Villarreal v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
JOSE VILLARREAL, §
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Plaintiff, §
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v. § Civil Case No. 7:23-CV-00421
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WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC, §
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Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a personal injury lawsuit arising from a slip and fall incident in a Wal-Mart
store. Plaintiff Jose Villarreal was a patron of Wal-Mart in Edinburg, Texas, who slipped
and fell while in the store’s restroom after water had accumulated on the ground. After
the accident, Villarreal sued Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC (“Walmart”) in federal court.
On May 1, 2026, this Court granted summary judgment and entered a final judgment on
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Peter Bray in favor of Walmart after Villarreal
failed to respond to Walmart’s motion.
Pending before the Court is Villarreal’s Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Dkt. No. 59). For the following
reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to seek alteration or
amendment of a final judgment within 28 days after its entry. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). It
“serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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or to present newly discovered evidence.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479
(5th Cir. 2004). To prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must show either: (1) a
manifest error of law or fact; (2) an intervening change in controlling law; or (3) the
availability of new evidence not previously available. Schiller v. Phys. Res. Group, Inc., 342
F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Such motions are “an extraordinary remedy that should be
used sparingly” and are “not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or
arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet,
367 F.3d at 478–79.
II. DISCUSSION
Villarreal’s Motion fails the Rule 59(e) standard and is nothing more than an
attempt to repackage arguments he has already made and that this Court has already
considered and rejected. Specifically, he alleges that the Court made a manifest error of
law in ruling that he waived his “independent dangerous-condition claim” by asserting
it for the first time in his objections to Judge Bray’s Memorandum and Recommendations,
(Dkt. No. 54), granting summary judgment for Walmart, (Dkt. No. 59 at 1–2). According
to Villarreal, because his First Amended Petition, (Dkt. No. 26), makes reference to the
unsafe conditions of the bathroom flooring and because Walmart and Judge Bray both
considered the testimony of Villarreal’s flooring expert at summary judgment—
testimony that stated that the dangerous condition resulted from the “high-traction floor
coupled with the presence of water”—the waived claim was already before the Court,
(see generally Dkt. No. 59).
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This argument fails. As the Court has previously ruled, Villarreal’s failure to
timely raise the independent dangerous-condition claim waived that argument. (See Dkt.
No. 57). Villarreal has presented no legitimate justification for why that ruling was
manifest error. The First Amended Complaint makes no reference to an independent
dangerous-condition claim. The allegations to which Villarreal cites in his Motion are
general statements of the floor’s unsafe conditions in line with a traditional slip-and-fall
case and do not explicitly allege an inherent-condition claim. Moreover, Villarreal failed
to respond to Walmart’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Court has already
held resulted in a waiver. (Dkt. No. 57). It is immaterial that Walmart’s Motion discussed
the testimony of Villarreal’s expert as Villarreal failed to raise that claim himself prior to
the Court’s ruling on the Motion. See Cutrera v. Bd. Of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429
F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is
raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the
court.”). Rather than granting summary judgment “merely because a motion is
unopposed” as Villarreal argues, (Dkt. No. 59 at 3), the Court granted summary judgment
on de novo review after a magistrate judge accepted unopposed facts as undisputed,
analyzed Villarreal’s raised claims under Texas law, and concluded that Walmart met its
burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
That Villarreal disagrees with this Court’s decision to grant Walmart’s Motion is
not a justification to grant a Rule 59(e) motion. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 478–79. Therefore,
and for the foregoing reasons, Villarreal’s Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), (Dkt. No. 59), is DENIED.
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It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on June 12, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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