Lyman v. Henderson

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
PHIL LYMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEIDRE HENDERSON, in her official
capacity as Lt. Governor of the State of Utah,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
DEIDRE HENDERSON’S
[18] MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
Case No. 4:25-cv-00069-DN-PK
District Judge David Nuffer
Plaintiff Phil Lyman asserts that he has been denied the statutory right under the National
Voting Rights Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) to inspect the Statewide Voter Registration List of the
State of Utah (“Utah voter rolls”).1 Mr. Lyman alleges that Defendant Lieutenant Governor (“Lt.
Governor”) Deidre M. Henderson violated his federal statutory right by relying on Utah law,
which he argues the NVRA preempts, and by denying him access to Utah’s voter rolls beyond
what is already publicly available.2 Mr. Lyman claims a continuing informational injury persists
despite exhausting every administrative remedy to avoid litigation.3
Lt. Governor Henderson moves to dismiss Mr. Lyman’s case for lack of standing.4 The
Lt. Governor contends that under TransUnion v. Ramirez,5 Mr. Lyman has “failed to
establish . . . concrete injury-in-fact based on generalized grievances from alleged violations of
1 Complaint, docket no. 1, filed June 6, 2025.
2 Id. ¶¶ 21-24.
3 Id. ¶¶ 25, 48.
4 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (“Motion”), docket no. 18, filed August 4, 2025.
5 Id. at 8 (citing TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426-27 (2021)).
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the NVRA.”6 The Lt. Governor argues that a statutory injury alone is insufficient. The Lt.
Governor argues that the facts alleged “underscores the lack of any real downstream
consequences by alleging nothing more than the ‘informational injury’ as [Mr. Lyman]
characterizes it.”7
Mr. Lyman opposes the Motion asserting, “the Lt. Governor’s factual focus in
TransUnion steers her legal analysis astray” and is “flat wrong.”8 Instead, Mr. Lyman states that
the holding in TransUnion is distinguishable, and that “the standing inquiry is controlled by
Public Citizens [v. United States Dep’t of Justice] and [FEC v. ] Akins.”9 Mr. Lyman says public
disclosure obligations, like the NVRA, are less like the injuries articulated in TransUnion, and
more similar to federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) injuries.10 On this basis, Mr.
Lyman asks that the Motion be denied.
Lt. Governor Henderson replies stating Mr. Lyman is recycling arguments previously
rejected by the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.11 According to Lt. Governor Henderson, each
circuit court “held that plaintiffs asserting mere ‘informational injury’ under the NVRA [do] not
satisfy Article III standing. And those courts properly applied the Supreme Court’s analysis in
TransUnion.”12 Accordingly, the Lt. Governor moves for an order that agrees with those circuits
holding that Mr. Lyman has failed to “identify downstream consequences that have a nexus to
6 Motion at 14.
7 Id. at 11.
8 Lyman’s Response to Motion to Dismiss (“Opposition”) at 4, docket no. 27, filed August 29, 2025.
9 Id. at 5 (cleaned up).
10 Id. at 2-5.
11 Lt. Governor’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Reply”) at 2, docket no. 28, filed September 12, 2025
(citing Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 136 F.4th 456 (3rd Cir.
2025); Campaign Legal Center v. Scott, 49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022); Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Benson,
136 F.4th 613 (6th Cir. 2025)).
12 Reply at 2.
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the interest Congress sought to protect with the NVRA.” Such a holding would require a
dismissal of this case.13
After the parties submitted their briefs, but before this order was issued, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit released its opinion in Voter Reference Found. v. Torrez.14 In
Torrez, the Tenth Circuit addressed standing under the NVRA for the first time since the
Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion.15 The Tenth Circuit found standing in Torrez because
the claim “does not rest on an informational injury; it rests on the statute’s chilling effect” as a
basis for a threat of criminal prosecution.16 Because Torrez was published after the parties
submitted their initial memoranda, supplemental briefing was ordered to address its potential
impact on this case.17 The Lt. Governor submitted her supplemental memorandum on December
19, 2025.18 Mr. Lyman filed his supplemental brief regarding Torrez on January 2, 2026.19 Mr.
Lyman filed a subsequent supplemental notice of the District of Arizona’s decision in Public
Interest Legal Foundation v. Fontes.20 All submissions have been fully considered in this order.
A thorough review of the memoranda, exhibits, supplemental briefs, and applicable law
has been completed. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED. Furthermore, Mr.
13 Reply at 7.
14 Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025).
15 Id. at 5.
16 Id.
17 Docket Text Order, docket no. 36, filed December 5, 2025.
18 Defendant Lt. Governor Henderson’s Memorandum Regarding Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (“Lt. Governor’s Supplement”), docket no. 37, filed December 19, 2025.
19 Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum (“Lyman’s Supplement”), docket no. 38, filed January 2, 2026.
20 Lyman’s Third Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Fontes Supplement”), docket no. 39, filed January 13, 2026
(discussing Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Fontes, No. CV-25-02722-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 45037 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 5, 2026).
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Lyman’s Motion for Summary Judgment21 and the Lt. Governor’s Motion for Relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)22 are both FOUND MOOT.
1 	BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 4
2 	STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................ 7
3 	DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 	A Statutory Right Does Not Automatically Create an Injury In Fact ..................... 9
3.1.1 	A Private Right of Action Exists Under the NVRA. ................................ 10
3.1.2 	An Asserted Informational Injury That Causes No Adverse Effects Cannot
Confer Article III Standing. ...................................................................... 10
3.1.3 	The Supplemental Authority Informs Without Binding This Case. ......... 16
3.1.4 	Circuit Courts Agree That After TransUnion an Informational Injury
Without Downstream Consequences Does Not Establish Standing. ........ 21
4 	CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
5 	ORDER ............................................................................................................................. 26
1 	BACKGROUND
Phil Lyman is a registered voter in the state of Utah.23 Mr. Lyman has served as County
Commissioner for San Juan County24 and as a Utah state representative.25 Most recently, Mr.
Lyman ran for Governor of Utah.26 Currently, Mr. Lyman does not hold political office in Utah
and is a private citizen. Mr. Lyman brings this suit as a private citizen, seeking voter list
maintenance documents to assess what Mr. Lyman calls the “Statewide Voter Registration List”
(hereinafter “Utah’s voter roll”).27
On September 22, 2024, Mr. Lyman sent a letter to Lt. Governor Henderson’s office
requesting “voter list maintenance records,” including: “a copy of the statewide voter registration
21 Lyman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, docket no. 17, filed July 29, 2025.
22 Motion for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), docket no. 33, filed November 24, 2025.
23 Complaint ¶ 3.
24 Chilcoat v. San Juan County, No. 4:19-CV-00027-DN, 2025 WL 3034914 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2025).
25 United States v. Lyman, No. 2:14-CR-00470 DN, 2019 WL 5310263, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 21, 2019).
26 Lyman v. Cox, 2024 UT 35, 556 P.3d 49, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1057 (2025), reh'g denied, 145 S. Ct. 1323
(2025).
27 Complaint ¶ 3.
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database, including data for voters classified as ‘private’ and ‘withheld’”.28 Mr. Lyman requested
access to every Utah voter’s “year of birth information” which is restricted under Utah law.29 In
the letter Mr. Lyman stated he was entitled to review the Utah voter rolls, despite Utah law
forbidding private citizens from having access to these rolls, because the NVRA “as a federal
enactment, supersedes and preempts Utah law.”30 Therefore, according to Mr. Lyman, “a denial
of [his] request would violate the NVRA.” Mr. Lyman alleges that Lt. Governor Henderson
never responded to his letter.31
In October 2024, Mr. Lyman again wrote to the Lt. Governor’s office, again seeking
access to records pursuant to the NVRA.32 On November 4, 2024, the Lt. Governor’s office
responded, directing Mr. Lyman to the office’s website for access to the public version of the
Utah voter roll. Regarding Mr. Lyman’s request for portions of the Utah voter roll designated
“private” or “withheld,” the Lt. Governor’s office stated that she “does not have discretion to
ignore [the] state statute and provide unrestricted access to the state’s voter rolls as [Mr. Lyman
has] requested.”33 Mr. Lyman says he has yet to be provided with, or permitted to inspect, the
portions of the Utah voter roll designated “private” or “withheld.”34
Mr. Lyman subsequently retained the Public Interest Litigation Foundation (“PILF”) as
counsel.35 On March 7, 2025, PILF allegedly sent a letter to the Lt. Governor’s office stating that
28 Id. ¶ 21.
29 Id. ¶ 58.
30 Id. ¶ 23.
31 Id. ¶ 24.
32 Id.
33 Id. ¶ 26; Exhibit B to Complaint.
34 Id. ¶ 26.
35 Id. ¶ 27.
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she was in violation of the NVRA “for failure to permit inspection of voter list maintenance
records as required by 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i).”36 PILF’s letter gave the Lt. Governor 90 days to
fulfill Mr. Lyman’s request, “or a lawsuit would be filed against her” under 52 U.S.C.
§ 20510(b) of the NVRA.37
Neither PILF nor Mr. Lyman received a response from the Lt. Governor or any other
person in her office following PILF’s Letter.38 To date, Mr. Lyman has not been given access to
review portions of the Utah voter roll designated “private” or “withheld.”39 Mr. Lyman can see
the portions of Utah’s voter rolls designated “public” on the Lt. Governor’s website.40
Mr. Lyman complains that he is injured, and continues to be injured, by the Lt.
Governor’s actions described above.41 Mr. Lyman says he has exhausted all administrative
remedies before pursing this litigation.42 Mr. Lyman claims that he has satisfied the pre-litigation
notice requirement provided under the NVRA.43 Should he succeed in this litigation, Mr. Lyman
states that he intends to use his access to the Utah voter rolls to pursue legal action to enforce the
NVRA and “state voter list maintenance requirements.”44 Mr. Lyman states he “intends to use
his findings to propose and promote best practices and solutions for specific and general voter
list maintenance problems faced by election officials.”45
36 Id. ¶¶ 27-29; (citing the “Notice Letter,” Exhibit C).
37 Id.
38 Id. ¶ 30.
39 Id. ¶ 31.
40 Id.
41 Id. ¶ 36.
42 Id. ¶ 25.
43 Id. ¶ 33.
44 Id. ¶ 3.
45 Id. ¶ 3.
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2 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Lt. Governor Henderson moves to dismiss Mr. Lyman's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)46 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss may take
one of two forms: the motion may be a facial attack that “questions the sufficiency of the
complaint;”47 or, the motion may be a factual attack that “challenge[s] the facts upon which
subject matter jurisdiction depends.”48 When a motion raises a facial challenge to the complaint,
“a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.”49 However, on a factual
challenge, the court is not required to accept the complaint's allegations as true and “may not
presume” that they are true.50 A factual Rule “12(b)(1) motion is considered a ‘speaking motion’
and can include references to evidence extraneous to the complaint.”51 And a court enjoys “wide
discretion to . . . resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.”52
“Article III of the [United States] Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”53 “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role
in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to
actual cases or controversies.”54 “‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that
plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have standing to sue.’”55 “This is the threshold question in
46 Motion at 1.
47 Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1003.
51 Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987).
52 Id.
53 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, (2013).
54 Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)).
55 Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)).
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every federal case[.]”56 Each element of standing “must be supported in the same way as any
other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”57 “For purposes of ruling on a
motion to dismiss for want of standing . . . courts must accept as true all material allegations of
the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.”58
“Congress's creation of a statutory prohibition or obligation and a cause of action does
not relieve courts of their responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered
a concrete harm under Article III.”59 “For standing purposes, therefore, an important difference
exists between (i) a plaintiff's statutory cause of action to sue a defendant over the defendant's
violation of federal law, and (ii) a plaintiff's suffering concrete harm because of the defendant's
violation of federal law.”60 In other words, “under Article III, an injury in law is not
an injury in fact.”61 “Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants
cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.”62
Thus, “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant's statutory
violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.” 63
56 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
57 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
58 Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501.
59 Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 877 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425
(2021)).
60 Looper, 22 F.4th at 877 (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425).
61 Id.
62 Id. (quotations omitted).
63 Id.
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3 	DISCUSSION
The parties positioned themselves on opposite sides of an apparent circuit split over
NVRA standing.64 The Lt. Governor urges alignment with the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits,
arguing that Mr. Lyman lacks standing because he cannot allege the “downstream consequences”
that flow from an informational injury.65 The Lt. Governor contends that the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Laufer v. Looper reflects the same reasoning.66 Mr. Lyman argues that those cases,
and Looper, are distinguishable. He says his informational injury is akin to a FOIA injury and
favors First Circuit precedent he says recognizes standing for informational injuries under the
NVRA.67
Each side of the apparent circuit split is addressed below, along with Looper. The parties’
supplemental briefing on Torrez has been considered. The precedent is clear: Mr. Lyman’s
informational injury, standing alone, does not establish NVRA standing.
3.1 	A Statutory Right Does Not Automatically Create an Injury In Fact
The parties dispute whether Mr. Lyman may proceed. To resolve the standing question,
this order proceeds in four steps: (1) whether the NVRA confers statutory standing and creates a
private right of action; (2) whether any Tenth Circuit precedent governs; (3) how the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Torrez informs that inquiry; and (4) how other circuits have addressed the
same question and what guidance their reasoning offers here.
64 Motion at 14-16; Opposition at 4-6.
65 Reply at 2-5.
66 Id. 1-3.
67 Opposition at 11-13 (citing Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2024)).
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Though Lyman has statutory standing (an injury in law), that is insufficient to establish a
concrete and particularized injury in fact sufficient to establish Article III standing (an injury in
fact) for an NVRA claim. Statutory standing alone does not always add up to injury in fact.
3.1.1 	A Private Right of Action Exists Under the NVRA.
The Tenth Circuit recently confirmed in Torrez that the NVRA provides a private right of
action.68 The NVRA expressly provides a private right of action:
(b) Private right of action
(1) A person who is aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may provide written
notice of the violation to the chief election official of the State involved.
(2) If the violation is not corrected within 90 days after receipt of a notice under
paragraph (1), or within 20 days after receipt of the notice if the violation
occurred within 120 days before the date of an election for Federal office, the
aggrieved person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court for
declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to the violation.
(3) If the violation occurred within 30 days before the date of an election for
Federal office, the aggrieved person need not provide notice to the chief election
official of the State under paragraph (1) before bringing a civil action under
paragraph (2).69
Neither party disputes that the statutory requirements have been met.70 Therefore,
accepting as true all material allegations of the complaint and construing the facts in favor of
Lyman as non-movant,71 the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish statutory standing.
3.1.2 	An Asserted Informational Injury That Causes No Adverse Effects Cannot
Confer Article III Standing.
The parties dispute which Supreme Court precedent governs standing under the NVRA.
The Lt. Governor contends Mr. Lyman's complaint is “facially deficient because the allegations
68 Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1078.
69 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)(1-3).
70 Motion at 6.
71 Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501 .
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fall short of meeting Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury in
fact.” 72 The Lt. Governor relies on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez as
controlling authority.73 Mr. Lyman counters that the NVRA’s “standing framework originates
with the federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),”74 making his informational injury
sufficient under FEC v. Akins75 and Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice.76
In both Spokeo and TransUnion the Supreme Court “rejected the proposition that ‘a
plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury in fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person
a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.’”77 Standing
presents a threshold question of law that must first be addressed.78
“For Article III standing, a plaintiff must have (1) ‘suffered an injury in fact,’ (2) that is
‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,’ and (3) that is likely to be ‘redressed
by a favorable decision.’”79 An “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”80 “An asserted informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy
Article III.”81
72 Motion at 5-6.
73 Motion at 3-6.
74 Opposition at 2.
75 Complaint ¶ 60 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998)).
76 Opposition at 2 (citing Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).
77 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 414 (2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016),
as revised (May 24, 2016)).
78 Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1996).
79 Laufer, 22 F.4th at 876 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
80 Id.
81 TransUnion v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 441 (2021).
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The Lt. Governor cites the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Looper.82 In Looper, Ms. Deborah
Laufer, a self-identified ADA “tester” from Florida, reviewed the Colorado Elk’s Run Inn’s
online reservation system and sued alleging ADA violations.83 Ms. Laufer stated she intended
“in the near future” to “to test [the website] for compliance with 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e)
and/or to utilize the system to reserve a guest room and otherwise avail herself of the goods,
services, features, facilities, benefits advantages, and accommodations of the Property.”84 The
district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Tenth
Circuit, relying on Spokeo and TransUnion, held that Ms. Laufer lacked Article III standing
because, “the Supreme Court explained that a statutory violation does not necessarily establish
injury in fact.” Ms. Laufer argued that she sustained an informational injury and therefore had
standing under Akins and Public Citizen.85 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating:
The Supreme Court's recent decision in TransUnion shows why this argument
fails. In that case the United States, participating as amicus, argued that the
plaintiffs had suffered an “informational injury” under Public Citizen and Akins
when TransUnion allegedly failed to provide them with required disclosures in a
specified format under the FCRA. The Court rejected this argument in part
because “the plaintiffs have identified no ‘downstream consequences’ from
failing to receive the required information.” “An asserted informational injury that
causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.”86
Here, the Lt. Governor argues that Looper is applicable because it shows “[t]he Tenth
Circuit has rejected [Mr. Lyman’s] reading of Public Citizen and Akins.”87 Mr. Lyman disagrees,
82 See Reply at 3 (quoting Looper, 22 F.4th at 881 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022)).
83 Looper at 874-75.
84 Id. at 875.
85 Id. at 880.
86 Id. at 880-881.
87 Reply at 5.
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arguing that Looper is distinguishable because “[t]he [Tenth Circuit] was well aware of the
TransUnion decision and interpreted it as being in accord with Public Citizen and Akins.”88
Furthermore, his Opposition asserts “Mr. Lyman alleges exactly such an adverse effect”
therefore distinguishing Looper.89 The “downstream consequences” Mr. Lyman alleges to have
incurred are: (1) the impaired ability to “study and analyze Utah’s voter list maintenance
programs and activities.”; (2) the impaired ability to “assess Utah’s enforcement of state and
federal voter eligibility requirements.”; and (3) the impaired ability to “assess Utah’s compliance
with voter list maintenance obligations.”90
The Fourth Circuit in Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC91 held that Ms. Deborah Laufer (the
same plaintiff who appeared in Looper) possessed Article III standing to sue a hotel owner for
violations of the ADA’s Hotel Reservation Regulation based solely on an alleged informational
injury.92 Ms. Laufer, acting again as a “tester,” visited Naranda’s website and discovered they
failed to provide accessibility information required by law. 93 Ms. Laufer had no intention of
booking a room at the hotel.94 The Fourth Circuit analogized Ms. Laufer’s injury to that of a Fair
Housing Act tester in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,95 who possessed standing despite having
no intention to rent an apartment because she had been denied “truthful information” to which
she was statutorily entitled.96 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Havens Realty “squarely rejected
88 Opposition at 11-12.
89 Id. at 11-12.
90 Id. at 8.
91 Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, 60 F.4th 156 (4th Cir. 2023).
92 Id. at 166.
93 Id. at 159–60.
94 Id.
95 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982).
96 Naranda Hotels, 60 F.4th at 166–67.
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any . . . use requirement,” holding that a tester’s lack of intention to use services “does not negate
the simple fact of injury.”97 The Fourth Circuit further emphasized that while plaintiffs in Public
Citizen and Akins had articulated uses for withheld information, “those asserted uses were not a
factor in the Public Citizen and Akins Article III standing analyses.”98Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.99
The Fourth Circuit expressly disagreed with the Looper’s reliance on TransUnion to
impose a “downstream consequences” requirement.100 In Looper, the Tenth Circuit interpreted
Public Citizen and Akins to require plaintiffs to demonstrate “some relevance” by showing an
intended use for withheld information beyond litigation.101 The Fourth Circuit stated that
TransUnion had distinguished rather than reinterpreted those precedents, differentiating
information “received in the wrong format” from a complete “fail[ure] to receive any required
information.”102 The Fourth Circuit observed that Havens Realty had “squarely rejected any . . .
use requirement” of downstream consequences. The Fourth Circuit believed that while the
Public Citizen and Akins plaintiffs had articulated uses for requested information, “those asserted
uses were not a factor in the Public Citizen and Akins Article III standing analyses.”103
Despite the disagreement between the Tenth Circuit in Looper and the Fourth Circuit in
Naranda, involving the same plaintiff, the same statutes, and nearly identical facts, Looper is
binding on district courts in the Tenth Circuit. This case does not invoke the Fair Housing Act,
97 Id. at 172.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 175.
100 Id at 172 n.7.
101 Looper, 22 F.4th at 881.
102 Naranda Hotels, 60 F.4th at 170.
103 Id. at 172.
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the ADA, racial animus, nor any form of discrimination. Mr. Lyman alleges a purely
informational injury under the NVRA. Mr. Lyman chose to file this case in the Tenth Circuit
where Looper controls. Looper requires plaintiffs alleging informational injuries to demonstrate
that the withheld information has “some relevance” to them beyond the litigation itself.104
Mr. Lyman attempts to allege downstream consequences, but it makes no real difference.
The consequences Mr. Lyman cites simply repackage his core claim: a desire to monitor and sue
the Lt. Governor for alleged NVRA violations.105 Therefore, like in Looper, Mr. Lyman merely
seeks to see if the Lt. Governor’s office follows the NVRA, which is no different than Ms.
Laufer trying to see if the Elk’s Run Inn followed the ADA.106 The Tenth Circuit squarely
rejected analogies to FOIA, instead holding that plaintiffs alleging informational injuries must
demonstrate “some relevance” of the withheld information beyond the lawsuit itself and identify
“downstream consequences” from the regulatory violation. 107
Mr. Lyman himself has stated he has suffered an “informational injury.”108 Though Mr.
Lyman has served as a county commissioner, state legislator, and gubernatorial candidate, all
roles that under Utah law would have given him the information he now seeks,109 he is now a
private citizen seeking to oversee the Lt. Governor’s NVRA compliance. Mr. Lyman alleges a
statutory violation without an injury in fact. Under Looper, that is insufficient for Article III
standing.
104 Looper, 22 F.4th at 881.
105 Id.
106 Looper, 22 F.4th at 879.
107 Id. at 877.
108 Opposition at 1.
109 Utah Code § 20A-2-104(4).
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Mr. Lyman has not suffered a concrete injury sufficient to establish injury in fact, and he
therefore lacks Article III standing.
3.1.3 	The Supplemental Authority Informs Without Binding This Case.
The parties’ successive supplemental briefs document how NVRA jurisprudence
continues to develop nationally. Two cases are at the center of the supplemental briefs: (1) Voter
Reference Foundation, LLC v. Torrez; and (2) Public Interest Legal Found v. Adrian Fontes. 110
Both cases have been reviewed and are discussed below. While each case examines the same
out-of-circuit precedent at issue here, each is factually distinguishable.
3.1.3.1 	Torrez Does Not Support Mr. Lyman’s Claim Because He Faces No
Threat of State Enforcement and his Injury Is Solely Informational.
After the parties issued their respective briefs, the Tenth Circuit ruled on NVRA standing
in Voter Reference Foundation, LLC v. Torrez.111 The parties were ordered to provide
supplemental briefing on Torrez.112
In Torrez, Voter Reference Foundation (“VRF”) published New Mexico’s voter data,
received from the New Mexico Secretary of State's Office.113 New Mexico’s Secretary of State
accused VRF of violating New Mexico’s “Use Restrictions” and the “Data Sharing Ban,” and
referred VRF for criminal investigation and prosecution.114 New Mexico’s Attorney General
then forwarded the referral to the FBI, and internal notes from the Secretary’s Office recorded an
instruction not to fulfill VRF’s subsequent voter-data requests.115 Facing a credible threat of
110 See Lt. Governor’s Supplement; see also Lyman’s Supplement; see also Fontes Supplement; and Lyman’s First
Notice of Supplemental Authority, docket no. 35, filed December 4, 2025.
111 Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1.
112 Docket Text Order, docket no. 36, filed December 5, 2025.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2.
115 Id. at 3.
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prosecution, VRF removed the New Mexico voter data from its website and refrained from
further publication despite a stated desire to continue doing so.116
VRF issued formal notice under the NVRA identifying the refusal to disclose voter data
as a statutory violation, but the Secretary did not cure the violation within the NVRA’s required
timeline.117 VRF sued asserting five First and Fifth Amendment claims and sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent New Mexico from prosecuting it under the Election Code or restricting its
use and publication of voter data.118 The district court granted VRF's motion for preliminary
injunction, which was stayed by the Tenth Circuit.119 After a one-day bench trial, the district
court found the State’s refusal to provide voter data was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination and enjoined the State from enforcing the “Use Restrictions” and the “Data
Sharing Ban,” against VRF.120 The State appealed.
Though standing was not raised by either party on appeal, the Tenth Circuit discussed
it.121 The Tenth Circuit observed that the State submitted supplemental authority, relying on
PILF v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa.122 and Benson123 to contend that VRF lacked standing.124
The Tenth Circuit distinguished those cases, stating:
In those cases, plaintiffs had not alleged an injury in fact because they could not
show that the unlawful denial of record requests caused a concrete downstream
injury . . . But VRF's claim does not rest on an informational injury; it rests on the
statute’s chilling effect. VRF faces possible criminal investigation and
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.at 4.
120 Id. at 5.
121 Id. at 1078.
122 Id. (citing Sec'y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th at 465–69).
123 Id. (citing Benson, 136 F.4th at 629).
124 Id. at 5.
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prosecution based on the Secretary's criminal referral letter to the Attorney
General and FBI, indicating that VRF’s conduct is proscribed by New Mexico's
Election Code. 125
Due to the threat of criminal prosecution, the Tenth Circuit found that VRF had standing.126
Here, both parties agree that Torrez “does not address standing in this case.”127 The Lt.
Governor affirms “Torrez is of no help to Plaintiff here.”128 Mr. Lyman states that the injury in
Torrez is “wholly dissimilar from Mr. Lyman’s injury and so has no bearing on the pending
motion to dismiss.”129 After distinguishing the facts of Torrez, Mr. Lyman distinguishes the
holding of Torrez:
Torrez did not address whether the denial of a public records request constitutes a
concrete injury under Article III. That question was not presented by the facts
before the court, and the Tenth Circuit appropriately did not decide it. Torrez
involved a wholly different and unrelated injury than the one alleged here.130
Finally, both parties spotted the Tenth Circuit's carve out in Torrez for informational
injuries131 when the Tenth Circuit stated, “VRF’s claim does not rest on an informational injury;
it rests on the statute’s chilling effect.” 132 Mr. Lyman himself has admitted the facts of his case
are distinguished from Torrez.133 Therefore, the calculus is straightforward. Both parties agree
Torrez is distinguished because Mr. Lyman has alleged only an informational injury, and the
Tenth Circuit itself carved out informational injuries from Torrez's reach. Torrez does not apply.
125 Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1078.
126 Id. at 6.
127 Lyman’s Supplement at 2.
128 Lt. Governor’s Supplement at 5.
129 Lyman’s Supplement at 1.
130 Id. at 4.
131 Compare Lt. Governor’s Supplement at 1 and Lyman’s Supplement at 2 referencing Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1068.
132 Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1078.
133 Lyman’s Supplement at 2-3.
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The parties do not dispute134 that the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Torrez is consistent with
Looper. The viewpoint discrimination presented in Torrez meets the “concrete interest” or
“injury in fact” that the Tenth Circuit stated in Looper is necessary to establish standing post-
TransUnion.135 Therefore, Torrez represents a narrower holding in the NVRA context that builds
on Looper: a credible claim of viewpoint discrimination establishes a concrete injury in fact, and
when paired with the NVRA’s private right of action, a party has standing to sue. Absent
impairment of a concrete interest, however, an informational injury alone is insufficient to confer
standing under the NVRA.
Both Looper and Torrez show that not all statutory rights create a concrete harm, and that
standing under the NVRA requires more than a mere informational injury.
3.1.3.2 	Fontes Informs Without Governing This Case.
After briefing closed, after the Tenth Circuit’s Torrez decision, but before this order was
issued, another NVRA ruling emerged from the District of Arizona in PILF v. Fontes.136 In
Fontes, PILF who serves as counsel for Mr. Lyman in this case, requested all Electronic
Registration Information Center (“ERIC”) Retraction Reports and related correspondence from
Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes under the NVRA.137 Secretary Fontes moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing PILF lacked standing under TransUnion.138 PILF
countered, as it does here, that Public Citizen and Akins confer standing.139
134 Compare Lt. Governor’s Supplement at 1; and Lyman’s Supplement at 2.
135 Compare Looper, 22 F.4th at 879 with Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1068.
136 Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Fontes, No. CV-25-02722-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 45037 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5,
2026).
137 Id. at *1.
138 Id. at *2.
139 Id. at *3.
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The district court denied the motion to dismiss. First, Judge Liburdi rejected PILF’s
reliance on Public Citizen and Akins, applied TransUnion instead, and held “[b]ecause [PILF]
alleges an informational injury, it must also show a nexus between the downstream consequence,
the alleged harm, and the concrete interest Congress sought to protect.”140 Second, Judge Liburdi
found PILF’s alleged downstream consequences sufficient for standing. In coming to that
determination Judge Liburdi distinguished all out-of-circuit precedent141 and applied binding
Ninth Circuit precedent, most notably Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes.142 In Mi Familia Vota, the
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to request the same records PILF sought, against
the same Arizona Secretary of State, under the same NVRA provisions.143 Bound by that
precedent, Judge Liburdi ruled PILF's downstream consequences established standing.144
Fontes informs without governing. Judge Liburdi applied TransUnion, distinguished out-
of-circuit precedent, and followed binding circuit authority. This order does the same but reaches
a different result. Geography determines the outcome. While Judge Liburdi could distinguish
Looper and was bound by Mi Familia Vota, the opposite holds true here. In the Tenth Circuit,
Looper binds and Mi Familia Vota persuades at most. As discussed above, Looper mandates
dismissal.
140 Id.
141 Id. (distinguishing Scott, 49 F.4th at 938; Looper, 22 F.4th at 881; Benson, 136 F.4th at 630 n.11; Sec'y of Pa.,
136 F.4th at 466).
142 Id. (citing Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes, 129 F.4th 691, 717 (9th Cir. 2025)).
143 Mi Familia Vota, 129 F.4th at 710-715.
144 Fontes, No. CV-25-02722-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 45037 at *4-5.
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3.1.4 	Circuit Courts Agree That After TransUnion an Informational Injury
Without Downstream Consequences Does Not Establish Standing.
It appears at first glance that the parties have taken opposite sides of a circuit split arising
post-TransUnion. The Lt. Governor favors the Fifth, Third, and Sixth Circuits as the “three
federal courts of appeals [that] have rejected ’[information injury as sufficient for Article III
standing] in NVRA cases.”145 Mr. Lyman praises the First Circuit’s position in Public Interest
Legal Fund v. Bellows146 and asserts that “Courts across the country have recognized that
statewide registration lists fall squarely within this statutory mandate.”147 A closer look reveals
no split at all, and instead the circuits apply a single rule: if there is no threat of state
enforcement, there is no injury in fact.
After TransUnion was decided in 2021, the Fifth Circuit was the first to address standing
under the NVRA in 2022 in Campaign Legal Center v. Scott.148 In Scott, Campaign Legal Center
identified more than 11,000 registered voters in Texas as potential non-citizens based on Texas
Department of Public Safety records.149 Campaign Legal Center wrote to the Texas Secretary of
State for voter-specific information to evaluate the accuracy of the Texas’s electoral process.150
The Texas Secretary of State refused to disclose the requested records. Campaign Legal Center
sued under the NVRA alleging that Texas had unlawfully withheld information the NVRA
requires to be made available for public inspection. The district court, after determining that
there was standing to bring the case, issued an injunction requiring the State of Texas to provide
145 Reply at 3 (citing Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th at 456; Scott, 49 F.4th at 931; Benson, 136 F.4th at
613).
146 Bellows, 92 F.4th at 54.
147 Opposition at 13 (citing Bellows, 92 F.4th at 47).
148 49 F.4th at 931.
149 Id. at 934.
150 Id.
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information requested.151 On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that after TransUnion, the
Campaign Legal Center did not have standing.152 The Fifth Circuit analyzed Supreme Court
precedent:
Even if Plaintiffs had a right to the records sought, an issue we do not reach, they
have not established an injury in fact. Spokeo implied and TransUnion held that
“under Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact.” TransUnion generally
rejected the Attorney General's advocacy for an unlimited “informational injury”
approach to standing, in part by explaining that “the plaintiffs have identified no
‘downstream consequences’ from failing to receive the required information.’” As
this court recently observed, TransUnion rejected “the proposition that ‘a plaintiff
automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.’”153
The Fifth Circuit applied this analysis to Campaign Legal Center’s claims for standing.154
Campaign Legal Center argued a statutory right to the “visibility” of the Texas’s process, to
which they were denied. The Fifth Circuit stated this was not enough, because “absent concrete
and particularized harm to [Campaign Legal Center] from not obtaining the requested personal
voter information, they assert no cognizable injury in fact.”155 The Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.156
Following Scott, the Third and Sixth Circuits adopted the same basic rule: “failure to
articulate specific downstream consequences demonstrates [a failure] to show a sufficient injury
to confer Article III standing.”157 In Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., PILF, which represents Mr.
Lyman here, sent multiple letters to Pennsylvania's Secretary of the Commonwealth after the
151 Id. at 932.
152 Id. at 939.
153 Id. at 937.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 939.
157 Benson, 136 F.4th at 632.
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Secretary disclosed that a “glitch” in a state computer system had allowed ineligible persons to
register to vote while applying for or renewing driver's licenses or vehicle registrations.158
Though the Secretary gave PILF some records, all the records requested were not provided and
PILF filed suit.159 On appeal, PILF argued, as they do here, that Public Citizen and Akins govern
standing under the NVRA.160 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating as follows:
One can dispute whether TransUnion raised the bar in terms of the adverse
consequences that must be alleged to satisfy the standing requirements in different
statutory settings . . . [b]ut it set the standard we must follow. And under the
Supreme Court's standard, statutory context is important. Here, as in TransUnion,
we are presented with a statute with a purpose that goes farther than government
transparency such as FOIA. The required disclosure of certain records is merely
one aspect of the statutory scheme in service of a greater purpose—that is, as we
explain below, the expansion of voter participation in federal elections.161
The Sixth Circuit applied TransUnion, vacated the District Court's orders, and remanded with
instructions to the District Court to dismiss the case.162
In Benson (in the Sixth Circuit), PILF sent multiple letters to the Michigan Secretary of
State regarding deceased registrants on the active voter rolls.163 After not getting the results they
wanted, PILF filed suit under the NVRA to obtain voter rolls in Michigan.164 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit specifically noted that PILF had raised identical arguments before the Third Circuit,
and called the arguments “unavailing.”165 The Sixth Circuit noted that the Third Circuit found
158 Sec'y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th at 459.
159 Id. at 460.
160 Id. at 462.
161 Id. at 463.
162 Id. at 470.
163 Benson, 136 F.4th at 632.
164 Id. at 632 (citing Sec'y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th at 468).
165 Id. at 631.
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PILF “failed to identify some specific adverse downstream consequence for its mission or future
plans.” The Sixth Circuit followed the Third and the Fifth and rejected PILF’s arguments.166
Though PILF failed in the Third and Sixth Circuits, they prevailed before the First Circuit
in Bellows.167 PILF requested Maine’s voter roll under the NVRA, and acknowledged that a state
statutory exception barred PILF’s intended uses.168 Maine’s Deputy Secretary of State denied the
request, stating she lacked authority to release the file, and PILF sued.169 While the case was
pending, the Maine Legislature adopted a new statutory exception, which allowed access for
voter-list-maintenance review but imposes civil penalties of up to $1,000 for misuse.170
On appeal, Maine argued that PILF lacked standing because the State would not treat
PILF’s conduct as a violation.171 The First Circuit rejected that position, holding that Maine’s
position was not “nonenforcement” but that “these statements [of the Secretary of State to refrain
from prosecution] do not have the force of law and are not binding on future officeholders.”172 In
other words, because PILF still faced a possibility of enforcement under the new state exception
from a different administration, the First Circuit held that PILF had standing.173
The out-circuit-cases use legal reasoning consistent with Tenth Circuit precedent. The
holdings from the Fifth, Third, and Sixth Circuits found no standing for cases that only presented
an informational injury. This is exactly what the Tenth Circuit stated in Looper: “an injury in law
166 Id. at 632 (citing Sec'y Commonwealth of Pa., 136 F.4th at 469).
167 Bellows, 92 F.4th 36.
168 Id.at 43.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 50.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 50-51.
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is not an injury in fact.”174 The First Circuit, and now the Tenth Circuit in Torrez, found a party
had standing when there was the threat of either civil or criminal enforcement. The circuits are
not in conflict.
Mr. Lyman concedes that his only injury is informational,175 and nothing in the record
shows any threat that Utah may enforce its laws against Mr. Lyman through civil penalties or
criminal prosecution. Mr. Lyman has not alleged any threat of civil enforcement by the Lt.
Governor, and none appears in the Lt. Governor’s filings. Without a real enforcement risk,
Torrez and Bellows do not support a finding of standing. The simple rule is this: if there is no
threat of state enforcement, there is no injury in fact. The persuasive holdings in Benson, Scott,
and Secretary of Pennsylvania, along with the binding rule in Looper, make clear that
informational injuries alone cannot establish standing under the NVRA after TransUnion.
Granting the Lt. Governor’s Motion to Dismiss is therefore appropriate.
4 	CONCLUSION
Mr. Lyman has satisfied the NVRA’s statutory prerequisites for suit, but statutory
violation does not provide Article III standing. Article III requires more than a statutory right and
an informational injury; it demands a concrete harm. The Supreme Court made this clear in
TransUnion, and the Tenth Circuit has applied that rule in both Looper and Torrez. Mr. Lyman
only wants information to monitor the Lt. Governor's compliance with the NVRA. He faces no
threat of prosecution; no civil penalty; no viewpoint discrimination; and no adverse consequence
beyond being denied access to data he seeks. That is no more than an informational injury, Mr.
Lyman falls short of Article III's threshold requirement. Without a concrete harm; enforcement
174 Looper, 22 F.4th at 877 (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425).
175 Opposition at 2.
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risk; chilling effect; or tangible downstream harm, there is no case or controversy. Mr. Lyman's
claimed injury is admittedly entirely informational, and under controlling authority, that is
insufficient. The Lt. Governor's Motion to Dismiss is therefore GRANTED.
5 	ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lt. Governor’s Motion to Dismiss176 is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
1. 	Mr. Lyman’s Motion for Summary Judgment177 is FOUND MOOT.
2. 	Lt. Governor’s Motion for Relief funder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)178
is FOUND MOOT.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is ordered to CLOSE THE CASE.
Signed January 14, 2026.
BY THE COURT
________________________________________
David Nuffer
United States District Judge
176 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), docket no. 18, filed August 4, 2025.
177 Lyman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, docket no. 17, filed July 29, 2025.
178 Motion for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), docket no. 33, filed November 24, 2025.
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