Craig, Eugene v. AWL, II, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CHERYL SHOCKLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ASCEND LOANS, LLC, BENHTI ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and W6LS, INC.,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
24-cv-424-jdp
EUGENE CRAIG,
Plaintiff,
v.
AWL, II, INC., BENHTI ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and W6LS, INC.,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
24-cv-493-jdp
Attorney Eric Crandall is counsel for the plaintiffs in two Fair Credit Reporting Act
cases, Shockley v. Ascend Loans, LLC, et al., No. 24-cv-424, and Craig v. AWL, II, Inc., et al.,
No. 24-cv-493. Both cases were dismissed last year on tribal sovereign immunity grounds.
See Dkt. 58 (’424 case); Dkt. 45 (’493 case).
The cases are still open to consider sanctions against attorney Crandall. Shortly after
the cases were dismissed, counsel for defendants moved for sanctions in both cases, contending
that plaintiffs and Crandall failed to withdraw proofs of service after they were shown to be
false. Dkt. 62 (’424 case); Dkt. 47 (’493 case). The defendants, located in Oklahoma, were
never actually served and the purported proofs of service were fake. That wasn’t Crandall’s
fault: the process server was dishonest. But Crandall failed to withdraw the proofs of service
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 1 of 10

2
even after he was presented with compelling evidence that the proofs of service were fake. For
that, Rule 11 sanctions are warranted. Those sanctions are adequate deterrence, so the court
will decline to suspend Crandall’s practice privileges.
BACKGROUND
Shockley and Craig have convoluted histories, which the court summarizes here.
A. History of the cases
These Fair Credit Reporting Act cases arrived at the court in the summer of 2024.
Shockley was filed here, Dkt. 1 (’424 case); Craig was removed from state court, Dkt. 1 (’493
case). In September 2024, defendants in both cases moved to dismiss on two grounds:
insufficient service or, alternatively, tribal sovereign immunity. See Dkt. 32 (’424 case); Dkt. 22
(’493 case). In their motions to dismiss, defendants contended that plaintiffs filed false proofs
of service because the individual who plaintiffs purportedly served, Jim Hopper, was not
defendants’ registered agent and had never been served with the summons and complaints for
the lawsuits. See Dkt. 32, at 2–4 (’424 case); Dkt. 22, at 2–4 (’493 case). In response, plaintiffs
contended that the service was presumptively valid because the proofs of service were signed.
See Dkt. 45, at 9 (’424 case); Dkt. 37, at 8 (’493 case). In Craig, Crandall also filed an “affidavit
of due diligence” purportedly signed by the process server, William Gillum. Dkt. 35, Ex. 1 (’493
case). The affidavit indicated that Gillum served “Jimmy Hooper” as authorized agent for
service of process with “the documents” for both Shockley and Craig. Id.
The court dismissed Shockley because tribal sovereign immunity barred Shockley’s
claims against the defendants. See Dkt. 58 (’424 case). On the same day, November 6, 2024,
defense counsel in Craig presented evidence that Gillum’s affidavit of due diligence was false.
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 2 of 10

3
See Dkt. 42, at 1 (’493 case). Defense counsel submitted a declaration from the real William
Gillum, indicating that he had not prepared the proofs of service in Shockley or Craig, nor had
he prepared the affidavit of due diligence. See Dkt. 43 (’493 case). The Gillum declaration,
combined with the earlier declaration of Jim Hopper, makes a compelling case that the proofs
of service filed by Crandall were completely fake.
B. History of the sanctions motions
On December 2, 2025, defendants served Crandall with draft Rule 11 sanctions
motions with letters indicating their intent to file the motions if Crandall failed to withdraw
the service documents within 21 days. See Dkt. 63 (’424 case); Dkt. 48 (’493 case).
Two days later, Judge William M. Conley dismissed Craig, also on tribal sovereign
immunity grounds. Dkt. 45, at 2 (’493 case). Craig was reassigned to this judge to resolve both
sanctions motions. Dkt. 55 (’493 case).
Defendants filed their now-ripe Rule 11 sanctions motions on January 6, 2025.
Dkt. 62 (’424 case); Dkt. 47 (’493 case). The court ordered Crandall to “(1) explain what steps,
if any, he took to investigate the alleged falsified documents after November 6, 2024, and
(2) identify the individual or individuals at Oklahoma Judicial Process Service with which he
has had contact about these cases.” Dkt. 72 (’424 case); Dkt. 56 (’493 case). In response,
Crandall sought to depose his contact at the process server company, Makayla Saramosing.
See Dkt. 73 and Dkt. 74 (’424 case); Dkts. 57–59 (’493 case). The court allowed Crandall to
proceed with deposing Saramosing and directed him to file a supplemental response to the
sanctions motions by August 19, 2025. Dkt. 75 (’424 case); Dkt. 60 (’493 case).
On August 21, 2025, Crandall moved to compel Saramosing to comply with his
subpoenas. Dkt. 77 (’424 case); Dkt. 62 (’493 case). Saramosing moved to quash the
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 3 of 10

4
subpoenas. Dkt. 83 (’424 case); Dkt. 68 (’493 case). The court granted Saramosing’s motions
to quash because Crandall’s subpoenas exceeded the geographic limits under Rule 45 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. 84, at 2 (’424 case); Dkt. 69, at 2 (’493 case). The
court gave Crandall thirty more days to explain what steps, if any, he took to investigate the
alleged falsified documents after November 6, 2024. See Dkt. 84, at 3 (’424 case); Dkt. 69,
at 3 (’493 case). Crandall did not respond.
On November 6, 2025, the court ordered Crandall to show cause why he should not be
suspended from practice in this court for one year. Dkt. 88 (’424 case); Dkt. 73 (’493 case). In
response, Crandall filed a declaration and submitted evidence showing that he took the
following steps to investigate the alleged falsified documents:
• 	On November 6, 2024, he sent Saramosing an email message: “Mr. William
Gillum has disavowed and renounced the declarations and affidavits of service
in these two cases. How do you wish to proceed?” Dkt. 89, Ex. 4, at 3 (’424
case); Dkt. 74 (’493 case);
• 	The same day, Saramosing responded: “Eh? Lemme ask him to see what’s going
on[.]” Id.;
• 	On November 12, 2024, he sent a follow-up email message: “I have a scheduling
hearing tomorrow in the Craig v. American Web Loan case. Any response from
Mr. Gillum?” Id. at 2;
• 	The same day, Saramosing replied: “Nothing noteworthy, no ugh[.]” Id.;
• 	The next day, he sent: “You have to do better than that, as I paid you 1K to
serve process, and now your agent has disavowed the service he made. Please
provide me with Mr. Gillum’s address, e-mail and phone.” Id.;
• 	On January 7, 2025, he sent another email message to Saramosing:
Last 	year 	I 	paid 	your 	company 	to 	serve 	process 	in
Oklahoma in a number of cases. Mr. William Gillum
served the summons and complaint in 2 cases in July, and
when 	his 	service 	was 	questioned, 	gave 	the 	attached
October 2024 affidavit.
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 4 of 10

5
Several weeks later, Mr. Gillum (now listed as William
Gillum Jr.) filed a declaration that denied service and
claimed in paragraph 6 that the October 2024 affidavit
was false.
Now, With U Loans is moving for sanctions. I would like
to speak to you tomorrow about this. What is a good time?
Id., Ex. 5, at 2–3;
• 	On January 9, 2025, he sent a follow-up email message: “I need a call today.”
Id. at 2;
• 	The same day, Saramosing responded: “Okay everything in oklahoma is shut
down due to the heavy snow, but we will call you shortly[.]” Id.;
• 	At some point, Crandall called legal services for the process server company “over
a dozen times,” but “[n]o calls were returned.” Id., ¶ 12.
Crandall says that he “had no time to investigate further after Ms. Saramosing stopped
communicating with [him] after January 9, 2025.” Id., ¶ 13.
ANALYSIS
The court will start by addressing defendants’ motions for Rule 11 sanctions and then
turn to the court’s order to show cause why Crandall should not be suspended from practice in
this court.
A. Defendants’ motions for Rule 11 sanctions
Defendants move for sanctions under Rule 11, seeking reimbursement of the fees and
expenses incurred in connection with the Rule 11 motion and in responding to the fake proofs
of service. Dkt. 62 (’424 case); Dkt. 47 (’493 case). The court may sanction parties or their
attorneys who violate Rule 11(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). The blame here lies with
Crandall, not plaintiffs.
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 5 of 10

6
Rule 11’s central purpose is “to deter baseless filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). One of the duties under Rule 11 is to ensure that,
in all filings submitted by counsel, factual contentions have evidentiary support. Rule 11
provides, in pertinent part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
. . . .
(3) 	the 	factual 	contentions 	have 	evidentiary 	support 	or, 	if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The court may impose an appropriate sanction for violations of Rule 11(b). The court
must consider “whether a sanctioned party’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.”
Brown v. Fed’n of State Med. Bds. of the U.S., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on
other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989); see In re
Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1988).
The court does not blame Crandall for the fake proofs of service. There’s no evidence
that Crandall himself created the fake proofs or service or that he directed anyone to create
them. Crucially, there is no evidence that Crandall knew they were fake when he filed them.
Neither does the court expect Crandall to investigate and get to the bottom of the egregious
acts of forgery committed by the Oklahoma process server.
But the court will hold Crandall accountable for his own actions. Once he was presented
with compelling evidence—on November 6, 2024—that the proofs of service were fake, he
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 6 of 10

7
should have taken immediate action to investigate the service of process. And once defense
counsel served Crandall with their Rule 11 letters, the only reasonable course of action would
be to withdraw the proofs of service, because he could no longer reasonably contend that the
factual contentions in the proofs of service had viable evidentiary support.
The court does not require Crandall to get to the bottom of the mess at the process
server. But if Crandall wanted to stand by the proofs of service, he needed to investigate their
validity 	in 	response 	to 	defense 	counsel’s 	well-supported 	allegations. 	But 	Crandall’s
investigation was superficial. He’s done nothing more than exchange a handful of email
messages with his contact at the process server company and attempt to call the company’s
legal services department. See Dkt. 89, ¶¶ 9, 11–12. Crandall says he “had no time to investigate
further after [his contact] stopped communicating with [him] after January 9, 2025.” Id., ¶ 13.
If Crandall’s investigation revealed anything, it’s that the process server he had engaged was
untrustworthy.
Any reasonable attorney, faced with the same circumstances, would have withdrawn the
proofs of service. But rather than withdraw the documents, Crandall stood pat on Saramosing’s
words and “Gillum’s” affidavit of due diligence. The court concludes that Crandall violated
Rull 11(b) by failing to withdraw the proofs of service once defense counsel served its Rule 11
letters because a reasonable attorney would have recognized that the factual contentions in the
proofs of service lacked valid evidentiary support.
The court must determine an appropriate sanction, which must be “limited to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Defendants have asked for a reasonable and moderate sanction, which
is to require Crandall to pay the fees and expenses incurred in making the Rule 11 motions
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 7 of 10

8
and in responding to the fake proofs of service. The court dismissed Shockley on sovereign
immunity grounds the same day that defendants presented the declaration from the real
Gillum. And Judge Conley dismissed Craig on the same grounds a few days later. So Crandall’s
Rule 11 violation didn’t extend the litigation on the merits. But defense counsel here discovered
serious misconduct, and Crandall’s failure to concede that service had not validly been made
ended up dragging out the resolution of the Rule 11 motions. The court called upon Crandall
to explain his own conduct, Dkt. 72 (’424 case); Dkt. 56 (’493 case), but he was slow to do so,
and his explanation is not completely satisfying.
Counsel are encouraged to stipulate to the amount of fees and expenses to be recovered.
If they are not able to agree on the amount, defendants may have until February 2, 2026, to
submit an accounting of their reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in (1) preparing
their Rule 11 letters to Crandall, their Rule 11 motions and replies, their briefs in opposition
to Crandall’s motion to compel Saramosing to comply with his subpoenas, and the itemized
accounting of their reasonable attorney fees and expenses; and (2) preparing responses to the
allegedly falsified proofs of service and supporting affidavit of due diligence, and the allegations
contained in plaintiffs’ filings relying on those falsified documents. Defendants’ request must
comply with the court’s requirements for fee requests. Attachment to Dkt. 56, at 39 (’424
case). Crandall may have 14 days to object to the reasonableness of the attorney fees and
expenses.
B. Potential suspension of practice under the court’s inherent authority
The court ordered that Crandall “show cause why he should not be suspended from
practice in this court for one year.” Dkt. 88 (’424 case); Dkt. 73 (’493 case). Federal courts
have inherent authority to suspend attorneys from practice for their misconduct. See Matter of
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 8 of 10

9
Lisse, 921 F.3d 629, 643 (7th Cir. 2019); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985). But courts
must “exercise caution in invoking [their] inherent power,” reserving it for bad-faith conduct
that willfully abuses the judicial process and is not adequately sanctioned by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991); see Corley v. Rosewood
Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 1998).
The court is not fully satisfied with Crandall’s response to the order to show cause,
because he does not explain why he did not withdraw the proofs of service during the Rule 11
safe harbor period. Dkt. 89 (’424 case); Dkt. 74 (’493 case). He also doesn’t explain why he
believed that Makayla Saramasong and her company, OJPS Legal Process, would be a reliable
process server in the first place. But the court concludes that Rule 11 provides an adequate
sanction, so a suspension of his practice privileges is not warranted.
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 9 of 10

10
ORDER
1. 	Defendants AWL II, Inc. and W6LS, Inc.’s motions for sanctions, Dkt. 62 (’424
case) and Dkt. 47 (’493 case), are GRANTED.
2. 	Not later than February 2, 2026, AWL II, Inc. and W6LS, Inc. may submit an
accounting 	of 	any 	reasonable 	attorney 	fees 	and 	expenses 	they 	incurred 	in
(1) preparing their Rule 11 letters to Crandall, their Rule 11 motions and replies,
their briefs in opposition to Crandall’s motion to compel Saramosing to comply with
his subpoenas, and the itemized bill of their reasonable attorney fees and expenses;
and (2) preparing responses to the allegedly falsified proofs of service and supporting
affidavit of due diligence, and the allegations contained in plaintiffs’ filings relying
on those falsified documents. Crandall may have fourteen days to oppose the
amount of fees and expenses.
Entered January 12, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
Case: 3:24-cv-00493-jdp Document #: 75 Filed: 01/12/26 Page 10 of 10