Abreu v. Weber County Sheriff's Office et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
ANGEL CHRISTOPHER ABREU,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEBER CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT
COMPLAINT
Case No. 2:25-cv-00348-JNP
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Plaintiff Angel Christopher Abreu, acting pro se as a pretrial detainee, brought this civil-
rights action. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025).0F
1 Having now screened the Complaint, ECF No. 1,
under its statutory review function, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2025),1F
2 the Court orders Plaintiff to file
an amended complaint curing deficiencies if he would like to further pursue claims.
1 The federal statute creating a “civil action for deprivation of rights” reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . ., subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025).
2 The screening statute reads:
(a) Screening.—The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity
or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 1
of 17

2
A. COMPLAINT’S DEFICIENCIES
The Complaint:
1. is not on the Court-required form.
2. is not clear as to whether Plaintiff understands the difference between suing defendants
in their individual or official capacities. (See below.)
3. does not adequately specify factual allegations meeting the elements of municipal
liability under which an attacked policy could be held unconstitutional. (See below.)
4. improperly names Weber County Sheriff’s Office and Inmate Management Committee
as § 1983 defendants, when they are not independent legal entities that can sue or be sued. (See
below.)
5. improperly alleges civil rights violations on a respondeat superior theory. (See below.)
6. does not concisely link each element of claims of excessive force to separate individually
named defendant(s). (See below.)
7. does not concisely link each element of claims of medical and physical mistreatment to
separate individually named defendant(s). (See below.)
8. raises issues of classification change/programming and administrative segregation in
way that does not necessarily support a cause of action. (See below.)
9. generally does not properly affirmatively link an individual named defendant to each
element of each alleged civil rights violation. (See below.)
10. does not adequately link each element of a retaliation claim to specific, named
defendant(s). (See below.)
(b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2025).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 2
of 17

3
11. needs clarification on an unnecessary-rigor claim under the Utah Constitution.2F
3 (See
below.)
12. needs clarification on his potential negligence claim, which would be brought under
Utah law. See Tesch for T.T. v. Bonneville Prop. Inv., LLC, 2025 UT 58, at ¶ 19 (“To prevail on
a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: duty of care, breach of duty, legal
causation, and damages.”).
13. does not adequately link each element of a due-process claim to specific named
defendant(s). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (cleaned up)).
14. possibly inappropriately alleges civil rights violations on the basis of denied
grievances. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009).
15. possibly inappropriately alleges a constitutional right to a grievance process. See Boyd
v. Werholtz, 443 F. App’x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“[T]here is no independent
constitutional right to state administrative grievance procedures. Nor does the state’s voluntary
provision of administrative grievance process create a liberty interest in that process.”); Dixon v.
Bishop, No. CV TDC-19-740, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41678, at *20 (D. Md. Mar. 11,
2020) (“[P]risons do not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause when they
adopt administrative mechanisms for hearing and deciding inmate complaints[;] any failure to
abide by the administrative remedy procedure or to process [grievances] in a certain way does not
create a constitutional claim.”).
16. appears to allege “random and unauthorized deprivation of property under color of state
law,” without acknowledging that such a claim “does not give rise to a § 1983 claim if there is an
adequate state post-deprivation remedy.” Frazier v Flores, 571 F. App’x 673, 675–677 (10th Cir.
2014) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
17. does not adequately link each element of a legal-access claim to specific named
defendants. (See below.)
3 Plaintiff should keep in mind that, if he brings state-law claims, the Court could take jurisdiction
over the claim only as a matter of “pendent jurisdiction,” a doctrine that allows “district courts to
hear [state-law] claims that form ‘part of the same case or controversy’ as the claims on which
original federal jurisdiction is based.” Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 379
F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, if all Plaintiff’s “federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
(1988).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 3
of 17

4
18. has claims possibly based on current confinement; however, the complaint apparently
was not submitted using legal help that Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to by his institution.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (requiring prisoners be given “‘adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law’ . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have
a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions
or conditions of confinement”) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (emphasis
added)).
B. GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “(1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.”
Rule 8’s requirements mean to guarantee “that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims
against them are and the grounds upon which they rest.” TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v ESPN,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).
Pro se litigants are not excused from meeting these minimal pleading demands. “This is so
because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his
alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a
claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, it is improper for the Court “to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant.” Id.
Thus, the Court cannot “supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that
assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff should consider these points before filing an amended complaint:
1. The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate
by reference, any part of the original complaint(s). See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 4
of 17

5
(10th Cir. 1998) (stating an amended complaint supersedes the original). Also, an amended
complaint may not be added to after filing without moving for amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
2. Each defendant must be named in the complaint’s caption, listed in the section of the
complaint setting forth names of each defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims
within the “cause of action” section of the complaint.
3. The complaint must clearly state what each individual defendant—typically, a named
government employee—did to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260,
1262–63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is an essential
allegation in a civil rights action). “To state a claim, a complaint must ‘make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom.’” Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App’x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (cleaned up). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at
least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred.
4. Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should
be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully
explain the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” of each claim. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly Court was particularly
critical of complaints that ‘mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the alleged
[claim].’ [550 U.S. 544, 565] n.10 (2007). Given such a complaint, ‘a defendant seeking to respond
to plaintiff’s conclusory allegations . . . would have little idea where to begin.’ Id.”).
5. Plaintiff may not name an individual as a § 1983 defendant based solely on supervisory
position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 5
of 17

6
6. Grievance denial alone, unconnected to “violation of constitutional rights alleged by
plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d
1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009).
7. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by
a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2025). However, Plaintiff need
not include grievance details in the complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
8. Official capacity versus individual capacity. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit explains:
The Supreme Court has instructed that “official-capacity suits
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25 (1991) (cleaned up). By contrast, individual-capacity suits
“seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for
actions taken under color of state law.” Id.
Coates v. Reigenborn, Nos. 22-1339 & 22-1434, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27456, at *9–10 (10th
Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (unpublished); see also Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 932 (10th
Cir. 2015) (“A suit against a government agent in his official capacity is treated as a suit against
the government.”).
One difference between suing a defendant in an official versus individual capacity has to
do with alleging causation. To adequately assert causation against a defendant in an individual
capacity, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant “set in motion a series of events
that he knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [the plaintiff] of her
constitutional rights.” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); see
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 6
of 17

7
also Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) (“When confronting individual-capacity
§ 1983 claims, our focus must always be on the defendant—on the injury he inflicted or caused to
be inflicted, and on his motives.” (cleaned up)). Conversely, to adequately assert causation against
a defendant in an official capacity, the plaintiff must first identify an official policy or custom, and
then establish that the challenged policy or custom was the “‘moving force’ behind the injury
alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Plaintiff should keep in mind too that “it makes no sense to sue a governmental entity in
its individual capacity.” Jackson-Mackay v. McDonald, No. 22-8033, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS
6356, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 17, 2023). And, finally, “[t]here is no longer a need to bring official-
capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can
be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167 n.14 (1985) (referencing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
9. Municipal liability principles. Plaintiff should study and incorporate these general
principles in reframing any municipal liability claim:
In addition to a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must satisfy three
elements to succeed on a Monell claim: “(1) an official policy or
custom, (2) causation, and (3) deliberate indifference.” [Lucas v.
Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir.
2023)].
An official policy or custom may include:
(1) 	a 	formal 	regulation 	or 	policy
statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice
that, 	although 	not 	authorized 	by
written 	law 	or 	express 	municipal
policy, 	is 	so 	permanent 	and 	well
settled as to constitute a custom or
usage with the force of law; (3) the
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 7
of 17

8
decisions 	of 	employees 	with 	final
policymaking 	authority; 	(4) 	the
ratification 	by 	such 	final
policymakers of the decisions--and
the basis for them--of subordinates to
whom 	authority 	was 	delegated
subject to these policymakers’ review
and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately 	train 	or 	supervise
employees, so long as that failure
results from deliberate indifference to
the injuries that may be caused.
Id. (quotations omitted). ”For causation . . . the challenged policy or
practice must be closely related to the violation of the plaintiff’s
federally protected right.” Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 	962 	F.3d 	1204, 	1241 	(10th 	Cir. 	2020) (quotations
omitted). The policy or custom must be “the moving force behind
the injury alleged.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police
Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). And
“[a] local government policymaker is deliberately indifferent when
he deliberately or consciously fails to act when presented with an
obvious risk of constitutional harm [that] will almost inevitably
result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by the
plaintiff.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 997–98 (10th Cir.
2019) (quotations omitted).
Buchanan v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, No. 22-7029, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 28156, at *18–
21 (10th Cir. Oct. 24, 2023) (unpublished).
10. Governmental sub-units. “Generally, governmental sub-units are not separate suable
entities that may be sued under § 1983.” Hinton v. Dennis, 362 Fed. App’x 904, 907 (10th Cir.
2010) (finding county criminal justice center not suable entity under § 1983). Indeed, the Tenth
Circuit has acknowledged that sheriff’s departments and police departments “are not legally suable
entities.” Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. App’x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Smith v. Lawton
Corr. Facility, No. CIV-18-110-C, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45488, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7,
2018) (stating correctional facilities “not suable entities in a § 1983 action”).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 8
of 17

9
11. Respondeat superior. The Supreme Court holds that, in asserting a § 1983 claim
against a government agent in an individual capacity, “a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Consequently, there is no respondeat
superior liability under § 1983. See id. (“. . . Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Entities
may not be held liable on the sole ground of an employer-employee relationship with a claimed
tortfeasor. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Supervisors are considered liable for their own
unconstitutional or illegal policies only, and not for employees’ tortious acts. See Barney v.
Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1998).
12. Excessive Force. This is general information on an excessive-force cause of action:
“An excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective
prong that asks if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation, and (2) a subjective
prong under which the plaintiff must show that the officials acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” [Redmond v. Crowther,
882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up)]. An official’s state
of mind is sufficiently culpable “if he uses force maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Id. (cleaned up).
Lehman v McKinnon, No. 20-1312, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250, at *5–6 (10th Cir. Sept. 10,
2021) (unpublished).
13. Inadequate medical and physical treatment.3F
4 The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment requires prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement”
4 The Tenth Circuit holds that a pretrial detainee’s claims as to conditions of confinement are
controlled 	by 	the Fourteenth 	Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause, 	and 	that 	“the Eighth
Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.” Routt v. Howard, 764 F. App’x
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 9
of 17

10
including “adequate . . . medical care.” Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998))
(quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998)). To state a cognizable claim
under the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide proper medical care or physical treatment, “a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical [and physical] needs.” Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Any Eighth Amendment claim must be evaluated under objective and subjective prongs:
(1) “Was the deprivation sufficiently serious?” And, if so, (2) “[d]id the officials act with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind?” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
Under the objective prong, a medical or physical need is “sufficiently serious . . . if it is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Sealock v.
Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (2000) (cleaned up).
The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that prison officials were
consciously aware that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and wantonly disregarded the
risk “by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
(1994). 	“[T]he ‘inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care’ tantamount to negligence
does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.” Sparks v. Singh, 690 F. App’x 598, 604 (10th
Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). 	Furthermore, “a prisoner who
merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional
762, 770 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.
1998)); see Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2020).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 10
of 17

11
violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 811 10th Cir. 1999); see also Gee v.
Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Disagreement with a doctor’s particular method
of treatment, without more, does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.”).
14. Classification and administrative segregation. An inmate’s transfer to different
housing (e.g., medical unit) or adjustment of privileges (e.g., attending classes) does not
necessarily mean that prison administrators were deliberately indifferent to conditions with
substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Allen v. Raemisch, 603 F.
App’x 682, 684 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“[P]risoners do not have a protected liberty or
property interest in keeping a specific prison job . . . .”). Nor is it, per se, “‘atypical [of] ... the
ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Adams v. Negron, 94 F. App’x 676, 678 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (unpublished) (holding placement in highly
structured, restrictive prison housing was not deliberate indifference)).
15. Affirmative Link.
[A] plaintiff who brings a constitutional claim under § 1983 can’t
obtain 	relief 	without 	first 	satisfying 	the personal-participation
requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant
“personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation” at
issue. [Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018)].
Indeed, 	because § 	1983 is 	a “vehicle[] 	for 	imposing 	personal
liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for
careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving
multiple defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2013); see also Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250 (explaining that when
plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against multiple defendants, “it is
particularly 	important 	. 	. 	. 	that 	the 	complaint 	make 	clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom”); Tonkovich v.
Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1998))
(holding that district court’s analysis of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
was “infirm” where district court “lump[ed]” together plaintiff’s
claims against multiple defendants—“despite the fact that each of
the defendants had different powers and duties and took different
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 11
of 17

12
actions with respect to [plaintiff]”—and “wholly failed to identify
specific actions taken by particular defendants that could form the
basis of [a constitutional] claim”).
Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App’x 784, 790–91 (10th Cir. 2019).
“A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger swift and certain dismissal.”
Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has “gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the
personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will
render the plaintiff’s claim frivolous.” Id.
16. Retaliation Claim. To properly assert a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege three
elements: (1) he was involved in “constitutionally protected activity”; (2) Defendants’ behavior
injured him in a way that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in
that activity”; and (3) Defendants’ injurious behavior was “substantially motivated” as a reaction
to his constitutionally protected conduct. Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir.
2007).
17. Unnecessary Rigor. The following passage gives information on validly stating that a
specific defendant’s behavior meets the elements of an unnecessary-rigor cause of action:
Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution states in part, “[p]ersons
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.”
Although 	this 	clause 	“closely 	approximates 	the 	language 	of
the Eighth Amendment,” it has no federal counterpart. Dexter v.
Bosko, 2008 UT 29, 184 P.3d 592, 595. The Utah Supreme Court
has had “few opportunities to interpret or apply the unnecessary
rigor.” Id. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the
unnecessary rigor clause “‘protects [prisoners and arrestees] against
unnecessary abuse . . . that is ‘needlessly harsh, degrading or
dehumanizing.’” Id. at 595 (quoting Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732,
737 (Utah 1996)). To state a claim for a violation of the unnecessary
rigor clause, the violation “‘must arise from ‘treatment that is clearly
excessive or deficient and unjustified, not merely the frustrations,
inconveniences, and irritations that are common to prison life.’” Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 12
of 17

13
at 	597 (quoting 	Bott, 	922 	P.2d 	at 	741). 	When 	the 	claim 	of
unnecessary rigor arises from an injury, a constitutional violation is
made out only when the act complained of presented a substantial
risk of serious injury for which there was no reasonable justification
at the time. Id. (quoting Bott, 922 P.2d at 741). The conduct at issue,
moreover, “must be more than negligent to be actionable.” Id.
In addition to these requirements, a plaintiff must also establish
three elements to support an unnecessary rigor claim: (1) “A flagrant
violation of his or her constitutional rights;” (2) “Existing remedies
do not redress his or her injuries;” and, (3) “Equitable relief, such as
an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s
rights or redress his or her injuries.” Id. at 	597–98 (quoting
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533, 538–39 (Utah
2000)).
. . . [However, Plaintiff’s] § 1983 claims likely serve as existing
remedies that redress his injuries[, mooting the need to also bring an
unnecessary rigor claim].”
Asay v. Daggett County, No. 2:18-CV-422, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5794, at *18–20 (D. Utah Jan.
11, 2019).
18. Legal-access claim. It is true that prison inmates “have a constitutional right to
‘adequate, effective, and meaningful’ access to the courts and that the states have ‘affirmative
obligations’ to assure all inmates such access.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir.
1980). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court expounded on the obligation
to provide legal access by stating “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers
by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.” Id. at 828 (footnote omitted & emphasis added).
However, to successfully assert a constitutional claim for denial of access to courts, a
plaintiff must allege not only inadequacy of the library or legal assistance provided but also “that
the denial of legal resources hindered [the plaintiff’s] efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim.”
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 13
of 17

14
Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). In other words, a
plaintiff must show that “denial or delay of access to the court prejudiced him in pursuing
litigation.” Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the non-frivolous
litigation involved must be “habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding current confinement.”
Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 616; accord Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353–55 (1996).
C. MOTION FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL
Plaintiff also moves for “appointment of counsel.” ECF No. 4.
“As a civil litigant, plaintiff has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Johnson v.
Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). And the Court lacks authority to appoint counsel;
still, federal statute authorizes the Court to ask counsel to agree to represent an indigent plaintiff
free of charge.4F
5 See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(1) (2025) (“The Court may request an attorney to
5 The Tenth Circuit has noted:
Each year, the district court receives hundreds of requests for legal
representation and only a small number of attorneys are available to
accept these requests. Accordingly, the district court must use
discretion in deciding which cases warrant a request for counsel. To
do otherwise would deprive clearly deserving 	litigants of an
opportunity 	to 	obtain 	legal 	representation. 	The 	dilemma 	is
unfortunate for litigants [denied counsel]. But the dilemma [i]s not
the district court’s fault; that dilemma [i]s the product of the court’s
lack of authority to compel legal representation or to reimburse
attorneys for their time.
Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S.
Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (stating courts may not “require an unwilling attorney to
represent an indigent litigant in a civil case”); Greene v. U.S. Postal Serv., 795 F. App’x 581, 583
(10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“In most legal communities, only a limited number of attorneys
are willing to take these cases. Thus, the district court [must] decide how to maximize the benefit
from these local resources.”); Gross v. GM LLC, 441 F. App’x 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished) (observing courts rarely request counsel to represent parties in civil actions);
Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1992) (cautioning courts
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 14
of 17

15
represent any person unable to afford counsel.”); McCleland v. Raemisch, No. 20-1390, 2021 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29490, at *15 n.3 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (unpublished) (explaining, when
prisoner-plaintiffs “refer to appointing counsel,” they “really refer to a request that an attorney
take the case pro bono”). Plaintiff has the burden of convincing the Court that Plaintiff’s claim has
enough merit to warrant such a request of counsel, and he has not yet met it. McCarthy v. Weinberg,
753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). Additionally, “[i]t is not enough” for Plaintiff to argue that he
needs help “in presenting his strongest possible case, as the same could be said in any case.” Steffey
v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Instead, in deciding whether to ask volunteer counsel to represent Plaintiff at no cost, this
Court considers a variety of factors, like “the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual
issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the complexity of the
legal issues raised by the claims.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)
(cleaned up). Considering the above factors, the Court concludes here that, at this time, Plaintiff’s
claims may not be colorable, the issues in this case are not complex, and Plaintiff does not appear
to be too incapacitated or unable to adequately function in pursuing this matter. Thus, the Court
denies for now Plaintiff’s motion for “appointment of counsel.” ECF No. 4.
that indiscriminately appointing “volunteer counsel to undeserving claims will waste a precious
resource and may discourage attorneys from donating their time”).
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 15
of 17

16
D. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff must within sixty days cure the Complaint’s deficiencies noted above by filing
a document entitled, “Amended Complaint,” that does not refer to or include any other document.
ECF No. 1.
2. The Clerk’s Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-
rights complaint which Plaintiff must use to pursue an amended complaint.
3. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order’s
instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice.
4. The amended complaint shall not include any claims outside the dates and allegations of
transactions and events contained in the Complaint. The Court will not address any such new
claims or outside allegations, which will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to raise other claims and
allegations, Plaintiff may do so only in a new complaint in a new case. If an amended complaint
is filed, the Court will screen each claim and defendant for dismissal or an order effecting service
upon valid defendants who are affirmatively linked to valid claims.
5. Plaintiff must tell the Court of any address change and timely comply with Court orders.
See D. Utah Civ. R. 83-1.6(b) (“An unrepresented party must immediately notify the Clerk’s
Office in writing of any name, mailing address, or email address changes.”). Failure to do so may
result in this action’s dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss
the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under
this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction,
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 16
of 17

17
improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the
merits.”).
6. Extensions of time are disfavored, though reasonable extensions may be granted. Any
motion for time extension must be filed no later than fourteen days before the deadline to be
extended.
7. No direct communication is to take place with any judge. All relevant information,
letters, documents, and papers, labeled with case number, are to be directed to the court clerk.
8. Plaintiff must observe this District of Utah local rule: “A party proceeding without an
attorney (unrepresented party or pro se party) is obligated to comply with: (1) the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure; (2) these Local Rules of Practice; (3) the Utah Standards of Professionalism
and Civility; and (4) other laws and rules relevant to the action.” DUCivR 83-1.6(a).
9. Plaintiff’s motion for “appointment of counsel” is DENIED. ECF No. 4. However, if—
after the case develops further—it appears that counsel may be needed or of specific help, the
Court may ask an attorney to appear pro bono on Plaintiff’s behalf. The Court will continually
reevaluate the need for counsel; thus, no further motions for appointed counsel are needed.
SIGNED January 15, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
CHIEF JUDGE JILL N. PARRISH
United States District Court
Case 2:25-cv-00348-JNP Document 14 Filed 01/15/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 17
of 17