact about whether dangers inherent in Dexter's design
of the 3,500-pound GAWR Axles without brakes outweighed the
benefits of the design.
A product is defective under the latent danger test if
use of the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner (including reasonably foreseeable misuses) involves a
substantial danger not readily recognizable by an ordinary user
of the product, and the manufacturer fails to give adequate
warnings of the danger. Tabieros, 85 Hawai#i at 367, 944 P.2d at
1310. We concluded that Dexter was not entitled to summary
judgment on Waipa's negligent-failure-to-warn claim. Carrick's
opinions also raise genuine issue of material fact about whether
the Axles were defective under the latent danger test.
The circuit court erred by granting summary judgment
for Dexter on Waipa's strict products liability claim. We need

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not address the circuit court's denial of Waipa's HRCP Rule 56(f)
request.

C. Dexter's cross-appeal is moot.

We are vacating the order granting Dexter's motion for
summary judgment and the Final Judgment as to Dexter. Thus,
Dexter's cross-appeal on the denial of costs is moot. Cf. Ass'n
of Owners of Kalele Kai v. Yoshikawa, 149 Hawai#i 417, 420, 493
P.3d 939, 942 (2021) (stating that "an award of attorneys' fees
is inappropriate where the underlying judgment is vacated").

V. CONCLUSION

The circuit court's July 23, 2021 Order Granting
Defendant County of Hawai#i's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Order Denying Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion are affirmed.
The July 23, 2021 Order Granting Defendant Dexter Axle
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Counts Against
Dexter of Plaintiff Kamakaila K. Waipa's Complaint is vacated.
The April 19, 2022 Final Judgment is affirmed in part
as to the County of Hawai#i and vacated in part as to Dexter Axle
Company. This case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. Waipa's
motion for retention of oral argument is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 17, 2025.

On the briefs:
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Stanley H. Roehrig, Presiding Judge
Nathan P. Roehrig,
for Plaintiff-Appellant/ /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Cross-Appellee Associate Judge
Kamakaila K. Waipa.
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Lincoln S.T. Ashida, Associate Judge
Brian W. Tilker,
Jacob A. Kamstra,
for Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant
Dexter Axle Company.

Steven K. Idemoto,

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Deputy Corporation Counsel,
County of Hawai#i,
for Defendant-Appellee
County of Hawai#i.

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