Hardy v. City of Naples et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
MICHAEL HARDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF NAPLES; UINTAH COUNTY;
and CHAMPION X CORPORATION,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND TO DENY
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER
(DOC. NOS. 5 & 6)
Case No. 2:25-cv-00586
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Claiming harassment and conspiracy to retaliate, Michael Hardy filed this action
without an attorney and without paying a filing fee.1 Along with his complaint, Mr. Hardy
filed motions for a preliminary injunction and a protective order.2 After screening Mr.
Hardy’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and identifying deficiencies, the
court invited Mr. Hardy to file an amended complaint.3 Mr. Hardy did not file an
amended complaint by the deadline in the court’s order or anytime thereafter. Because
Mr. Hardy’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, and
1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1; Mot. to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 2.)
2 (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Doc. No. 5; Mot. for Protective Order, Doc. No. 6.)
3 (See Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl. and Temporarily Granting Mot.
to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 10.)
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further opportunities to amend would be futile, the undersigned4 recommends the
district judge dismiss this action without prejudice and deny the motions for preliminary
injunction and protective order.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When a court authorizes a party to proceed without paying a filing fee, the court
must dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.”5 In making this determination, the court uses the standard for
analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 To avoid dismissal under this rule, a complaint must
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”7 The court
accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views the allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.8
But a court need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.9 “[A] plaintiff
must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim,”10 and “[t]hreadbare recitals
4 This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. No. 9.)
5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
6 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
7 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
8 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
9 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
10 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
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of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”11
Because Mr. Hardy proceeds without an attorney (pro se), his filings are liberally
construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”12 Still, pro se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.”13 For instance, pro se plaintiffs still have “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”14 While courts must
make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”15 courts “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s
behalf.”16
11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
12 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
13 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
14 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
15 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
16 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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ANALYSIS
Mr. Hardy brought this case against the City of Naples and Uintah County (both
in Utah), and Champion X Corporation, a private company in Vernal, Utah.17 He alleges
he has been harassed daily for three years by loud noises coming from Champion X’s
facility near his home, which the company denied responsibility for.18 He believes this
harassment “may involve individuals” coordinating with local government, law
enforcement, or public entities as retaliation against him because he filed a civil rights
action against a Naples City police officer.19 Mr. Hardy claims this retaliation by the City
of Naples and Uintah County violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20
He also contends Defendants unlawfully conspired under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to “harass,
intimidate, or punish” him.21 Finally, he asserts two state-law claims: a claim for private
nuisance based on Champion X’s noise and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
17 (Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, Doc. No. 1.)
18 (Id. ¶¶ 7–10.)
19 (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.) Although Mr. Hardy does not identify the case number, he appears to
be referring to the suit he filed in this district in March 2025 against Officer Robert
Magaha and the City of Naples, claiming they violated his constitutional rights by seizing
his car without a warrant or providing notice and a hearing. See Hardy v. McGaha, et
al., No. 2:25-cv-00203 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2025).
20 (Compl. ¶¶ 15–17, Doc. No. 1.)
21 (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.)
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distress based on Defendants’ actions generally.22 The complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief under federal law.23
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
First, Mr. Hardy fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 only
provides a recovery mechanism for violations of federal rights in specific
circumstances.24 “To establish a cause of action under [§] 1983, a plaintiff must allege
(1) deprivation of a federal right by (2) a person acting under color of state law.”25 A
local government “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.”26 “Instead, ‘the government as an entity’ may only be held liable
‘when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.’”27
Here, Mr. Hardy generally alleges the City of Naples and Uintah County, “through
their agents,” acted under color of law to harass him in retaliation for suing a Naples
22 (Id. ¶¶ 20–24.)
23 Mr. Hardy contends this court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343 for his civil rights and conspiracy
claims, and supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
(Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. No. 1.)
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2017) (describing § 1983 generally).
25 Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988).
26 See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019).
27 Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
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City police officer.28 Elsewhere in the complaint, he alleges “the source of the
harassment may involve individuals” coordinating with local government, and that
“members of a multi-agency task force may be involved in coordinating this conduct.”29
But Mr. Hardy does not allege facts showing any official policy or custom gave rise to
his injury. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against the City of Naples
and Uintah County under § 1983.30
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Second, Mr. Hardy fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Section 1985 prohibits certain conspiracies to interfere with a person’s civil
28 (Compl. ¶ 16, Doc. No. 1.)
29 (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14 (emphasis added).)
30 Mr. Hardy appears to assert a § 1983 claim against City of Naples and Uintah
County, not Champion X. (See Compl. ¶ 16, Doc. No. 1.) Moreover, Champion X is a
private company, which ordinarily is not subject to suit under § 1983. See Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“Like the state-action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes
from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Private entities may be held accountable as state
actors in certain circumstances, such as when “state officials and private parties have
acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Gross v.
Samudio, 630 F. App’x 772, 779 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (quoting Wittner v.
Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 777 (10th Cir. 2013)). While Mr. Hardy makes conclusory
allegations of conspiracy and coordination between the defendants in support of his 42
U.S.C. § 1985 claim, these allegations are unsupported by factual development
necessary to establish the existence of a conspiracy, as explained in the next
section. In other words, Mr. Hardy fails to allege facts showing Champion X may be
treated as a state actor for purposes of § 1983.
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rights.31 Although Mr. Hardy does not identify any of § 1985’s subsections, he claims
Defendants “entered into a tacit or explicit agreement to harass, intimidate, or punish
[him] for his civil rights lawsuit.”32 This suggests his claim is likely based on § 1985(2)
or § 1985(3).33 The complaint fails to state a claim under either provision.
To start, Mr. Hardy does not allege facts supporting a conspiracy claim under
§ 1985(2). A conspiracy claim under § 1985(2) requires three elements: “(1) a
conspiracy, (2) to deter attendance in court or testimony by force or intimidation or to
injure a witness for having appeared in court or testified, and (3) injury to the plaintiff.”34
The conspiracy element requires “a meeting of the minds” between “two or more
persons acting in concert.”35 A § 1985(2) claim “fails when the complaint does not
allege either that the defendant’s actions in some way were designed to intimidate or
31 See Archuleta v. City of Roswell, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1247 (D.N.M. 2012); 42
U.S.C. § 1985(1)–(3).
32 (Compl. ¶ 18, Doc. No. 1.)
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (addressing conspiracies interfering with judicial
proceedings); id. § 1985(3) (addressing conspiracies depriving rights or privileges); cf.
§ 1985(1) (addressing conspiracies interfering with federal officials performing their
duties).
34 Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1113; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); Wright v. No Skiter Inc., 774
F.2d 422, 425 (10th Cir. 1985) (“For the purposes of § 1985(2), an individual is deemed
to have ‘attended’ a court of the United States from the moment that the person files a
complaint.” (citation modified)).
35 Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1129
(10th Cir. 1994)); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okla., 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th
Cir. 1990).
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deter the plaintiff from appearing in a judicial proceeding or to injure a person for
appearing in court.”36
Mr. Hardy has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for civil conspiracy
under § 1985(2). He generally alleges Defendants entered an agreement, claiming the
“coordinated use of after-hours noise, ongoing denials, and local government ties to the
involved actors suggest a conspiracy.”37 Mr. Hardy suggests the noise “may involve
individuals” coordinating with local government and a “multi-agency task force.”38 But it
is unclear who is alleged to have agreed to what with whom. Although conspiracies are
often established through circumstantial evidence (since direct evidence of an
agreement is rare),39 Mr. Hardy has not alleged direct or indirect circumstances showing
an agreement. For instance, although Mr. Hardy filed his civil rights suit in March 2025,
he claims the noise from Champion X’s facility has harassed him daily for three years.40
This does not suggest Champion X acted in concert with the City of Naples and Uintah
County to harass Mr. Hardy by emitting loud noises in retaliation for his lawsuit. Where
the complaint does not give rise to an inference that Defendants conspired to deter Mr.
Hardy’s attendance in court or to injure him for having attended, Mr. Hardy fails to state
a claim under § 1985(2). This claim should be dismissed.
36 Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1114 (citations omitted).
37 (Compl. ¶¶ 18–19, Doc. No. 1.)
38 (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.)
39 Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 702 (10th Cir. 1990).
40 (Compl. ¶¶ 7–10, Doc. No. 1.)
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To the extent Mr. Hardy intends to state a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), he
similarly fails to do so. To assert a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a
conspiracy; (2) to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities;
(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury or deprivation resulting
therefrom.”41 This statute applies “only to conspiracies motivated by ‘some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’”42 In other words,
the plaintiff “must be a member of a statutorily protected class, and the actions taken by
defendant must stem from plaintiff’s membership in the class.”43 Mr. Hardy does not
allege facts revealing a discriminatory animus, nor does he claim to be a member of a
protected class. Further, as explained above, his allegation of conspiracy is conclusory
and unsupported by specific factual allegations regarding an agreement between the
defendants. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim under § 1985(3), and this claim should
be dismissed.
41 Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
42 Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101–02).
43 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1980).
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C. State-Law Claims
Mr. Hardy’s remaining claims arise under state law.44 Because Mr. Hardy’s
claims under § 1983 and § 1985 should be dismissed, the court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.45
* * *
For these reasons, this action must be dismissed.46 “Dismissal of a pro se
complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff
cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.”47 The court previously identified the deficiencies described
above and permitted Mr. Hardy to amend his complaint to correct them,48 but he failed
to do so. Therefore, further opportunities to amend would be futile, and dismissal is
44 (Compl. ¶¶ 20–24, Doc. No. 1.)
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing for supplemental jurisdiction over related state law
claims “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction”); Estate of
Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“District courts do not otherwise have jurisdiction to hear pendent state law claims but
for their intertwinement with claims over which they have original jurisdiction.”); Smith v.
City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all
federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”).
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
47 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (citation omitted).
48 (See Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl. and Temporarily Granting Mot.
to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 10.)
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necessary. Mr. Hardy’s motions for preliminary injunction and protective order49 must
also be denied, where they relate to and ultimately depend on the claims he fails to
state in the complaint.
RECOMMENDATION
Because Mr. Hardy’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under
federal law, and further opportunities to amend these claims would be futile, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS the district judge (1) dismiss Mr. Hardy’s federal claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); (2) decline to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims and dismiss
them without prejudice; (3) deny the motions for preliminary injunction and protective
order;50 and (4) dismiss this action without prejudice. Mr. Hardy has the right to object
to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days, and failure to object may be
considered a waiver of objections.51
DATED this 29th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
49 (See Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Doc. No. 5 (seeking to enjoin Defendants for “noise
disturbances and harassment” from Champion X’s facility); Mot. for Protective Order,
Doc. No. 6 (seeking a protective order “to safeguard his rights, ensure the fair
administration of justice, and prevent any further harm or retaliation”).)
50 (Doc. Nos. 5 & 6.)
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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