Lainez Lainez v. Bondi et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
WILMER ANTONIO LAINEZ LAINEZ,
Petitioner,
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V. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00064
TODD BLANCHE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner is currently detained in federal immigration custody in Texas. Before
the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (Dkt.
No. 1), and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, (Dkt. No. 10).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s deprivation of liberty without constitutionally
adequate procedures is a violation of his due process rights, and the failure to provide
due process warrants his release. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted in part. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner
by June 17, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. The parties are ordered to notify the Court of the status
of Petitioner’s release by June 18, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, challenges his ongoing detention without a bond
hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 2013. (Dkt. No. 1 at
5).1 Petitioner represents that he has no criminal history and Respondents’ evidence is
consistent with that assertion. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2; Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3). Petitioner last
1 When citing to the page numbers of any document in the record, the Court will cite to the page
numbering of the Court’s internal CM/ECF docket system, and not to the page numbers in the underlying
documents.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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resided with his family—including his three children—in Riverdale, Maryland, and he
has a U.S. citizen willing to serve as his sponsor if released. (Dkt. No. 18 at 3).
On November 6, 2025, Petitioner was detained during a vehicle stop in Frederick,
Maryland. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 2). He was served a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court.
(Dkt. No. 10-2). Though Petitioner has requested custody redeterminations, he has not
received a bond hearing on the merits while he’s been detained. (Dkt. Nos. 18-3, 18-4).
On February 25, 2026, Petitioner was ordered removed. (Dkt. No. 18-5). However, he filed
a timely appeal, which remains pending, so his removal order is not final. (See Dkt. No.
18-6); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.
B. Legal Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
released interim guidance in July 2025, announcing a new legal position on detention
authorities for noncitizens. The guidance interpreted the mandatory detention provision
of Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as
applying to the detention of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who
have not been admitted, whether they arrive at a port of entry or enter without
inspection. This position was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
September 2025. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In the months following the shift in policy, federal district courts across the
country found the Government’s interpretation at odds with the text of the statute and
ordered bond hearings, or release, for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under
the policy. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit held
that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission, regardless of whether they
are actively “seeking admission” when they are detained. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026). However, Buenrostro did not address the validity of
due process claims such as those raised by Petitioner in this case. See, e.g., Bonilla Chicas
v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); see also
Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025), overruled by Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494 (explaining the Court’s prior
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statutory interpretation of Section 1225).
C. Procedural Background
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, maintaining that
he is entitled to release from detention. In his petition, Petitioner raises several claims
for relief: violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; violation of the
INA; denial of opportunity to challenge misclassification for mandatory detention;
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and violation of the Suspension Clause.
Petitioner requests, among other things, that this Court issue an order declaring his
detention unlawful and immediately release him from custody or provide a bond hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondents move to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, asserting
that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims, is subject to mandatory detention, and his
detention does not violate due process. The Court principally addresses Petitioner’s
procedural due process claim and finds that his detention violates due process.2 The
Court incorporates the legal standards and analysis applied in its prior order granting a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under similar facts. Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No.
5:26-CV-268, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026).
There, this Court found that Buenrostro does not foreclose due process challenges
to mandatory detention, a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention may bring an as-
applied due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225(b)(2), Supreme Court precedent
does not foreclose that type of challenge, and liberty interests in freedom from detention
must be protected by due process of law, including individualized justification for civil
detention. See id. The Court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge
and found that the petitioner’s procedural due process rights had been violated. Id. at 13
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Court ordered immediate
release for the due process violation. Id. at 17.
The Court finds that the same reasoning applies to these facts, though Petitioner’s
length of presence in the United States is factually distinct from Lopez Moncebais.
2 Because the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief without consideration of his other claims,
the Court will decline to address the merits of those claims.
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Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2013. The Court’s reasoning in Lopez
Moncebais relied on the petitioner’s length of residence in the United States in evaluating
his liberty interest. Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s residence in the United States
since 2013 still creates a sufficient liberty interest to require that his detention is
safeguarded with constitutionally adequate procedures, including an individualized
determination of whether he should be detained.
Petitioner’s claims are not barred by any failure to exhaust. This Court, along with
others, has previously analyzed exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing
Section 2241 habeas petitions regarding the denial of bond hearings. See, e.g., Perdomo
Flores v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-162, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2025). As noted in those
cases, there is no statutory requirement to exhaust remedies for alien detention claims;
rather, “[u]nder the INA exhaustion of administrative remedies is only required by
Congress for appeals on final orders of removal.” Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-
337, 2025 WL 2691828, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (quoting Garza-Garcia v. Moore,
539 F. Supp. 2d 899, 904 (S.D. Tex. 2007)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may
review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative
remedies.”) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner is not asking the court to review a final removal order, so there is
no 	statutory requirement to 	exhaust. 	Aside 	from statutory requirements, 	federal
prisoners generally must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a Section 2241
habeas petition. See, e.g., Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th
Cir. 2012). However, exhaustion may be waived “where the attempt to exhaust such
remedies would itself be a patently futile course of action.” Id. (citing Fuller v. Rich, 11
F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)). Because the BIA has held that IJs lack jurisdiction to hear
claims like Petitioner’s, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 217, it would be
patently futile to require him to seek relief through the BIA on this issue. The Court finds
that, to the extent that prudential exhaustion of remedies would be required, it should
be waived in this case.
For these reasons and the reasons discussed in the Court’s analysis in Lopez
Moncebais, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to relief, and the appropriate
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remedy is to order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.3
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, (Dkt. No. 1), is GRANTED 	in 	part and DENIED 	in 	part.
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, (Dkt.
No. 10), is DENIED.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody by June 17,
2026, at 5:00 p.m., under reasonable conditions of release, and to submit a status report
to the Court confirming Petitioner’s release by June 18, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Respondents
must notify Petitioner’s counsel of the exact time and location of Petitioner’s release no
less than two hours prior to Petitioner’s release from custody. Respondents are ordered
to return Petitioner’s identity documents and personal effects upon his release.
All other relief requested by Petitioner is DENIED.
If Petitioner is re-detained, Petitioner must be afforded procedural due process as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A final judgment will follow.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on June 15, 2026.
______________________________
John A. Kazen
United States District Judge
3 A district court has equitable discretion in determining the appropriate remedy “as law and justice
require” for unlawful detention in a habeas petition. See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 127–28 (2022).
The Court finds that the specific harm Petitioner suffered—unlawful deprivation of liberty without due
process—is remedied by granting his immediate release, rather than ordering a bond hearing. As explained
in Lopez Moncebais, “[t]he Court recognizes the weight of its decision to order Petitioner’s release from
custody.” No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 16. Though, the Court reaches this conclusion for several reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit has held that Section 1226(a), which provides for a bond hearing, does not apply to
any applicants for admission. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494. Additionally, a hearing after Petitioner’s
unjustified deprivation of liberty does not cure the deprivation. See Bonilla Chicas, No. 5:26 CV-131, 2026
WL 539475, at *12. Finally, the Court finds that an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to hold the bond
hearing if ordered because the BIA’s position is that there is no jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for all
applicants for admission detained under Section 1225(b)(2). Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216;
see also Rojas v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-443, 2025 WL 3038262, at *4, n.2.
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