Magnuson v. Dewitt County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
ROBERT JAMES MAGNUSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00032
DEWITT COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CASE
Plaintiff Robert James Magnuson (“Plaintiff”) is appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis in this prisoner civil rights action. Plaintiff’s case is subject to screening pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2),
1915A. For purposes of screening, the undersigned recommends: (1) all of Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); and (2) the dismissal of this case
counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1
1 Plaintiff is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in
any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger
of serious injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
Plaintiff is currently and inmate at the Hays County Jail in San Marcos, Texas,
although this case arises in connection with his incarceration at the DeWitt County Jail in
Cuero, Texas. Plaintiff filed this case on April 21, 2026, in the Austin Division of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. (D.E. 1). In his original
complaint, Plaintiff raised a variety of claims, most related to his allegations that his rights
were violated in connection with his criminal prosecution and probation revocation in
DeWitt County. On April 23, 2026, the case was transferred to the Victoria Division of the
Southern District of Texas. (D.E. 5). Thereafter, the case was referred to the undersigned
for case management. On May 20, 2026, the undersigned held a Spears2 hearing at which
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to explain his claims. During the Spears hearing, after
Plaintiff explained his claims, the undersigned identified and discussed with Plaintiff
certain deficiencies in his complaint. The undersigned also explained the provisions of the
three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and gave Plaintiff an
opportunity to dismiss his case without prejudice to avoid a strike, or alternatively, to file
2 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The purpose of a Spears hearing is to determine whether a prisoner
alleging a constitutional deprivation should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Spears, 766 F.2d at 181–82. The evidentiary hearing is “in the nature of a motion for more definite statement.” Id.
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an amended complaint to attempt to cure his pleading deficiencies. On May 28, 2026, the
Court received and granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File and Amended Complaint.
(D.E. 16, D.E. 18).
In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names DeWitt County, Texas, as the
sole defendant.3 Plaintiff alleges he was on community supervision in case number 21-10-
13705 in the 24th Judicial District Court, DeWitt County, Texas. A motion to revoke his
supervision was filed and a warrant was issued which also set a $6,000.00 cash bond.
Plaintiff paid the bond, but he was never released. In around November 2025, Plaintiff’s
community supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to ten years custody. Plaintiff
filed an appeal in the revocation case, he is represented by counsel on appeal, and as of this
writing, his state appeal is pending.
At the time of the probation revocation hearing in DeWitt County, Plaintiff had a
pending state criminal case in Travis County, Texas, for theft of a vehicle which was
subsequently dismissed after the DeWitt County revocation proceeding. Additionally,
Plaintiff had a pending state felony charge for evading arrest with a vehicle in Hays County,
Texas, which remains pending and is where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated.
In the instant federal civil case Plaintiff names DeWitt County, Texas, as the
defendant. Plaintiff complains he posted bail but was never released on bond. He alleges
the money he deposited for bail was illegally forfeited. Plaintiff alleges he was irreparably
damaged by not being released from custody, being denied his freedom, and by having his
3The factual background set forth herein is taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and his Spears hearing
testimony from May 20, 2026.
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$6,000.00 illegally forfeited. Plaintiff files his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages and unspecified declaratory relief.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
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dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against DeWitt County
Plaintiff names DeWitt County as the entity responsible for his being detained after
he made the cash deposit of his bail. Under § 1983, a municipality such as DeWitt County
may only be held liable for acts for which it is actually responsible. See Doe on Behalf of
Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). The governmental body must either itself subject
a person to a deprivation of rights or cause a person to be subjected to such deprivation.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011). A municipality is liable for the
constitutional violations of its employees only if the alleged constitutional deprivations
resulted from municipal policy or custom. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161,
166 (5th Cir. 2010) (a municipality may not be subject to liability merely for employing a
tortfeasor; liability requires deliberate action attributable to the municipality that is the
direct cause of the alleged constitutional violation).
Liability of a municipality under § 1983 therefore requires proof of three elements:
a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving
force” is the policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.
“Where a policy is facially unconstitutional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it was
promulgated with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences that
constitutional violations would result.” Duke v. Dallas Cnty., No. 3:20-CV-117-G (BH),
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2021 WL 3525106, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3204565 (N.D.
Tex. July 29, 2021) (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579-80 & n.22); accord Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849-50 (5th Cir. 2009). “[I]solated unconstitutional
actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability,” because “the
unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some
sort of official action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. Plaintiff has not alleged
any custom or policy that is facially unconstitutional or that any policy resulted in the
deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was unlawfully detained are conclusory
and do not state sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
posting of a bond does not necessarily mean that the detained person will automatically be
released. There may be other reasons a person remains in custody, such as the person
having other arrest warrants, detainers, or pending charges. Plaintiff testified at the Spears
hearing that at the time of the revocation proceedings in DeWitt County, Plaintiff had a
pending case in Travis County. Also, Plaintiff is currently in custody in Hays County for
charges pending there. While the timing of the charges outside of DeWitt County is
unclear, it does not appear Plaintiff has been released from custody since his November
2025 DeWitt County revocation proceedings. It is likely that Plaintiff’s charges in other
Texas counties resulted in the delay or stay of his release from custody in DeWitt County.
Even if the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff in other jurisdictions were not the cause
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of his not being released on bond, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to raise a
plausible claim against any responsible person or entity.
B. Unlawful Taking of Plaintiff’s Bail
Plaintiff alleges DeWitt County violated his rights protected by the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it forfeited his bond. (D.E. 17, p. 3).
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. While
not cited directly, Plaintiff’s complaint is also construed to be brought for a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
The Supreme Court has held that a random and unauthorized intentional deprivation
of property does not violate the Due Process Clause if the State provides an adequate post-
deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1984); Myers v.
Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). A claimant must either take advantage of the
available remedies or show the available remedies are inadequate. Hudson, 468 U.S. at
534-35.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claim that his $6,000.00 was taken or withheld unlawfully,
Plaintiff has an adequate remedy to pursue the recovery of his bail. Article 17.02 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]ny cash funds deposited under this
Article shall be receipted for by the officer receiving the same and shall be refunded to the
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defendant if and when the defendant complies with the conditions of his bond, and upon
order of the court.” Plaintiff has a “clear statutory right to move the [state] court for an
order compelling the return of [his] bail money.” Obregon v. Melton, No. 3:02-cv-1009D,
2004 WL 302293, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2004) (citing Baize v. Shaver, 935 S.W.2d 498,
499-500 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ of mandamus granted)). Plaintiff has
not alleged he made a motion with the state court to return his bail. Even if Plaintiff did
make such a motion, he has the right to appeal the denial of such order through the state
courts or perhaps to file for a writ of mandamus through the state courts. Plaintiff has
adequate state remedies in the state courts for the return of his bail, and his claim is not
cognizable in this Court. To the extent Plaintiff claims the loss of property was only the
result of negligence, he has no claim for violation of a constitutionally protected right.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
C. Claims Not Specifically Addressed in this Memorandum
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
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The undersigned has liberally construed Plaintiff’s pleadings to give his claims fair
and meaningful consideration. Before entering this recommendation to dismiss, the
undersigned warned Plaintiff of his pleading deficiencies and allowed Plaintiff to amend
his pleadings. Plaintiff fully explained his claims to the undersigned during a Spears
hearing and also filed an amended complaint. The undersigned has attempted to articulate
and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate
leniency to pro se litigants while at the same time requiring compliance with applicable
pleading and screening standards. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not
specifically addressed by the undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation,
Plaintiff has failed to state such claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the
claim to be identified or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Again,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise to a
reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, the
factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that any claim not
addressed in this Memorandum and Recommendation is not currently before this Court
because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
Additionally, because Plaintiff has been provided the opportunity to explain his claims at
the Spears hearing, has been granted leave to amend, has been warned of his pleading
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deficiencies, and because any amendment would be futile, the undersigned recommends
Plaintiff not be granted further leave to amend.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above and for purposes of §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), the
undersigned recommends: (1) all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b)(1); and (2) the dismissal of this case counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Respectfully submitted on June 3, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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