Belkadi v. Mayle

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MASSINISSA BELKADI,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL NO. 1:24-cv-14
(KLEEH)
C.C. Mayle, a police officer
for the City of Morgantown,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 36]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 36]. For the reasons discussed herein, the Motion
is GRANTED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 	February 	1, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	Massinissa 	Belkadi 	(“Belkadi”
or 	“Plaintiff”), 	by 	counsel, 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	against 	Defendant
C.C. Mayle (“Mayle” or “Defendant”), a police officer for the City
of Morgantown. 	ECF No. 1. 	The Complaint alleged (1) 42 U.S.C. §
1983 	Excessive 	Force 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Fourth, 	Eight, 	and
Fourteenth 	Amendments; 	(2) 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	False 	Arrest 	in
violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) 42
U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	Unlawful 	Search 	and 	Seizure 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Fourth, 	Eighth, 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments, 	(4) 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983
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Unlawful 	Detainment 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Fourth, 	Eighth, 	and
Fourteenth Amendments; (5) Battery; and (6) Assault. 	Id.
Defendant moved for partial dismissal of the Complaint on March
27, 	2024 	[ECF 	No. 	3], 	which 	was 	granted 	on 	March 	5, 	2025.1 	ECF
No. 	21. 	Thus, 	pursuant 	to 	this 	Court’s 	Memorandum 	Opinion 	and
Order 	Granting 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Dismissal 	[ECF 	No.
3, 27], the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage
are: 	(1) 	Excessive 	Force, 	(2) 	False 	Arrest 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment, (5) Battery, and (6) Assault under West Virginia Common
Law. 	On August 1, 2025, Defendant Mayle filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the remaining Counts. 	ECF No. 36. 	On August 22, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. 	ECF No. 41. 	Then on September 5, 2025, Defendant filed
a 	Reply 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Response. 	ECF 	No. 	46. 	The 	Motion 	is 	thus
fully briefed and ripe for review.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
In 	the 	Complaint, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	on 	the 	evening 	of
February 2, 2023, he was in downtown Morgantown, West Virginia and
1 The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of
Plaintiff’s Complaint for False Arrest and Unlawful Search and Seizure
because the alleged unlawful conduct is duplicative and included within
Count Two. Additionally, the Court dismissed Counts I through IV to the
extent 	the 	claims 	were 	brought 	under 	the 	Eighth 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendments.
2 The following facts are provided from Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No.
1], Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 37], and the surveillance and body camera footage of
the incident [ECF 36, Ex. C, E].
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planned to meet up later in the night with his girlfriend. 	Compl.,
ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 4-5. 	When the two met up, Plaintiff alleges his
girlfriend 	was 	intoxicated, 	and 	while 	attempting 	to 	help 	get 	her
back 	to 	his 	apartment, 	one 	of 	the 	girlfriend’s 	friends 	yelled 	at
Plaintiff and a stranger then picked up Plaintiff’s girlfriend and
carried her away. 	Id. at ¶¶ 6-10.
Defendant Officer C.C. Mayle arrived shortly thereafter. 	Id.
at 	¶¶ 	15-16. 	Prior 	to 	Mayle’s 	arrival, 	security 	footage 	from 	a
nearby 	Chase 	Bank, 	shows 	Belkadi 	approaching 	his 	girlfriend 	and
her 	friend. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	Ex. 	E, 	at 	00:10-00:17. 	The 	group 	then
moves 	mostly 	out 	of 	shot, 	with 	only 	their 	lower 	halves 	visible,
but 	a 	confrontation 	clearly 	occurs 	with 	seven 	passersby’s
eventually joining the group. 	Id. at 00:18-00:43. 	Next, various
people, 	including 	Plaintiff, 	can 	be 	seen 	yelling, 	shoving, 	and
exhibiting 	other 	aggressive 	behaviors. 	Id. 	at 	00:47-1:05.
Plaintiff’s 	girlfriend 	appears 	to 	fall 	to 	the 	ground 	and 	is 	then
helped 	to 	her 	feet 	by 	an 	unknown 	individual. 	Id. 	at 	1:03-1:09.
Belkadi 	approaches 	the 	individual, 	shoving 	multiple 	women 	out 	of
the 	way 	to 	get 	there, 	and 	pushes 	the 	individual. 	Id. 	at 	1:09-
1:13.
Around 	this 	time, 	a 	witness 	called 	911 	and 	requested 	that 	an
officer “come to High Street in front of Chase Bank.” 	ECF No. 36,
Ex. B, at 00:09-00:13. 	The caller explained that she witnessed a
man try to “take” his girlfriend by physically dragging her out of
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a bar. 	Id. at 00:29-00:54. 	As Officer Mayle arrived on the scene,
he turned on his body camera, and a vehicle can be seen pulling up
next 	to 	him 	on 	High 	Street. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	Ex. 	C, 	at 	00:24-0029.
Mayle 	testified 	that 	the 	driver 	of 	said 	vehicle 	then 	pointed 	to
Plaintiff 	and 	informed 	Mayle 	that 	he 	had 	watched 	the 	individual
punch a female in the face.3 	ECF No. 36, Ex. D, Mayle Dep., at p.
7:2-8. 	As Mayle approached the scene, his body camera recorded a
visibly 	agitated 	Plaintiff 	who 	was 	crying 	and 	yelling 	“Where 	is
she?”. 	ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39.
As 	Mayle 	approached 	Plaintiff, 	dispatch 	informed 	Mayle 	via
radio 	call 	of 	the 	report 	that 	witnesses 	observed 	an 	incident
wherein 	a 	male 	beat 	a 	female, 	and 	multiple 	witnesses 	saw 	him
dragging 	her 	out 	of 	a 	bar 	into 	a 	vehicle. 	Id. 	at 	00:39-00:59.
Mayle 	asked 	Plaintiff, 	“what’s 	going 	on 	man?” 	but 	Plaintiff 	did
not 	acknowledge 	Mayle 	and 	attempted 	to 	walk 	by 	him. 	Id. 	Then,
Plaintiff alleges, Mayle physically placed his hands on Plaintiff
and 	forced 	him 	to 	sit 	on 	steps 	outside 	a 	restaurant 	– 	detaining
him. 	ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 17-18.
Furthermore, the body camera footage shows Plaintiff objecting
to 	his 	detainment 	and 	repeatedly 	refusing 	to 	comply 	with 	Mayle’s
orders. 	ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 1:01-1:28. 	Plaintiff exhibits signs
3 While this interaction can be seen on Mayle’s body camera footage, the
audio is unclear. The contents of 	the statement made by the driver 	to
Mayle is taken from Mayle’s deposition.
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of 	impairment 	and 	intoxication 	throughout 	the 	interaction
including 	crying, 	yelling 	at 	Mayle 	and 	onlookers, 	disobeying
orders, and struggling to communicate with Officer Mayle. 	Id. at
00:36-3:10. 	Additionally, 	Officer 	Mayle 	testified 	in 	his
deposition that he “could smell the odor of intoxicating beverage
coming off [Belkadi’s] breath.” 	Mayle Dep., at p. 18:5-6. At one
point 	during 	the 	interaction, 	Plaintiff 	can 	be 	seen 	observing
someone 	filming 	him, 	which 	causes 	Plaintiff 	to 	move 	toward 	the
bystander 	in 	an 	aggressive 	manner. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	Ex. 	C, 	at 	1:28-
1:38. 	Plaintiff 	testified, 	based 	on 	his 	actions, 	it 	would 	have
been 	reasonable 	for 	Mayle 	to 	believe 	Plaintiff 	may 	have 	used
violence against the bystander. 	ECF No. 36, Ex. A, Belkadi Dep.,
at 121-122:21-5.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	Mayle 	then 	started 	questioning 	and 	yelling
at 	him, 	he 	alleges 	Mayle 	accused 	Plaintiff 	of 	pulling 	his
girlfriend into a car, and then Mayle informed Plaintiff he would
be arrested if Plaintiff did not stop yelling at him. 	ECF No. 1,
at ¶¶ 19-24. 	Plaintiff can then be seen on the body camera footage
yelling 	at 	another 	onlooker, 	crying, 	and 	becoming 	increasingly
agitated. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	Ex. 	C, 	at 	1:55-2:11. 	Mayle 	attempted 	to
explain 	to 	Plaintiff 	that 	he 	was 	told 	by 	dispatch 	that 	Plaintiff
was 	observed 	dragging 	a 	woman 	into 	a 	car. 	Id. 	at 	2:11-2:14.
Plaintiff 	responded 	by 	screaming 	at 	Mayle. 	Id. 	at 	2:14-2:22.
Plaintiff 	then 	notices 	another 	onlooker 	filming 	and 	attempts 	to
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stand up again. Id. at 2:25-2:30.
Mayle then asked Plaintiff for his ID and name, but Plaintiff
refused to provide either and claimed he did not have his wallet.
Id. 	at 	2:30. 	Mayle 	asked 	again; 	Plaintiff 	refused 	once 	more 	to
provide his name. Id. at 3:00. 	Mayle then told Plaintiff to stand
up, 	and 	Plaintiff 	then 	provided 	his 	full 	name 	and 	began 	to 	reach
for his wallet to get his ID. 	Id. at 3:05.
When 	Plaintiff 	was 	ordered 	to 	stand, 	he 	remained 	seated 	and
responded 	with 	“no, 	no, 	no” 	and 	“no, 	sir”. 	Id. 	at 	3:05-3:11.
Mayle told Plaintiff to stand 7 times. 	Id. at 3:02-3:11. 	After
Plaintiff did not stand, Mayle grabbed Plaintiff and lifted him to
a 	standing 	position. 	Id. 	at 	3:10. 	Mayle 	then 	ordered 	Plaintiff
to 	turn 	around 	and 	Plaintiff 	can 	be 	seen 	turning 	to 	face 	Mayle.
Id. 	at 	3:11-3:13; 	ECF 	No. 	37, 	Ex. 	E, 	at 	6:05. 	Mayle 	then 	swung
Plaintiff 	from 	a 	standing 	position 	which 	caused 	Plaintiff’s 	head
to 	strike 	the 	sidewalk. 	Id. 	at 	3:14. 	Mayle 	testified 	that
Plaintiff 	took 	a 	“bladed” 	stance, 	and 	grabbed 	Mayle’s 	right 	arm,
resisting 	his 	attempt 	to 	arrest 	Plaintiff. 	Mayle 	Dep.,at 	57:24,
60:18-24.Mayle 	testified 	that 	he 	believed 	Plaintiff 	was 	actively
resisting arrest. Id. at 60:14-15.
Mayle, along with another officer, then proceeded to handcuff
Plaintiff. 	ECF 	No. 	37, 	Ex. 	C, 	at 	3:15-3:30. 	There 	were 	no
additional punches, kicks, or strikes to Plaintiff. 	Id. at 3:30-
4:15. 	Plaintiff 	then 	requested 	to 	talk 	to 	Mayle 	in 	private 	and
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Mayle escorted Plaintiff towards a police vehicle and informed him
that 	he 	was 	under 	arrest 	for 	disorderly 	conduct 	and 	public
intoxication. 	Id. at 4:25-5:18.
Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries to his head and finger
by 	way 	of 	Mayle’s 	actions. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶ 	45. 	Plaintiff 	was
treated at Mon Health Medical Center for his claimed injuries and
was 	diagnosed 	with 	a 	concussion 	and 	facial 	abrasions. 	Id. 	at 	¶¶
46-47. 	Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, obstructing
an 	officer, 	fleeing 	from 	an 	officer, 	public 	intoxication, 	and
underage possession/consumption of alcohol. 	Id. at ¶ 48. 	However,
all the charges were later dismissed. 	Id. at ¶ 49.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(a). 	The 	movant 	“bears 	the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, 	answers 	to 	interrogatories, 	and 	admissions 	on 	file,
together 	with 	the 	affidavits, 	if 	any,’ 	which 	it 	believes
demonstrate 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 	The nonmoving
party 	must 	“make 	a 	sufficient 	showing 	on 	an 	essential 	element 	of
its 	case 	with 	respect 	to 	which 	it 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	proof.” 	Id.
at 	317–18. 	Summary 	judgment 	is 	proper 	“[w]here 	the 	record 	taken
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as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving 	party, 	there 	[being] 	no 	‘genuine 	issue 	for 	trial.’”
Matsushita 	Elec. 	Indus. 	Co. 	v. 	Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574,
587 	(1986). 	The 	Court 	views 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most
favorable 	to 	the 	non-moving 	party 	and 	draws 	any 	reasonable
inferences 	in 	the 	non-moving 	party’s 	favor. See Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
56(a); see Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
In 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment, 	he 	requests 	that
the 	Court 	grant 	summary 	judgment 	on 	each 	of 	the 	remaining 	Counts
in 	the 	Complaint.4 	ECF 	No. 	36. 	Additionally, 	Defendant 	asserts
all Counts should be dismissed as a matter of law, and Plaintiff’s
claims 	under 	§ 	1983 	should 	be 	dismissed 	under 	the 	Doctrine 	of
Qualified 	Immunity. 	For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	herein, 	this 	Court
agrees 	on 	all 	fronts 	and 	hereby 	GRANTS 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36].
A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Count
I (Excessive Force) of Plaintiff’s Complaint because Defendant
is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his
constitutional rights by use of excessive force, fails as a matter
of 	law 	because 	the 	force 	used 	was 	reasonable 	under 	the
4 Those remaining Counts are Count I (Excessive Force), Count II (False
Arrest), Count V (Battery), and Count VI (Assault).
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circumstances. 	Therefore, 	no 	violation 	of 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional 	rights 	occurred, 	and 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified
immunity 	precludes 	Plaintiff’s 	claim. 	Accordingly, 	Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count I.
Qualified 	immunity 	“protects 	government 	officials 	from
liability 	for 	civil 	damages 	insofar 	as 	their 	conduct 	does 	not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” 	Pearson v. Callahan,
555 	U.S. 	223, 	231 	(2009) 	(quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
It “may be invoked by a government official sued in his personal,
or 	individual, 	capacity.” 	Ridpath 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Governors 	Marshall
Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 	The
protection 	extends 	to 	“all 	but 	the 	plainly 	incompetent 	or 	those
who 	knowingly 	violate 	the 	law.” 	Malley 	v. 	Briggs, 	475 	U.S. 	335,
341 (1986).
An officer, generally, is protected by qualified immunity if
his 	“actions 	could 	reasonably 	have 	been 	thought 	consistent 	with
the 	rights 	they 	are 	alleged 	to 	have 	violated.” 	Anderson 	v.
Creighton, 	483 	U.S. 	635, 	638 	(1987) 	(citations 	omitted). 	The
inquiry involves asking “whether the totality of the circumstances
justified 	a 	particular 	sort 	of 	search 	or 	seizure.” 	Tennessee 	v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985).
The 	test 	to 	determine 	whether 	an 	officer 	is 	entitled 	to
qualified 	immunity 	is 	two-fold: 	the 	Court 	must 	determine 	“(1)
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whether 	a 	constitutional 	violation 	occurred; 	and 	(2) 	whether 	the
right 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	violation[.]”
Jones 	v. 	City 	of 	Martinsburg, 	961 	F.3d 	661, 	667 	(4th 	Cir. 	2020)
(citation 	omitted). 	The 	United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the
Fourth Circuit applies a “split burden of proof for the qualified-
immunity 	defense.” 	Stanton 	v. 	Elliott, 	25 	F.4th 	227, 	233 	(4th
Cir. 	2022) 	(citation 	omitted). 	The 	plaintiff 	bears 	the 	burden 	on
the 	first 	prong, 	and 	the 	officer 	bears 	the 	burden 	on 	the 	second
prong.” 	Id. 	The Court can address either prong first. 	Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236.
The “dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he 	confronted.” 	Brosseau 	v. 	Haugen, 	543 	U.S. 	194, 	199 	(2004)
(citation omitted). 	Under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
analysis, 	force 	is 	not 	excessive 	if 	it 	is 	objectively 	reasonable
under the circumstances facing the officer, without regard to his
underlying intent. 	Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
Courts 	analyze 	three 	factors 	to 	determine 	whether 	a 	police
officer 	used 	excessive 	force, 	violative 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment:
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate 	threat 	to 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	officers 	or 	others, 	and
whether 	he 	is 	actively 	resisting 	arrest 	or 	attempting 	to 	evade
arrest 	by 	flight.” 	Pegg 	v. 	Herrnberger, 	845 	F.3d 	112, 	120 	(4th
Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting 	Graham, 	490 	U.S. 	at 	396). 	The 	doctrine 	of
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qualified 	immunity 	protects 	those 	police 	officers 	who 	could
reasonably 	believe 	that 	their 	actions 	were 	lawful, 	in 	light 	of
clearly established law at the time of the action. 	Id. at 117.
Against 	these 	considerations, 	the 	court 	must 	balance 	“the
intrusion 	on 	the 	individual’s 	Fourth 	Amendment 	interests.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 	The degree of the intrusion is “generally
measured 	by 	the 	amount 	of 	force 	employed 	to 	affect 	the 	seizure.”
Turmon 	v. 	Jordan, 	405 	F.3d 	202, 	207 	(4th 	Cir. 	2005). 	The
assessment 	considers 	“[t]he 	extent 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	injuries.”
Id. 	However, 	“the 	severity 	of 	injury 	resulting 	from 	the 	force
used has always been but one consideration in determining whether
force was excessive.” 	Smith v. Murphy, 634 F. App’x 914, 917 (4th
Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Critically, 	the 	“calculus 	of 	reasonableness 	must 	embody
allowance 	for 	the 	fact 	that 	police 	officers 	are 	often 	forced 	to
make 	split-second 	judgments 	– 	in 	circumstances 	that 	are 	tense,
uncertain, 	and 	rapidly 	evolving 	– 	about 	the 	amount 	of 	force 	that
is necessary in a particular situation.” 	Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–
97. 	“The 	reasonableness 	of 	a 	particular 	use 	of 	force 	must 	be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather 	than 	with 	the 	20/20 	vision 	of 	hindsight.” 	Id. 	at 	396.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant 	argues 	that 	summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate
because 	the 	force 	used 	did 	not 	rise 	to 	a 	level 	of 	violating 	the
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Constitution and he is entitled to qualified immunity. 	Reply, ECF
No. 46, at 5. 	Furthermore, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot
show a clear violation of his constitutional rights and therefore
has 	failed 	to 	meet 	his 	burden 	of 	satisfying 	the 	first 	prong 	of
Jones. 	This Court addresses only the Plaintiff’s burden outlined
in 	Jones, 	as 	Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	meet 	that 	threshold 	here 	is
dispositive of the claim in Count I.
Here, the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Plaintiff’s
claims 	against 	Defendant 	who 	was 	working 	in 	his 	capacity 	as 	a
government 	official 	when 	the 	subject 	interaction 	occurred.
Pearson, 	555 	U.S. 	at 	231. 	The 	uncontroverted 	facts, 	established
by the surveillance and body camera footage, show Mayle could have
reasonably 	believed 	his 	actions 	were 	consistent 	with 	the
constitutional 	rights 	he 	is 	alleged 	to 	have 	violated. 	Anderson,
483 U.S. at 638. 	Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that “it would
be 	clear” 	to 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	in 	Mayle’s 	position 	that 	“his
conduct 	was 	unlawful” 	given 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances 	he
confronted. 	Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199.
First, 	the 	crimes 	at 	issue 	were 	public 	intoxication,
obstruction, 	and 	disorderly 	conduct. 	ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	14.
Additionally, 	as 	Officer 	Mayle 	arrived 	on 	the 	scene, 	he 	was
informed 	by 	dispatch 	that 	a 	witness 	had 	reported 	seeing 	a 	male
assault a female and attempt to drag her out of a bar into a car.
ECF 	No. 	36, 	Ex. 	C, 	at 	00:39-00:59. 	Then, 	Mayle 	was 	informed 	by
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the driver of a passing vehicle that he watched the Plaintiff punch
a 	female 	in 	the 	face. 	ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	3. 	Thus, 	Mayle 	could 	have
held a reasonable belief that severe criminal activity was afoot.
Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
Next, 	Mayle 	observed 	a 	visibly 	agitated, 	crying 	Plaintiff.
ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39. 	As detailed above, he was then
informed 	by 	two 	independent 	sources 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	recently
been 	violent 	with 	a 	female. 	Id. 	at 	00:24-0029, 	00:39-00:59.
Additionally, 	Plaintiff 	repeatedly 	disobeyed 	lawful 	orders: 	he
yelled 	at 	Officer 	Mayle 	in 	response 	to 	questions, 	he 	appeared
physically 	impaired 	and 	smelled 	of 	alcohol, 	and 	on 	two 	separate
occasions Plaintiff yelled at and made aggressive movements toward
bystanders 	who 	were 	filming 	the 	interaction. 	Id. 	at 	1:01-1:38;
ECF No. 37, at 3. 	Based on these facts, a reasonable officer could
infer 	that 	Plaintiff 	posed 	an 	immediate 	threat 	to 	the 	safety 	of
the officer and others. 	Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
Lastly, 	Plaintiff 	was 	told 	to 	stand 	seven 	times 	before 	Mayle
assisted him to his feet. 	ECF No. 36, Ex. C, at 00:30-00:39. 	Once
standing, 	Plaintiff 	was 	ordered 	to 	turn 	around 	but 	can 	be 	seen
turning 	to 	face 	Officer 	Mayle 	instead. 	Id. 	at 	3:11-3:13. 	This
undisputed evidence provides a sufficient basis for the reasonable
belief that Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade. Pegg, 845 F.3d at 120.
When the Pegg factors, representing the government’s interest,
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are balanced against the intrusion on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
rights, the scales tip decidedly in favor of Defendant. 	Plaintiff
sustained 	a 	concussion, 	facial 	abrasions, 	and 	an 	injury 	to 	his
finger. 	ECF No. 1, at ¶ 45-47. 	However, these injuries, and the
level 	of 	force 	used 	by 	Officer 	Mayle, 	do 	not 	suffice 	to 	overcome
the 	evidence 	which 	supports 	the 	objective 	reasonableness 	of
Mayle’s 	actions. 	In 	considering 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Court, 	as
well as the applicable law, summary judgment is appropriate because
a 	reasonable 	officer 	could 	have 	thought 	Mayle’s 	actions 	were
consistent with the constitutional rights Plaintiff alleges Mayle
violated. 	Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638. 	Therefore, Mayle is entitled
to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the security and body camera footage do not create
a triable issue of fact with respect to the Excessive Force claim
in 	Count 	I, 	and 	the 	claim 	in 	Count 	I 	fails 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.
Defendants’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	36] 	as 	to 	Count
I 	is 	GRANTED 	and 	Count 	I 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	[ECF 	No. 	1] 	is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on 	Count 	II 	(False
Arrest) is GRANTED because the arrest was lawful.
Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of his
constitutional 	rights 	through 	false 	arrest, 	fails 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law 	because 	the 	initial 	detention 	of 	Plaintiff, 	and 	his 	eventual
arrest, 	were 	lawful. 	Therefore, 	Defendant 	is 	protected 	by 	the
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qualified 	immunity 	extended 	to 	law 	enforcement 	officers 	on 	the
claim in Count II.
First, where a police officer has reasonable suspicion, based
on specific and articulable facts, that “criminal activity may be
afoot[,]” the officer may temporarily detain an individual. 	Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 	The reasonable suspicion standard
is 	a 	less 	demanding 	standard 	than 	probable 	cause 	and 	is 	a
“nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical
considerations 	of 	everyday 	life 	on 	which 	reasonable 	and 	prudent
men, 	not 	legal 	technicians, 	act.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Branch, 	537
F.3d 	328, 	336 	(4th 	Cir. 	2008) 	(quoting 	Ornelas 	v. 	United 	States,
517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)).
A court analyzing the lawfulness of a Terry stop must view the
“cumulative 	information 	available” 	to 	the 	officer. 	Ornelas, 	517
U.S. at 695-96. Therefore, a stop should not be deemed “unjustified
based 	merely 	on 	a 	‘piecemeal 	refutation 	of 	each 	individual’ 	fact
and 	inference[.]” 	Branch, 	537 	F.3d 	at 	337. 	Furthermore, 	an
“officer’s 	decision 	to 	stop 	and 	detain 	an 	individual 	must 	be
evaluated objectively.” 	Id.
In 	addition, 	“there 	is 	no 	cause 	of 	action 	for 	‘false 	arrest’
under 	section 	1983 	unless 	the 	arresting 	officer 	lacked 	probable
cause.” 	Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974).
Probable cause exists when there is enough evidence to “warrant a
man 	of 	reasonable 	caution” 	to 	believe 	an 	offense 	has 	been
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committed. 	Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Mayle 	violated 	his 	Fourth 	Amendment
constitutional rights because Plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful, “as
the defendant could not have believed that he had legal authority
to arrest the plaintiff[.]” 	Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 65. 	Defendant
contends that summary judgment is appropriate because his initial
detention 	of 	Plaintiff 	was 	supported 	by 	reasonable, 	articulable
suspicion, and the subsequent arrest of Plaintiff was supported by
probable 	cause. 	Def. 	S.J. 	Memo., 	ECF 	No. 	37. 	This 	Court 	agrees
with Defendant.
Here, 	Officer 	Mayle’s 	initial 	detention 	of 	Plaintiff 	was
lawful because it was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. 	The information that 911 dispatch, and the witness on
the 	scene 	provided 	Mayle, 	along 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	visible
impairment 	and 	agitated 	state, 	indisputably 	provide 	the 	specific
and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 	Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 	Likewise, the record establishes
probable 	cause 	existed 	for 	Mayle’s 	arrest 	of 	Plaintiff. 	The
information 	available 	to 	Mayle 	about 	the 	alleged 	incident,
Plaintiff’s 	condition, 	and 	his 	refusal 	to 	comply 	with 	lawful
orders, 	are 	together 	sufficient 	to 	“warrant 	a 	reasonable 	man 	of
reasonable caution” to believe an offense had been committed. 	Wong
Sun, 371 U.S. at 479.
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Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	for 	false 	arrest 	fails 	as 	a
matter 	of 	law 	because 	both 	the 	Officer’s 	initial 	detention, 	and
arrest of Plaintiff, were lawful. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	36] 	as 	to 	Count 	II 	is 	GRANTED 	and 	Count 	II 	of
Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V (Battery) is
GRANTED 	because 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	immunity 	from 	the 	battery
claim under West Virginia state law.
Plaintiff’s 	claim 	under 	West 	Virginia 	state 	law 	for 	battery
fails 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	because 	legal 	justification 	existed 	for
Officer 	Mayle’s 	physical 	contact 	with 	the 	Plaintiff. 	In 	West
Virginia, a person is liable for battery if (1) “he acts intending
to 	cause 	a 	harmful 	or 	offensive 	contact 	with 	the 	person 	of 	the
other 	or 	a 	third 	person, 	or 	an 	imminent 	apprehension 	of 	such 	a
contact,” and (2) “a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly 	or 	indirectly 	results.” 	W. 	Va. 	Fire 	& 	Cas. 	Co. 	v.
Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 494 (W. Va. 2004).
However, 	“the 	right 	to 	make 	an 	arrest 	or 	investigatory 	stop
necessarily 	carries 	with 	it 	the 	right 	to 	use 	some 	degree 	of
physical 	coercion 	or 	threat 	thereof 	to 	effect 	it.” 	Graham, 	490
U.S. at 396. 	Generally, a law enforcement officer “engaged in an
arrest 	is 	afforded 	a 	privilege 	that 	precludes 	a 	battery 	claim.”
Weigle 	v. 	Pifer, 	139 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	760, 	776 	(S.D.W. 	Va. 	2015)
(citation omitted). 	Under West Virginia state law:
(b) An employee of a political subdivision is
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immune 	from 	liability 	unless 	one 	of 	the
following applies:
(1) 	His 	or 	her 	acts 	or 	omissions 	were
manifestly 	outside 	the 	scope 	of
employment or official responsibilities;
(2) 	His 	or 	her 	acts 	or 	omissions 	were
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or
in a wanton or reckless manner; or
(3) 	Liability 	is 	expressly 	imposed 	upon
the employee by a provision of this code.
Id. 	at 	775-76 	(citing 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	29-12A-5(b)). 	Additionally,
police 	officers 	“performing 	discretionary 	functions 	are 	shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate 	clearly 	established 	. 	. 	. 	constitutional 	rights[.]” 	Syl.
Pt. 	4, 	City 	of 	Saint 	Albans 	v. 	Botkins, 	228 	W. 	Va. 	393 	(2011).
Therefore, 	“[West 	Virginia’s] 	approach 	to 	matters 	concerning
immunity historically has followed federal law.” 	Id. at 398.
In light of the Court’s preceding findings that the Defendant
is 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	from 	the 	§ 	1983 	claims 	because
the 	arrest 	of 	Plaintiff 	was 	lawful, 	and 	the 	force 	used 	to 	affect
the arrest was reasonable, this Court finds the Plaintiff’s claim
for 	Battery 	must 	also 	fail 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law. 	Additionally,
nothing in the record indicates that Mayle should not be afforded
a privilege precluding a battery claim under State law. 	Mayle was
working 	as 	an 	employee 	of 	a 	political 	subdivision, 	his 	acts 	were
within 	the 	scope 	of 	his 	employment, 	and 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	his
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acts 	were 	done 	with 	“malicious 	purpose, 	in 	bad 	faith, 	or 	in 	a
wanton or reckless manner.” 	W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b).
Accordingly, 	Defendant 	is 	entitled 	to 	immunity 	from
Plaintiff’s battery claim and that claim fails as a matter of law.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36] as
to 	Count 	V 	is 	GRANTED 	and 	Count 	V 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	[ECF
No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on 	Count 	VI 	(Assault)
is 	GRANTED 	because 	Plaintiff 	is 	entitled 	to 	immunity 	from 	the
Assault claim under West Virginia state law.
In 	West 	Virginia, 	a 	person 	is 	liable 	for 	assault 	if 	(1) 	“he
acts 	intending 	to 	cause 	a 	harmful 	or 	offensive 	contact 	with 	the
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension
of 	such 	a 	contact,” 	and 	(2) 	“the 	other 	is 	thereby 	put 	in 	such
imminent apprehension.” 	Stanley, 602 S.E.2d at 495. 	However, as
discussed 	above, 	an 	officer’s 	right 	to 	conduct 	a 	lawful 	arrest
must coincide with his right to use physical force or to threaten
the use of such force. 	Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, Mayle was acting within the scope of his employment and
no 	exception 	under 	West 	Virginia 	Code 	§ 	29-12A-5(b) 	applies.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to immunity under that section
on 	Plaintiff’s 	assault 	claim, 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	for 	assault
fails as a matter of law. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[ECF No. 36] as to Count VI is GRANTED and Count VI of Plaintiff’s
Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 36] is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims under §
1983 	(Count 	I 	and 	Count 	II) 	and 	under 	West 	Virginia 	state 	law
(Count 	V 	and 	Count 	VI). 	Counts 	I, 	II, 	V, 	and 	VI 	of 	Plaintiff’s
Complaint 	[ECF 	No. 	1] 	are 	hereby 	DISMISSED 	WITH 	PREJUDICE. 	As
these were the only remaining claims against sole Defendant Officer
Mayle, 	this 	action 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITH 	PREJUDICE 	and 	shall 	be
STRICKEN 	from 	the 	Court’s 	active 	docket. 	Any 	remaining 	pending
motions in this action shall be TERMINATED.
It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.
DATED: 	March 31, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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