Martinez v. Bisignano

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
VINCENT M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:25-cv-00141-JCB
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
PROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND2
Plaintiff Vincent M. (“Plaintiff”) alleges disability due to various physical and mental
impairments. Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act3 in July 2020.4 Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially5 and upon reconsideration.6 On
September 26, 2023, Plaintiff appeared with counsel for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”).7 The ALJ issued a written decision on January 5, 2024, denying Plaintiff’s
1 Frank Bisignano is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), he
has been substituted as the Defendant in this case. ECF No. 9.
2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have consented to Judge Jared C.
Bennett conducting all proceedings in this case, including entry of final judgment. ECF No. 6.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434.
4 ECF No. 7, Administrative Record (“AR ___”) 227-28.
5 AR 128-37.
6 AR 138-49.
7 AR 46-76.
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claim.8 Plaintiff appealed the adverse ruling, and, on January 30, 2025, the Appeals Council
denied his appeal,9 making the ALJ’s decision final for purposes of judicial review.10 Plaintiff
then filed suit in this court seeking review of Commissioner of Social Security Frank Bisignano’s
(“Commissioner”) final decision.11
S TANDARD OF REVIEW
This court “review[s] the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal
standards were applied.”12 The Commissioner’s findings, “if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.”13 “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.”14 “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, [this court may] neither reweigh the
evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].”15 “The failure to apply the correct
legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal
principles have been followed [are] grounds for reversal.”16
8 AR 19-43.
9 AR 1-7.
10 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
11 ECF No. 1.
12 Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
13 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
14 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citation modified).
15 Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
16 Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
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The aforementioned standards apply to the Commissioner’s five-step evaluation process
for determining whether a claimant is disabled.17 If a determination can be made at any one of
the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, the subsequent steps need not be analyzed.18
Step one determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If [the claimant] is, disability benefits
are denied. If [the claimant] is not, the decision maker must proceed
to step two: determining whether the claimant has a medically
severe impairment or combination of impairments. . . . If the
claimant is unable to show that his impairments would have more
than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities, he is
not eligible for disability benefits. If, on the other hand, the claimant
presents medical evidence and makes the de minimis showing of
medical severity, the decision maker proceeds to step three.19
At step three, the claimant must show that his or her impairments meet or equal one of
several listed impairments that are “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any
gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.”20 “If the
impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to
benefits. If not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step . . . .”21 Before considering step four,
however, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).22 An
individual’s RFC is his greatest ability to do physical and mental work activities on a regular and
17 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1988) (discussing the five-step process).
18 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Williams, 844 F.2d at 750.
19 Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51 (citation modified); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(ii).
20 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
21 Williams, 844 F.2d at 751.
22 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (e).
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continuing basis despite limitations from his impairments.23 In making this determination, the
ALJ must consider all the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe. 24
For the fourth step, the claimant must show, given his RFC, that his impairments prevent
performance of his “past relevant work.”25 “If the claimant is able to perform his previous work,
he is not disabled.”26 If, however, the claimant is not able to perform his previous work, he “has
met his burden of proof, establishing a prima facie case of disability.”27
From here, “[t]he evaluation process . . . proceeds to the fifth and final step,” where the
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner.28 The decision maker must determine “whether the
claimant has the [RFC] to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age,
education, and work experience.”29 If it is determined that the claimant “can make an adjustment
to other work,” he is not disabled.30 If, on the other hand, it is determined that the claimant
“cannot make an adjustment to other work,” he is disabled and entitled to benefits.31
23 Id. § 404.1545(a)(1), (b)-(c).
24 Id. § 404.1545(a)(2).
25 Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
26 Williams, 844 F.2d at 751.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. (citation modified); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
30 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
31 Id.
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ANALYSIS
Of the several reasons the ALJ provided in his step-two finding that Plaintiff’s mental
conditions were “nonsevere,”32 three were undisputedly wrong. First, the ALJ stated that
Plaintiff’s medical history for mental health showed a “lack of treatment.”33 The record clearly
shows otherwise.34 Second, related to treatment, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “did not take any
psychotropic medications.”35 Although one medical record on January 23, 2019, states that
Plaintiff was not using any “psychotropic drugs” at that time,36 several other records clearly
show that Plaintiff had been prescribed psychotropic drugs such as trazadone.37 Finally, the
ALJ’s nonseverity finding relied on Plaintiff’s “lack of subjective complaints”38 despite several
medical records documenting Plaintiff’s complaints that he was severely depressed.39
Although the ALJ’s decision contains these factual errors, they are harmless. Harmless
error applies in the context of judicial review of Social Security cases.40 Even if the court
assumes that the ALJ erred in his step-two finding, any such error is harmless because the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had severe impairments, concluded that Plaintiff could not be denied
32 AR 25.
33 AR 25.
34 See, e.g., AR 495-98, 930-68, 1021-29, 1037-43.
35 AR 26.
36 AR 434.
37 See, e.g., AR 476-77, 860, 966, 1081.
38 AR 25.
39 See, e.g., AR 133, 145.
40 See, e.g., Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing the applicability
of harmless error in Social Security cases).
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benefits at step two, and proceeded to step three. “[A]t step two, the ALJ must consider the
combined effect of all of the claimant’s impairments without regard to whether any such
impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity to survive step two.”41 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has explained that any error committed in
that consideration is rendered “harmless when the ALJ reache[s] the proper conclusion that [the
claimant cannot] be denied benefits conclusively at step two and proceed[s] to the next step of
the evaluation sequence.”42 That is precisely what the ALJ did here.
As further evidence that the ALJ’s factual errors were harmless in his disability
determination, the court reviews his analysis at steps four and five. Where, as here, the ALJ
makes a finding of a nonsevere mental impairment at step two, the reviewing court considers
whether the ALJ’s step-four analysis: (1) recognizes that a separate mental assessment is required
at step four; (2) discusses the medical opinion evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental impairments;
and (3) does not make any statement indicating that the ALJ was using the step-two analysis as a
substitute for an adequate RFC analysis.43
Here, the ALJ recognized that the mental assessment for an RFC is separate from step
two’s mental assessment,44 discussed the medical evidence specific to Plaintiff’s mental health,45
41 Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
42 Id.; see also Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he failure to find a
particular impairment severe at step two is not reversible error when the ALJ finds that at least
one other impairment is severe.”).
43 Suttles v. Colvin, 543 F. App’x 824, 825-26 (10th Cir. 2013).
44 AR 27.
45 AR 29-35.
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and concluded that Plaintiff’s RFC does not support mental limitations.46 Specifically, the ALJ
found persuasive “the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants that evaluated
[Plaintiff]’s mental impairments.”47 The ALJ recognized that the opinions of the state agency
psychological consultants were “based upon a thorough review the medical record as a whole.”48
In fact, these state agency psychological consultants explain in their respective reports that
Plaintiff obtained mental-health treatment, including medication, and complained about severe
depression to his medical providers.49 Despite acknowledging all the facts that the ALJ missed,
both consultants concluded that Plaintiff’s mental health impairments were nonsevere.50 This
information in the consultants’ reports is important because the ALJ was clearly aware of it—
even the parts that contradict his statements at step two—and relied upon that information to
reach the conclusion that no mental-health conditions should be placed in Plaintiff’s RFC.
Consequently, the ALJ did not place any mental-health limitations in Plaintiffs’ RFC. And with
the RFC that the ALJ formulated, the ALJ concluded that there were enough jobs in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform to preclude a finding of disability.51 Plaintiff does not
46 AR 34.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 AR 131-33 (discussing Plaintiff’s mental health therapy and medications); AR 145 (discussing
Plaintiff’s self-reported severe depression to medical providers and Plaintiff seeing a therapist
who supported disability for depression and anxiety).
50 AR 132 (“The evidence does not show a severe psychiatric impairment, nor does [Plaintiff]
appear to be claiming disability due to a psychiatric condition . . . .”); AR 145 (“I agree with the
initial [state agency psychological consultant’s report], assessing no functional limitations based
on [Plaintiff’s] mental condition.”).
51 AR 35-36.
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challenge that finding. Therefore, the factual errors in the ALJ’s step-two analysis are harmless
given his analysis of mental impairments at step four, which show by substantial evidence that
Plaintiff is not disabled.52
O RDER
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this 13th day of November 2025.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
52 Plaintiff’s opening brief also contends that the ALJ “mischaracterized” certain record
evidence. ECF No. 8 at 13-14. The court has reviewed each one of these purported
mischaracterizations and determines that they have adequate record support under the
substantial-evidence standard. Plaintiff’s desire for a more nuanced description of Plaintiff’s
limitations is insufficient to show a want of substantial evidence here.
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