Grant v. Western Governors University

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
RODERICK MARTIN GRANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTERN GOVERNORS
UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
RULING & ORDER
Case No. 2:25-cv-00631
District Court Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Plaintiff Roderick Martin Grant (“Mr. Grant” or “Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed his
action against Defendant Western Governors University (“Defendant”) on July 31, 2025.1
On October 30, 2025, the court issued a Memorandum Decision denying Plaintiff’s
Motion to appear remotely and requiring him to appear in person for his November 14, 2025
deposition.2 Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed his pending renewed Motion for Protective Order.3
Relatedly, Plaintiff also filed Motions for Sanctions against the Defendant for failure to meet and
confer and for selecting an unreasonable deposition location.4 As set forth herein, the court
considers each of Plaintiff’s Motions.
1 ECF No. 1, Complaint.
2 ECF No. 29, Amended Memorandum Decision and Order.
3 ECF No. 33, Renewed Motion for Protective Order.
4 ECF No. 35, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Defendant’s Refusal to Confer Regarding Deposition
and Protective Order; ECF No. 37, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Unreasonable Deposition
Location.
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I. 	Renewed Motion For Protective Order To Appear Remotely
On November 11, 2025, twelve days after the court issued its Memorandum Decision
denying Plaintiff’s Motion to appear remotely, Mr. Grant filed a “renewed” Motion once again
“seeking permission to appear remotely” for his November 14, 2025 deposition.5 Given the time
frame and Mr. Grant’s “supplementation” of evidence, the court construes the renewed Motion
as one for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.6
Relief under Rule 60 is “extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional
circumstances.”7 A Rule 60 Motion allows the court to provide a party relief from judgment for
the following reasons: (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;” (2) “newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered. . . ;” (3)
“fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;” (4) “the judgment is void;”
(5) “the judgment has been satisfied, release, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment
that has been reversed or vacated; or apply it prospectively is no longer equitable;” and (6) “any
other reason that justifies relief.”8
Construing Mr. Grant’s renewed Motion liberally, the court finds Plaintiff fails to identify
any exceptional circumstances allowing the court to reconsider its November 11, 2025 ruling.
For the most part, Plaintiff’s pending Motion rehashes arguments similar to those made in his
earlier filing. To the extent that Plaintiff’s renewed Motion supplements the record with
5 ECF No. 33 at 1.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
7 Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10 th Cir. 2016) (quoting ClearOne Communications Inc. v.
Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 754 (10th Cir. 2011)).
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
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“individualized factual, medical, and logistical details,” the evidence does not qualify as “newly
discovered” since Mr. Grant only provides information that was previously available but not
raised in his original motion.9 Plaintiff’s assertion that the court’s prior ruling was in error or that
the court requested further factual development before requiring Mr. Grant to travel to Utah for
his deposition is incorrect. In denying Plaintiff’s request for a remote deposition, the court
properly considered all of the factors presented and did not seek or request any additional
information from Mr. Grant.
Accordingly, the court finds no reason to reconsider or set aside its previous ruling and
Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.10 Defendant’s request for attorney fees is denied.
II. 	Motions for Sanctions
Next, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, Mr. Grant moves for sanctions
against Defendant, for failure to meet and confer in good faith about the possibility of Plaintiff
testifying remotely and for offering Defendant’s counsel’s office as the deposition location.11
As discussed above, on October 30, 2025, the court denied Mr. Grant’s request to appear
remotely for his November 14, 2025 deposition.12 As a result, the issue of Plaintiff’s remote
testimony has been resolved and, even if substantiated, an alleged failure to meet and confer on
9 ECF No. 33 at 1. See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Tr., 994 F.2d 716, 728 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 112 S. Ct. 719, 116 L. Ed. 3d 823 (1992) (“Motions to reopen for newly
discovered evidence are not favored” and require the presentation of “matter which could not reasonably
have been previously adduced.”)).
10 ECF No. 33.
11 ECF No. 35; ECF No. 37.
12 ECF No. 29.
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issues related the deposition would not, at this juncture, alter the court’s decision. Moreover,
Federal Rule 37 does not apply to how depositions are conducted, and the rule imposes no
obligation on Defendant to confer about duly noticed depositions.
Given Defendant’s contention that the parties met and conferred over these issues at the
September 12, 2025 attorney planning conference, it seems that Plaintiff’s actual focus in on
Defendants’ failure to agree to his requests. “[I]nflexible conduct” in failing to accede to
Plaintiff’s request to appear remotely, however, does not serve as grounds for monetary
sanctions and an opposing party’s failure to agree to specific accommodation requests is not a
sanctionable offense.13
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions For Refusal To Confer and Motion for
Sanctions for Unreasonable Location are DENIED.14
ORDER
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Protective Order to Appear
Remotely,15 Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Refusal to Confer,16 and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions for Unreasonable Deposition Location17 are DENIED.18
13 ECF No. ECF No. 35 at 3.
14 ECF No. 35; ECF No. 37.
15 ECF No. 33.
16 ECF No. 35.
17 ECF No. 37.
18 Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court concludes there are circumstances that make an award of
reasonable expenses unjust, and denies Defendant’s requests for attorney fees at this time. The court
acknowledges that pro se status, by itself, does not shield Mr. Grant from an award of reasonable
expenses and “[w]hile Plaintiff’s pro se status will not necessarily protect [him] from sanctions in the
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DATED this 11th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Dustin B. Pead
United States Magistrate Judge
future, in this instance it does.” Alphonsis v. Century Regional Detention Facility, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
259086, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020).
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