Magnuson v. Dewitt County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
ROBERT JAMES MAGNUSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00032
DEWITT COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Robert James Magnuson, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed
this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). (D.E. 26). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Hays County Jail in San Marcos, Texas,
although this case arose in connection with his incarceration at the DeWitt County Jail in
Cuero, Texas. In his Amended Complaint, which was the operative pleading in this action,
Plaintiff names DeWitt County, Texas, as the sole defendant. (D.E. 18). Plaintiff alleged
he posted bail in the amount of $6,000, but that the money he deposited for bail was
illegally forfeited. Plaintiff claimed he was irreparably damaged by not being released
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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from custody, was denied his freedom, and was subjected to having his $6,000 illegally
forfeited. Plaintiff sought monetary damages and unspecified declaratory relief.
In a Memorandum and Recommendation issued on June 3, 2026 (M&R), the
undersigned recommended that: (1) all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and (2) the dismissal of this case
counted as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (D.E. 19, p. 11). As support
for these recommendations, the undersigned concluded that:
● Plaintiff’s allegations failed to state a claim of municipal liability against
DeWitt County;
● his allegations regarding being unlawfully detained were conclusory and
failed to allege a plausible claim; and
● Plaintiff’s constitutional claims attacking the forfeiture of his bond amount
failed because the random and unauthorized intentional deprivation of his
property did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
since he retained an adequate state law remedy to pursue the recovery of his
bail.
Id. at 6-9.
Plaintiff submitted objections to the M&R, arguing that he was in fact released on
bond. (D.E. 23, p. 1). Plaintiff further argued that the trial court in DeWitt County had a
policy of illegally forfeiting a criminal defendants’ bond even if they were present for
criminal proceedings. Id. On June 24, 2026, District Judge David S. Morales overruled
Plaintiff’s objections, adopted the M&R, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, and
imposed a strike under § 1915(g). (D.E. 24). That same day, District Judge Morales
entered a Final Judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims and closing this case. (D.E. 25).
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II. DISCUSSION
A motion which attacks a final judgment is treated either as a motion to alter or
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 1994).
On June 25, 2026, only one day after the Final Judgment was entered, the Court received
Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (D.E. 26). As such, Plaintiff’s
motion is properly construed as one arising under Rule 59(e).
A Rule 59(e) motion must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or
must present newly discovered evidence. Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir.
2005) (internal quotations omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion serves the narrow purpose of
allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004). A Rule 59(e)
motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that
could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Id. In other words, “a
‘Rule 59(e) motion is not proper to re-litigate matters that have been resolved to the
movant’s dissatisfaction’ and a party cannot attempt to obtain ‘a second bite at the apple’
on issues that were previously addressed by the parties and the Court.” N. Cypress Med.
Ctr. Operating Co. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, No. H-08-2379, 2010 WL 2245075
at * 1 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2010) (Atlas, J.) (quoting Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, No. 03-CA-
0305, 2005 WL 1420846, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2005)). Reconsideration of a judgment
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after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Templet, 367 F.3d
at 479.
Plaintiff again argues in his Rule 59(e) motion that he was released on bond, which
was contrary to the M&R’s recitation of the facts. (D.E. 26, p. 1). Plaintiff also argues
that DeWitt County has a policy—as established by the clerks of the court—of counting
criminal defendants as absent even if they were in court and counted present by the county
judge. Id. at 1-2. These arguments, however, were either raised by Plaintiff or could have
been raised by him before the entry of the Final Judgment. Indeed, District Judge Morales
already overruled Plaintiff’s objection regarding his release on bond and objection
referencing a similar policy in DeWitt County. (See D.E. 24). It is not appropriate for
Plaintiff to have another opportunity to raise such matters in an attempt to gain “a second
bite at the apple.” Plaintiff otherwise raises nothing to establish a manifest error or law or
fact that would cause the Court to revisit its Final Judgment. Plaintiff, therefore, is not
entitled to the extraordinary remedy of relief from the Final Judgment under Rule 59(e).
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s
Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment (D.E. 26) be DENIED.
Respectfully submitted on July 9, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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