Espinoza v. Ramos et al

5:24-cv-00068Txwd05.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
LYDIA ESPINOZA, Individually and as the
Administrator of the Estate of A.H., a Minor,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN RAMOS and THE CITY OF SAN
ANTONIO, TEXAS,
Defendants.
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SA-24-CV-68-FB (HJB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Fred Biery:
This Report and Recommendation concerns the motions for summary judgment filed by
Defendants City of San Antonio (“the City”) (Docket Entry 33) and Officer Stephen Ramos
(Docket Entry 41). Pretrial matters have been referred to the undersigned for consideration, (See
Docket Entry 10.) For the reasons set out below, I recommend that Defendants’ motions (Docket
Entries 33 and 41) be GRANTED.
I. 	Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged constitutional violations.
(See Docket Entry 1, at 8–16.) The Court has original jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. 	Plaintiff also asserts state-law tort claims (see Docket Entry 1, at 17–19), over
which the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. I have authority
to issue this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
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II. 	Factual Background.1
This case arises out of a police shooting in the early morning hours of June 3, 2022, which
resulted in the tragic death of A.H., a minor. 	At 1:13 A.M. on that date, Officer Ramos was alone
on patrol when he received a report of multiple gunshots in a San Antonio neighborhood. (Docket
Entry 35-2, at 3:50–4:04.) In separate police cruiser, Officer Nicholas Espinoza also responded to
the report of gunfire. 	(Docket Entry 35-3, at 3:18–32.) 	At 1:17 A.M., based on information
provided by a pedestrian in the area, Ramos proceeded to different nearby area to investigate the
gun shots and asked that the other responding officers rendezvous to that area. (Docket Entry 35-
2, at 6:56–7:50; see Docket Entry 35-1, at 6:55–7:20.) 	Espinoza responded to the request and
proceeded to that location. (Docket Entry 35-3, at 7:13 et seq.)
At about 1:21 A. M., Officer Espinoza spotted a red sedan, which A.H. was driving, on a
residential street and alerted Officer Ramos to their location and direction of travel. (Docket Entry
35-3, at 11:15–22.) One minute later, Officer Ramos encountered A.H.; they were driving toward
one another down the narrow residential street. 	(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:12–20.) 	Ramos
activated the emergency lights and siren on his police cruiser, which was blocking A.H.’s path
forward.2 (Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:12–12:21; Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:12–20.) A.H. threw the
car into reverse and accelerated away from Officer Ramos. 	(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:18–22.)
1 As the events in this case were largely caught on videotape, the undersigned presents the
facts in this section “in the light depicted by the videotape.” Bagley v. Guillen, 90 F.4th 799, 802
(5th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The Court received video evidence by flash drive from the City
(Docket Entry 35) and compact discs from Officer Ramos (Docket Entry 42). The City’s files were
designated as Exhibits B-3, B-4, and B-5. This Report and Recommendation refers to these
exhibits as Docket Entries 35-1, 35-2, and 35-3. It does not additionally cite Officer Ramos’s video
evidence, as it is abridged but otherwise identical.
2 In his affidavit, Officer Ramos states that he “activated [his] overhead emergency lights
to alert the approaching vehicle that [he] was a police officer.” (Docket Entry 41-1, at 3.)
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While A.H. was reversing away from Ramos, Officer Espinoza arrived on the scene, driving up
from behind A.H. and activating his emergency lights. (Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:20–22.) As A.H.
reversed toward Espinoza, Ramos warned him: “watch it, don’t let him ram you!” (Docket Entry
35-2, at 12:24–26; Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:53–55.) A.H. narrowly avoided a collision by rotating
the front wheels to the left at the last minute, as if initiating a three-point turn. (Docket Entry 35-
1, at 12:22–28.) 	Ramos continued to pull forward throughout all of this, shrinking the distance
between his and A.H.’s vehicles. (Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:22–30; Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:21–
25.)
After A.H. had stopped reversing and turning the car—driving onto the sidewalk in the
process—his car was positioned perpendicular to Officer Espinoza’s cruiser. (Docket Entry 35-1,
at 12:28; Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:40–52.) As a result, the driver-side of Espinoza’s police cruiser
was facing the front of A.H.’s vehicle. (Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:26–28.) Espinoza opened his
driver-side door and drew his weapon, yelling “hey, let me see your hands.” (Docket Entry 35-3,
at 11:57; see Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:28–29.) A.H. then accelerated directly toward Espinoza.
(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:29–32; Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:57–59.) Espinoza pulled his limbs back
into the cabin just before A.H.’s vehicle made contact with his police cruiser, slamming his driver-
side door shut upon impact. (Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:59–12:01.)
As A.H. was driving toward Officer Espinoza’s police cruiser, Officer Ramos jumped out
of his car with his gun drawn. (Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:30–32.) Within one second of A.H.’s
ramming Espinoza’s cruiser, Ramos fired a single shot into the driver-side door of A.H.’s vehicle,
just below the door handle. (Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:31; Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:32; Docket
Entry 35-3, at 12:00–01.) A few seconds after the shot was fired, A.H. stepped out of the car and
proceeded to lie down on the pavement. (Docket Entry 12:35–45.) The bullet Ramos fired had
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penetrated through the driver-side door and struck A.H. in the abdomen. (Docket Entry 35-2, at
12:45–50, 13:40–45.)
Officer Ramos retrieved his first-aid kit and tried to tend to A.H.’s wound. (Docket Entry
35-2, at 13:45–16:00.) Because A.H.’s vehicle was t-boning Officer Espinoza’s police cruiser, he
had to climb out through his driver-side window to engage the other suspects. (Docket Entry 35-
3, at 12:04–12:20.) While rendering first aid to A.H., Ramos asked Espinoza whether he was hurt,
explaining that he had seen Espinoza “getting out of the car” right before A.H. drove toward him.
(Docket Entry 35-2, at 14:35–40; Docket Entry 35-3, at 14:03–08.) In explaining what happened
to another responding officer, Espinoza stated: “as I’m getting out of my car, [A.H.] rammed his,
rammed my vehicle—almost runs me over; and then, uh, that’s when Ramos took the shot.”
(Docket Entry 35-3, at 21:01–12.)
A.H. did not survive. (Docket Entry 41, at 1; Docket Entry 43-1, at 15.)
III. 	Procedural Background.
Plaintiff, A.H.’s mother, asserts a § 1983 excessive-force claim against Officer Ramos,
and § 1983 claims against the City on the grounds that it failed to adequately train, supervise, and
discipline its officers and that its own policies, customs, and practices caused the alleged use of
excessive force. (See id. at 8–16.) In addition to her federal claims, Plaintiff also asserts a claim
for assault and battery under Texas law against Officer Ramos. (See id. at 17.) Plaintiff brings
each of the above claims on behalf of A.H., as the administrator of his estate, pursuant to the Texas
Survival Statute, TEX. C IV. P RAC . & R EM. C ODE § 71.021. (See Docket Entry 1, at 18.)3 Plaintiff
3 Although Plaintiff purports to assert an independent “survival claim” (see Docket Entry
1, at 18), such a claim is not available; the Texas Survival Statute merely “preserves a claim for
the estate,” Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2004), such that a “personal-injury action
survives the injured person’s death and may be prosecuted on her behalf.” Stevenson v. Ford Motor
Co., 608 S.W.3d 109, 131 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.).
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also brings these claims on her own behalf, pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Statute, C IV.
P RAC . & R EM. § 71.002 et seq. (See Docket Entry 1, at 17–18.)
Both Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. 	(See Docket Entries 33 and
41.) With regard to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, Defendants both contend that Officer Ramos’s use
of force was not excessive, and accordingly that no constitutional violation occurred. (See Docket
Entry 33, at 21; Docket Entry 41, at 9–18.) But even if the use of force were excessive, the City
additionally argues that its policies are constitutionally sound, and thus were not the cause of the
violation; and Officer Ramos argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Docket Entry
33, at 9–20; Docket Entry 41, at 18–19.) Officer Ramos further argues and that provisions of the
Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) preclude the claims for assault and battery. (See Docket Entry
41, at 19–21.)
Plaintiff has responded to both motions (see Docket Entries 37 and 43), and both
Defendants have filed replies (see Docket Entries 39 and 47).
IV. 	Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P.
56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Allen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 63 F.4th 292, 300 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A disputed fact is material if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Allen, 63 F.4th at 300 (quoting Anderson,
447 U.S. at 248). In short, the question for the Court is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
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disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
In most cases, the nonmovant on summary judgment “must bring forward evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact only after the movant shows entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law.” Tiede v. Salazar, 518 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Giles v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001)). But when a defendant “raises the defense of qualified
immunity,” as here, “the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defense does not apply.” Perry
v. Mendoza, 83 F.4th 313, 317 (5th Cir. 2023). In other words, qualified immunity “alters the usual
summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.” Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court generally “must view all facts and
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Feist v. La., Dep’t of Just., Off. of
the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). 	“Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation,” however, “are not sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 2016). And
“when there is video evidence in the record,” as here, “courts are not bound to accept the
nonmovant’s version of the facts if it is contradicted by the video.” Crane v. City of Arlington,
Tex., 50 F.4th 453, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation modified), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 342 (2023);
see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–79 (2007).
V. 	Discussion.
A. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims.
This Report and Recommendation first considers Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims before turning
to her related state claims. As previously explained, Plaintiff brings her § 1983 claims both on
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A.H.’s behalf, as the administrator of his estate, pursuant to the Texas Survival Statute, and on her
own behalf as wrongful death claims, pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Statute. As explained
below, the § 1983 claims fail because they are all predicated on an allegation of unconstitutionally
excessive force—a matter as to which Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact.
1. 	Requirement of a predicate constitutional violation.
“Section 1983 provides a civil remedy in federal courts for violations, under color of state
law, of a person’s constitutionally recognized rights, privileges, or immunities.” 	Miller v.
Metrocare Servs., 809 F.3d 827, 833 (5th Cir. 2016). Section 1983 claims may be brought against
both municipalities and individual government employees. The elements of the claim—and the
defenses available—vary depending on the type of defendant. For claims against a municipality,
the plaintiff must show that the constitutional violation resulted from a policy or custom of the
municipality. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, (1978)
(“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). For claims against individual employees,
the plaintiff may have to overcome the defense of qualified immunity, which “protects government
officials from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be
legal.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021). But as a prerequisite to either claim, the
plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation occurred. 	See Loftin v. City of Prentiss, Miss.,
33 F.4th 774, 783 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Without a predicate constitutional violation, there can be no
Monell liability.”) (citation modified); Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2017) (“To
prevail on . . . . [a] § 1983 claim . . . . [a plaintiff] must show both that [the defendant] (1) deprived
her of her constitutional rights and (2) acted under color of state law.”) (internal marks omitted).
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Because a constitutional violation is a prerequisite to all of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, Plaintiff must
cite evidence raising a genuine dispute that Officer Ramos used excessive force on A.H., thereby
violating his right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures.
2. 	Excessive force.
“When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right
at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.” 	Aguirre v. City of San
Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2021). “A violation of this right occurs when a seized person
suffers an injury that results directly and only from a clearly excessive and objectively
unreasonable use of force.” Salinas v. City of Houston, 138 F.4th 822, 831 (5th Cir. 2025). 	In
determining the objective reasonableness of police uses of force, the Court must keep in mind that
they “are often forced to make split second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”
Romero v. City of Grapevine, Tex., 888 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 	Accordingly, a particular use of force “must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”
and the Court must refrain from “second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene,
of the danger presented by a particular situation.” Romero, 888 F.3d at 177 (citation modified).
Whether an officer’s use of force was excessive turns on the factors set out in Graham:
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” 	Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). 	“While all
factors are relevant, the threat-of-harm factor typically predominates the analysis when deadly
force has been deployed.” Crane, 50 F.4th at 463; see generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
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11 (1985). Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation only briefly considers the first and third
Graham factors before turning to the threat-of-harm factor. 	All three factors, however, weigh
against finding a constitutional violation in this case.
a. 	The first and third Graham factors: severity of the offense and evasion.
Based on the undisputed evidence, Officer Ramos had reasons to believe that A.H. was
committing serious offenses and attempting to evade arrest at the time he fired his weapon. When
Ramos encountered A.H.’s vehicle and turned on his emergency lights, he was responding to a
report of gunfire in the area. (Docket Entry 35-2, at 3:50–4:04; Docket Entry 41-1, at 2.) After
Ramos activated the emergency lights, A.H. immediately tried to flee—throwing his car into
reverse and speeding backward, nearly colliding with Officer Espinoza. 	(Docket Entry 35-1, at
12:18-28.) And less than a second before Ramos fired his weapon, A.H. had used his vehicle as a
battering ram by driving it directly at Espinoza, smashing into the driver-side of Espinoza’s
vehicle. (Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:29–32; Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:30–33; Docket Entry 35-3, at
11:57-12:01.)
Based on these facts, there was good reason to believe that A.H. had committed at least
two serious offenses prior to Officer Ramos’s use of deadly force. 	First, a person commits
aggravated assault if he “intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily
injury” and “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.” TEX. P ENAL
C ODE §§ 22.01(a)(2); 22.02(a)(2). 	In this case, the video evidence clearly shows that A.H.
knowingly drove his car at Officer Espinoza, crashing into the driver-side door of his police cruiser.
(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:29–32.) 	Used like that, “[a] motor vehicle . . . is clearly capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury and therefore can be a deadly weapon.” See Mills v. State,
541 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 	And A.H. threatened
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Espinoza with imminent bodily injury, as Espinoza barely got back into vehicle before the impact
of A.H.’s car slammed his driver-side door shut. (Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:59–12:01.) Moreover,
because A.H. clearly would have known that Officer Espinoza was a police officer attempting to
detain him, his effort to drive into Officer Espinoza with his car was a first-degree felony. 	See
TEX. P ENAL C ODE § 22.02(b)(2)(B).
Second, a person evades arrest or detention “if he intentionally flees from a person he
knows is a peace officer . . . attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” 	TEX. P ENAL C ODE
§ 38.04(a). 	And using a vehicle to do so is a third-degree felony. 	Id. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). 	A.H.
certainly knew, based on the video evidence clearly depicting marked police cruisers activating
emergency lights and sirens, that Officers Ramos and Espinoza were peace officers attempting to
detain him.4 Nevertheless, A.H. tried to flee in his vehicle. Like aggravated assault of an officer,
evasion by vehicle is considered a serious offense under an excessive-force analysis. See Salazar
v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2022). These offenses support a finding that the first
Graham factor weighs heavily against finding that Ramos employed excessive force. The third
Graham factor likewise weighs in Ramos’s favor, as A.H. was actively evading detention when
Ramos fired his weapon.
b. 	The second Graham factor: danger to the officers or to others.
“An officer’s use of deadly force is not excessive, and thus no constitutional violation
occurs, when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the
officer or to others.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021). Here,
4 Whether A.H. knew that such detention was lawful is immaterial. See Nicholson v. State,
682 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (The question is whether the person must know that
the law enforcement officer is attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him[;] [t]hat answer is no—
he must simply know that the detaining or arresting person is a peace officer.”).
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the video evidence clearly shows that A.H. posed a threat of serious harm to Officer Espinoza.
(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:29–32; Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:57–59.) 	Indeed, Espinoza narrowly
avoided being seriously injured when A.H. drove his car into the side of Espinoza’s vehicle while
the door was open. (Docket Entry 35-3, at 11:59–12:01.)
While “an exercise of force that is reasonable at one moment can become unreasonable in
the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased,” Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 333
(5th Cir. 2021), in this case Officer Ramos fired his weapon only once, and he did so within a split-
second of the collision between A.H.’s and Officer Espinoza’s vehicles. 	(Docket Entry 35-1, at
12:31; Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:32; Docket Entry 35-3, at 12:00–01.) That is, the threat of serious
harm and the use of force occurred “in near contemporaneity.” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312,
322 (5th Cir. 2007). In such circumstances, Ramos had little choice but to “respond[ ] to a serious
threat quickly and decisively.” 	Hathaway, 507 F.3d at 322. 	And “[g]iven the extremely brief
period of time” he had “to react to a perceived threat like this one, it [wa]s reasonable [for him] to
do so with deadly force.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that “A.H.’s intent was to flee, not target [Officers] Espinoza or Ramos
with his vehicle.” (Docket Entry 43, at 13.) Even assuming this assertion to be true, A.H.’s intent
would make no constitutional difference as to reasonableness of Ramos’s use of force. The Fifth
Circuit has made this clear in a similar case, holding that the suspect “was using his car as a
weapon” even if he had no intention of doing so. Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 187 (5th Cir.
2021). In making that determination, the court offered the following illustration:
Suppose a small child finds his parents’ loaded pistol and plays with it, not
intending to shoot anyone. Is the pistol any less a weapon when the child doesn’t
intend to shoot it? Obviously not. Does the pistol constitute a deadly threat to others
when the child doesn’t intend to shoot it? Obviously. So too with [a] car.
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Id. 	Thus, A.H.’s car was a deadly weapon that posed a threat of serious harm to Espinoza
regardless of whether A.H. intended to hurt Espinoza with it.
Plaintiff also argues in her response that Officer Espinoza was never in any real danger,
pointing out that he “was safely inside of his vehicle at the time of impact,” and that “no windows
were broken and no airbags were deployed” as a result of the impact. (Docket Entry 43, at 14.)
Even assuming this to be the case, “it’s not relevant whether, in hindsight, [anyone] was ever in
real danger.” Malbrough v. Stelly, 814 F. App’x 798, 805 (5th Cir. 2020). Instead, what matters is
“whether it would have appeared to a reasonable officer on the scene that [he], other officers, or
bystanders were in danger.” 	Id. A reasonable officer in Officer Ramos’s position would have
perceived that Espinoza was in serious danger when A.H. accelerated toward his open door.
(Docket Entry 35-1, at 12:28–32.) And in a span of seconds, Officer Ramos exited his vehicle and
fired his weapon. (Docket Entry 35-2, at 12:30–32.) The collision and the gunshot occurred “in
near contemporaneity.” 	Hathaway, 507 F.3d at 322. 	Thus, as the undersigned previously
explained, “[g]iven the extremely brief period of time” that Officer Ramos had “to react to a
perceived threat like this one, it [wa]s reasonable [for him] to do so with deadly force.” Id. 	The
second factor thus also weighs against a finding of excessive force.
As all of the Graham factors weigh against finding excessive force, the Court should find,
considering the totality of the circumstances, that Officer Ramos’s use of deadly force was an
objectively 	reasonable 	response 	to 	the 	rapidly 	evolving 	circumstances 	he 	encountered.
Accordingly, Ramos is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for excessive
force. And because excessive force is the only constitutional violation alleged, the City is also
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claims against it. See Hicks-Fields v.
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Harris Cnty., Tex., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (“As is well established, every Monell claim
requires an underlying constitutional violation.”) (citation modified).
B. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claims.
In addition to her federal claims, Plaintiff asserts state-law tort claims for assault and for
battery against Officer Ramos, and for wrongful death against both Defendants pursuant to the
Texas Wrongful Death Statute. (See Docket Entry 1, at 17–18.)5 In response to the tort claims,
Officer Ramos invokes the provisions of the TTCA. 	(See Docket Entry 41, at 19–20.) And as
explained below, the wrongful-death claims fail because they are wholly derivative of the other
claims in this case.
1. 	Plaintiff’s Tort Claims.
The TTCA “bars tort claims against government employees when (1) the alleged tort
occurred ‘within the general scope of that employee’s employment’ and (2) ‘it could have been
brought under [the TTCA] against the governmental unit.’” Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th
741, 749 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting TEX. C IV. P RAC . & R EM. C ODE § 101.106(f)). In this case, the
first prong is satisfied because Plaintiff alleges—and the video evidence clearly shows—that
Officer Ramos was, at all relevant times, “acting within the course and scope of his duties as a law
enforcement official for the SAPD.” 	(Docket Entry 1, at 17.) 	The TTCA’s second prong also
5 Plaintiff also purports to assert two other claims that are not in fact independent causes of
action. First, as previously noted, see supra n.3, she purports to raise an independent survival claim
under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 71.021. (See Docket Entry 1, at 18.) But that statute
merely “preserves a claim for the estate, rather than creating a new cause of action.” Pluet, 355
F.3d at 384. Plaintiff also purports to assert an indemnification claim against the City under Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, § 102.002, (See Docket Entry 1, at 19.) Like § 71.021, that
provision does not create a cause of action; instead, it provides a rule regarding the party from
whom payment of an award of damages may be sought. In any event, the provision applies only
where there is “a cause of action for negligence.” TEX. C IV. P RAC . & R EM. C ODE § 102.002(a). It
therefore has no bearing on this case, as no negligence cause of action has been asserted.
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appears satisfied, as it requires only “that a claim against a government employee sound in tort.”
Espinal, 96 F.4th at 749. 	“If it does, then it must be dismissed—even if the governmental unit
‘would be immune from suit.’”6 Id. (quoting Wilkerson v. Uni. Of N. Tex. By & Through Bd. of
Regents, 878 F.3d 147, 161 n.16 (5th Cir. 2017)). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s assault and battery
claims appear to be foreclosed. Espinal, 96 F.4th at 749.
Although Officer Ramos advances these arguments in his motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff neither addresses them in her response nor offers any additional arguments in support of
her assault and battery claims against Officer Ramos. (See generally Docket Entry 43.) Even if
they were not foreclosed by the TTCA, they should be considered to be abandoned. 	See, e.g.,
Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ailure to pursue [a] claim
beyond [the] complaint constitute[s] abandonment.”); Muniz v. El Paso Marriott, 773 F. Supp. 2d
674, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing claims as abandoned where plaintiff “failed to address”
them in response to summary judgment motion), aff’d sub nom. Muniz v. Columbia Sussex Corp.,
477 F. App’x. 189 (5th Cir. 2012); Whitmire v. Terex Telelect, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 540, 548 (E.D.
Tex. 2005) (dismissing claims as abandoned that “were not raise[d] or brief[ed]” in summary
judgment response).
Because Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims are foreclosed by the TTCA and were
abandoned by Plaintiff’s failure to address them in her responsive brief, Officer Ramos is entitled
to summary judgment on those claims.
6 The undersigned notes that the TTCA does not waive governmental immunity from
claims “arising out of assault, battery, . . . or any other intentional tort.” C IV. P RAC . & R EM.
§ 101.057(2). Still, “for [§] 101.106(f), suit ‘could have been brought’ under the [TTCA] against
the government regardless of whether the [TTCA] waives immunity from suit.” Franka v.
Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 385 (Tex. 2011).
Case 5:24-cv-00068-FB Document 52 Filed 01/05/26 Page 14 of 16
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2. 	Plaintiff’s Wrongful Death Claims.
The Texas Wrongful Death Statute creates “a new cause of action for those surviving the
decedent.” Pluet, 355 F.3d at 384. However, a claim under the statute “derives wholly from the
cause of action that the decedent could have asserted for personal injuries had he lived.” Delesma
v. City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1985). 	Thus, any “defenses to the decedent’s
personal injury action are defenses to the wrongful death plaintiffs’ claim.” Slaughter v. S. Talc
Co., 949 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1991); see, also Montano v. Orange Cnty., Tex., 842 F.3d 865,
882 (5th Cir. 2016) (“A plaintiff seeking to recover on a wrongful death claim under § 1983 must
prove both the alleged constitutional deprivation required by § 1983 and the causal link between
the defendant’s unconstitutional acts or omissions and the death of the victim.”).
In this case, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and
state-law claims for assault and battery; accordingly, they are also entitled to summary judgment
on any claim under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute.
VI. 	Conclusion and Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
(Docket Entries 33 and 41) be GRANTED.
VII. 	Notice of Right to Object.
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on
all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a
“filing user” with the Clerk of Court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified
mail, return receipt requested. 	Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
Case 5:24-cv-00068-FB Document 52 Filed 01/05/26 Page 15 of 16
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filed within 14 days after being served with a copy of the same, unless this time period is modified
by the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. C IV. P. 72(b).
The parties shall file any objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections
on all other parties. An objecting party must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or
recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections;
“objections that are frivolous, conclusory, or general in nature needn’t be considered.” Williams
v. Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC, 694 F. Supp. 3d 874, 881 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (citing Battle v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987)).
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo
review by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985); Acuña v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections
to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this Report and
Recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking
on appeal the unobjected-to, proposed findings and conclusions accepted by the district court.
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED on January 5, 2026.
_________________________
Henry J. Bemporad
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 5:24-cv-00068-FB Document 52 Filed 01/05/26 Page 16 of 16

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