Romeo et al v. Antero Resources Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JACKLIN ROMEO et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	CIVIL NO. 1:17-CV-88
(KLEEH)
ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
Pending is the Class Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment
on Each of Defendant’s Eighteen Affirmative Defenses [ECF No.
437]. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. For good cause, the class members’
motion for leave to submit an additional exhibit is also
GRANTED [ECF No. 454], and said exhibit is deemed FILED [ECF No.
454-1].
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2, 2017, the plaintiffs, Jacklin Romeo, Susan S.
Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated (together, “Plaintiffs”), filed a
second amended class action complaint, which is the governing
complaint in this case. See ECF No. 31. On September 19,
2018, Defendant Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) filed an
answer. See ECF No. 39. On March 23, 2020, this Court
certified the proposed
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
2
class. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	152. 	On 	June 	11, 	2025, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of
Appeals of West Virginia answered certified questions. 	See Romeo
v. Antero Res. Corp, 917 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. June 11, 2025). 	After
the parties could not agree on a schedule to govern the case moving
forward, 	the 	Court 	entered 	a 	schedule 	on 	July 	30, 	2025. 	See 	ECF
No. 	436. 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	with
respect to all affirmative defenses asserted by Antero. 	The motion
is fully briefed and ripe for review.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	if 	“there 	is 	no 	genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	The movant
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on 	file, 	together 	with 	the 	affidavits, 	if 	any, 	which 	it 	believes
demonstrate 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact.”
Celotex 	Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477 	U.S. 	317, 	323 	(1986) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted). 	The burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party 	to 	present 	“specific 	facts 	showing 	that 	there 	is 	a 	genuine
issue 	for 	trial.” 	Blair 	v. 	Defender 	Servs., 	Inc., 	386 	F.3d 	623,
625 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
3
“When 	the 	moving 	party 	has 	carried 	its 	burden . . . , its
opponent 	must 	do 	more 	than 	simply 	show 	that 	there 	is 	some
metaphysical 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	material 	facts.” 	Matsushita 	Elec.
Indus. 	Co., 	Ltd. 	v. 	Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	586 	(1986)
(citations 	omitted). 	Rather, 	the 	Court 	must 	ask 	“whether 	the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S.
242, 	251–52 	(1986). 	At 	its 	core, 	the 	summary-judgment 	process
examines 	whether 	a 	trial 	is 	needed. 	See 	id. 	at 	250. 	“Where 	the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party, 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	for
trial.” 	Matsushita, 	475 	U.S. 	at 	587 	(citation 	and 	internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
As 	a 	preliminary 	matter, 	in 	its 	response, 	Antero 	moves 	to
withdraw, 	and 	asks 	the 	Court 	to 	strike, 	all 	but 	four 	of 	its
affirmative 	defenses. 	Plaintiffs 	reply 	that 	granting 	summary
judgment in their favor, as opposed to withdrawing or striking, is
more appropriate. 	Given the timing of Antero’s attempt to withdraw
the 	affirmative 	defenses, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	with 	Plaintiffs 	that
they are entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defenses
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 3 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
4
that 	Antero 	attempts 	to 	withdraw: 	Affirmative 	Defenses 	1–8, 	12,
13, 	15, 	and 	16–18. 	The 	only 	affirmative 	defenses 	at 	issue 	are
Affirmative Defenses 9, 10, 11, and 14. 	See ECF Nos. 31, 39. 	For
the 	reasons 	discussed 	below, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiffs 	are
entitled to summary judgment on those affirmative defenses as well.
A. 	Affirmative Defenses 9 (Payment and Release), 10 (Accord
and Satisfaction), and 11 (Res Judicata)
In 	Affirmative 	Defense 	9, 	Antero 	asserts 	that 	“Plaintiffs’
and/or 	putative 	class 	members’ 	claims 	may 	be 	barred 	by 	the
doctrines 	of 	payment 	and/or 	release.” 	ECF 	No. 	39. 	Under 	West
Virginia law, to prevail on an affirmative defense of payment and
release, 	Antero 	must 	prove 	that 	one 	or 	more 	members 	of 	the
certified 	class 	released 	their 	royalty 	underpayment 	breach 	of
contract 	claims 	against 	Antero, 	as 	alleged 	in 	Plaintiffs’
operative second amended class action complaint. 	See McDaniel v.
Kleiss, 	503 	S.E.2d 	840, 	847 	(W. 	Va. 	1998) 	(recognizing 	that 	a
release 	is 	“the 	giving 	up 	or 	abandoning 	a 	claim 	or 	right 	to 	the
person 	against 	whom 	the 	claim 	exists 	or 	the 	right 	is 	to 	be
exercised 	and 	enforced”). 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Antero 	has 	not
produced any evidence that it reimbursed any of the class members
for 	the 	royalty 	underpayments 	at 	issue 	or 	that 	any 	of 	the 	class
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 4 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
5
members 	released 	their 	claims 	against 	Antero 	for 	the 	royalty
underpayments at issue.
In 	Affirmative 	Defense 	10, 	Antero 	asserts 	that 	“Plaintiffs’
and/or putative class members’ claims may be barred by the doctrine
of 	accord 	and 	satisfaction.” 	ECF 	No. 	39. 	To 	show 	an 	accord 	and
satisfaction, 	the 	person 	asserting 	the 	defense 	must 	prove 	the
following:
(1) 	[c]onsideration 	to 	support 	an 	accord 	and
satisfaction; (2) an offer of partial payment
in full satisfaction of a disputed claim; and
(3) 	acceptance 	of 	the 	partial 	payment 	by 	the
creditor 	with 	full 	knowledge 	that 	the 	debtor
offered 	it 	only 	upon 	the 	condition 	that 	the
creditor 	accept 	the 	payment 	in 	full
satisfaction 	of 	the 	disputed 	claim 	or 	not 	at
all.
Richards 	v. 	Kees, 	572 	S.E.2d 	898, 	899 	(W. 	Va. 	2002) 	(citation
omitted). 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Antero 	has 	not 	produced 	any
evidence that it reached an accord and satisfaction with any class
member regarding the royalty underpayment claims at issue.
In 	Affirmative 	Defense 	11, 	Antero 	asserts 	that 	“Plaintiffs’
and/or putative class members’ claims may be barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.” 	ECF No. 39. 	The doctrine of res judicata “bars
a 	party 	from 	suing 	on 	a 	claim 	that 	has 	already 	been 	litigated 	to
final judgment by the party or such party’s privies and precludes
the assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of action,
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 5 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
6
or 	defense 	which 	could 	have 	been 	asserted 	in 	that 	action.” 	See
Dan 	Ryan 	Builders, 	Inc. 	v. 	Crystal 	Ridge 	Dev., 	Inc., 	803 	S.E.2d
519, 	530 	(W. 	Va. 	2017). 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Antero 	has 	not
identified 	or 	produced 	any 	final 	judgment 	that 	adjudicated 	any
class member’s royalty underpayment claims against Antero in this
case.
In 	response, 	Antero 	provides 	information 	regarding
settlements in two cases: Cather v. Seneca-Upshur Petroleum, Inc.,
1:09-CV-139 	(N.D.W. 	Va.), 	and 	Antero 	Resources 	Corporation 	v.
Bridge, No. 13-C-305-3 (Cir. Ct. Harrison Cnty.). 	Antero asserts
that 	these 	settlements 	impact 	the 	claims 	of 	Plaintiff 	Rine 	and
Plaintiff Miller, as well as several other members of the certified
class. 	The Cather settlement resolved and released certain royalty
owners’ claims relating to the calculation and payment of oil and
gas 	royalties, 	including 	breach 	of 	contract 	for 	the 	deduction 	of
post-production 	costs. 	See 	Cather 	Final 	Order, 	No. 	1:09-CV-139,
ECF No. 178, at 5. 	The Cather settlement agreement, Antero argues,
presented settlement class members with two settlement options and
released 	Seneca-Upshur 	Petroleum, 	Inc. 	(“Seneca-Upshur”) 	and 	its
successors. 	See 	Cather 	Settlement 	Agreement, 	ECF 	No. 	139-1, 	at
29-31. 	Antero 	is 	a 	successor 	to 	Seneca-Upshur 	Petroleum, 	LLC.
See Answer, ECF No. 39, at (¶ 23 (admitting same).
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
7
Antero argues that the certified class members on leases for
which 	“Option 	A” 	was 	chosen 	include 	Plaintiff 	Rine, 	Plaintiff
Miller, 	and 	28 	additional 	Romeo 	class 	members. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	446-
5. 	This 	Court’s 	approval 	of 	the 	class 	action 	settlement 	and 	the
leases subject thereto are a matter of public record. 	See Cather
Final 	Order, 	No. 	1:09-CV-139, 	ECF 	No. 	178; 	see 	also 	Cather 	Order
Granting 	Approval, 	No. 	1:09-CV-139, 	ECF 	No. 	190 	(approving
recordation 	of 	the 	list 	of 	leases 	subject 	to 	Option 	A 	in 	each
county in which the properties subject thereto are located).
Finally, 	Antero 	argues 	that 	another 	certified 	class 	member
has 	entered 	into 	a 	confidential 	settlement 	agreement 	with 	Antero
that likely affects her claims here. 	See Bridge Dismissal Order,
ECF No. 443-1. 	For all of these reasons, Antero argues that there
are genuine issues of material fact regarding Antero’s affirmative
defenses of payment and release, accord and satisfaction, and res
judicata, 	so 	Plaintiffs 	are 	not 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on
Affirmative Defenses 9, 10, and 11.
In sum, Antero relies on the following evidence to argue that
summary judgment is improper:
(1) 	The 	final 	order 	approving 	the 	Cather 	class
settlement, 	dated 	May 	31, 	2012, 	No. 	1:09-CV-
139, ECF No. 178 (the “Cather Final Order”);
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
8
(2) 	The 	Cather 	class 	settlement 	agreement, 	dated
July 	1, 	2011, 	No. 	1:09-CV-139, 	ECF 	No. 	139-1
(the “Cather Settlement Agreement”);
(3) 	The Cather defendants’ motion for approval of
attached Exhibit 1, and directing recordation
of 	Exhibit 	1, 	dated 	January 	16, 	2014, 	No.
1:09-CV-139, 	ECF 	No. 	187 	(the 	“Cather 	Motion
for Approval”);
(4) 	The 	Cather 	order 	granting 	the 	defendants’
motion for approval and recordation of Exhibit
1, 	dated 	April 	9, 	2014, 	No. 	1:09-CV-139, 	ECF
No. 	190 	(the 	“Cather 	Order 	Granting
Approval”);
(5) 	Antero’s 	supplemental 	response 	to
Interrogatory 	No. 	11 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	second
interrogatories, ECF No. 446-5; and
(6) 	The 	agreed 	dismissal 	order 	in 	Bridge, 	dated
September 14, 2015, ECF No. 443-1 (the “Bridge
Dismissal Order”).
In reply, Plaintiffs argue that Antero was not a defendant in
Cather, 	that 	Cather 	resolved 	the 	royalty 	underpayment 	claims 	of
designated class members against the named defendants only through
November 	4, 	2010, 	and 	that 	Cather 	did 	not 	resolve 	the 	royalty
underpayment 	claims 	of 	any 	of 	the 	Romeo 	class 	members 	against
Antero. 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	the 	Cather 	Final 	Order 	and 	the
Cather 	Settlement 	Agreement 	do 	not 	set 	forth 	any 	facts 	that
establish 	any 	of 	the 	required 	elements 	of 	Antero’s 	affirmative
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
9
defenses 	9, 	10, 	and 	11. 	Plaintiffs 	also 	argue 	that 	the 	Bridge
Dismissal Order contains no proof that class member Kimberly Smith
released any part of the royalty underpayment claims against Antero
which 	are 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	litigation. 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that
Antero 	has 	not 	identified 	any 	statement 	in 	any 	of 	the 	Cather
exhibits 	that 	constitutes 	a 	release 	by 	any 	members 	of 	the 	Romeo
certified class.
Plaintiffs assert that the Cather class members who selected
Option 	A 	were 	limited 	to 	those 	identified 	in 	the 	“Owner 	Name”
column 	in 	an 	exhibit 	attached 	to 	the 	Cather 	Motion 	for 	Approval.
See Cather Motion for Approval, No. 1:09-CV-139, ECF No. 187. 	In
their motion, the Cather defendants stated, in pertinent part,
Seneca-Upshur prepared the attached Exhibit 1
identifying 	each 	Covered 	Lease 	for 	which 	the
Class 	Member 	selected 	Settlement 	Option 	A.
The 	Class 	Members 	who 	elected 	Settlement
Option A and their respective royalty interest
is set forth under the columns entitled “Owner
Name” 	and 	“Interest.” 	In 	those 	instances
where all Class Members entitled to royalties
under 	a 	given 	Covered 	Lease 	did 	not 	elect
Option 	A, 	only 	those 	royalty 	owners 	who 	made
the election are identified on Exhibit 1.
Id. 	at 	3. 	The 	same 	information 	was 	also 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	Cather
Order Granting Approval. 	Cather Order Granting Approval, No. 1:09-
CV-139, 	ECF 	No. 	190. 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	a 	comparison 	of 	the
“Owner 	Name” 	column 	to 	the 	Romeo 	certified 	class 	confirms 	that
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 9 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
10
only five members of the Romeo certified class selected Option A:
Nicholas 	Ward 	Stone, 	Donald 	Brooks 	Fox, 	Emma 	M. 	Lamb, 	Dennis
Powell, and Megan Campbell Deem.
Plaintiffs 	further 	argue 	that 	the 	selection 	of 	Option 	A 	did
not 	alter 	Antero’s 	royalty 	payment 	obligations 	to 	the 	five 	Romeo
class members who selected it. 	Rather, they argue, the five class
members 	agreed 	that 	from 	and 	after 	November 	3, 	2010, 	(1) 	their
royalties 	“may 	be 	calculated 	on 	volumes 	actually 	sold 	for 	which
Seneca-Upshur receives proceeds” (Cather Motion for Approval, No.
1:09-CV-139, ECF No. 187); (2) Seneca-Upshur was obligated to pay
them royalties based upon prices it received on its sale of natural
gas 	products 	at 	its 	Point 	of 	Sale 	(id. 	at 	3); 	and 	(3) 	“point 	of
sale” 	was 	defined 	as 	“that 	point 	where 	the 	gas, 	produced 	from 	a
well 	on 	a 	Covered 	Lease, 	enters 	the 	receipt 	meter 	of 	an
unaffiliated 	third-party 	gathering, 	transmission, 	or 	pipeline
system, 	and 	at 	which 	time 	title 	and 	ownership 	to 	such 	gas 	passes
to an unaffiliated third party buyer (id.). 	Plaintiffs argue that
the five Romeo class members’ selection of Option A did not alter
Antero’s royalty payment obligations to them under the applicable
Mutschelknaus or Matthew royalty provisions in their class leases
because (1) under the applicable Mutschelknaus and Matthew royalty
provisions 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	five 	class 	members’ 	leases, 	Antero
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
11
“may not deduct” from Plaintiffs’ royalties “a proportionate share
of 	the 	costs 	incurred 	in 	processing, 	fractionating, 	and
transporting 	residue 	gas 	and 	natural 	gas 	liquids 	to 	the 	point 	of
sale,” 	see 	Syl. 	Pt. 	8, 	Romeo, 	917 	S.E.2d 	26 	(citation 	omitted);
(2) 	Option 	A 	did 	not 	alter 	that 	obligation, 	particularly 	because
Antero’s 	title 	to 	the 	residue 	gas 	and 	natural 	gas 	liquids 	that
Antero produced from class wells and sold to third-party purchasers
transferred 	at 	Antero’s 	point 	of 	sale 	of 	the 	residue 	gas 	and
natural gas liquids to such purchasers, Schopp Dep., ECF No. 446-
8, 	at 	21:24-23:18, 	46:5-48:15; 	and 	(3) 	all 	of 	the 	Romeo 	class
members’ 	damages 	have 	been 	determined 	based 	upon 	the 	volumes 	of
residue 	gas 	and 	natural 	gas 	liquids 	sold 	by 	Antero 	to 	purchasers
of such natural gas products at the point of sale, Fifth Supp. to
Phend Report, ECF No. 446-7, at ¶¶ 4 and 15 and Exh. A.
Plaintiffs 	further 	argue 	that 	Antero 	has 	not 	submitted 	any
evidence that the Bridge settlement agreement resolved any part of
Kimberly 	Smith’s 	royalty 	underpayment 	claims 	against 	Antero 	that
are 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	case. 	Plaintiffs 	point 	out 	that 	the 	Bridge
Dismissal 	Order 	does 	not 	set 	forth 	any 	of 	the 	terms 	of 	Antero’s
settlement 	agreement 	with 	Kimberly 	Smith. 	See 	Bridge 	Dismissal
Order, ECF No. 443-1. 	Plaintiffs argue that the evidence submitted
regarding 	Cather 	and 	Bridge 	does 	not 	prove 	any 	of 	the 	required
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
12
elements 	of 	Antero’s 	accord 	and 	satisfaction 	defense. 	Finally,
Plaintiffs argue that Antero’s evidence does not include any such
judgment to prove res judicata.
After considering the record and the parties’ arguments, the
Court 	agrees 	with 	Antero 	that 	summary 	judgment 	is 	inappropriate
with 	respect 	to 	Affirmative 	Defenses 	9, 	10, 	and 	11. 	Antero 	has
produced evidence that Antero is a successor to Seneca-Upshur. 	At
least five Romeo class members have released claims against Seneca-
Upshur and its successors relating to the calculation and payment
of 	oil 	and 	gas 	royalties, 	including 	breach 	of 	contract 	for 	the
deduction 	of 	post-production 	costs. 	Accordingly, 	at 	this 	stage,
Plaintiffs 	are 	not 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Affirmative
Defenses 9, 10, and 11.
B. 	Affirmative Defense No. 14 – Treatment as a Class Action
In 	Affirmative 	Defense 	14, 	Antero 	asserts 	that 	“Plaintiffs
are not appropriate class representatives, and this action is not
appropriate 	for 	treatment 	as 	a 	class 	action.” 	ECF 	No. 	39.
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	this 	Court 	rejected 	those 	arguments 	when
it 	granted 	the 	motion 	for 	class 	certification 	on 	March 	23, 	2020.
See ECF No. 152. 	Plaintiffs also point out that on April 15, 2020,
the 	United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	denied
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
13
Antero’s petition for permission to appeal the order. 	See ECF No.
171.
In 	response, 	Antero 	maintains 	its 	argument 	(which 	it 	has
asserted 	throughout 	this 	case) 	that 	the 	case 	is 	unsuitable 	for
class 	certification 	and 	that 	the 	class 	representatives 	are
inappropriate. 	Antero 	argues 	that 	payees 	holding 	subsequent
modifications 	are 	not 	included 	in 	the 	class 	and 	that 	many 	class
members were likely paid royalties at least as much as the actual
sales price or even overpaid. 	In other words, Antero argues that
it 	has 	individualized 	defenses 	to 	each 	of 	those 	class 	members’
claims based on their actual payment history. 	Accordingly, Antero
argues, 	the 	predominance 	issues 	posed 	by 	the 	use 	of 	a 	universal
damages 	theory 	as 	opposed 	to 	individualized 	analyses 	of 	harm
underscores the impropriety of class treatment in this case.
Upon review, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ position. 	This
Court 	has 	previously 	considered 	and 	rejected 	Antero’s 	arguments
that 	class 	certification 	is 	inappropriate. 	The 	class 	has 	been
certified. 	Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to Affirmative Defense 14.
C. 	Plaintiffs’ Claim Relating to the 1983 Lease
In 	its 	response, 	Antero 	argues 	that 	because 	Plaintiffs 	have
withdrawn their claims arising from the 1983 Lease and Antero has
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

ROMEO V. ANTERO 	1:17-CV-88
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EACH OF
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES [ECF NO. 437]
14
withdrawn 	its 	affirmative 	defense 	regarding 	the 	same, 	the 	Court
should also strike allegations pertaining to the 1983 Lease in the
second 	amended 	complaint 	to 	avoid 	confusing 	the 	issues 	at 	trial.
In 	reply, 	Plaintiffs 	oppose 	the 	request, 	asserting 	that 	the
allegations 	provide 	relevant 	factual 	background 	to 	Plaintiff
Romeo’s 	mineral 	interests 	and 	her 	lessor’s 	interests 	under 	the
March 	14, 	1984 	Lease 	referenced 	in 	Paragraph 	4 	of 	the 	second
amended 	complaint. 	At 	this 	stage, 	especially 	given 	the 	small
amount 	of 	briefing 	dedicated 	to 	the 	issue, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
striking 	the 	information 	would 	be 	premature, 	and 	the 	request 	is
denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	above, 	the 	Class 	Members’ 	Motion
for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on 	Each 	of 	Defendant’s 	Eighteen 	Affirmative
Defenses [ECF No. 437] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record.
DATED: March 31, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
Case 1:17-cv-00088-TSK Document 498 Filed 03/31/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>