Duran v. Honorable Christine Del Prado, Individual et al

5:25-cv-01491Txwd15.12.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
ARTURO OSVALDO DURAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDICIAL OFFICER HONORABLE
CHRISTINE DEL PRADO,
INDIVIDUAL, POLICE OFFICER SAPD;
ADAM H. LEE, INDIVIDUAL, SAN
ANTONIO; ATTORNEY AT LAW JOE
STENBERG, INDIVIDUAL,
MAGISTRATE CELESTE MARIE
RAMIREZ, INDIVIDUAL, BEXAR
COUNTY; AND WILLIAM MCMANUS,
INDIVIDUAL,
Defendants.
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SA-25-CV-01491-JKP
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Jason K. Pulliam:
Before the Court in the above-styled cause of action are Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1], Proposed Complaint [#1-1], and
Motion to Appoint Counsel [#2]. This case was automatically referred to the undersigned upon
filing for an order on Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and motion to
appoint counsel and a review of the pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The undersigned
therefore has authority to enter this order and report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). By his motions, Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP based on his inability to afford
court fees and costs and requests appointment of counsel. Having considered the motions and
documentation provided by Plaintiff, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff’s IFP motion [#1], deny
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the motion to appoint counsel [#2], recommend the District Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief and claims for damages against Plaintiff’s appointed attorney
and the two state judge Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and recommend the District
Court stay Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants pending the resolution of his state
criminal proceedings.
I. Motion to Proceed IFP
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United
States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350, as well as
an administrative fee.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP includes
his income and asset information, which indicates that he does not have sufficient monthly
resources available to pay the filing fee. The Court will therefore grant the motion to proceed
IFP.
II. Review Under Section 1915(e)
Pursuant to the Court’s October 8, 2019 Standing Order, the undersigned has also
reviewed Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint [#1-1] under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this Court may screen any civil complaint filed by a party
proceeding IFP to determine whether the claims presented are (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This Court also has an ongoing
obligation to evaluate its subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141
(2012).
1 The administrative fee, which is currently $55, is waived for plaintiffs who are granted
IFP status. See District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
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This case arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful arrest on August 20, 2024, and an
ensuing criminal prosecution. Plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded due process at many
intervals of his encounter with the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD), from the traffic stop
that led to his arrest to his detention and current criminal proceedings in Bexar County District
Court. Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of San Antonio, SAPD Chief William McManus,
SAPD Officer Adam Lee (the arresting officer), Judge Celeste Ramirez (Bexar County
Magistrate), Judge Christine Del Prado (the Bexar County District Judge presiding over his
criminal proceedings), and Joe Stenberg (his appointed attorney).
Plaintiff states in his proposed Complaint that there are ongoing criminal proceedings
against him related to these events and provides the Court with a cause number, 2024CR010945.
A public records search confirms that there is a pending criminal case in the 227th District Court
of Bexar County before Judge Christine Del Prado against Plaintiff, in which Plaintiff is awaiting
trial on felony charges. Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint alleges constitutional violations by
SAPD, Bexar County Judges, and the attorney appointed to represent him in his criminal case.
By his lawsuit, Plaintiff asks this Court to dismiss his state criminal case, bar Judges Ramirez
and Del Prado and Defendant Stenberg from the practice of law, permanently enjoin Defendants
from retaliating against Defendant with further convictions, and award him $999,999.99 in
compensatory damages from each Defendant. For the reasons that follow, the District Court
should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Younger
abstention doctrine; dismiss his damages claims against his appointed attorney and Judges
Ramirez and Del Prado; but stay his damages claims against the remaining SAPD Defendants
pending the resolution of his state criminal proceedings.
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A. Younger Abstention and Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
First, under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts must “refrain from
considering requests for injunctive relief based upon constitutional challenges to state criminal
proceedings pending at the time the federal action is instituted.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388
F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases). Three conditions must be met for the doctrine to
apply: (1) the dispute must involve an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state
interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated; and (3) the state proceeding
must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Wightman v. Tex. Sup.
Ct., 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1996).
First, Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint and court records over which the Court may take
judicial notice establish that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in ongoing criminal
proceedings. Second, these proceedings concern the enforcement of state criminal law,
something in which the state has as strong interest. Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir.
2018). As to the third requirement, federal courts “should assume that state procedures will
afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). To overcome this assumption, plaintiff must show
that he “had no opportunity to litigate the federal issue in state court.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731
F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has attached to his proposed
Complaint a copy of a motion to disqualify Judge Del Prado filed in his state criminal case.
Plaintiff’s own filings demonstrate that he is actively availing himself of the opportunity to
litigate issues raised in his proposed federal Complaint in state court. Plaintiff has not overcome
the assumption that there is an adequate remedy in state court to raise his constitutional
challenges. To the extent Plaintiff believes he will not receive a fair trial in state court, he still
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has an adequate remedy at law because he may raise his constitutional concerns on direct appeal.
See Thomas v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 576, 594–95 (N.D. Tex. 2018). Accordingly, all three
conditions of Younger abstention are satisfied here.
Even where the prerequisites for Younger abstention are satisfied, there are narrow
exceptions to the doctrine, such as where “extraordinary circumstances” justify intervention and
irreparable injury is imminent or a state proceeding is clearly being brough in bad faith or with
the purpose of harassment. DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1180. A prosecution is taken in bad faith if
state officials proceed “without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 85 (1971); accord Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth
Circuit has made clear that “the ‘bad faith’ exception is narrow and should be granted
parsimoniously.” Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1985). Although Plaintiff
alleges he was denied due process repeatedly throughout his proposed Complaint, he does not
sufficiently plead that his prosecution was taken in bad faith, only that he does not believe
“driving while drunken” is a recognizable offense in the Texas. As to the “extraordinary
circumstances” exception, Plaintiff has not identified any imminent irreparable injury other than
a possible conviction. The narrow exceptions to Younger abstention do not apply here, and the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s request for injunctive and declaratory
relief.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Damages Against the Judge Defendants
Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages from each Defendant in their individual and
official capacities for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Notably, “requests
for monetary damages do not fall within the purview of the Younger abstention doctrine.” Allen
v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff, however, cannot
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pursue compensatory damages against the two judge Defendants named in his proposed
Complaint. Judges are immune from suit for acts taken in a judicial capacity under the doctrine
of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This immunity is not
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Id. Insofar as Plaintiff is seeking damages from
Judges Ramirez and Del Prado in their official capacities, these claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, as they are in essence claims for damages against the State of Texas itself. See
Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding judges are “entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in their official capacities as
state actors”). The District Court should therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Judges
Ramirez and Del Prado under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
C. Plaintiff’s Claims against his Appointed Attorney
Plaintiff’s claims against his appointed attorney should also be dismissed. “Section 1983
claims require that the conduct complained of be done under color of law, and private attorneys,
even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit
under section 1983.” Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988). Private
attorneys who have conspired with state actors may, however, be held liable under Section 1983,
even if the state officials with whom they are alleged to have conspired are themselves immune
from suit. Id. However, nowhere in Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint has he pleaded that
Defendant Stenberg conspired with others to deprive him of due process. The only allegations in
Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint about Stenberg is that he allegedly engaged in ex parte
communications with Magistrate Judge Ramirez to “get Stenberg on board with violating” his
constitutional rights by ensuring that “all exculpatory evidence” was concealed from Plaintiff in
his criminal case. Plaintiff does not articulate a theory of conspiracy or any due process
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violation by Stenberg actionable under Section 1983. If Plaintiff believes he is not receiving
effective assistance of counsel in his criminal case, he may raise these concerns in his criminal
case.
D. Plaintiff’s Claims against the SAPD Defendants
This leaves Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the City of San Antonio, SAPD
Officer Adam Lee, and SAPD Chief William McManus. These claims should be stayed pending
the resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held
that a Section 1983 claim for damages that “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of [the
plaintiff’s] conviction or imprisonment” does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has
been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). However, in Wallace v. Kato, the
Supreme Court held that the Heck bar does not apply to a civil rights claim that would impugn
pending criminal proceedings, and common practice supports the stay of such a civil rights claim
pending resolution of the criminal case. 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007). The Court explained:
If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files
any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or
anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and
in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal
case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. . . . If the plaintiff is
ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that
conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will
proceed, absent some other bar to suit.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The court
may—indeed should—stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case
has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between
the two.”).
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Accordingly, the Court should stay Plaintiff’s claim for damages under Section 1983
against the SAPD Defendants until his underlying state criminal case concludes. The District
Court should also administratively close this case; order that Plaintiff file a motion to reopen this
case within sixty (60) days after entry of judgment in the underlying state criminal case; and
warn Plaintiff that his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this case for failure to
prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).
III. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Finally, Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel. There is no right to the
automatic appointment of counsel in a civil case. Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th
Cir. 1994); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). However, courts have the discretion
to appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) in in forma pauperis proceedings where
exceptional circumstances are present. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted); see Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist and
whether the court in its discretion should appoint counsel, the following factors are relevant: (1)
the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the plaintiff is capable of adequately
representing herself; (3) the plaintiff’s ability to adequately investigate and present her case; (4)
the presence of evidence which consists largely of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in
the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and (5) the likelihood that appointment
will benefit the plaintiff, the court, and the defendant by shortening the trial and assisting in a
just determination. Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991);
Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Plaintiff has not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances are present in his case or
that, based on the record, appointment of counsel is appropriate under the applicable legal
standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The undersigned has already reviewed the pleadings and
determined that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief should be dismissed; that
Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Judges Del Prado and Martinez and Attorney Stenberg
should be dismissed; and that his remaining damages claims against the SAPD Defendants
should be stayed during the pendency of his state criminal proceedings. The appointment of
counsel would not save any of the claims for which the undersigned has recommended dismissal.
The Court will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel.
IV. Orders and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [#1] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel [#2] is
DENIED.
Additionally, having considered Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint [#1-1] under the
standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District
Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and his claims for
damages against Defendants Celeste Ramriez, Christine Del Prado, and Joe Stenberg pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
It is also RECOMMENDED that the District Court STAY Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants SAPD, Chief McManus, and Officer Adams pending the resolution of his state
criminal proceedings The District Court should also administratively close this case; order that
Plaintiff file a motion to reopen this case within sixty (60) days after entry of judgment in the
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underlying state criminal case; and warn Plaintiff that his failure to do so may result in the
dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
V. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on
all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as
a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified
mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be
filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is
modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The party shall file
the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which
objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party’s failure to file written objections to the
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party
from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985);
Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file
timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained
in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
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1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
SIGNED this 15th day of December, 2025.
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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