USA v. Brzozowske-Doubrava et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
Plaintiff/Respondent, §
§
v. § Criminal Action No. 6:22-CR-00090-3
§ Civil Action No. 6:25-CV-00033
CHARLES BRANCE ADAMS, §
§
Defendant/Movant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Charles Brance Adams’s pro se Motion to
Vacate Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Motion”), (Dkt. No. 233), to which the
United States of America (the “Government”) has responded, (Dkt. No. 263).1 For the
reasons stated herein, the Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Charles Brance Adams (“Adams”) is the brother of Trace Adams. (Dkt.
No. 184 at 5–6). On October 9, 2022, after Trace Adams was arrested for
manufacturing/delivering methamphetamine and steroids and for tampering with
evidence, he called his brother from prison. (Id. at 6). During that call, Trace asked
Adams to retrieve several items from Trace’s house—where Adams was staying—
including a cell phone, a box, and suspected United States currency possibly totaling
$7,400. (Id.). According to a Victoria County Sheriff’s Office (“VCSO”) deputy, Trace had
1 Docket Numbers (Dkt. No.) refer to the criminal case.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 28, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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a history of calling people while in custody to move evidence and contraband from one
location to another. (Id.).
VCSO and the Victoria Police Department (“VPD”) began surveillance on Trace’s
residence on October 10, 2022. (Id.). They observed a white Dodge truck belonging to
Trace leaving the location. (Id.). Law-enforcement authorities followed the vehicle and
observed it violating several traffic laws and suspiciously entering and exiting a nursing
home parking lot. (Id.). After pulling the vehicle over, officers identified the driver as
Adams and cited him for traffic violations and for the vehicle not having a window-tint
label. (Id.).
A search of Adams revealed a large amount of United States currency in his pants
pocket totaling about $7,420. (Id.). During an inventory search of the vehicle, law
enforcement located a blue and gray Under Armor backpack on the rear seat. (Id.). The
backpack contained Adams’s bank card, a single bag containing 5.38 grams of 99% pure
methamphetamine, a black box, and a digital scale with residue consistent with
methamphetamine. (Id.). The black box contained multiple individual bags of
methamphetamine. (Id.). The total seized amount of methamphetamine was 349.3 grams
of 91% pure methamphetamine (317.8 grams actual). (Id.). Adams later claimed he did
not know how much methamphetamine he was transporting. (Id. at 7).
On December 22, 2022, Adams, Trace, and another co-defendant were charged
with knowingly and intentionally conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a
controlled substance. (Dkt. No. 1). This violation involved more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
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841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). (Id.). A Superseding Indictment was later filed to add
additional co-defendants. (Dkt. No. 92). On February 26, 2024, Adams pled guilty to the
charged crime pursuant to a written plea agreement. (See Dkt. No. 257); (see also Dkt. No.
174). Under the plea agreement, Adams agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 of the
indictment and waive his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence,
except to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See generally Dkt. No 174). In
exchange, the Government agreed to recommend a sentence within the applicable
guideline range as well as several potential guideline reductions based on timely
notification of guilty plea and substantial assistance. (Id.).
At his February 26, 2024, rearraignment hearing, Adams affirmed under oath that
he had been able to communicate with his counsel, Mr. Joel Thomas, and that he had had
enough time to discuss the case with counsel. (Dkt. No. 257 at 6–7). Adams testified that
he understood the nature of the charges, the elements of each offense, and his right to
plead not guilty and proceed to trial. (Id. at 7–10). He stated that he and counsel had
discussed how his sentence would be calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines and
that he understood that he faced a maximum of life imprisonment. (Id. at 10–12). He
further testified that he was not threatened, coerced, or promised leniency in exchange
for his guilty plea. (Id. at 12). He also testified that he understood and signed the plea
agreement and that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if he did not receive the
sentence he was expecting or had hoped for. (Id. at 14–15). Adams also affirmed that the
facts contained in the Stipulation of Facts were true. (Id. at 16–21). The Court accepted
Adams’s guilty plea after being satisfied that he was competent to enter the plea, he
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understood the consequences of entering a plea, and he was voluntarily and knowingly
pleading guilty. (Id. at 21).
Adams’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated the base offense
level for Count 1 at 32. (Dkt. No. 184 at 13). Two levels were subtracted for Adams’s
minor role in the criminal activity. (Id.). After credit for acceptance of responsibility, his
total offense level was 27. (Id.). With a criminal history category of V, his advisory
Guidelines sentencing range was 120–150 months. (Id. at 20). Adams filed an objection
to the PSR on the grounds that he should have received a four-point reduction for his
minor role in the criminal activity as opposed to the two-point reduction he actually
received. (See Dkt. No. 183). The Court agreed with Adams and granted an additional
two-point reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)(A) and (B)(i). (Dkt. No. 190 at 1).
The new Guidelines sentencing range therefore was 120–125 months.2 (Id.). The Court
sentenced Adams to 120 months’ imprisonment as well as 24 months’ imprisonment for
violating a term of supervised release, to run concurrently. (Dkt. No. 197 at 14).
Judgment was entered on May 20, 2024. (Dkt. No. 189). On June 3, 2025, Adams
filed a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Dkt. No. 233). The Government filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in response. (Dkt. No. 263). Despite moving for an
extension of time to file a reply, (Dkt. No. 267), and a continuance, (Dkt. No. 270)—both
of which the Court granted, (Dkt. Nos. 269, 271)—Adams failed to file a reply.
2 The minimum term of imprisonment for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)
is 120 months. (Dkt. No. 184 at 27).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
There are four cognizable grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence: (1) constitutional issues, (2) challenges to the
district court’s jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) challenges to the length of a
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and (4) claims that the sentence is otherwise
subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th
Cir. 1996). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional
rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal
and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v.
Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992).
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegation presented in a Section 2255 motion
is properly analyzed under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984). United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592,
598 (5th Cir. 2001). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant
must demonstrate that his or her counsel’s performance was both deficient and
prejudicial. Id. This means that a movant must show that counsel’s performance was
outside the broad range of what is considered reasonable assistance and that this deficient
performance led to an unfair and unreliable conviction and sentence. United States v.
Dovalina, 262 F.3d 472, 474–75 (5th Cir. 2001).
In reviewing ineffectiveness claims, “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance
must be highly deferential,” and every effort must be made to eliminate “the distorting
effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. An ineffective assistance
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claim focuses on “counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed
as of the time of counsel’s conduct,” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.” Id. at 689–90, 104
S.Ct. at 2065–66. With regard to the prejudice requirement, a movant must show that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Armstead v.
Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A court need not address both components of the
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); Carter v. Johnson, 131
F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Failure to prove either deficient performance or actual
prejudice is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Adams raises the following claims in his Section 2255 Motion:
1) His counsel failed to make objections during the sentencing phase of his
trial related to a mitigating-role adjustment and an incorrect criminal
history calculation.
2) His guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made because his attorney
lied to him.
3) The traffic stop precipitating his arrest was unlawful and his attorney
should have moved to suppress the evidence against him.
(Dkt. No. 233 at 5–10, 14–18).
The Government responds that each claim is legally meritless or is otherwise
procedurally barred. (Dkt. No. 263).
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A. GROUND ONE
In Ground 1 of the Motion, Adams claims that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing because his counsel failed to argue for a mitigating role sentencing
adjustment and failed to object to his criminal history point calculation. (Dkt. No. 233 at
5, 14–15). This argument is contradicted by the record. Not only did Adams’s counsel
file a substantive written objection addressing the mitigating role adjustment, (see Dkt.
No. 183), counsel also orally urged this same objection at sentencing, (Dkt. No. 191 at 8–
9). In fact, both Probation and the Court agreed with Adams’s counsel and granted him
an additional two-point sentence reduction. (Id.). As for the criminal history score claim,
his counsel also argued at sentencing that “his criminal history is a little bit over
represented” because “[h]e basically received seven points for one offense.” (Id. at 10–
11). This is the same argument Adams now asserts in his Section 2255 motion. (See Dkt.
No. 233 at 5, 14–15).3 Adams cannot claim his counsel was ineffective when his counsel
raised the very same objections at sentencing that he now asserts.
Accordingly, Adams has failed to show that his counsel’s performance at
sentencing was deficient, and the Court therefore denies his claims in Ground 1.
3 Even if Adams’s counsel failed to raise this issue at sentencing it would still be meritless.
As the Government explains, (see Dkt. No. 263 at 20–22), under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), prior
sentences are treated as a single sentence unless (1) they are “separated by an intervening arrest,”
(2) “the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument,” or (3) “the
sentences were imposed on the same day.” None of these sections apply to Adams’s previous
sentences. (See Dkt. No. 184 at 18–19).
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B. GROUND TWO
In Ground 2 of his Motion, Adams claims that he was coerced into pleading guilty
and that he did not do so voluntarily or knowingly. (Id. at 6, 15–17). Specifically, he
asserts that he was coerced because counsel told him (1) that he would get “50 to life,”
that he would never win at trial, and that the Government “could charge [him] with the
entire conspiracy” which “was absolutely untrue,” (2) that his brother would testify
against him, (3) that he could pursue civil lawsuits against the Sheriff’s Office for Fourth
Amendment violations despite “a guilty plea barr[ing] [him] from any action,” and
(4) that he would receive a minimal-role adjustment if he pled guilty. (Id.).
Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective
assistance of competent counsel.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65, 130 S.Ct. 1473,
1480–81, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (quoting first McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90
S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and then citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct.
at 2063). Strickland’s two-part analysis applies to claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this context. E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369–70, 88
L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). During this stage of a proceeding, the Supreme Court has reiterated
that counsel has “the critical obligation . . . to advise the client of ‘the advantages and
disadvantages of a plea agreement.’” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370, 130 S.Ct. at 1484 (citing
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51, 116 S.Ct. 356, 368, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995)). “It
is the lawyer’s duty to ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly,” and
the “lawyer must actually and substantially assist his client in deciding whether to plead
guilty.” United States. v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 440 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Herring v. Estelle,
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491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974)). “It is his job to provide the accused an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts.” Id. “The advice he gives need not be perfect, but it
must be reasonably competent.” Id. In this context, the prejudice prong requires the
prisoner to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” United States v. Smith,
844 F.2d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370). “The test
is objective; it turns on what a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would do.” Id.
at 209; accord Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372, 130 S.Ct. at 1485 (“[A] petitioner must convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances.”).
In determining the voluntariness of a plea, a court considers all relevant
circumstances, including whether the defendant: (1) had notice of the charges against
him; (2) understood the constitutional protections he was waiving; and (3) had access to
competent counsel. United States v. Washington, 480 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). With
respect to sentencing, a guilty plea is considered knowing and voluntary so long as a
defendant knows “the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.” Ables v.
Scott, 73 F.3d 591, 592 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447
(5th Cir. 1990)). As long as Adams “‘understood the length of time he might possibly
receive, he was fully aware of his plea’s consequences.’” See Barbee v. Ruth, 678 F.2d 634,
635 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Adams’s sworn statements in open court are entitled to a strong presumption of
truthfulness. United States v. Lampaziane, 251 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Blackledge
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v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977)). Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit affords “great weight to the defendant’s statements at the plea colloquy.” United
States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283–84 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, a signed,
unambiguous plea agreement is accorded great evidentiary weight when deciding if the
plea is entered voluntarily. See Bonvillan v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986).
Adams affirmed under oath at rearraignment that he had discussed his charges
with counsel and understood the charges. (Dkt. No. 257 at 6–7). He stated that he
understood his right to a trial and his rights at trial, and that he was waiving those rights.
(Id. at 7–9). He affirmed that he understood all the elements of the offense he was charged
with. (Id. at 9–10). Adams acknowledged the maximum punishment and stated that he
had discussed the sentencing procedures with counsel. (Id. at 10–11). He affirmed that
no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty, and no one had promised him
leniency. (Id. at 12). He also affirmed that the plea agreement was accurately described,
the stipulation of facts was true and correct, and he had given counsel permission to sign
both documents. (Id. at 13–21). The Court accepted Movant’s guilty plea after being
satisfied that he was competent to enter a plea, that there was a factual basis for the plea,
that he understood the consequences of entering a plea, and that he was voluntarily and
knowingly pleading guilty. (Id. at 21).
The evidence before the Court shows that Adams’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary. Accordingly, Adams’s claim in Ground 2 is denied.
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C. GROUNDS THREE AND FOUR
Finally, Adams argues in Grounds 3 and 4 that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress related to alleged Fourth
Amendment violations during his arrest. (Dkt. No. 233 at 8–9, 17–18).
“A voluntary and unconditional guilty plea has the effect of waiving all
nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” United States v. Wise, 179 F.3d 184,
186 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 25
L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 77 & n. 3 (5th Cir. 1966) (collecting
cases)). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in
fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.” United States v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1240 (5th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted). “This includes all [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims
‘except insofar as the ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea
involuntary.’” United States v. Palacios, 928 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit and other courts have
found waiver on this basis when a defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is premised
on a failure to file a motion to suppress. United States v. Terry, 233 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2000)
(per curiam); see also Boudreaux v. Kent, No. 3:20-CV-00120, 2023 WL 2439840, at *5 (M.D.
La. Feb. 16, 2023), report and recommendation adopted 2023 WL 2436954 (M.D. La. Mar. 9,
2023); Sanchez v. United States, No. 3:15-CR-00432, 2020 WL 1942137, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2020 WL 1940269 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2020).
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Because the Court has already found that Adams’s plea was voluntary, his right
to challenge counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress is waived. Accordingly, his
claims in Grounds 3 and 4 are denied.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The Section 2255 Rules instruct this Court to “issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11,
§ 2255 Rules.
A certificate of appealability (COA) “may issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “The
COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas
petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336,
123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). To warrant a grant of the certificate as to
claims denied on their merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).
This standard requires a Section 2255 movant to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could
debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues
presented deserved encouragement to proceed further. United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d
325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying upon Slack, 529 U.S. at 483–84).
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Based on the above standards, the Court concludes that Adams is not entitled to a
COA. That is, reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s resolution of his claims, nor
do these issues deserve encouragement to proceed. See Jones, 287 F.3d at 329.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Adams’s pro se Motion to Vacate Sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, (Dkt. No. 233), is DENIED, and he is further DENIED a Certificate of
Appealability.
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on May 28, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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