Coleman, Sidney v. Sperry, Sam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
SIDNEY L. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
21-cv-65-wmc
SAM SPERRY,
Defendant.
A jury found in favor of pro se plaintiff Sidney L. Coleman on Fourth Amendment
unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution claims asserted against defendant Sam Sperry,
an Eau Claire Police Department officer, and in Officer Sperry’s favor on Coleman’s Fourth
Amendment excessive force clam. (Dkt. #148.) The jury proceeded to award Coleman
compensatory and punitive damages totaling $550,000. (Dkt. #149.) The court then
entered final judgment accordingly. (Dkt. # 151.)
Still pending before the court are seven, post-judgment motions. In two of those
motions, defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(b) and for a new trial under Rule 59. (Dkt. ##161, 162.) Those motions
will be denied in their entirety because the court finds that the jury's verdict is supported
by the evidence. In a third motion, which the court will grant in part, defendant asks the
court to stay plaintiff’s execution on the final judgment and waive any requirement for a
supersedeas bond pending final resolution of the case. (Dkt. #166.) In the fourth motion,
plaintiff asks the court to appoint him counsel. That motion, along with what are
essentially cross-motions for a new trial on his excessive force claim in plaintiff’s responses
to defendant’s motions (dkt. ##174 at 2 & 176 at 2), will all be denied, although counsel
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is likely to be appointed by the Seventh Circuit in inevitable appeals by both sides. Finally,
the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment interest. (Dkt. #186.)
BACKGROUND
On January 28, 2021, Sidney Coleman filed a complaint against the Eau Claire
Police Department, the City of Eau Claire, the State of Wisconsin, and various Eau Claire
Police Department officers, county prosecutors, and state court judges, claiming that on
October 7, 2019, he was illegally stopped, searched, and prosecuted after being racially
profiled as a drug dealer.1 (Dkt. #1.) Coleman was granted leave to proceed against
Officer Sperry, Eau Claire Police Department Officer Jimmy Vang, and four John Doe
defendants on Fourth Amendment claims based on the stop and search of his vehicle, the
search of his hotel room, and for malicious prosecution, as well as a Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim based on gun pointing.2 (Dkt. #13.) With the limited factual record
before it, the court granted summary judgment on Coleman’s claims in favor of every
defendant save Sperry, and his remaining claims against Sperry proceeded to trial.3 (Dkt.
#72.)
1 Coleman’s complaint initially included his brother Timothy Coleman and wife Lakesha Johnson
as named plaintiffs. However, both Timothy and Lakesha were dismissed from this case for failure
to prosecute. (Dkt. #11 and Dkt. #12.)
2 The John Doe defendants were subsequently identified as Eau Claire Police Department Officers
Cole Conway, Anthony Briski, David Mikunda, and Aaron Schiefelbein.
3 Through summary judgment, neither party had taken any depositions. After the close of discovery
and shortly before the court issued its opinion granting and denying in part defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, however, defendants moved to compel Coleman’s deposition. (Dkt. #60.)
Two weeks earlier, defendants had previously sent Coleman a notice requiring his deposition on
March 5, 2024, three days before the close of discovery. (Dkt. #62-1.) Though Coleman claimed
he never received that notice, defendants produced evidence suggesting that Coleman had, in fact,
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At trial, Coleman testified to his version of his relevant interactions with Officer
Sperry. In short, Coleman had moved to a motel in Eau Claire from Alabama with his wife
and children, seeking a fresh start in life. (Dkt. #153, at 99:23-100:5.) On the evening of
October 7, 2019, Coleman and his brother Timothy, who was visiting, left the motel
because Timothy needed to go to the store. (Id. 100:14-19.) Before setting off on that
errand in Timothy’s rental car, Coleman briefly went back upstairs to retrieve his driver’s
license from his room. (Id. 100:20-101:1, 107:18-22.) Despite complying with all traffic
laws, Coleman was nevertheless pulled over by a police car. (Id. 106:9-107:8.) Concerned
about their safety inside of the vehicle, both Colemans then got out of their car and locked
the doors at Timothy’s instigation. (Id. 107:2-108:3.) At that point, the Eau Claire Police
Department officer who had pulled them over -- later identified as Officer Sperry -- pulled
his gun on them, before other officers arrived and did the same. (Id. 108:9-14.) Coleman
and his brother were then handcuffed and taken to a squad car. (Id. 108:23-109:3.)
While the Colemans were in the squad car, Sperry and his colleagues searched the
rental car. (Id. 109:17-21.) According to Coleman, he wasn’t aware of anything being in
the car and Timothy volunteered that if the officers found anything in the rental car, it
belonged to him, not Coleman. (Id. 109:9-11, 110:2-6.) Officers found an “ecstasy pill”
and a “joint of marijuana” upon searching the car (id. 109:23-25), described as “DRUG
METH” and “DRUG MARIJUANA” in Sperry’s post-arrest incident report, both items
were later identified as being “owned” by Timothy, rather than Coleman (id. 111:9-25;
contacted defendants’ counsel in an attempt to reschedule the deposition but never agreed upon a
mutually convenient time. (Dkt. #73.) Accordingly, the court directed plaintiff to appear for a
deposition on March 19, 2024, which he did. (Dkt. #124.)
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dkt. #118, at 3-4). Nevertheless, Coleman was also criminally charged with possession of
methamphetamine and marijuana as party to a crime. (Dkt. #153, at 112:5-16; Dkt. #49-
2.) As a result, Coleman spent seven days in jail, then several months fighting those
criminal charges, although all were ultimately dropped by prosecutors nearly one year later.
(Dkt. #158, at 4:3-15.)
Unsurprisingly, Sperry offered a different version of the relevant events to the jury,
which included his description of the Regency Inn and Suites, where Coleman and his
family had been staying, as a well-known “hotbed” of drug sales and other criminal activity
in Eau Claire. (Dkt. #158, at 24:25-25:24.) When Coleman returned to the car, Sperry
also testified that he observed Timothy engage in “evasive behavior.” (Id. 29:14-24.)
Further, having determined that the vehicle was a rental car, Sperry explained that rentals
were in his experience often used for criminal activity. (Id. 33:17-25.) For all of these
reasons, after the Colemans drove away from the Regency Inn’s parking lot, Sperry
followed them. (Id. 35:6-7.)
When he was approximately one hundred yards away, Sperry then testified that
Coleman failed to stop at a red light before turning right. (Id. 35:10-17.) After following
Coleman for several hundred more yards, including through several lane changes and a left
turn, which Sperry also perceived as evasive action, he turned on his warning lights and
initiated a traffic stop. (Id. 35:19-36:13, 37:6-21.) When Coleman and his brother
suddenly exited their car, Sperry was concerned that they could flee or utilize a gun against
him; as a result, he pulled his gun on them for safety reasons and radioed dispatch for
backup, which arrived a minute or two later. (Id. 40:1-43:8.) After those officers also took
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out their guns, Sperry and his colleagues then handcuffed the Colemans -- who they had
not yet identified -- and placed them in separate squad cars. (Id. 43:23-44:4.)
When Coleman and his brother were safely in the officers’ patrol vehicles, Sperry
and some of his colleagues next walked up to the Coleman’s rental car to conduct a visual
search for any other passengers, again as a safety protocol. (Id. 44:7-12.) Though the
officers did not locate any other occupants in the vehicle, Sperry testified he detected a
“strong odor of marijuana” coming from the car, and upon reaching the front of the car,
also observed an open container of beer on the floorboard of the car’s passenger side. (Id.
16-21.) After receiving basic biographical information from the Colemans, Sperry then
began to search their vehicle. (Id. 45:24-46:9.)
During Sperry’s search of the car, he located a knife in the driver-side door pocket,
a hypodermic needle under the passenger-side floor mat, a corner-cut baggie with a
substance he recognized as marijuana, and a gem baggie with two, multicolored pressed
pills, as well as four cell phones and a tablet. (Id. 46:10-22.) Sperry recognized the pills
as ecstasy, also known as MDMA. (Id. 48:15- 49:1.) Further, after conducting a field test
of the pills, using a kit called “NARK II,” which can identify the presence of
methamphetamine or MDMA in the substance being tested. (Id. 49:6-18.) That test
yielded a presumptive positive result. (Id.)4
After the unwarranted car search, Sperry obtained a warrant to search Coleman’s
hotel room, because he believed that both Coleman and Timothy were involved in the sale
4 In the incident report that Sperry drafted after Coleman’s arrest, he described locating evidence
of 1.1 grams of MDMA belonging to both Coleman and Timothy, which had yielded a “positive
presumptive test result for the presence of amphetamines.” (Dkt. #118, at 11.)
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or distribution of controlled substances, in his view potentially involving a “greater criminal
enterprise,” rather than simple possession. (Id. 53:2-54:5.) Moreover, according to Sperry
-- and contrary to Coleman’s testimony -- Timothy only admitted owning the “small
amount of marijuana” that was in the car, rather than “all of the substances[.]” (Id. 54:6-
10.) During the execution of the search warrant at Coleman’s hotel room, officers found
on top of a child’s backpack a glass bong and metal grinder, both often used to consume
THC. (Id. 57:14-17.) Nevertheless, as a result of the search, officers determined that
Coleman was not involved in drug distribution. (Id. 57:18-20.) After finishing the search
of Coleman’s hotel room, Sperry completed an incident report detailing his encounter with
the Colemans, as well as the information and evidence he obtained, which was sent to the
Eau Claire County District Attorney’s Office for subsequent use in determining if charges
were appropriate. (Id. 58:2-13.)
At the conclusion of Officer Sperry’s direct examination, a juror passed along a
question asking that he “re-explain field tests for amphetamines,” because “[i]sn’t MDMA
considered an amphetamine?” (Id. 66:4-9; dkt. #150-1.) In response, Sperry explained
that he was initially mistaken, and the field test was “both a test for the presence of
amphetamines in MDMA, as well as [a test for] the presence of methamphetamine.” (Dkt.
#158, at 87:18-88:14.) Moreover, Sperry added that MDMA in the Eau Claire area was
often cut with methamphetamine, rather than being strictly made with amphetamines.
(Id.) Beyond the field test, Sperry also noted that a second test would be required to prove
the presence of amphetamines in those pills (id. 89:6-18), and acknowledged that
possession of those drugs were chargeable under different criminal statutes. (Id. 88:24-
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89:5.) Finally, Sperry acknowledged that the discrepancy between his police report
describing amphetamines and “every other charging document” listing methamphetamine
was due to “a mistake of understanding what the test kit will show.” (Id. 90:19-23.)5
Before Sperry concluded his testimony, jurors had four, additional questions for
him: (1) whether the field test he conducted would test positive for either MDMA or
methamphetamine; (2) whether amphetamines “equal[ed]” MDMA or meth; (3) whether
Timothy’s residence was also searched; and (4) why Sperry didn’t pull Coleman over
sooner after he observed Coleman running the red light. (Dkt. #158, at 2:7 and Dkt.
#150-1, at 2-4.) Sperry responded that the field test was “just for methamphetamine”;
amphetamines were an “overall umbrella” under which those drugs fell; Timothy’s
residence was not searched; and he “couldn’t have conducted the traffic stop any sooner
than [he] had.” (Dkt. #158, at 103:20-104:23.)
Sperry called one additional witness, Officer Vang, who told jurors that on the
evening of October 7, 2019, he responded to a request for support from Sperry in an
“urgent” and “quite serious” situation. (Id. 109:12-18.) Vang’s testimony largely mirrored
Sperry’s description of the arrest and vehicle search with one notable exception: he told
jurors that when they searched the Colemans’ vehicle, Sperry was on the passenger side of
the car -- not the driver’s side. (Id. 129:16-130:9.) Vang added that while he saw a Corona
bottle in the vehicle on the passenger side “right away[,]” he only saw it “right when [he]
opened the door” on the floorboard, rather than from outside the car. (Id. 131:11-19.)
5 The Wisconsin State Crime Lab only confirmed the presence of methamphetamine in the pills
that Sperry recovered on June 26, 2020, albeit over eight months after Coleman was arrested and
charged. (Dkt. #135, at 1.)
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After two days of testimony, the liability case was submitted to the jury. During
their deliberations on liability, the jury sent the court four questions in two notes. In their
first note, jurors asked if: (1) there was video of the traffic stop or body cam footage; and
(2) they could have a map of the roads involved in this case. (Dkt. #150-2, at 1; dkt.
#159, at 2.) After discussion with the parties, the court answered the question regarding
the availability of video in the negative, while providing the jurors with a basic screenshot
from Google Maps of the relevant area. In their second note, the jury asked for: (3)
standard Eau Claire Police Department procedures for brandishing a firearm; and (4)
confirmation that officers are equipped with non-lethal force, including OC spray or tasers.
(Dkt. #150-2, at 3; dkt. #159, at 9-11.) The court also provided the jury with responses
to those questions despite Sperry’s objections. (Dkt. #159, at 10-11.)
After deliberating for roughly half a day, the jury found Sperry liable for stopping
Coleman without reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic offense or crime,
and for maliciously prosecuting Coleman for offenses charged after his arrest on October
7, 2019. (Dkt. #148.) However, Sperry was found not liable for use of excessive force
against Coleman. (Id.)
The trial then proceeded to a damages phase, during which Coleman testified about
the impact that the traffic stop, subsequent hotel room search, and ultimate prosecution,
all had on him. In particular, he explained how his period of incarceration after the arrest
led him to worry deeply about his wife and children’s ability to subsist on their own,
particularly given his wife’s challenges in being able to take care of the children by herself.
(Dkt. #160, at 17:4-18:3.) Although the court emphasized to jurors that they could only
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award damages to Coleman, not to his wife or children (id. 18:4-10), Coleman was also
allowed to explain that as a result of his arrest and subsequent eviction from the Regency
Inn and Suites, he and his family were forced to live in a U-Haul storage unit and the
further impact this had on him. (Id. 19:4-19.) He also introduced exhibits including hotel
and moving receipts, academic transcripts, and tuition account statements incurred as a
result of the disruption after his arrest and incarceration.
Jurors posed additional questions to Coleman during the damages phase, including:
(1) when Coleman moved back to Alabama; (2) how long he resided in Eau Claire; and (3)
why, specifically, Coleman felt he had to move his family from Eau Claire back to Alabama.
(Dkt. #160, at 68.) Coleman testified in response to each of those questions as posed by
the court. (Id., at 68-70.)
Finally, during the course of their deliberations on damages, jurors sent a note
asking whether the search warrant application and hotel search could be considered in
calculating damages for Coleman’s malicious prosecution claim. (Dkt. #150-2, at 6; dkt.
#160, at 98-99.) With the agreement of the parties, the court responded in writing that
“although neither was the subject of a specific claim in this case,” jurors “may consider all
facts to the extent they inform your finding as to the damages caused by one of defendant’s
violations of the Fourth Amendment, provided you do not double count injuries or damage
awards.” (Dkt. #160, at 99-100; dkt. #50-2, at 6.)
After approximately 90 minutes of deliberation, the jury awarded Coleman:
$50,000 in compensatory damages but zero dollars in punitive damages for the illegal
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traffic stop and $400,000 in compensatory damages and an additional $100,000 in
punitive damages for the malicious prosecution. (Dkt. #149.)
OPINION
I. Rule 50(b) Motions (Dkt. #161; Dkt. #174)
Under Rule 50, judgment may be granted as a matter of law where there is no
“legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to uphold the jury’s verdict on that issue. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50(a). More specifically, the court is to “examine the evidence presented, combined
with any reasonably drawn inferences, and determine whether that evidence sufficiently
supports the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2013). In doing so, the court is not
to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Rather, the court must ensure
that more than “a mere scintilla of evidence” supports the verdict, Hossack v. Floor Covering
Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2007), and reverse “only if no rational jury
could have found for the prevailing party,” AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d at 835.
Further, “[b]ecause the Rule 50(b) motion is only a renewal of the preverdict
motion, it can be granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict motion.” Wallace v.
McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. of
Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (refusing to consider the defendant’s
argument that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment
action, in part, because the defendant did not raise that argument in its initial Rule 50(a)
motion); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 cmt. 1991 Amendments (“A post-trial motion for judgment
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can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion.”). This distinction is
important because at the conclusion of the liability phase of this trial, defendants moved
for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution and excessive force claims (dkt. ##139, 154 at 29), which the court implicitly
denied by allowing both to go to the jury. On the other hand, plaintiff did not raise any
motion under Rule 50(a) at trial, instead opting to seek judgment as a matter of law on his
excessive force claim “pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3)” in his opposition to defendant’s
motion. (Dkt. #174, at 2.) Because plaintiff never filed a pre-verdict motion for judgment
as a matter of law, let alone raise a timely motion under Rule 50(b), his request for
judgment as a matter of law on his excessive force claim must be denied.
In defendant’s first motion for a directed verdict, he argues that: (1) because the
evidence in the record established the searches of plaintiff’s vehicle and hotel room were
supported by probable cause, plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of
law; (2) defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to the search of plaintiff’s vehicle
and hotel, because he had arguable probable cause to search them based on his
observations; and (3) there was no evidence to support a finding that defendant used
excessive force against plaintiff. (Dkt. #139.) While the jury subsequently found
defendant liable for maliciously prosecuting plaintiff, it also found that defendant did not
use excessive force against him. (Dkt. #148, at 1.)
Defendant’s renewed motion for a directed verdict again argues that: the record
lacked any evidence or legal basis for the jury to find he maliciously prosecuted plaintiff;
and in the alternative, he was entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. #161.) Defendant
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also asks the court to order a new trial as to plaintiff’s unreasonable traffic stop claim, even
if it only enters judgment as a matter of law in defendant’s favor as to plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim. (Id. at 33.) Because defendant failed to raise the insufficiency of
plaintiff’s evidence regarding the traffic stop as grounds for a directed verdict in his Rule
50(a) motion, the court need only address his arguments that the record lacks evidence to
support the jury’s finding that defendant maliciously prosecuted plaintiff, and that
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Thompson, 625 F.3d at 407.6 Those arguments
are addressed below in turn.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Jury’s Finding of Malicious Prosecution
Claims of malicious prosecution require proof that: the underlying prosecution was
instituted without probable cause; defendant's motive in bringing the charges was
malicious; and the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson v. Clark,
596 U.S. 36, 42, 49 (2022). Since the district attorney dropped the prosecution
altogether, the last element is certainly satisfied. Further, when analyzing a malicious
prosecution claim, courts are to consider whether probable cause existed when the plaintiff
was charged, not when he or she was arrested. Holland, 643 F.3d at 254. In the context
of a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause exists where the facts alleged “would lead
6 Even if the court were to consider the merits of defendant’s challenge to the jury’s finding that he
lacked grounds to make the original traffic stop, there is ample evidence to support the jury’s
rejection of Officer Sperry’s credibility in claiming lawful reasons for following defendant from the
hotel or seeing his supposed illegal right turn from more than 100 yards away. Indeed, dash cam
video only produced by the Eau Claire Police Department after trial confirms that Coleman made
no illegal right turn, just as the jury concluded. See https://www.weau.com/2024/05/01/jury-rules-
favor-mans-lawsuit-against-eau-claire-police-officer/ (last viewed March 12, 2026).
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a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or to entertain an honest and sound
suspicion that the accused committed the offense charged.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733
F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2013).
On the basis of defendant’s observations, testimony, and written reports, plaintiff
was charged with possessing methamphetamine and cannabis, both as a party to a crime,
and possession of a concealed knife. (Dkt. #49-2, at 1-2.) Defendant also issued plaintiff
with a traffic citation for running a red light. (Dkt. #49-3.) Since all charges were dropped
by prosecutors, the only remaining question is whether the defendant instituted the
underlying prosecution without probable cause and acted with malice. While the existence
of probable cause as to any one of those charges defeats a malicious prosecution claim,
Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 698 (7th Cir. 2019), jurors had enough evidence to
conclude that defendant in fact lacked probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed
any of those offenses.
As to the red light violation and knife possession charges, jurors were entitled to
weigh the competing narratives of the parties, and decide that plaintiff’s version -- where
he neither ran the red light, nor possessed or was aware of any knife in the car -- was more
credible. Taylor v. Bradley, 448 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir. 2006). While the drug possession
charges present a somewhat closer question, jurors were instructed on the definitions of
possession and possession of an illicit drug as a party to a crime in Wisconsin. (Dkt. #143,
at 8-9; dkt. #154, at 44:13-47:12.) Based on plaintiff’s denial that he knew anything
about the drugs found in Timothy’s rental car when officers stopped them and Timothy’s
immediately acknowledging that the drugs were his, jurors could credibly find that plaintiff
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lacked the necessary knowing, actual physical control over those drugs, or an intent to
exercise control over them as required to prove possession under Wisconsin law. See Wis.
JI-Criminal 6030 (2024). Similarly, even though plaintiff could have been liable as a party
to a crime by directly possessing the drugs, he also could have been held liable “by
intentionally aiding and abetting the person” who possessed them or by being a member
of a conspiracy to commit that crime. That broader definition notwithstanding, jurors
obviously accepted the plaintiff’s testimony while finding defendant’s testimony and
theory of the case less than credible.
Based on its questions alone, the jury plainly questioned defendant’s testimony
regarding: the nature of the drug involved; plaintiff’s supposed possession of each being
credible, much less chargeable under the different criminal statutes; field tests he
conducted on the substances found in the rental car; and defendant’s sometimes
inconsistent answers about what those tests showed. Though the court sought to assist
jurors in understanding the case by allowing defendant to answer their questions, his own
conflicting testimony alone could reasonably give jurors the opportunity to doubt his
credibility and credit plaintiff’s account that he had no idea about the existence of any of
those drugs in the car, much less any basis to conclude the drugs were in plaintiff’s
possession or that he was somehow a party to the crime of possession by his brother.
Particularly after the jury found that defendant’s original decision to follow and stop
defendant lacked good faith. the court will not disturb the jury’s subsequent finding that
defendant acted maliciously in pursuing charges against him. Indeed, the jury was free to
find defendant’s conduct here was tainted from the start and his decision to press for
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charges against plaintiff, rather than his brother alone, was more about saving face than
any good faith evaluation of the available evidence. See Holland v. City of Chicago, 643 F.3d
248, 255 (7th Cir. 2011) (malice can be inferred where “a defendant lacks probable cause
and the circumstances indicate a lack of good faith”).
B. Qualified Immunity
Finally, given the evidence undermining defendant’s version of events, the court will
also deny defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity grounds as a matter of law.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time
of the challenged conduct. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012); Ewell v. Toney,
853 F.3d 911, 919 (7th Cir. 2017). In evaluating defendant’s assertion of qualified
immunity here, the question for the court is whether a reasonable officer could have
mistakenly believed that probable cause existed, a concept the courts refer to as “arguable
probable cause.” Harris v. City of La Crosse, No. 23-cv-62-jdp, 2024 WL 3823094, at *11,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---- (W.D. Wis. 2024) (citing Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
While this is a “pure question of law” that must be decided by the court, rather than
a jury, Thayer, 705 F.3d at 247, the court must accept the jury’s determination that
plaintiff’s version of events carried the day and apply the law to those facts. Zellner v.
Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007). When construing those facts in the light
most favorable to plaintiff -- meaning defendant lacked probable cause or arguable probable
cause to initiate a stop or assert any criminal charges against him, and did so nonetheless -
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- an objectively reasonable officer would have known that it was constitutionally
impermissible to: (1) arrest someone without probable cause, Harney v. City of Chicago, 702
F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2012); or (2) falsify the factual basis for a judicial probable cause
determination. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019).
Similarly -- and as discussed further below -- the jury’s verdict on plaintiff’s
unreasonable traffic stop was supported by evidence in the record, including plaintiff’s own
testimony. As a result, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on that count
either.7 Second, even if a defendant may raise his qualified immunity defense after the
jury verdict, see Thompson, 625 F.3d at 407, the jury obviously credited plaintiff’s testimony
that he complied with all traffic laws and there was no arguable probable cause to stop him
at all.
Since no reasonable officer could have believed it was constitutionally permissible
to stop a motorist without reasonable suspicion that he had committed any traffic or other
criminal offense, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 n.7 (2007) (collecting cases), the
jury was entitled to suspect defendant’s action in inventing a basis for doing so from the
start. Even viewing the subsequent evidence of possession of illicit drugs in isolation, a
reasonably objective officer should have realized that the evidence did not rise to arguable
probable cause to charge plaintiff with possession of the drugs or knife found in a car rented
by his brother, who promptly admitted ownership over them. Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d
7 Further, defendant failed to raise any argument about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
plaintiff’s seizure claim in his original Rule 50(a) motion. Consequently, he is arguably barred from
claiming an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law at this point in his Rule 50(b) motion.
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999 (7th Cir. 2014). Similarly, stretching to charge plaintiff with possession “as a party
to a crime” does not meet the smell test, much less rise to arguable probable cause. See id.
II. Rule 59 Motions (Dkt. #162; Dkt. #176)
After a jury trial, the court may also grant a new trial under Rule 59 on some or all
of the issues for “any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action
at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Defendant timely filed a motion seeking
a new trial on the grounds that: (1) the jury’s verdict lacked any basis in the record; and
(2) the court committed several errors that affected the jury’s verdict. (Dkt. #162.) In
turn, plaintiff appears to assert his own Rule 59 motion in his response to defendant’s
motion (dkt. #176, at 9), which although untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (requiring
motions for new trial to be filed no later than 28 days after entry of judgment), the court
is inclined to consider given plaintiff’s pro se status. Accordingly, the court analyzes the
arguments that defendant makes in support of his motion -- attacking the sufficiency of
the evidence that the jury relied on to reach its verdict, and alleging that the court
committed certain errors in admitting and adducing evidence at trial -- as well as plaintiff’s
response in the alternative.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, a new trial “may be granted only if the jury’s verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.” King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing ABM Marking, Inc. v. Zanasi Fratelli, S.R.L., 353 F.3d 541, 545 (7th Cir.
2003)). To meet this standard, defendant must demonstrate that no rational jury could
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have rendered a verdict against him. King, 447 F.3d at 534 (citing Woodward v. Corr. Med.
Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 926 (7th Cir. 2004)). Here, again, the court must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, leaving issues of credibility and weight of
evidence to the jury. King, 447 F.3d at 534. Thus, “[t]he court must sustain the verdict
where a ‘reasonable basis’ exists in the record to support the outcome.” Id. (quoting
Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004)).
In his Rule 59 motion, defendant throws the proverbial kitchen sink at the jury’s
verdict, basically arguing that none of its findings were supported by facts in the record.
However, because the court has already determined that the jury had a sufficient factual
basis on which to find defendant liable for maliciously prosecuting plaintiff in the context
of defendant’s Rule 50 motion, see discussion supra Section I.A, it also concludes that the
jury’s verdict on that count does not go against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Nevertheless, the court addresses the remaining jury findings that defendant challenges --
its verdict on plaintiff’s unlawful stop claim, and its awards for compensatory and punitive
damages -- as well as plaintiff’s cross-motion below.
1. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure
Defendant asks the court to order a new trial on the issue of whether he initiated
the October 7, 2019, traffic stop without reasonable suspicion that plaintiff had committed
a moving violation. (Dkt. #163, at 4.) Although defendant maintained throughout the
trial that his observation of plaintiff’s failure to stop at a red light gave him reasonable
suspicion to initiate a stop, plaintiff similarly insisted throughout the trial that he did stop
at the light. Such credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence are reserved for
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the jury. Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012). Rather than point
to a lack of evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim, defendant’s only argument appears to be
that the court’s liability instructions and responses to its questions somehow prejudiced
the jury against him and called his credibility into question. (Dkt. #163, at 64.) For the
reasons discussed below, those instructions were proper. Moreover, there is a reasonable,
independent basis for finding that the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence in the
form of plaintiff’s own testimony, who the jury obviously found more credible than
defendant.
In his briefing, plaintiff contends that defendant either perjured himself on the
stand or misled the court as to the events and evidence in this case. (Dkt. #176, at 10.)
While there was no evidence at trial to support that accusation, the court is alarmed that
video of the traffic stop surfaced publicly, published by defendant’s employer itself, just
one week after the trial’s conclusion. EauClairePD, Eau Claire Police 19PD22024, YOUTUBE
(May 1, 2024), https://youtu.be/a8XKCApujMM. Though defendant’s counsel never
affirmatively represented to the court that no such footage existed (dkt. #159, 7:21-8:10)
and plaintiff does not appear to have pursued the video in discovery, the court specifically
flagged the absence of that video in its order on summary judgment and its inability to
resolve some of, if not all of, plaintiff’s factual assertions as a result. (Dkt. #72, at 7 n.2.)
Nevertheless, an Eau Claire Deputy City’s Attorney discussed the video and its alleged
probative value with media outlets after its publication. See Daniel Gomez, Jury rules in
favor of man’s lawsuit against Eau Claire police officer, WEAU 13 NEWS (May 1, 2024),
https://www.weau.com/2024/05/01/jury-rules-favor-mans-lawsuit-against-eau-claire-police-
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officer/ (“I don’t think a reasonable person can watch that video and think that the Eau
Claire Police Department did anything wrong[.]”).
Given that the footage necessarily existed throughout the pendency of this case, the
failure of defendant’s counsel to produce that video in discovery or at trial -- or at least
bring its existence to the court’s attention -- is deeply troubling. In any event, absent any
justification for the delay in producing the video, defendant may not use it to argue for a
retrial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
2. Compensatory Damages Award
Defendant also challenges the size of the jury’s compensatory damages award to
plaintiff as to both his unlawful stop claim ($50,000) and his malicious prosecution claim
($400,000), arguing that the jury lacked evidence to award either. (Dkt. #163, at 68-77.)
Plaintiff testified to physical injury, pain, and emotional suffering experienced because of
these Fourth Amendment violations. See Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 865
(7th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, defendant contends that the jury’s awards lacked a rational
relationship with the evidence adduced at trial, while failing to show why that is the case
as to either award.
Citing only a single case involving an unlawful traffic stop where the district court
limited plaintiff’s damages to $1, Martin, 934 F.3d at 594, defendant argues that the jury
overshot by awarding plaintiff $50,000. While the Seventh Circuit has described an
unlawful traffic stop as a “de minimis deprivation of liberty” for which damages could be
“too slight to support the expense of suing[,]” Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 248 (7th Cir.
1996), the jury was presented with evidence that, despite committing no traffic offense,
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plaintiff and his brother -- both African-American -- were suddenly stopped with guns
drawn, late at night, in a town about which both were largely unfamiliar, against a broader,
national discussion regarding videotaped violence and even deaths of individuals in police
custody.8 (Dkt. #160, at 32:14-22.) Considering all of the circumstances, the court will
not upset the jury’s finding as to the appropriateness of the damages plaintiff experienced
as a result of defendant’s unlawful traffic stop.
Nor will the court disturb the jury’s compensatory and punitive damage awards for
malicious prosecution. Largely because of an illegal stop and dubious charges against
plaintiff (as opposed to plaintiff’s brother), the evidence adduced at trial and credited by
the jury showed that plaintiff spent a week in jail, suffering significant upheaval to his
personal life and academic career, then was forced to rebuild his life in a different state
that he had previously sought to leave, while continuing to fight criminal charges for a
series of offenses that he did not commit in this state. Under those circumstances, the
jury’s award of $400,000 is within the range of reasonableness.
3. Punitive Damages Award
Next, defendant demands a new trial to determine whether punitive damages were
warranted. (Dkt. #163, at 77.) Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acts
“wantonly and willfully, or was motivated in his actions by ill will or a desire to injure.
Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2009). In a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must
8 While plaintiff referenced the murder of George Floyd as having “just” taken place at the time he
was arrested, (dkt. #160 at 42), that actually occurred nearly a year later, in the summer of 2020,
there is no doubt that and other heavily reported incidents were in the plaintiff’s and the jurors’
minds in this case.
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prove that defendant was motivated by an “evil motive or intent, or [] reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983). The court must give deference to a jury’s award of punitive damages “unless there
was no rational connection between the evidence on damages on the verdict -- unless, in
other words, the verdict was ‘monstrously excessive.’” Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc.,
704 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1983). Given the necessary finding that defendant acted
maliciously by arresting and charging plaintiff, a punitive damages award of $100,000 is
certainly not per se unreasonable.
B. Alleged Evidentiary Errors
The court may also grant a new trial if “the trial was unfair to the moving party.”
Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 973, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (citing David v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003)). Defendant argues that several evidentiary errors
at trial warrant the grant of a new trial on plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and unlawful
stop claims. However, a new trial based on an error in the admission of evidence is granted
only in “extraordinary situations,” Shick v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 611
(7th Cir. 2002), in which the error likely affected a substantial right of a party -- meaning
that there is a significant chance that the error affected the jury's verdict. Horvath v. West
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. App’x. 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, whether there was
reversible error “turns on an analysis of the evidentiary ruling in the context of the entire
trial record.” Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2013). Defendant faces
an uphill battle in this case, because the outcome of the trial depended upon the resolution
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of relatively simple issues from highly disputed factual testimony. Whitehead v. Bond, 680
F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2012).
1. Judicial Notice of NARK II Test
At the heart of defendant’s motion for a new trial is the court’s decision --
responding to a jury question arising out of his own testimony -- to take judicial notice of
the manufacturer's description of the NARK II test that defendant stated he used on the
pills retrieved from the rental car. (Dkt. #163, at 1.) While now implying that he may
have used another test that was not the NARK II -- notwithstanding his testimony at trial
to using the “Narco II” test for methamphetamine and MDMA -- defendant never pointed
the court to any other test that he may have used instead. (Dkt. #163, at 49; dkt. #158,
at 49:6-15). Whether or not the court erred in judicially noticing a fact regarding a drug
test that defendant himself testified to using, the court is reasonably confident that
decision had limited affect on his substantial rights in the jury’s evaluation of his decision
to charge plaintiff with possession of what were admittedly, ultimately determined to be
MDMA pills. Indeed, the real issue was not whether illicit drugs were present in the case,
which even defendant agrees plaintiff’s brother admitted were his, at least with respect to
the marijuana, and according to plaintiff and his brother all illicit drugs, but whether it was
reasonable to find probable cause to charge plaintiff with possession “as a party to a crime”
simply because he was driving his brother’s rental car, especially after his brother
immediately took ownership of the drugs.
Regardless, defendant himself first testified on direct examination that a positive
NARK II test result would show that the substance being tested contained
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“methamphetamine or MDMA.” (Dkt. #158, at 49:14-15 (emphasis added).) Even in
later testimony, the defendant took the position that his field test was “just for
methamphetamine[,]” but that amphetamines were an “overall umbrella” under which
both drugs fell. Regardless, given the jurors’ obvious confusion about what the test could
show as evidenced by notes received from multiple jurors, and what defendant was actually
testing for, the court does not think it was an error to take judicial notice of a fact that
defendant’s own, initial testimony put in question.
2. Closing Liability Instructions
Defendant also objects to the court’s decision to include a paraphrased summary of
the NARK II test description in its closing jury instructions, arguing that it misled the jury
and unfairly characterized his testimony as “confusing[,]” which further undermined his
credibility. (Dkt. #163, at 2.) He also contends that the court erred in supplementing its
written closing liability instructions by referencing the substances found in the rental
vehicle, stating that “we now know” one of the substances was methamphetamine. (Id. at
3.)
However, erroneous jury instructions cannot prejudice defendant unless
“considering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the evidence and arguments, the
jury was misinformed about the applicable law.” Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v. Ashton Drake
Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, the jury instructions on possession of
controlled substances and possession as a party to a crime were sourced, verbatim, from
the pattern Wisconsin Jury Instructions for those crimes. Accordingly, the court’s inclusion
of a judicially-noticed fact in the closing liability instructions, as well as its reference to the
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State Crime Lab’s conclusion that the pills found in the rental car were, in fact,
methamphetamine -- a fact adduced in defendant’s own case-in-chief -- did not misinform
the jury as to the law or undisputed facts, much less swayed its understanding of how to
apply either.
3. Court Questions During Redirect Examination of Plaintiff
Finally, defendant contends that a new trial is warranted because the court asked
plaintiff “leading” questions during plaintiff’s rebuttal examination, which “impermissibly
suggest[ed]” his testimony regarding an open container of alcohol in his vehicle, despite
lacking personal knowledge of the subject matter. (Dkt. #163, at 3, 10.) To begin, a court
may, in its discretion, permit leading questions on direct or re-direct examination of a
witness. Arnold v. United States, 7 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1925). Moreover, the court
rephrased its question to plaintiff, without objection, simply to clarify for the jury what he
knew about the bottle (dkt. #154, at 25-14-17), and his answer -- that it was under the
passenger seat on the floor boards, and not visible from outside the vehicle -- was consistent
with his original statement that he wasn’t aware of any illegal substances being present in
the car. Finally, plaintiff could well have learned about the bottle’s location after officers
retrieved it, something defendant’s counsel never explored with plaintiff.
III. Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and to Waive Supersedeas Bond
(Dkt. #165)
Defendant also moves to stay execution of the judgment and waive the supersedeas
bond requirement until final resolution of his appeal. As explained in his motion,
defendant was insured from 2019 through 2021 -- the years during which the events giving
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rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred -- by a series of Public Entity Liability insurance policies
issued by the Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company (“WMMIC”). (Kaul Decl.
(dkt. #168) ¶¶ 3-4.) The limit of liability for the 2019 policy is $10 million per occurrence,
with a deductible of $200,000 per occurrence, and the limit of liability for the 2020 and
2021 policies is $12 million per occurrence, also with a deductible of $200,000 per
occurrence. (Id.) Jacqueline Kaul, director of operations at WMMIC, avers that “WMMIC
has accepted coverage, without reservation of rights, for the claims asserted by [plaintiff]
against [defendant].” (Id. at ¶ 4.) “In the event [defendant] is unsuccessful on appeal,”
Kaul further avers that WMMIC will provide coverage under the terms of the relevant
policies to pay the judgments, including any award of attorney’s fees, costs, and interest.”
(Id.)
In considering whether to waive the bond requirement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(d), the Seventh Circuit instructs that this court consider the following
factors:
(1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of
time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on
appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district court has
in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether
the defendant's ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the
cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the
defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the
requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the
defendant in an insecure position.
Dillon v. City of Chi., 866 F.2d 902, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Most, if not all, of those factors weigh in favor of waiving the
bond requirement: the apparent lack of dispute over the application of the insurance
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policies to cover final judgments here; WMMIC’s solvency; the sworn representations
made by WMMIC’s director of operations about coverage under these insurance policies;
and the City of Eau Claire’s ultimate liability should payment not be made timely under
the policies.
Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal
provided within 21 days of this opinion and order: (1) WMMIC provides a formal, written
assurance of payment of the final judgment in full, including all accrued interest, attorneys’
fees and costs, should no appeal be sought timely or within 30 days of remand of an appeal
for enforcement of that judgment, whichever is later; and (2) the City of Eau Claire provides
a written acknowledgement of its obligation to do the same within 60 days of that amount
being due should WMMIC fail to perform timely on its assurance.
IV. Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. #172)
Despite ably representing himself at trial, plaintiff again asks the court to appoint
counsel to represent him in this lawsuit and this request must again be denied. Litigants
in civil cases do not have a constitutional right to counsel, and the court does not have the
authority to order counsel to represent him in a civil matter. Rather, the court can only
assist in recruiting counsel who may be willing to serve voluntarily. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
A party requesting assistance in recruiting counsel must show three things: (1) he
cannot afford to hire a lawyer, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); (2) he made reasonable efforts on
his own to find a lawyer to represent him, Jackson v. Cnty. of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073
(7th Cir. 1992); and (3) the legal and factual difficulty of the case exceeds his ability to
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prosecute it, Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655. Since plaintiff was allowed to bring this case with a
partial payment of fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), he met the first requirement. (See dkt.
#5.) However, plaintiff has not met the other two requirements: he has neither presented
any evidence of efforts to find a lawyer to represent him, nor has he established that this
is one of those cases that is too factually or legally complex for the plaintiff to litigate on
his own. Plaintiff asserted that his detention limited his access to court documents or
materials with which to file briefs or motions, but these circumstances are common among
the many unrepresented prisoner plaintiffs in this court, and plaintiff’s timely filings
several weeks later showed that he managed to obtain the resources needed to litigate this
case. Indeed, he has now prevailed both on summary judgment and at trial, as well as on
nearly all of defendant’s post-trial motions. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff may require
counsel to represent him on appeal, he should direct that request to the Seventh Circuit,
which has a larger group of counsel to prevail upon for representation.
V. Motion for Prejudgment Interest (Dkt. #185)
Finally, nearly six months after the entry of final judgment in this case, plaintiff
moved for an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $200,140.97. (Dkt. #185.)
Without identifying any specific authority authorizing reconsideration of the order
entering final judgment, plaintiff contends that he is “presumptively entitled to
prejudgment interest in claims arising under Federal law.” (Id. at 1 (citing Rivera v. Benefit
Tr. Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1991)).) In fairness, a party may make that
request in a post-trial motion, even if he fails to plead it in his complaint. Brooms v. Regal
Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 424 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (final judgments
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“shall grant the relief to which a party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings”). There are essentially two ways for
plaintiff to do so after the entry of final judgment: (1) a motion to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Rule 59; or (2) a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to
Rule 60. Because Rule 59 requires that a motion to alter or amend a judgment be filed no
later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the court would have
to construe his motion as one for relief from the judgment under Rule 60, which gives
litigants far longer periods -- in some cases, an indefinite amount of time -- in which to file.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Nevertheless, the decision to award prejudgment interest is a matter within the
district court’s discretion, Pickett v. Sheridan Health Ctr., 813 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2016),
and there are important limits on such awards. In particular, the Seventh Circuit has
cautioned against an award when the jury's damages award takes into consideration the
time value of money. This concern is most clearly illustrated in cases where the jury awards
an amount for lost wages, combining both losses for past and future wages. Williamson v.
Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1298 (1987). As the court explained in
Williamson, “[o]nly back pay and expenses in the past may be augmented by prejudgment
interest.” Id. Similarly, an award of prejudgment interest is also not appropriate if the
jury's award included interest. See Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger, 54 F.3d 1234, 1246-47
(7th Cir. 1995) (presuming that the jury's award included an interest augmentation).
Although plaintiff presented some evidence of specific moving and tuition expenses
that he incurred after his arrest, the jury was only instructed to consider the “pain and
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suffering that [plaintiff] has experienced, as well as any mental or emotional injury
resulting from that physical pain and suffering” in awarding compensatory damages.
(Damages Instr. (dkt. #145) 1.) In his closing argument on damages, plaintiff similarly
explained that the evidence of expenses that he introduced was intended to explain “what
me and my family went through and continuously go through[.]” (Trial Tr. (dkt. #160)
76.)
Given that the jury presumptively awarded plaintiff compensatory damages based
on injuries presented at trial in 2024, the money value of those damages awarded
presumably was as of the time of the verdict, not at the time of injury. Therefore, the court
finds no basis to enter a prejudgment interest award to account for any time lapse between
the injury and that verdict, especially since neither side asked for any clarifying language
in the jury instructions on damages.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Defendant Sam Sperry’s renewed motion for directed verdict and entry of
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (dkt. #161) and
motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (dkt. #162) are DENIED.
2) Defendant’s motion to stay execution of judgment and waive the supersedeas
bond requirement (dkt. #166) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART. The stay is GRANTED for 60 days to provide defendant with time to
file the two submissions from WMMIC and the City of Eau Claire as described
above. If defendant provides those submissions, the stay is extended until
resolution of any appeal. If defendant fails to provide those submissions, the
stay will be lifted after the 60-day period.
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3) Plaintiff Sidney Coleman’s motions for appointment of counsel (dkt. #172),
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (dkt. #174), new
trial (dkt. #176), and prejudgment interest (dkt. #185) are DENIED.
Entered this 12th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
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