Kramer v. Itz et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
MELANIE GRACE KRAMER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00006
BELONG / SJRC TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Melanie Grace Kramer is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“ifp”)
in this civil action. This case is subject to screening pursuant to the in forma pauperis
statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2).1 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
respectfully recommends Plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise state law claims and invoke the
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to do so
and DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s state law claims. Finally, the undersigned
recommends the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order (D.E. 3).
1 Ms. Kramer is a civilian who is not in custody. Nevertheless, section 1915(e)(2)(B) screening applies equally to
prisoner as well as non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases. See Newsome v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 301
F.3d 227, 231–33 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of non-prisoner claims for frivolity and failure to state a claim
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint and application to proceed ifp on
February 4, 2026. (D.E. 1, D.E. 2). Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a temporary
restraining order on February 4, 2026. (D.E. 3). Plaintiff’s ifp application was granted on
February 6, 2026. (D.E. 8). On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff appeared in person at a Spears2
hearing where she was given an opportunity to explain her claims. The factual background
is drawn from her Complaint, her Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and her Spears hearing testimony.
Plaintiff is a single mother with three children whose current ages are 8, 11, and 17.
In February 2020, Holly Hamilton, an employee with the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (DFPS), appeared at Plaintiff’s residence and removed the children
from Plaintiff’s home. This action was done based on an allegation Plaintiff slammed the
head of one of her children through a wall. Ms. Kramer vehemently denies the incident
occurred; however, she testified she thereafter went into a deep depression and began
abusing “heavy” drugs. Plaintiff is currently on state felony probation for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. However, Plaintiff further testified she is currently drug free, is
2 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that testimony given at a Spears hearing is incorporated into the pleadings).
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mentally stable, recently received her associates degree, and is currently an A student
working toward a bachelor’s degree.
The removal of the Plaintiff’s children from her custody in 2020 resulted in state
court proceedings regarding the children and their subsequent placement in foster homes.
The proceedings remain ongoing before the 135th District Court, in Victoria County, Texas
in case number 20-03-85670-B with District Judge Lisa Harvey Moore currently presiding.
The children are represented by attorney ad litem Julie Hale. Plaintiff is represented by
attorney Steven Cihal in the civil proceedings relating to her children and parental rights.
Plaintiff’s two younger children have been placed with a family member of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s oldest child was initially placed in a group home but was subsequently placed
with foster parents who are not related to Plaintiff or the child. Plaintiff’s oldest child is
currently 17 years old and turns 18 in March of this year.
As of the date of the Spears hearing, the most recent state court proceeding relating
to Plaintiff’s children was on February 10, 2026. According to Plaintiff, the purpose of the
proceeding was for DFPS to no longer be involved with Plaintiff’s two younger children.
However, those proceedings did not go as expected, when Plaintiff and the children’s foster
parents refused to sign the plan proposed by DFPS and the case was reset.
In Plaintiff’s complaint she names forty defendants. The defendants include the
Texas DFPS, DFPS case workers, investigators, social service agencies and supervisors,
foster parents, the Victoria County Sheriff’s Department, local law enforcement officers,
the Texas Rangers, Judge Lisa Harvey-Moore, the Victoria County District Clerk, the
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children’s ad litem attorney, and a variety of other persons. While Plaintiff’s complaint
provides little to no factual context for her claims, she provided the undersigned with a
general factual background during the Spears hearing.
Plaintiff alleges the initial removal of her children from her custody was unlawful
and without cause. She alleges that over the course of several years DFPS made decisions
that were not supported by fact, and in some cases were based on incorrect or fabricated
facts. She alleges the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive her of her rights and
have falsified or fabricated evidence. She alleges her children have been kidnapped, she
has been defamed as a “mental subject,” she has been discriminated against, her privacy
has been invaded, her speech has been suppressed, and her vehicle has been subjected to
unlawful tracking. She alleges the defendants actions violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order immediately returning her oldest
child to her custody and removing any reference as her being a “mental subject” from law
enforcement and DFPS records. She also seeks recovery of monetary damages, attorney’s
fees, and costs of court.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed IFP and therefore, her complaint is subject
to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which imposes a screening responsibility on
the district court when the plaintiff has been granted IFP status. That section provides for
sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it (1) is frivolous or malicious;
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(2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is legally frivolous under § 1915
when it is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A court may
dismiss a complaint as frivolous if, after providing the plaintiff with the opportunity to
present additional facts, when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-34 (1992). A claim is factually frivolous if the facts are
“clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and
‘delusional.’” Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1992) (citations omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the factual
allegations are not sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculation level. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal for failure to state a claim
is appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Plaintiffs must state enough facts to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. In considering whether to
dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, all factual
allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed favorably to the plaintiff.
Fernandez-Montez v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted). Further, pro se pleadings are reviewed under a less stringent standard than those
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drafted by attorneys, and such pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction that includes
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions will not suffice” to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Fernandez-Montez, 987 F.2d at 284. The complaint must state more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citation omitted). Dismissal is appropriate “only if it appears that no relief could
be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations.”
Newsome, 301 F.3d at 231.
Plaintiff attempts to raise several claims based on federal law. Section 1983 of Title
42 of the United States Code provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law
by those acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color
of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of
state law if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim,
the improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v.
Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
Section 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code, often referred to as the Ku Klux
Klan Act, creates a cause of action for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 creates a private civil remedy for three
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prohibited forms of conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Subsection (1) prohibits
conspiracies to prevent federal officers from performing the duties of their offices “by
force, intimidation, or threat;” Subsection (2) concerns conspiracies directed at the right of
participation in federal judicial proceedings; Subsection (3) prohibits conspiracies to
“depriv[e] ... any person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws” and those
aimed at preventing a person from lawfully voting. Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Par.
Consol. Gov’t, 921 F. Supp. 2d 605, 642 (W.D. La. 2013). Sections 1 and 2 are inapplicable
in the present case. Unlike a Section 1983 claim, Section 1985 does not require a state
actor. Cervini v. Cisneros, 593 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (citing Paynes v.
Lee, 377 F.2d 61, 63–64 (5th Cir. 1967)). However, “naked allegation[s]” of discriminatory
intent are too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561,
572 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12189, provides
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. To establish a valid ADA claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has a qualifying
disability; (2) she is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which
the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;
and (3) such discrimination is by reason of his disability. Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of
La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir. 2018). A qualifying disability is a “physical
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or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A). The definition of “disability” is to be given broad construction. See id. §
12102(4)(A).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims
Plaintiff brings most of her claims under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, seeking
to hold Government officials and others responsible for constitutional violations in
connection with her parental rights and custody of her children. Under the domestic
relations exception, federal courts have traditionally refused to adjudicate cases involving
marital status or child custody issues which are pending in state court. Rykers v. Alford,
832 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1987). Federal courts should not determine “which parent
should receive custody, what rights the noncustodial parent should have, how much child
support should be paid and under what conditions, or whether a previous court’s
determination on these matters should be modified…” Id; Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S.
293, 308 (2006) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703–04 (1992) (Family
law matters are traditionally litigated in state court systems and federal courts generally
abstain from hearing such matters).
The instant case arises in a similar context to facts and claims in Walker v. Walker,
No. 4:20-cv1204, 2021 WL 3642077 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2021). In Walker, United States
District Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. addressed similar jurisdictional questions and found
that even if federal question jurisdiction existed for the plaintiff’s section 1983 claims,
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federal courts normally abstain from adjudicating family-law disputes under Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Additionally, Judge Hanks found in Walker that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgements under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Walker at *4 (citing inter alia, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 413 (1923)).
See also Janosek v. Gonzalez, No. 2:17-cv-111, 2017 WL 3474104 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 11,
2017)(N. Ramos) (Remanding family law case to state court based on lack of jurisdiction).
Plaintiff’s case, at its core, is a child-custody and parental rights case in which she
seeks to sue the people who were involved in any way with the removal of her children
from her custody, from the law enforcement officers and social workers to the foster
parents and state court judges. All of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the circumstances
related to the removal of Plaintiff’s children from her custody and the Court should abstain
from adjudicating these claims.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to raise claims not intertwined with the underlying
child custody proceedings, Plaintiff has not alleged any discrete facts to raise any plausible
claim. Plaintiff’s claims are entirely conclusory. She alleges the defendants conspired3
3 Section 1983 claims usually involve a state actor. The Fifth Circuit has recognized situations where a private citizen
can be considered to be acting under the color of state law, but such actions must be “fairly attributable to the State.”
Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2004). For non-state actors to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff
must show a conspiracy between those defendants and state actors. Id. at 420. Conclusory allegations will not suffice.
“Conclusory allegations that do not reference specific” facts tending to show an agreement are insufficient. Duke v.
Collier, No. 6:24-CV-85-JDK-KNM, 2025 WL 1605026, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2025) (quoting Montgomery v.
Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019)). While Plaintiff names some defendants who are state employees, she
has not stated any facts that any of these defendants did any action which could be construed as a violation of any
right protected by the Constitution or law of the United States. To the extent Plaintiff alleges her rights were violated
by state actors, her allegations are conclusory and are not supported by the facts. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the
existence of a conspiracy (under either Section 1983 or 1985) between state actors and private citizens are also
unsupported by any facts.
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against her to remove her children from her residence or that they violated her rights under
the Constitution or ADA, but she does not allege any facts to support such claims. During
the Spears hearing, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to explain the basis for her claims,
and she was unable or unwilling to provide a factual basis for her claims. For example,
Plaintiff alleges she suffered from serious mental health problems and her rights were
violated when her children were removed from her custody. However, she fails to allege
any facts that indicate her rights were violated under the ADA. Plaintiff essentially argues
in a circular manner that her rights were violated when her children were removed from
her custody and the facts supporting her claims are that her children were unlawfully
removed from her custody. She also argues, without providing context, that various people
involved in the investigation and legal proceedings falsified reports or evidence or
otherwise acted unethically. However, all of Plaintiff’s complaints are centered around the
investigation and state court proceedings relating to the custody of her children. Plaintiff
has not stated sufficient facts to raise plausible claims under any of these theories of
liability. Twombly, 500 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff’s allegations seeking to bring federal claims
are not sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculation level for any of her claims.
Id. Under the judicial screening standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff’s federal
claims are subject to sua sponte dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
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During the Spears hearing Plaintiff also testified she is currently on probation after
having been convicted in state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Plaintiff’s
testimony could be construed to be an allegation that she believes this conviction was
unjust or somehow improper. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise claims in
connection with her conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, for example
whether the evidence was fabricated or the conviction was somehow improper, such claims
are not cognizable under the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 486-87. The Heck rule also applies to both monetary and injunctive or declaratory
relief, which, if granted, would necessarily imply that a conviction is invalid. See Mann v.
Denton Cty., Tex., 364 F. App’x 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2010); Reger v. Walker, 312 F. App’x
624, 625 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm
has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated, thus any claim seeking to undermine the
validity of this conviction is Heck-barred.
The undersigned respectfully recommends Plaintiff’s federal claims be
DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise state law claims for defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, or other state law claims, the Court
could elect to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367. However, the Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction if the Court dismisses all the claims over which the Court has original
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts
should avoid making needless decisions of state law. Lewis v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv.
Dist. No. 2, 956 F. Supp. 2d 722, 735 (E.D. La. 2013), aff’d, 562 F. App’x 209 (5th Cir.
2014) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)). The
undersigned notes Plaintiff’s state law claims are just as devoid of a factual basis as her
federal claims and are also subject to dismissal. However, the undersigned views Plaintiff’s
state law claims differently from her federal claims. While Plaintiff has currently failed to
allege facts to state a plausible state law claim, it is at least theoretically possible that she
has a plausible claim. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss these claims without prejudice.
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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
In addition to the Complaint, Plaintiff has separately filed an Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. (D.E. 3). Plaintiff filed the motion under seal, and the details
of the sealed motion need not be set out herein at length. The motion generally concerns
Plaintiff’s eldest child who turns 18 in March of this year. Plaintiff again complains
without factual or legal support that the custody order placing this child in foster care was
obtained through fraud. She further complains about the risk of her child disappearing,
being isolated, and the quality of medical care the child is receiving. Plaintiff further alleges
without any basis in fact that the child is being groomed by her foster parents for possible
sexual exploitation. Plaintiff seeks the immediate return of the child to her custody or a
neutral relative and other relief.
Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Direct
Biologic, L.L.C. v. McQueen, 63 F.4th 1015, 1020 (5th Cir. 2023). Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The decision
to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”) To
issue such relief, the Court must “balance the competing claims of injury and must consider
the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted). And only when the movant has “clearly carried the
burden of persuasion should a court grant preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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To obtain a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the
movant must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities
tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Ramirez v. Collier, 595
U.S. 411, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1269 (2022). Each of the factors weigh against granting a
preliminary injunction.
This memorandum and recommendation sets forth the reasons why Plaintiff’s
claims have no merit. Further, Plaintiff has not established any irreparable harm.
Specifically, her testimony establishes there are ongoing state court proceedings where
Plaintiff’s concerns may be addressed. The children are represented by attorney ad litem
Julie Hale who has an obligation to look out for the best interests of the children. Plaintiff
is represented by attorney Steven Cihal in the civil proceedings relating to her children and
Plaintiff’s attorney has the obligation to work on behalf of Plaintiff’s interests. Plaintiff’s
two younger children have been placed with a family member of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s oldest
child is almost of the age of majority. Plaintiff recently filed a document indicating her
oldest child requested Plaintiff to terminate the instant litigation. While Plaintiff
characterizes the events as evidence of witness tampering, the undersigned views the
development as further reason to believe Plaintiff’s motion for emergency injunctive relief
is unwarranted. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory, without merit, and the children’s
interests are protected by their attorney ad litem and by State District Judge Lisa Harvey.
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The undersigned recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for a
Protective Order. (D.E. 3).
D. Other Claims Not Specifically Addressed in this Memorandum
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
The undersigned has attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an
impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants while at
the same time requiring compliance with applicable pleading and screening standards. To
the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not specifically addressed by the
undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to state such
claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the claim to be identified, understood,
or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Again,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise to a
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reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, the
factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff is further advised that any claim not addressed in this Memorandum and
Recommendation is not currently before this Court because Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
The undersigned further recommends Plaintiff not be given leave to amend because
she was provided with an opportunity to explain her claims at an evidentiary hearing. The
undesigned has considered Plaintiff’s testimony and finds any amendment would be futile
because Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous or otherwise lack merit.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned recommends all of Plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff fails to state claims on which
relief may be granted. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise state law claims and invoke the
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to do so,
and Plaintiff’s state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. Further, the
undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for a Protective Order (D.E. 3) be
DENIED.
Respectfully submitted on February 26, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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