Betancourt Blanco v. Bondi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
HECYERSON EDUARDO
BETANCOURT BLANCO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAM BONDI, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL; KRISTI LYNN
NOEM, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TODD M.
LYONS, DIRECTOR OF UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
SYLVESTER M ORTEGA, FIELD
OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR DETENTION
AND REMOVAL, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; AND
WARDEN WAYMON BARRY,
KARNES COUNTY DETENTION
FACILITY;
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
5-25-CV-01412-FB-RBF
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Fred Biery:
This Report and Recommendation concerns Petitioner’s pending Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. See Dkt. No. 1. The District Judge referred pretrial matters for resolution by the
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to Rules CV-72 and 1 of Appendix C to the Local Rules for the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See Dkt. No. 3. Authority to enter
this recommendation stems from 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, it is
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recommended that the Petition should be GRANTED and that Respondents should be
ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody.
Factual and Procedural Background
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Petitioner Hecyerson Eduardo Betancourt Blanco is a
Venezuelan national who entered the United States on September 25, 2023. Dkt. No. 1 at 7; Dkt.
No. 6 at 2-3. DHS apprehended him upon his physical entry into the United States, served him
with a Notice to Appear, and released him into the country three days later using a Form I-220A,
which is also called an “Order of Release on Recognizance” or “ORR.” See Dkt. No. 1 at 7-8;
Dkt. No.6 at 6. The ORR specifically advised Petitioner of the following:
You have been arrested and placed in removal proceedings. In accordance with
section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions
of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own
recognizance provided you comply with the following conditions . . . .
Dkt. No. 2-1 at 1 (emphasis added). Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), cited by Plaintiff’s ORR, is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “Title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations” and its “applicable provisions” creates a comprehensive, intricate web of
regulations governing immigration. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1-1399. In painstaking (to say the least)
detail, these regulations govern, among other things, release on recognizance as well as
“[a]pprehension, custody, and detention” of those previously released. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§
236.1, 1236.1. They provide in Chapter 1 of Title 8, for example, Department of Homeland
Security regulations governing the release of certain “[u]nremovable aliens and certain long-term
detainees.” Id. § 236.1(c)(6). These provisions are largely mirrored in Title V. See id. § 1236.1.
They further provide that someone released on recognizance can be re-arrested pursuant to a
warrant. Id. §§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).
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Petitioner’s ORR form specified conditions governing his release, such as the need to
report for any hearing or interview as directed by the Department of Homeland Security or
Executive Office for Immigration review and the need to surrender for removal from the United
States “if so ordered.” Dkt. No. 2-1 at 1. The ORR is dated September 28, 2023, and it was
signed by Petitioner, an immigration officer, and the DHS Acting/Patrol Agent in Charge. Id.
On the same day in September of 2023, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear,
DHS Form I-862. Id. at 4. The Notice to Appear provided that Petitioner was “an alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” Id. A separate line on the form with a
check box, left unchecked, provided authorities the opportunity to designate Petitioner “an
arriving alien.” Id. The form further specified, “it is charged that you are subject to removal from
the United States pursuant to the following provision(s) of law: 212(a)(6)(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an alien present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General.” Id. The Notice to Appear set Petitioner for a hearing to be
held on November 13, 2023, in front of an immigration judge in Baltimore, Maryland. Id.
Petitioner did not sign the Notice to Appear, although the “Acting/Patrol Agent in Charge” and
another Border Patrol Agent did. Id. at 4-5.
Petitioner timely applied for asylum in August of 2024, and he was then scheduled for a
master calendar hearing in front of Immigration Judge to take place on December 5, 2025; the
parties have yet to provide the Court with an update on the status of the asylum application. See
Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Before his hearing, on August 30, 2025, Petitioner was arrested
by a Denton County sheriff’s deputy for failure to yield, a traffic infraction. Dkt. No. 1 at 8. The
deputy detained Petitioner for reasons not reflected in the record and notified Immigration and
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Customs Enforcement (ICE), which then issued an administrative warrant and subsequently
arrested and detained him. See id. at 7-8; see generally Dkt. No. 6 (providing no explanation or
context for Petitioner’s detention by Denton County).
DHS then placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Pearsall Immigration
Court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8. ICE charged him as inadmissible under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), id. 1 at 8, which provides that aliens are inadmissible if they “are
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled” or have “arrive[d] in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioner was then transferred to Karnes County Detention Center and has, it
appears, been held there since August 30, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at 8.
Petitioner avers, and Respondents do not contest, that ICE “issued a custody
determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without an opportunity to post bond or be
released on other conditions.” Id. In its briefing, the Government argues that Petitioner was
actually initially detained, contrary to his ORR, or perhaps always was subject to detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), which by its plain text describes an alien “who has not been
admitted or paroled into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the
satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United
States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility under this subparagraph.” To the Court’s knowledge, the Respondents’
November 25, 2025, Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. No. 6, is the first
and only time Respondents have invoked § 1225(b)(1) as the basis for Petitioner’s August 30,
2025, arrest and subsequent continued detention. See generally Dkt. No. 1 (assuming and
arguing that Petitioner is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
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Petitioner now brings the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, asking that the
Court, inter alia, order him released or, in the alternative, direct that he be provided a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Dkt. No. 1. He explains that on July 8, 2025, “ICE, in
coordination with DOJ, announced a new policy that rejected well-established understanding of
the statutory framework” applicable to him and those in a similar situation and thereby “reversed
decades of practice.” Id. at 11 (quotation omitted). As Petitioner understands things, this policy,
as further explained and refined in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),
mandates that “all noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or parole are
subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are ineligible for [Immigration Judge] bond
hearings.” Id. at 12.
Petitioner ultimately argues, among other things, that: (1) his detention and eligibility for
a bond hearing are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b) as the Government contends,
and that the Government has violated the provisions of the INA by detaining him pursuant to
§ 1225(b); (2) his detention violates bond regulations set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and
1003.19; and (3) his “re-arrest . . . on August 30, 2025,” and subsequent detention, inter alia,
violate his right to due process. Dkt. No. 1 at 17-19.
On December 19, 2025, the Court benefitted from an evidentiary hearing and a full and
frank discussion with the parties about the factual circumstances of the case, the evolving legal
frameworks, and the developing law in this area. See Dkt. No. 7.
Analysis
A. A Familiar Standard Governs the Habeas Petition.
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The
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petitioner “bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law; and because the
habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Villanueva v. Tate, No. 4:25-CV-03364, 2025 WL 2774610, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992), and Bruce v.
Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976)). A court considering a habeas petition must
“determine the facts[] and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Core Issues Presented.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Respondents cite the following jurisdiction-stripping and channeling
provisions of the INA to argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition:
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), § 1225(b)(4), and 1252(b)(9). See Dkt. No. 6 at 11-12.
Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments essentially rest on the flawed contention that the
present Petition is merely a challenge to “the decision to detain [Petitioner] in the first place or to
seek a removal order against him,” or that the Petition is otherwise necessarily a challenge to
“any part of the process by which his removability will be determined.” Id. at 11. Some aspects
of Respondents’ jurisdictional objections are well taken, however, and there are surely aspects of
Petitioner’s arguments that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain. But Respondents’ primary
argument is that there is no jurisdiction over any aspect of the case, and that argument rests on a
flawed premise. There is no need, therefore, to parse Respondents’ discrete jurisdictional
arguments; the Court need only establish it has jurisdiction sufficient to address the merits of at
least one of Petitioner’s arguments, which it does.
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This Court has previously rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments with regard to
§ 1252(g) in materially identical circumstances. See, e.g., Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No.
5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025). In Hernandez-Fernandez,
for example, the Court explained that a petitioner in these circumstances is not necessarily
challenging the execution or processing of a removal order but may instead be challenging his
ongoing detention as a violation of statutory or procedural due process guarantees. See
Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, *2-6 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 21, 2025). Petitioner’s due process challenge here, as in Hernandez-Fernandez, attacks his
“ongoing detention” and thereby is aimed at “enforcing his constitutional right to due process in
the context of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any
removal order.” Id. at *3. Thus, the petitioner in Hernandez-Fernandez was “not challenging
Respondents’ decision to execute a removal order,” nor “Respondents’ decision to commence or
adjudicate his removal proceedings.” Id. The same is true here. Moreover, the record in
Hernandez-Fernandez “[did] not indicate that there was a [final] removal order to execute,” id.,
which it appears is also true here. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, & 6 (none of which cite or attach
a removal order against Petitioner). In short, this Court has jurisdiction to evaluate Respondent’s
interpretation and application of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a) to determine whether
Petitioner’s constitutional and other federal rights are being violated.
C. Respondents’ Actions Are Unlawful.
Petitioner’s ORR specified that he was being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and
applicable regulations. See Dkt. No. 2-1 at 1. In exercising discretion to release him,
Respondents granted Petitioner various rights, not the least (and not the only) of which was the
right to be at liberty in the country. Respondents also invoked regulations applicable to release
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under § 1226. Respondents now contend, based on a new interpretation of the governing
statutory scheme, that: (1) § 1226(a) and regulations applicable to it do not apply here, even
though Respondents previously said the opposite; (2) § 1225(b)(1) applies as a matter of plain
statutory text, even though Respondents only invoked that provision for the first time months
after they re-arrested and detained Petitioner; and (3) only the process outlined by § 1225(b)(1)
ever was or is owed to Petitioner. Respondents’ arguments fail, and the Petition should thus be
granted.
1. As a purely factual matter, Respondents’ § 1225(b) and § 1226(a)
arguments fail. Respondents issued paperwork to Petitioner specifying that § 1226 and
applicable regulations governed Petitioner’s release. Dkt. No. 2-1 at 1. Moreover, the September
28, 2023, Notice to Appear issued to Petitioner designated him as “an alien present in the United
States,” id. at 4, not “an arriving alien” potentially subject to § 1225(b)(1). Indeed, a separate,
unchecked box on the Notice to Appear form could have been checked to reflect Petitioner was
at that time “an arriving alien” of the type contemplated in § 1225(b)(1). Id. Any argument that
Petitioner, as a purely factual matter, is somehow now “an arriving alien” who is subject to
§1225(b)(1) because he is “arriving” is false. Respondents’ own form, which has never been
updated, changed, or superseded to the Court’s knowledge (other than the Government’s
briefing, written and submitted months after the fact) does not support any assertion that, as a
matter of fact, Petitioner is “an arriving alien.”
2. Respondents cannot re-classify, re-arrest, and detain Petitioner under
§1225(b)(1) without any process. Many courts within and outside this District and Circuit have
addressed whether a petitioner in these circumstances can properly be subject to re-arrest and
detention under §1225(b), with the courts sometimes couching the discussion in terms of a
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constitutional issue and sometimes as a statutory-interpretation issue. See, e.g., Hernandez-
Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025)
(collecting cases, including in the Fifth Circuit); Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-CV-16200,
2025 WL 2976572, *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). The Fifth Circuit has not yet
spoken on the issue; nor, to this Court’s knowledge, has any other Circuit Court or the U.S.
Supreme Court. The overwhelming weight of persuasive authority, however, agrees with
Petitioner’s position that § 1226(a)—and not § 1225(b)—applies such that the Government
cannot unilaterally reclassify Petitioner as a § 1225(b) detainee and thereby deny him any
opportunity for a bond hearing. See Hernandez-Fernandez, No. 5:25-CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL
2976923, *7-*11 (finding a Fifth Amendment due process violation under materially similar
circumstances to those presented here); Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 WL
2976572, at *7 (rejecting the theory of statutory interpretation Respondents offer here and
collecting over twenty cases that reach the same conclusion); Report and Recommendation in 5-
25-CV-01038-OLG-RBF, Dkt. No. 13 in Lliguicota Mayancela v. Superintendent of Karnes
Cnty. Immigr. Processing Ctr.; but see, e.g., Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D.
Neb. Sept. 30, 2025) (declining habeas relief in similar circumstances but citing significant
procedural issues with the habeas petition).
Because the interplay between §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a) has received considerable
treatment in courts across the country, including in this District and Division specifically, the
Court will not rehash those discussions at length here. Suffice it to say, this Court adopts the
reasoning from several decisions from within this District and elsewhere that concludes, in
materially identical circumstances, that mandatory detention under § 1225(b) does not properly
apply in circumstances such as those presented here. See, e.g., Hernandez-Fernandez, No. 5:25-
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CV-00773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923; Mayancela v. Superintendent of Karnes Cnty. Immigr.
Processing Ctr., No. SA-25-CV-1038-OLG, 2025 WL 3540074 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025); Order
on Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Dkt. No. 11, Pereira-Verdi v. Lyons,
5-25-CV-01187-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025);Vargas v. Bondi, No. SA-25-CV-1023-FB
(HJB), 2025 WL 3300446 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Vargas v. Bondi, No. SA-25-CV-1023-FB, 2025 WL 3300141 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).
The following excerpt from the pertinent discussion in the Vargas Report and Recommendation
is particularly illustrative:
Respondents’ interpretation of § 1252(b)(2) does not accord with the plain
language of the statutory text or the settled rules by which it is to be interpreted.
The plain language of § 1252(b)(2) applies its mandatory-detention provision only
when the applicant for admission is “seeking admission.” See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(2)(A). At the hearing before the undersigned, Respondents argued that
“seeking admission” and being an “applicant for admission” are synonymous. But
this argument is contrary to established canons of statutory interpretation that “a
variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning,” and that “[w]ords are to be
given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them.”
Covarrubias [v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112], 2025 WL 2950097, at *4 [(S.D.
Tex. Oct. 8, 2025)] (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170, 140 (2012)).
“Seeking” is a “present-tense, or current, ongoing action, and varies materially
from the passive state of being an applicant.” Covarrubias, 2025 WL 295007, at
*4. And the INA specifically defines “admission” as “lawful entry . . . into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). When Petitioner was taken into custody, . . . he was not
“seeking admission” because he was not seeking “lawful entry into the United
States,” let alone after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.
Accordingly, Respondents’ interpretation of § 1252(b)(2) does not accord with
the language of the statute.
Second, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the relationship between §§ 1225 and
1226 in Jennings seriously calls Respondents’ interpretation into question. In that
case, the Court summarized that relationship as follows:
U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and
(b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal
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proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). The distinction drawn in Jennings,
between those immigrants “seeking admission into the country,” and those who
are “already in the country,” aligns perfectly with the text-based analysis set out
in the preceding paragraph.[]
Vargas, No. SA-25-CV-1023-FB (HJB), 2025 WL 3300446, at *8-*9. Although the above
discussion focuses on § 1225(b)(2) and Respondents here claim that detention is instead
governed by § 1225(b)(1), Respondent’s statutory interpretation argument is effectively the
same. The argument rests on misclassifying Petitioner as an “arriving alien” or designating him
as “inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)” and, because of this designation, necessarily not
amenable to § 1226(a), and it fails for the same reasons as the above-mentioned §1225(b)(2)
argument. As described in Jennings, the statute contemplates a distinction between aliens, on one
hand, who are seeking admission into the country (or are arriving in the country) and, on the
other hand, those who are already in the country. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.
Petitioner is not properly subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1) as “an alien . . . who is
arriving” because he isn’t “arriving”—he has been present in the country and at large for several
years pursuant to the ORR and § 1226(a). Nor is there any basis here to claim that he is
somehow effectively still “arriving” as a purely legal matter, as there might be if, for example, he
had been paroled into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). That provision, unlike
§ 1226(a), expressly provides that “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned
to the custody from which he was paroled . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
3. Several features of this case warrant further emphasis. The Court briefly
notes the following concerns. First, Petitioner appears to have only learned from the Response to
his Petition that Respondents are detaining him under § 1225(b)(1). Indeed, the Petition itself
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operates under the assumption that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2), not
§ 1225(b)(1). See generally Dkt. No. 1 (assuming, based on widespread government practice,
that Petitioner was re-detained under § 1225(b)(2)). But differences between arrest and detention
authority under § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) could materially affect due process and other concerns in
a given case. The failure to timely clarify—likely ahead of, or at least contemporaneous with, re-
arrest and detention—which authority purportedly authorizes re-arrest and detention raises
considerable due process concerns. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”).
Second, immigration officials initially released Petitioner and invoked § 1226 and
applicable regulations when doing so, yet they re-arrested and detained him without ever
addressing § 1226 or those regulations. Having purported to provide a set of rights and
regulations to govern Petitioner’s release, Respondents’ apparent belief that those rights and
regulations did not need to be addressed, acknowledged, or followed before Petitioner was re-
arrested and detained raises considerable due process concerns. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (“The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss …
and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the
governmental interest in summary adjudication.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The
Court also wonders whether some form of revocation proceeding is required in these
circumstances, as a matter of due process.
Third, Petitioner was detained following a traffic stop that may have been prolonged
solely to allow ICE to arrive at the scene and determine, while Petitioner was presumably not
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free to leave, whether Petitioner was subject to immigration detention. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8.
Although the Court has no other information about the stop, the information presently before the
Court raises constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350
(2015) (“We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the
stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”).
Fourth, it is apparently Respondents’ position that no individualized determination need
be made regarding the re-arrest and detention authority applicable to an entire class of
individuals presently at liberty in the United States, even though each may be released pursuant
to any of a variety of different legal authorities. See Dkt. No. 6 at 6 (arguing that Petitioner’s
initial release from custody after entry into the United States under § 1226(a) was “either in error
or in the exercise of discretion,” but that this initial decision “does not change the fact he was an
applicant for admission at the time he was initially apprehended” under the Government’s new
interpretation of the statute). Under Respondents’ detain-now-and-explain-later method, there
would be no case-by-case determination involved to ascertain, for example, whether the
circumstances governing an individual released pursuant to § 1226(a) might differ from those of
another individual released pursuant to § 1182(d)(5). If this is indeed the Government’s position,
it is troubling and stands in considerable tension with fundamental due process guarantees. See,
e.g., Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (stating, “[i]t is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings” and that
“detainees are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
case.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Fifth, there is considerable doubt as to whether post-deprivation tort remedies are or
would be available here if a constitutional due process violation has occurred. A Bivens action
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would be a challenge under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, to say the least. See Egbert v.
Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491-93 (2022); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135-37 (2017). And the
absence of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy may well increase the need for pre-deprivation
process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-29 (1990); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. at 690; Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 671-73 (2025).
D. Petitioner Should Be Released from Custody.
Having determined that Petitioner’s detention cannot continue unaffected in these
circumstances, the Court turns to the appropriate remedy. At the hearing held on December 19,
2025, the Government requested that should this Court be inclined to recommend relief for
Petitioner, the relief granted should come in the form of an order of release, not an order that a
§ 1226(a) bond hearing be held. Counsel for Petitioner agreed.
Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Dkt. No. 1, be GRANTED, and that Respondents should be ORDERED to
release Petitioner from custody. The Court notes that it will shorten the objection period to seven
days, as discussed at the hearing and provided below.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court ORDER that Petitioner, upon his
release, shall not be re-arrested and detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), barring some
material change in circumstances justifying such detention and not already addressed by the
present habeas proceedings. See Order on Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order, Dkt. No. 11 at *7, Pereira-Verdi v. Lyons et al, 5-25-CV-01187-XR (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10,
2025) (enjoining arrest and detention of “Petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral decision maker pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.”).
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Having considered and acted upon all matters for which the above-entitled and numbered
case was referred, it is ORDERED that the above-entitled and numbered case is RETURNED
to the District Court for all purposes.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on
all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as
a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to those not registered. Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must
typically be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, but this time
period may be further modified by the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In
light of the equities in this case, such as the deprivation of liberty at issue, the length of time that
Petitioner already been detained, and the recommendation that Petitioner be released, the
deadline to file objections to this Report and Recommendation is shortened as follows: the
parties must file any written objections within seven (7) days after receipt of a copy of this
Report and Recommendation.
Objections, responses, and replies must comply with the same page limits as other filings,
unless otherwise excused by the district court’s standing orders. See Rule CV-7. The objecting
party shall file the objections with the clerk of the court and serve the objections on all other
parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or
recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the
district court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. A party’s failure to
file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in
this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn,
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474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000).
Additionally, failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party,
except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 30th day of December, 2025.
RICHARD B. FARRER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 5:25-cv-01412-FB Document 16 Filed 12/30/25 Page 16 of 16