Smith v. All persons claiming a present or future Interest

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
IDA SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A PRESENT OR
FUTURE INTEREST IN ESTATE 13,
FRIIS, LINDA V. SMITH-FRANCIS,
WILLIAM E. SMITH, ELOISE V. SMITH-
HENDRICKS, BAB FRIIS NO. 1, PAUL
HOFFMAN, JANE HOFFMAN-WALKER,
ELEANOR ADAMS HOFFMAN, MAXWELL
ADAMS HOFFMAN, GLORIA FRANCOIS
MCGOWAN, DAVID A. BORNN AS TRUSTEE
TO THE GAF TRUST ESTATE 14 JOHN’S
FOLLY EXCLUDING ALL HEIRS AT LAW,
ESTATE 15 CONCORDIA A, CORAL BAY
QUARTER, ST JOHN UNITED STATES
VIRGIN ISLANDS, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, LAND RESOURCES DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, STANLEY
SELENGUT, WILLIAM B. POPPELTON,
LORRAINE A. POPPELTON, KEVIN M.
WALSH, MARIA K. STURATIS, SCOTT E.
WILMOSKI, CHARLES M. PERDUE,
MONICA PERDUE, JOZSEF NEMETH,
NANCY NEMETH, FRED S. PATTERSON,
MARGARET D. PATTERSON, JOHN R.
PERGOLIZZI, TREASURE VIEW LLC,
GEORGE PILLORGE, DEBORAH PILLORGE,
SCOTT L. HARTSHORN, CLAUDETTE C.
HARTSHORN, HEINZ G. FISHER, LINDA
G. BURDET TRUSTEES OF THE HEINZ G.
FISHER TRUST, DONALD DURANTE,
SAFIA B. DURANTE, CRAIG E.
MITCHELL, ALAN MARTIN KAUFMAN,
RACHELLE KAUFMAN, JEFFREY J.
McCRAVE, ANN McCRAVE, DOROTHY K.
JANOSKO, WILLIAM R. KINCER, SUSAN
B. KINCER, SUSAN GREER
LITTLEFIELD, WAYNE CHESTERFIELD,
MONIQUE FRANCOIS, PEDRITO
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Case: 3:11-cv-00041-RAM-GAT Document #: 351 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 1 of 9

Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 2
FRANCOIS, SALT POND VISTA LLC,
V.I. JOSEPH PALMINTERI, CARRIE
GLENN, MARC KAVE, EMILY J.
BRATTON, RICK HATHAWAY, RENE A.
SERVANT aka RENE H. SERVANT, MARIE
THERESE L. SERVANT, LORI JANE
SNACK, BRIAN K. WALDEN,
MINISTER ISHMAEL R. MUHAMMED,
MICHAEL CARPER, REUBEN WHEATLEY,
et al.
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
Ida Smith
New York, NY
Pro se plaintiff,
Maria Tankenson Hodge, Esq.
Hodge & Francois
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Paul Hoffman; Jane Hoffman Walker; and David A. Bornn,
Trustee of the GAF Trust,
Rafael F. Muilenburg, Esq.
Morrisette & Muilenburg
St. John, U.S.V.I.
For William E. Smith; Eloise V. Smith; Deborah Pillorge;
Claudette C. Hartshorn; Scott L. Hartshorn; Linda V. Smith-
Francis; and George Pillorge,
Gloria McGowan
Pro se,
Wayne Chesterfield
Pro se,
Monique Francois
Pro se,
Pedrito Francois
Pro se,
Joseph Palminteri
Pro se,
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 3
W. Mark Hillsman, Esq.
Law Offices of Norman P. Jones, P.C.
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Carrie Glenn; Lori Jane Snack; William B. Poppelton;
Lorraine A. Poppelton; Maria K. Sturaitis; Charles M.
Purdue; Monica Purdue; Salt Pond Vista, LLC; Heinz G.
Fisher; Linda G. Burdet, Trustee of the Heinz G. Fisher;
Safia B. Durante; Donald Durante,
Marc Kave
Pro se,
Emily J. Bratton
Pro se,
Rick Hathaway
Pro se,
Rene A. Servant
Pro se,
Marie Therese Servant
Pro se,
Brian K. Walden
Pro se,
John H. Benham, III, Esq.
Watts, Benham & Sprehn, P.C.
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Stanley Selengut,
Mark D. Hodge, Esq.
Hodge & Francois
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Kevin M. Walsh and Treasure View LLC,
Scott E. Wilmoski
Pro se,
Jozef Nemeth
Pro se,
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 4
Nancy Nemeth
Pro se defendant.
Fred S. Patterson
Pro se,
Margaret D. Patterson
Pro se defendant.
John R. Perqulizzi
Pro se,
Terryhill Enterprises, II
Pro se,
Missouri LLC
Pro se,
Craig E. Mitchell
Pro se,
Michael E. Fitzsimmons, Esq.
Stryker, Duensing, Casner & Dollison
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Alan Martin Kaufman,
Ann McCrave
Pro se,
Jeffrey J. McCrave
Pro se,
William R. Kincer
Pro se,
Susan B. Kincer
Pro se,
Susan Greer Littlefield
Pro se,
Kurt Shore
Pro se,
Suzanne L. Shore
Pro se,
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 5
Dorothy Janosko (also known as “Dorothy K. Janoko”)
Pro se.
ORDER
GÓMEZ, J.
Before the Court is Defendant Wayne Chesterfield’s
(“Chesterfield”) motion to disqualify Judge Curtis V. Gómez.
Plaintiff Ida Smith (“Smith”) initiated this action on
March 24, 2011. On April 1, Smith filed an amended complaint.
On two subsequent occasions, she attempted to further amend her
complaint. The Court denied Smith leave to amend her complaint
on both occasions.
Thereafter, on October 17, 2013, the Magistrate granted
Smith leave to amend her complaint on or before October 31,
2013. The Court extended that deadline nunc pro tunc to November
1, 2013. On November 1, 2013, Smith filed a second amended
complaint naming a number of defendants, including Chesterfield.
Subsequently, on March 25, 2014, Chesterfield moved to
disqualify the undersigned, alleging bias and asserting that the
undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Chesterfield makes several allegations in support of his
motion. Generally, Chesterfield complains: that the Court failed
to take certain actions such as holding a hearing on this case;
that the undersigned has some financial interest in the property
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 6
at issue; and that the Court failed to properly apply the
relevant laws.
Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code
(“Section 455”) outlines the circumstances that
require disqualification of a judge. Section 455, in
pertinent part, provides that:
(a) 	Any 	justice, 	judge, 	or 	magistrate 	judge 	of 	the
United 	States 	shall 	disqualify 	himself 	in 	any
proceeding 	in 	which 	his 	impartiality 	might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) 	He 	shall 	also 	disqualify 	himself 	in 	the
following circumstances:
(1) 	Where 	he 	has 	a 	personal 	bias 	or 	prejudice
concerning 	a 	party, 	or 	personal 	knowledge 	of
disputed 	evidentiary 	facts 	concerning 	the
proceeding;
(2) 	Where 	in 	private 	practice 	he 	served 	as
lawyer 	in 	the 	matter 	in 	controversy, 	or 	a
lawyer 	with 	whom 	he 	previously 	practiced 	law
served 	during 	such 	association 	as 	a 	lawyer
concerning 	the 	matter, 	or 	the 	judge 	or 	such
lawyer 	has 	been 	a 	material 	witness
concerning it;
(3) 	Where 	he 	has 	served 	in 	governmental
employment 	and 	in 	such 	capacity 	participated
as 	counsel, 	adviser 	or 	material 	witness
concerning 	the 	proceeding 	or 	expressed 	an
opinion 	concerning 	the 	merits 	of 	the
particular case in controversy . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Section 455”).
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 7
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Section
455 is “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,
486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). “A party seeking recusal need not show
actual bias on the part of the court, only the possibility of
bias.... Under § 455(a), if a reasonable man, were he to know
all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality under the applicable standard, then the judge must
recuse.” In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283, 343 (3d Cir.
1998) (internal quotations omitted); see also Massachusetts
School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d
1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The standard for recusal is whether
an objective observer reasonably might question the judge's
impartiality.”)
“[T]he responsibility for deciding a Section 455 motion to
recuse lies with the judge to whom the motion is directed.” In
re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 223 n.12 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir.
1994). The Court is not required to take the movant’s argument
at face value. See United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 68
(3d Cir. 1989) (“Motions to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) must
rest on the kind of objective facts that a reasonable person
would use to evaluate whether an appearance of impropriety had
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 8
been created, not on ‘possibilities' and unsubstantiated
allegations.”). Rather, the Court must determine for itself
whether there exists an adequate basis for recusal. See
generally Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.1995)
(explaining that “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there
is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the
law and facts require.”).
Chesterfield 	makes 	conclusory 	allegations 	that 	take 	issue
with 	the 	Court’s 	rulings, 	express 	displeasure 	with 	the 	Court’s
scheduling, 	and 	accuse 	the 	undersigned 	of 	having 	a 	financial
interest 	in 	the 	property 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	case. 	Those
allegations are insufficient for several reasons.
First,
judicial 	rulings 	alone 	almost 	never 	constitute 	a
valid 	basis 	for 	a 	bias 	or 	partiality 	motion. 	In
and 	of 	themselves 	(i.e., 	apart 	from 	surrounding
comments 	or 	accompanying 	opinion), 	they 	cannot
possibly 	show 	reliance 	upon 	an 	extrajudicial
source; 	and 	can 	only 	in 	the 	rarest 	circumstances
evidence 	the 	degree 	of 	favoritism 	or 	antagonism
required 	. 	. 	. 	when 	no 	extrajudicial 	source 	is
involved. 	Almost 	invariably, 	they 	are 	proper
grounds for appeal, not for recusal.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (assessing a
claim of bias pursuant to Section 455). Here, to the extent
Chesterfield alleges bias based on the undersigned’s judicial
rulings, Chesterfield’s allegations of bias are fatally
deficient.
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Smith v. All Persons Claiming a Present or Future Interest, et al.
Civil No. 2011-41
Order
Page 9
Second, Chesterfield’s allegation that the undersigned has
a financial interest in the case is similarly unavailing. In
Chesterfield’s affidavit attached to the motion, he alleges that
Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP “holds an interest in this
action by means of title insurance in the subject properties.”
(ECF No. 302-1.) Regardless, the undersigned retains no
financial interest in Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP.
In Chesterfield’s motion, he also alleges that Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC “may have issued title
insurance” on the relevant properties. (ECF No. 302)(emphasis
added). Because Chesterfield’s allegation relies on
“possibilities” and is an “unsubstantiated allegation[],” this
allegation is deficient. United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d at
68.
The premises considered, it is hereby
ORDERED that Chesterfield’s Motion to Disqualify is DENIED.
S\
CURTIS V. GÓMEZ
District Judge
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