Ledford, William v. Sukowaty, Laura et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WILLIAM N. LEDFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. LAURA C. SUKOWATY, ALANA M. ACKER,
and DR. DANIEL LAVOIE,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
24-cv-844-jdp
Plaintiff William N. Ledford, proceeding without counsel, is incarcerated at Columbia
Correctional Institution. Ledford alleges that medical staff refused to properly treat severe
infections that he developed. I granted Ledford leave to proceed on claims under the Eighth
Amendment and under Wisconsin medical negligence law. Dkt. 8. Ledford moves for a more
definite statement regarding part of defendants’ answer and he moves to strike some of their
affirmative defenses. Dkt. 14. Defendants move for summary judgment, contending that
Ledford failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for any of his claims. Dkt. 24. For the
reasons stated below, I will deny Ledford’s motion and I will grant defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in part.
ANALYSIS
A. Ledford’s motion for more definite statement and to strike affirmative defenses
Ledford objects to parts of defendants’ answer; he moves under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12 for a more definite statement regarding many of defendants’ responses to his
allegations and he moves to strike the asserted affirmative defenses of (1) failure to mitigate
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damages; (2) comparative or contributory negligence; (3) intervening or superseding causes;
and (4) discretionary immunity.
Motions 	like 	Ledford’s 	are 	disfavored 	because 	they 	delay 	proceedings, 	usually
unnecessarily. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir.
1989). Ledford seeks a more definite statement from defendants regarding their responses to
most of his allegations: defendants state that they lack the knowledge to respond to the
underlying factual allegations without a release of Ledford’s medical records to recount the
events. Ledford states that defendants should have anticipated this problem by seeking a
release. But discovery had not yet opened in this case at the time of defendants’ answer. I will
deny this portion of Ledford’s motion.
As for his motion to strike, Ledford has the burden to show “‘that the challenged
allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of
consideration, and unduly prejudicial.’” Stinson v. Schueler, No. 19-cv-379-jdp, 2020 WL
3403094, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 19, 2020) (quoting Pope v. Espeseth, Inc., No. 15-cv-486-jdp,
2016 WL 1715206, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 2016)).
Ledford hasn’t met that burden here. Defendants’ affirmative defenses plausibly relate
to his claims, and asserting them is not unduly prejudicial to Ledford. They are sufficient to
provide him with notice of the nature of the defenses, which is all that is required under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It is too soon to tell whether each of the defenses are meritorious;
they likely will depend on facts that will need to be fleshed out during discovery. None of them
is plainly unworthy of consideration, so I will not strike them. Ledford may contest these
defenses on the merits if defendants raise them at summary judgment or trial.
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B. Defendants’ exhaustion-based summary judgment motion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires inmates to exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in federal court about “prison conditions.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To comply with § 1997e(a), a prisoner must take each step in the
administrative process, Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002), which
includes following instructions for filing an initial grievance, Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d
714, 718 (7th Cir. 2005), as well as filing all necessary appeals, Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282,
284–85 (7th Cir. 2005), “in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules
require,” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025.
To exhaust administrative remedies in Wisconsin, inmates ordinarily must follow the
Inmate Complaint Review System process as set forth in Wisconsin Administrative Code
Chapter DOC 310. The purpose of these requirements is to give the prison administrators a
fair opportunity to resolve the grievance without litigation. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88–89
(2006). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense
that must be proven by defendants. Davis v. Mason, 881 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 2018).
The PLRA doesn’t apply to Ledford’s state-law claims. But Wisconsin imposes a similar
exhaustion requirement for state law claims, prohibiting prisoners from filing “a civil action or
special proceeding . . . with respect to the prison or jail conditions in the facility in which he is
or has been incarcerated, imprisoned or detained until the person has exhausted all available
administrative remedies that the department of corrections had promulgated by rule.” Wis.
Stat. § 801.02(7)(b). Because Wisconsin’s law is based on the federal PLRA, a court may take
guidance from federal PLRA case law. See Compton v. Cox, No. 12-cv-837-jdp, 2017 WL
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933152, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2017) (plaintiff “is free to use federal PLRA case law in
analyzing the Wisconsin version”).
Ledford’s claims are against defendants Sukowaty and Acker for initially failing to treat
his infection symptoms with anything other than an over-the-counter cream before he was
eventually taken to the hospital, and against defendant La Voie for running an “austerity
program” regarding medical treatment at DOC that contributed to his lack of care.
Defendants 	state 	that 	Ledford 	filed 	two 	grievances 	about 	the 	events 	at 	issue:
(1) grievance No. CCI-2024-3974 about Sukowaty and Acker failing to send him to the
hospital, which was fully litigated through the ICRS system; and (2) grievance No. CCI-2024-
4632 about prison officials failing to honor his advance heath care directives during the events,
which was rejected as untimely. Ledford did not file a response to defendants’ summary
judgment motion, so I will accept the grievance records that defendants filed in support of their
motion as undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). But defendants must still carry their burden to
show that summary judgment is appropriate. Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 (7th
Cir. 1994).
Because Ledford didn’t properly exhaust the ’4632 grievance, that grievance cannot
meet the exhaustion requirement for any of his claims.
That leaves the ’3974 grievance. Even though Ledford specifically complained in that
grievance about Sukowaty’s and Acker’s failure to properly treat him, defendants contend that
this grievance does not exhaust his claims because Ledford did not discuss the entire factual
basis underlying his Eighth Amendment claim: that Sukowaty’s and Acker’s inactions were
caused by the defendant La Voie’s “austerity program.” I explained this issue in my order
screening Ledford’s complaint:
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Ledford alleges that defendants Sukowaty and Acker initially
failed to treat his symptoms with anything other than an over-
the-counter cream. Prisoners aren’t entitled to the treatment of
their choice, and ordinarily a mistake in diagnosing or treating a
medical problem doesn’t state an Eighth Amendment claim,
because negligence isn’t enough to violate the Constitution. But
here, Ledford alleges that he had obviously serious medical
problems, and that CCI medical staff, led by Sukowaty, has
consciously chosen to provide less treatment to inmates with
diabetes under an “austerity program,” with Sukowaty explicitly
telling Ledford that she isn’t concerned about lawsuits that result
from that treatment. This suggests that Sukowaty and Acker did
not base their decisions on medical judgment but rather a desire
to follow the DOC’s austerity program. I conclude that this
sufficient to state Eighth Amendment claims against Sukowaty
and Acker.
Dkt. 8, at 4.
In the absence of particular grievance rules mandating more, inmates usually do not
have to plead legal theories in their grievances. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir.
2004). But a prisoner must still “provide[] notice to the prison of ‘the nature of the wrong for
which redress is sought.’” Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Strong
v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Ledford did provide prison staff with notice of what Sukowaty and Acker did to
harm him: fail to give him adequate medical treatment for his infection. Defendants cite no
authority in their brief, and I am aware of none, suggesting that a prisoner is required to provide
enough detail in a grievance to determine whether a prisoner believes that a defendant violated
his rights specifically under either the Constitution or under Wisconsin negligence law. And
other than with motivation-dependent causes of action such as First Amendment retaliation
claims, I am unaware of any authority suggesting that an inmate need include in a grievance
evidence suggesting a prison official’s motivation for taking a specific action that violates his
rights. See, e.g., Lockett v. Goff, No. 17-cv-93-jdp, 2017 WL 4083594, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept.
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13, 2017) (“If the grievance concerns alleged retaliation, then at a minimum it must identify
two things: the protected conduct that provoked the retaliation and the retaliatory act.”
(internal quotations omitted)). Because Ledford’s grievance put prison officials on notice of
what Sukowaty and Acker did to harm him, I will deny defendants’ summary judgment motion
regarding those defendants.
As for defendant La Voie, whom Ledford alleges orchestrated the austerity program, the
’3974 grievance didn’t put prison staff on notice about La Voie’s involvement or the austerity
program causing him harm. Because this grievance didn’t exhaust Leford’s claims against
La Voie, I will grant this portion of defendants’ summary judgment motion and I will dismiss
La Voie from the lawsuit.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff William N. Ledford’s motion for more definite statement and to strike
affirmative defenses, Dkt. 14, is DENIED.
2. 	Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 24, is GRANTED in part;
plaintiff’s claims against defendant La Voie are DISMISSED.
3. 	Defendant La Voie is DISMISSED from the case.
Entered January 9, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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