Hollis v. Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
DIANE HOLLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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1:24-CV-1483-RP-ML
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This is an action for judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision
of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, in their official capacity (“the
Commissioner”), denying disability benefits to Plaintiff.1 Before the court are Plaintiff’s
Opening Brief (Dkt. 11), Defendant’s Brief in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision (Dkt.
13), Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (Dkt. 14), and the Record of the Social Security administrative
hearing in this matter (Dkt. p), cited as TR __. Having considered the briefing, the record below,
and the case file as a whole, the Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to
the District Judge.
1 All matters in the case were referred to the Honorable Mark Lane, United States Magistrate Judge, for report
and recommendation (R&R) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(h) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to
United States Magistrate Judges.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 29, 2021, Diane Hollis filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning February 28, 2020, due to
arthritis with pain, back pain, hypertension, anxiety, depression, neuropathy, spine curvature, a
bulging disc, a hernia in the neck, and liver and kidney issues. TR 104-05, 112. Hollis’s claim
was initially denied on June 2, 2021, and upon reconsideration on February 9, 2022. TR 111,
119. After an administrative hearing held March 17, 2023 (TR 33-74), Administrative Law Judge
(the “ALJ”) Michael Sauve issued an unfavorable decision dated April 24, 2023. TR 124-35. By
Order dated September 18, 2023, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded
for the ALJ to determine whether Hollis’s job skills were readily transferable to other jobs. TR
140-45.
The ALJ held second hearing on March 29, 2024. TR 14. Hollis participated by online
video, and the hearing was also attended by Hollis’s representatives and a vocational expert (the
“VE”). The ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision on May 31, 2024. TR at 14-26. Hollis
appealed. The Appeals Council denied her request for review of the ALJ’s decision on October
15, 2024, thereby making the ALJ’s second decision the Commissioner’s final administrative
decision. TR 1. Hollis filed this action seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 1.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited. Specifically, the district court reviews:
(1) whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) if so, whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standard. Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir.
2014) (citing Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923; Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Greenspan
v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994)). It is the role of the Commissioner, and not the
courts, to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
As a result, the court “cannot reweigh the evidence, but may only scrutinize the record to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”
Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). The court may not substitute its own
judgment “even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision” because
substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.
1988). A finding of “no substantial evidence” will be made only where there is a “conspicuous
absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d
638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). If the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and her findings are supported by substantial
evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th
Cir. 1993).
B. Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof
Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reasons
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step sequential process: (1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments;
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(3) whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the
severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the
impairment or combination of impairments prevents the claimant from performing past relevant
work; and (5) whether the impairment or combination of impairments prevents the claimant from
doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. A finding that a claimant is disabled or not disabled
at any point in the process is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of the sequential analysis.
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 565. Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that there is other substantial gainful employment available that the claimant is capable of
performing. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1989). The Commissioner may
meet this burden by the use of opinion testimony of vocational experts or by use of
administrative guidelines in the form of regulations. Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1155
(5th Cir. 1982). If the Commissioner adequately points to potential alternative employment, the
burden then shifts back to the claimant to prove that she is unable to perform the alternative
work. Id.
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ determined as a threshold matter that Hollis met the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2025. TR 17. The ALJ then engaged in the
standard five-step sequential process, finding at step one that Hollis had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of February 28, 2020. TR 17.
At step two, the ALJ found Hollis has the following severe impairments: degenerative
disc disease of the cervical spine, degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder and hips,
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chronic kidney disease, hepatitis-C, hypertension, atherosclerosis, peripheral neuropathy, and
fibromyalgia. TR 17.
At step three, the ALJ determined Hollis did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). TR 19.
Before reaching step four, the ALJ determined that Hollis retains the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform:
sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except: she can frequently
climb ramps and stairs; she can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;
she can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; she can frequently
reach overhead on the right with the dominant extremity; she can frequently
handle, finger, and feel bilaterally; and she can have occasional exposure to
hazards such as unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts.
TR 20. Specifically, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms
could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence. TR 20. In making this RFC assessment, the ALJ determined that Hollis’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. TR 21.
As to Hollis’s mental health, the ALJ noted she had been diagnosed with mixed
depressive disorder with anxiety, but the ALJ found her mental impairments were non-severe.
TR 18. Hollis was prescribed Escitalopram and Buspirone by her family doctor for major
depressive disorder, and in February 2023, Hollis reported doing much better with use of
2 RFC is defined as the most an individual can still do despite their limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. The
responsibility to determine a claimant’s RFC belongs to the ALJ. Id. § 404.1546; Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552,
557 (5th Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider all the record evidence and determine
Plaintiff’s abilities despite their physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. The ALJ must consider the
limiting effects of the claimant’s impairments, even those that are nonsevere, and any related symptoms. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545. The relative weight to be given to the evidence, however, is within the ALJ’s
discretion. See Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 523 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d
340, 347 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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medications. TR 18. In May 2023, Hollis complained of fluctuations in weight, fatigue, feeling
helplessness, and excessive sleeping, but she denied suicidal ideation. TR 18. Moreover, Hollis
had not been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons, had not pursued formal mental health
treatment, and the record showed no exacerbations that required acute care. TR 18. Further,
examinations consistently indicated Hollis was alert and oriented and her memory function was
within normal limits. TR 18.
The ALJ noted that Hollis claimed she cannot use the first three fingers on either hand
because they were injured when she tried to break up a fight between her dogs. TR 20. In
January 2020, Hollis was treated in an ER following multiple dog bites. TR 21 (citing TR 922-
27). The ALJ stated, “[a]lthough [Hollis] testified that she developed neuropathy resulting from
these dog bites, when seen in follow-up by primary care physician Florence Spitler, DO, in
January of 2020, the wounds were healing well, and [Hollis] had no complaints.” TR 21 (citing
TR 612-13). After the January 2020 visit, Hollis did not return to Dr. Spitler until March of
2021, at which time she made no report of pain and/or numbness in her hands and had no related
abnormalities on exam. TR 21. Her coordination and gait were normal and there were no
musculoskeletal abnormalities or neurological deficits on exam. TR 21 (citing TR 608-10).
In February of 2020, lab tests confirmed abnormal kidney function testing (BUN,
creatinine, eGFR, and BUN/creatinine ratio), elevated liver enzymes, and positive results for
hepatitis C. TR 21 (citing TR 540-41). The evidence shows Hollis’s liver disease was
asymptomatic, and she had received no treatment for hepatitis C. TR 21. After February 2020,
Hollis pursued no further medical treatment for over a year, until she was seen by Dr. Spitler in
March 2021. TR 21. Then, she was not seen again by a doctor until she returned to Dr. Spitler in
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August of 2022 for her annual exam. TR 21. At that time, Hollis told Dr. Spitler she felt well
with no or few symptoms. TR 21.
However, in September 2022, Hollis was hospitalized for 9 days for chronic kidney
disease and acute renal failure. TR 22. She required dialysis during her inpatient stay, but she has
not required any additional dialysis treatments and there are no plans for her to be on dialysis.
TR 22. At a follow up appointment in October 2022, Hollis complained of fatigue but had no
other complaints, and her exam findings were within normal limits. TR 22. At a December 2022
appointment, Hollis again complained of fatigue, but her creatinine levels were stable. TR 22.
At a January 2023 visit with Dr. Spitler, Hollis’s creatinine was improved to just slightly
above normal, and Hollis did not report fatigue. TR 22. Hollis did report diffuse musculoskeletal
pain, but she appeared healthy looking and was in no acute distress. TR 22. She had no joint
tenderness or range of motion limitation on exam, and no evidence of ambulation difficulty. TR
22 (citing TR 1184-86). One month later, Hollis reported her pain was gone except for pain her
upper back and right hip, but she continued to report difficulty sleeping. TR 22. At that time,
Hollis had a normal physical exam. TR 22 (citing TR 1294).
In May 2023, Hollis reported worsening hip pain and pain in her fingers and shoulder for
the first time. TR 22. The Commissioner points out this visit was just a couple of weeks after the
first unfavorable decision on Hollis’s DIB application. Dkt. 13 at 6. On exam, Hollis had
tenderness to the fingertips of both hands but otherwise normal findings. TR 22. Dr. Spitler
diagnosed her with fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome and referred her to orthopedics for
evaluation. TR 22 (citing TR 1286-90). Although there was no evidence of an orthopedic
evaluation, x-rays of Hollis’s right shoulder showed only minimal arthropathy in the right AC
joint; x-rays of her left shoulder showed absence of the distal left clavicle but were otherwise
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normal; x-rays of her bilateral hips showed minimal arthritic changes bilaterally. TR 22 (citing
TR 1316-18).
A March 2024 MRI of Hollis’s right hip showed osteoarthritic changes with diffuse
labral tearing and degeneration, as well as possible cam type morphology of the proximal femur,
TR 23 (citing TR 1449). In addition, bone densitometry showed normal bone density of the
lumbar spine but osteopenia in the claimant’s left hip and femoral neck. TR 23 (citing TR 1451).
Hollis testified that she has constant pain, especially in her back, hips, and hands; cannot
use the first three fingers of either hand; can only take a few steps due to pain; and has severe
pain in the back of her legs while sitting. TR 23. She spends most of the day either in bed or in a
recliner; she cannot sit up straight and does not walk any farther than to the bathroom and back.
TR 23. The ALJ concluded that “even if [Hollis’s] daily activities are truly as limited as alleged,
it is difficult to attribute that degree of limitation to [Hollis’s] medical conditions, as opposed to
other reasons, given the extent of the objective clinical findings in the medical record and the
extent of treatment she has sought and received.” TR 23. The ALJ noted imaging studies have
only shown mild arthritic changes and Hollis has no evidence of gait abnormalities. TR 23.
Continuing on to step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Hollis is
unable to perform any past relevant work. TR 24. Hollis was 53 years old, which is defined as an
individual closely approaching advanced age, on her disability onset date. TR 25. Hollis
subsequently changed age category to advanced age. TR 25. The ALJ further found Hollis has at
least a high school education and had acquired work skills from past relevant work. TR 25.
Considering Hollis’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
the ALJ found Hollis has acquired work skills from past relevant work that are transferable to
other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. TR 25.
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Accordingly, the ALJ found Hollis was not under a disability from February 28, 2020, through
the date of the ALJ’s decision. TR 26.
Hollis now appeals from the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Issues Presented
Hollis presents two issues:
1. Whether the ALJ’s assessment of the completeness of the record is
supported by substantial evidence.
2. Whether the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Spitler’s Medical Opinion was in
compliance with the regulations and is supported by substantial evidence.
The court will address the second issue first.
B. Discussion
1. Dr. Spitler’s Medical Opinion
On January 11, 2023, Florence Spitler, D.O. completed a Medical Source Statement—
Mental. TR 640-42. Dr. Spitler treated Hollis since 2010 and had last seen her on January 7,
2023. TR 640. Dr. Spitler stated she had treated Hollis for acute renal failure due to
glomerulonephritis leading to chronic renal failure. TR 640. She stated Hollis had diminished
kidney function leading to fatigue and pain. TR 640. She further stated Hollis was unable to take
most medications due to her kidney insufficiency, but was currently taking temazepam for sleep
and Tylenol 500mg for pain. TR 640. Dr. Spitler checked a line indicating that Hollis’s
symptoms would interfere to the extent that Hollis would be unable to maintain persistence and
pace to engage in competitive employment. TR 640. She also checked a line indicating that
Hollis’s symptoms moderately impair her ability to perform activities of daily living, maintain
social functioning, and maintain concentration, persistence or pace. TR 640-41. She indicated
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that Hollis had experienced episodes of repeated decompensation at least three times in one year,
each lasting for two weeks, that cause her to withdraw from a situation or experience an
exacerbation of symptoms. TR 641. Dr. Spitler indicated that even a minimal increase in mental
demands or change would be predicted to cause Hollis to decompensate. TR 641. Dr. Spitler
expected Hollis to miss work more than four times per month. TR 641. However, Dr. Spitler also
stated Hollis did not have a history of at least one year of inability to function outside of a highly
supportive living situation. TR 641.
In evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ should consider: supportability, consistency,
relationship to the claimant, specialization, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c). The supportability and consistency factors are the most important in determining
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ is required to explain those factors and may explain, but need not
explain, the remaining factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). As for
supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . , the more
persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As for consistency,
“[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources
and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The ALJ rejected Dr. Spitler’s opinion. TR 23-24. Hollis argues the ALJ failed to
adequately address the supportability and consistency factors.
The ALJ found Dr. Spitler did not impose specific physical limitations on Hollis resulting
from her kidney disease but instead made conclusory findings about Hollis’s ability to work,
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which are findings reserved for the Commissioner. TR 23. In light of Hollis’s symptoms of
fatigue and pain resulting from her diminished kidney function, the ALJ found Hollis was
limited to sedentary work. TR 23. The ALJ also found “Dr. Spitler’s opinions are not persuasive
because they are not supported by her objective exam findings as summarized above nor are they
consistent with the longitudinal evidence.” TR 23.
Specifically, Dr. Spitler opined that Hollis would have moderate limitations in her ability
to perform activities of daily living, maintain social functioning, and maintain concentration,
persistence, and pace. Dr. Spitler also opined that Hollis had experienced repeated episodes of
decompensation. The ALJ found both of these opinions were entirely unsupported by Dr.
Spitler’s exam findings, which did not address any of these areas during the period relevant to
this decision. TR 24. Moreover, the ALJ noted Hollis had made no such complaints and, other
than a single hospitalization in September of 2022 for renal failure, her history of medical
treatment has been essentially unremarkable. TR 24. The ALJ further found Dr. Spitler’s opinion
that Hollis could be expected to miss work more than four times per month due to
psychologically based symptoms was unsupported and internally inconsistent because Dr. Spitler
did not cite any psychiatric diagnoses to support it and Hollis had not sought any treatment from
a mental health specialist. TR 24. Finally, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Spitler’s opinions were
unpersuasive “[b]ecause Dr. Spitler imposed significant restrictions that were not adequately
supported by underlying treatment records (hers or any other physicians).” TR 24.
Hollis argues the ALJ did not sufficiently address the sufficiency factor because the ALJ
did not discuss Hollis’s inability to take medications or subsequent autoimmune testing that led
Dr. Spitler to consider a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, alongside polyosteoarthritis affecting
multiple joints and peripheral neuropathic pain in the hands. See TR 1289-90. But the ALJ did
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find Hollis has the severe impairments of fibromyalgia, degenerative joint disease of the right
shoulder and hips, and peripheral neuropathy. TR 17. The ALJ did not reach the conclusions
Hollis desired, but that is not the same as the ALJ failing to adequately address Dr. Spitler’s
opinion.
Hollis essentially argues that the ALJ should have weighed the factors differently. This is
an improper invitation for the court to re-weigh the conflicting evidence, which is not the court’s
role. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Brown, 192 F.3d at 496. The cases Hollis cites are not persuasive.
Some were not from court’s in the Fifth Circuit. And, of those that were, the ALJ’s discussion of
Dr. Spitler’s opinion was far more substantial than what was described in those cases.
Hollis has not shown the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Spitler’s opinion.
2. Completeness of the Record
As noted, the ALJ did not find Dr. Spitler’s opinion persuasive. Additionally, the ALJ
found the state agency experts’ opinions had no probative value and were unpersuasive because
they failed to give a medical determination as to Hollis’s capacity for work activities. TR 24. The
state agency medical consultants determined there was insufficient evidence to impose functional
limitations due to Hollis’s repeated pattern of failure to cooperate. TR 24 (citing TR 104-11,
114-19). Hollis argues that in light of the lack of medical opinion, the ALJ failed to adequately
develop the record and therefore the court cannot undertake a substantial evidence review of the
Commissioner’s determination.
An ALJ has a duty to develop the facts fully and fairly relating to an applicant's claim for
disability benefits. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). If the ALJ does not satisfy
his duty, his decision is not substantially justified. Id. Reversal of his decision, however, is
appropriate only if the applicant shows that they were prejudiced. Id.; Madkins v. Bisignano, 150
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F.4th 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2025) (“The party seeking to overturn the Commissioner’s decision has
the burden to show that prejudice resulted from an error.”). “The touchstone for assessing
prejudice is whether errors ‘cast into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's decision.’” Lozano v. Comm'r, No. 4:21-CV-1365-P, 2023 WL 2618132, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-01365-P, 2023 WL 2619311
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2023).
It is the ALJ’s sole responsibility to weigh the evidence and formulate a plaintiff's RFC.
See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Usually, the ALJ should request a
medical source statement describing the types of work that the applicant is still capable of
performing, but the lack of such a statement does not make the record incomplete. Ripley v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). When there is no medical source statement, the court’s
inquiry focuses on whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. When the medical evidence that is available shows that a plaintiff
suffers little physical impairment, the ALJ is permitted to render a common-sense judgment
about the Plaintiff’s RFC in the workplace. Carter v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-01896-BF, 2013 WL
3328691, at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2013). Accordingly, the court will examine the relevant
medical evidence.
Hollis argues this is not a case concerning relatively little physical impairment such that
the ALJ could render a commonsense judgment about functional capacity even without a
physician's assessment. Hollis refers to her arthritis, joint pain, and pain in her fingers and argues
the “ALJ’s failure to offer a basis for considering the effects of fibromyalgia on the evidence,
‘calls into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s assessment of the
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opinion evidence[.]’” Dkt. 11 at 7 (citing Lott v. Astrue, 4:07-CV-140-A, 2008 WL 1868326, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2008)).
The Commissioner points out there were no RFC assessments from the State-agency
consultants in 2021 and 2022 because Hollis received minimal treatment and ignored requests
for information supporting her DIB claim. Dkt 13 at 7 (citing TR 116-17). Hollis acknowledged
the need for “better medical records” when she requested Appeals Council review in April 2023.
Id. (citing TR 235). And soon after, Hollis returned to Dr. Spitler with new complaints of joint
pain. Id. at 8 (citing TR 1286). The Commissioner also points out that ALJ noted this was the
first time Hollis had reported such symptoms, and her normal exam findings and mildly
abnormal imaging studies failed to corroborate the extreme functional restrictions that Hollis and
Dr. Spitler alleged. Id. (citing TR 22-23). The Commissioner rejects Hollis’s argument that
Hollis’s inability to substantiate her DIB claim with competent medical evidence meant that the
ALJ was required to fill the gap by ordering a consultative examination. Id. The Commissioner
contends “[f]urther development of the record is not required ‘unless the record establishes such
an examination is necessary to enable the [ALJ] to make the disability decision.’” Id. (quoting
Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The undersigned agrees with the Commissioner. The only evidence supporting the
extreme limitations Hollis seeks are Hollis’s own statements, not objective medical evidence. In
light of the objective medical evidence, Hollis has not shown further development of the record
was required. The court finds that the ALJ fulfilled his duty to develop the record and it was not
necessary for the ALJ to obtain an additional medical report regarding Hollis’s conditions and
her ability to work. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC and ultimate
decision.
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V. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the court’s role here is to determine whether the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard.
Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. It is the court’s responsibility to ensure the ALJ’s decision is
supported by more than a scintilla of evidence and that the ALJ properly applied the relevant
standards. The court cannot find the ALJ erred against Hollis in this case without substituting his
judgment for that of the ALJ, which he will not do.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Judge AFFIRM the Commissioner’s
decision in all aspects and DISMISS the complaint.
The referral to the Magistrate Judge should now be CANCELED.
VII. OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this Report and Recommendation must
file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2014); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the
specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection,
and specify the place in the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation where the disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will
bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
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magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain
error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
SIGNED November 19, 2025.
_______________________________
MARK LANE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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