Keefe, Randy v. Schutz, Michael et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
RANDY JAY KEEFE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL SCHUTZ, KEVIN M. TODRYK, KEITH J.
KLAFKE, BRENDA YASKAL, JORDEN LIPPERT,
JENNIFER MECUM, KIM SCHUTZ, TODD HEPLER,
and SUSAN RAIMER,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
25-cv-918-jdp
In response to my screening order, plaintiff Randy Jay Keefe brings an amended
complaint, alleging that defendants unlawfully drew his blood, manipulated and concealed
evidence, and prosecuted him. Although Keefe paid the filing fee, I have the authority to screen
the amended complaint before the case proceeds. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir.
1999). I will dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice because it fails to state a plausible
claim for relief and is barred by several immunity doctrines.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
The facts are drawn from Keefe’s amended complaint, Dkt. 4, and the docket sheet in
Columbia County case no. 2020CF65.
On February 6, 2020, at 7:00 p.m., an officer for the Portage Police Department,
defendant Michael S. Schutz, stopped Keefe’s vehicle for speeding. During the stop, Officer
Schutz began to suspect that Keefe was operating the vehicle while intoxicated, and he applied
for a blood draw warrant. The after-hours judge, defendant Todd Hepler, issued the warrant.
Hepler sent Officer Schutz two copies of the warrant. Officer Schutz served the warrant on
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Keefe, but he didn’t endorse either copy. Officer Schutz also mentioned a notice of intent to
revoke Keefe’s operating privilege. That night, Keefe’s blood was drawn. Officer Schutz then
transported him to the Columbia County Jail.
Officer 	Schutz 	returned 	to 	the 	Portage 	Police 	Department, 	where 	he 	entered
documents, including the unendorsed blood draw warrant and notice of intent to revoke, into
a secure evidence file. Officer Schutz then entered those documents into a secure evidence
transfer system called “TRACs,” so that Columbia County clerks of court could record and
enter the evidence “as they are sworn and bonded to do.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 7. The Columbia County
District Attorney Office also received the documents in TRACs.
The next day, a criminal complaint was filed against Keefe in the ’65 case. Keefe
appeared before Hepler, who released Keefe on a signature bond. Before the hearing, Hepler
had received the documents in TRACs. Hepler noticed that Officer Schutz had not endorsed
the blood draw warrant.
That morning, Hepler contacted the Columbia County clerk of courts, defendant Susan
Raimer. Hepler told Raimer that the documents should not be entered into “any record” until
Hepler authorized their entry. Id. ¶ 13. Raimer instructed the court clerks to delete the
documents.
Hepler also contacted the chief of the Portage Police Department, defendant Keith J.
Klafke, to arrange for the documents to be deleted. Hepler said that the notice of intent to
revoke had been issued incorrectly. Klafke then told a Portage officer, defendant Kevin Todryk,
to email clerks at the Columbia County Courthouse, defendants Jennifer Mecum and Kim
Schutz, and tell them that the notice of intent to revoke had been issued incorrectly and had
been voided in TRACs.
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Hepler also contacted the Columbia County district attorney, defendant Brenda L.
Yaskal, and told her to disregard the unendorsed blood draw warrant and that a corrected
warrant would be provided for their office.
Officer Schutz signed the blood draw warrant sometime between the February 7 hearing
and February 25, 2020. On February 25, a Columbia County assistant district attorney,
defendant Jordan Lippert, provided Keefe with discovery that included the endorsed blood
draw warrant.
In August 2020, clerks at the Columbia County Courthouse told Keefe that documents
were entered incorrectly on February 7 and that corrected documents were being provided by
the Portage Police Department. On August 10, 2020, Kim Schutz received corrected
documents, including the endorsed blood draw warrant and the notice of intent to revoke that
had been issued incorrectly and voided in TRACs. Kim Schutz used those documents to start
Columbia County case no. 2020TR4425R, a traffic forfeiture case based on the notice of intent
to revoke. A complaint against Keefe was also filed in the traffic forfeiture case that day.
On October 12, 2021, a hearing on Keefe’s motion to dismiss was held before former
Columbia County Circuit Court Judge Troy D. Cross. Cross dismissed the traffic forfeiture
case, but he denied Keefe’s request to dismiss the ’65 case. Lippert allowed Raimer and Officer
Schutz to provide false testimony. Lippert refused to turn over discovery emails for which Cross
denied a protective order.
Keefe later retained attorney Amanda K. Riek. Riek moved to suppress the blood draw
warrant on other grounds, and Cross granted the motion in March 2023. The state then
dismissed the charge of operating while intoxicated. Keefe believes that all defendants “violated
their oaths and committed actions at the direction of Hepler.” Dkt. 4 at 2.
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ANALYSIS
Keefe says he brings claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but
his theories for relief under these amendments are not clearly articulated. I take Keefe to bring:
(1) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based on the manipulation and
concealment of evidence, and the submission of false testimony; (2) a Fourth Amendment
claim challenging the legality of the blood draw; and (3) Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claims based on the initiation of the operating while intoxicated and traffic
forfeiture cases.
I will not allow Keefe to proceed on a Fifth Amendment claim because the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to the federal government’s actions. Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). Keefe has sued state officials, so the Fifth Amendment
doesn’t apply. I will consider the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims only.
A. General pleading problem
I begin with a general pleading problem. The basic rule is that mere negligence fails to
violate the Constitution. See Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). More
specifically, “negligent conduct does not offend the Due Process Clause.” Moran v. Calumet
City, 54 F.4th 483, 493 (7th Cir. 2022). “So an infringement must be intentional, or at least
reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.” Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248,
261 (2020); accord Moran, 54 F.4th at 493. Similarly, mere police negligence in obtaining a
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
145 (2009). “There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the
truth, and allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” Id.
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Keefe suggests that Hepler led a wide-ranging conspiracy among prosecutors, police
officers, and court clerks to deny him his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights after the
traffic stop and blood draw. But Keefe has not alleged any facts plausibly suggesting that to be
the case. “A complaint must contain more than mere conclusory allegations of such
a conspiracy; a factual basis for such allegations must be provided.” Bowman v. City of Franklin,
980 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1992). Without the implausible allegation of conspiracy, the
complaint at most describes mere negligence or mistake in obtaining the blood draw warrant
and processing case records. Keefe has failed to state any plausible Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment claim for this reason alone.
B. Specific pleading problems
The individual claims in Keefe’s amended complaint also suffer problems specific to
those claims.
1. 	Judicial immunity
A state judge has absolute judicial immunity from suit for acts or omissions performed
in his judicial capacity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983); Dawson v. Newman, 419
F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2005). “[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice.” Myrick v. Greenwood, 856 F.3d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 2017).
Keefe alleges that Hepler directed police officers to correct errors in the blood draw
warrant and notice of intent to revoke, and court clerks to refrain from recording erroneous
documents in a filing system. These allegations don’t plausibly suggest that Keefe was acting
outside his judicial capacity when he took those actions. Cf. Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 838
(7th Cir. 2011) (judicial immunity bars claim that state trial judge falsified transcripts). Keefe
suggests that Hepler conspired with the other defendants to manipulate and conceal evidence,
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but mere allegations of malice don’t overcome judicial immunity. Also, even if Judge Hepler’s
actions violated Wisconsin law, mere judicial mistakes don’t overcome judicial immunity.
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). I will not allow Keefe to proceed on any claims
against Hepler.
2. 	Quasi-judicial immunity
The basic rule is that court officials who carry out functions specifically directed by a
judge are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit for those actions. See Richman
v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2001); Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir.
1992).
Keefe alleges that Hepler directed Raimer to refrain from entering the original blood
draw warrant and notice of intent to revoke into any record until he authorized their entry. A
claim based on this allegation would be barred by quasi-judicial immunity.
Keefe also sues court clerks Mecum and Kim Schutz. His theory of relief against these
two defendants is not clearly articulated, but his allegations suggest that he faults them for not
recording, or for not properly recording, the unendorsed blood draw warrant and notice of
intent to revoke. Keefe also alleges that all defendants acted at the direction of Hepler. Claims
based on these allegations are barred by quasi-judicial immunity.
Keefe alleges that Chief Klafke told Officer Todryk to email Mecum and Kim Schutz
and tell them that the notice of intent to revoke had been issued incorrectly and voided in
TRACs. Klafke and Todryk are not judges, but Keefe does not describe any action that Mecum
and Kim Schutz took at their direction; the documents had already been voided in TRACs.
These allegations would not overcome quasi-judicial immunity and they do not state any
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plausible constitutional claim. I will not allow Keefe to proceed against Raimer, Mecum, or
Kim Schutz on a due process claim based on the manipulation or concealment of evidence.
3. 	Prosecutorial immunity
Prosecutors are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their work as
advocates. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976). A prosecutor’s advocacy role
includes acts that the prosecutor takes to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings, and
acts that the prosecutor takes to present the state’s case. See id. at 431; Greenpoint Tactical Income
Fund LLC v. Pettigrew, 38 F.4th 555, 565 (7th Cir. 2022).
I take Keefe to allege that Yaskal and Lippert violated his due process rights by bringing
the criminal and traffic cases against him even though those actions were based on erroneous
or manipulated evidence. Keefe challenges Yaskal and Lippert’s initiation of the cases, so
prosecutorial immunity bars claims based Keefe’s allegations. I will not allow Keefe to proceed
on his due process claims against Yaskal and Lippert based on the initiation of the criminal
and traffic cases.
4. 	Absolute immunity for courtroom testimony
Keefe brings due process claims against Officer Schutz and Raimer based on the
allegation that they provided false testimony at the hearing on his motion to dismiss. I will not
allow Keefe to proceed on these claims because absolute immunity bars them. See Khorrami v.
Rolince, 539 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (“This court [has] recognized that the absolute
immunity extends to a police officer’s participation in pretrial proceedings . . . .”); Curtis v.
Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1995) (the officer was entitled to absolute immunity for
his testimony at a preliminary hearing and a hearing on a motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence).
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5. 	Fourteenth Amendment claims against Yaskal and Lippert based on failure to
disclose evidence
Keefe alleges that the prosecutor defendants failed to disclose evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). But Keefe hasn’t alleged facts plausibly suggesting that
Yaskal or Lippert suppressed material exculpatory or impeaching evidence. See id. at 87;
Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2008). I will not allow Keefe to proceed
on his Brady claims against Yaskal and Lippert.
6. 	Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Schutz
Keefe brings a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Schutz based on the blood
draw. Keefe suggests that the blood draw warrant was not supported by probable cause,
primarily because Schutz failed to endorse it. In other words, Keefe’s theory is that the arrest
lacked probable cause because of the technical defect in the blood draw warrant.
“Because a blood draw is a search of a person, a search warrant for a blood draw must
be supported by probable cause.” Petersen v. Pedersen, No. 22-cv-684, 2024 WL 343226, at *6
(E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2024), aff’d, 140 F.4th 421 (7th Cir. 2025). As a general rule, the issuing
judge must make a practical, common-sense decision about whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the supporting affidavit, there is a fair probability that the search will reveal
evidence of a crime. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
A search warrant may also be based on an officer’s sworn oral testimony communicated
to the judge by telephone, radio, or other means of electronic communication. Wis. Stat.
§ 968.12(2)–(3). The standard for upholding the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause
under § 968.12 is the same as the standard under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Denure,
2002 WI App 56, ¶ 14. Courts must give “great deference” to the issuing judge’s determination
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that probable cause existed. Id.; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39 (“The reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” (alterations adopted)).
Keefe’s allegations indicate that the unendorsed blood draw warrant was supported by
probable cause. Keefe alleges that Officer Schutz stopped him at night, and it seems likely that
he had to speak with Hepler, the after-hours judge, for the blood draw warrant to be approved.
Cf. State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶ 42 (“Obtaining a search warrant to authorize a blood draw
may present practical difficulties. The principal difficulty is reaching a judge or court
commissioner after normal working hours.”). Keefe hasn’t alleged any facts plausibly suggesting
that Officer Schutz lacked a reasonable basis to believe that he was operating while intoxicated,
and he does not allege that the blood draw came back negative. Keefe’s allegations don’t
support even an inference that the information that Schutz provided to Hepler failed to
support a determination of probable cause.
Under these circumstances, the initial absence of Officer Schutz’s signature on the
blood draw warrant was immaterial. See State v. Hay, 2020 WI App 35, ¶ 23 n.7 (“Affidavits
and warrants can be formalized, if necessary and as appropriate, after the judge approves the
blood draw[.]” (emphasis in original)); State v. Kerr, No. 2016AP1766-CRNM, 2017 WL
1628519, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2017) (“The court determined that the lack of
signature on the affidavit was irrelevant because the issuing magistrate relied on the officer’s
sworn testimony over the telephone. We agree . . . .”). I will not allow Keefe to proceed on a
Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Schutz.
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7. 	Malicious prosecution claims
To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, the plaintiff must plausibly
allege that the defendant instituted a criminal prosecution against him without probable cause
and with malice (that is, a purpose other than bringing him justice), and that the prosecution
ended without a conviction. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44, 49 (2022); Evans v. Matson,
No. 23-2954, 2024 WL 2206638, at *2 (7th Cir. May 16, 2024).
Keefe challenges the institution of the cases for operating while intoxicated and traffic
forfeiture. But Keefe does not expressly allege that these actions were brought without probable
cause, and his allegations don’t suggest that to be the case. Quite the contrary, his allegations
indicate that probable cause supported the charge of operating while intoxicated. Keefe alleges
that Kim Schutz used corrected documents to institute the traffic forfeiture action, but this
allegation suggests only that she opened the case on the court’s docket. It does not plausibly
suggest that she made the decision to bring the case. But, even if Keefe could show that the
cases were instituted without probable cause, he hasn’t alleged facts plausibly suggesting that
they were instituted for a malicious purpose. Keefe broadly alleges that Hepler led a conspiracy
to deprive him of his constitutional rights, but this allegation is implausible. I will not allow
Keefe to proceed on a malicious prosecution claim.
CONCLUSION
When a plaintiff proceeds without counsel, the court of appeals has cautioned against
dismissing his case without giving him a chance to amend the complaint. Felton v. City of
Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2016). But “if it is clear that any amendment would be
futile,” I need not grant leave to amend. Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Keefe already received an opportunity to clarify his allegations and claims for relief, and
the amended complaint’s allegations show that his claims suggest negligence at most and are
barred by several immunity doctrines. It’s clear that further amendment would be futile, so I
will dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff Randy Jay Keefe’s amended complaint, Dkt. 4, is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
2. 	The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.
Entered April 2, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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