P.C.F. Properties in TX, LLC v. Coleman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
P.C.F. PROPERTIES IN TEX, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHANTEE T. COLEMAN,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:26-cv-4736
JUDGE DENA PALERMO’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se removal of a state court eviction action. ECF No. 1.1 Defendant
asserts federal question jurisdiction as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 1
at 3. Plaintiff’s petition seeks Defendant’s eviction from residential premises. ECF No. 1-
1.2
Although 	no 	party 	contested 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction, 	the 	Court 	has 	an
independent obligation to determine subject matter jurisdiction. See Benton v. Tex. Dep’t
of Criminal Justice, No. 4:24-CV-0112, 2024 WL 3237543, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 23,
2024), adopted, No. 4:24-CV-00112, 2024 WL 3246071 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2024)
(“Federal courts have an affirmative duty to examine sua sponte the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction.”) (citing Union Planters Bank Nat. Assn. v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir.
1 The district judge to whom this case is assigned referred all pretrial proceedings to the
undersigned. ECF No. 5.
2 Concerned it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and having already heard from Defendant in the
notice of removal, the Court entered a show cause order and ordered Plaintiff to either explain how
the Court had jurisdiction over its claims or file a motion to remand by July 1, 2026. ECF No. 8.
Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s Order.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:26-cv-04736 Document 9 Filed 07/08/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 5

2004)).
Based on the Court’s independent review, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the instant case. “Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ‘exists when “a
well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law.”’” Fisher v. Harmony Pub. Sch., No. 5:23-CV-183-H-BQ, 2023 WL 9102235,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2023), adopted, No. 5:23-CV-183-H-BQ, 2024 WL 56320 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 4, 2024) (quoting Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009)).
“A federal question exists ‘if there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial,
disputed question of federal law.’” Id. (quoting In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).
Defendant alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to § 1331 because the property is “associated with a federally insured mortgage
under Federal Housing Administration programs administered by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development” because the property is anticipated to be
conveyed to HUD. ECF No. l at 3–4, 1-1 at 10 (“The mortgage for the property in which
you are living is in foreclosure as a result of the property owner’s default. . . . ownership
of the property will probably be transferred to [HUD].”). Despite Defendant’s allegations,
her attached documentation demonstrates that Defendant, not HUD, now owns the
property. ECF No. 1-1 at 19. This ground for removal is unfounded.
Defendant next argues that federal question jurisdiction is appropriate because the
eviction proceeding “implicate Defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Supremacy Clause of
article VI.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff’s claims and injuries typically arise under Texas state
law; Defendant’s vague and conclusory allusions to violations of her constitutional rights
are insufficient to raise a federal question. See Fisher, 2023 WL 9102235, at *3; Blackburn
v. Lubbock FBI, No. 5:23-CV-161-H-BQ, 2023 WL 6139457, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
2023), adopted, No. 5:23-CV-161-H-BQ, 2023 WL 6444257 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2023).3
Defendant finally argues that “[r]emoval is independently proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 because Defendant is denied or cannot enforce in the state court her rights under
the Constitution and law providing for the equal rights of citizens of the United States”—
“Defendant’s federally protected interests in the Subject Property, arising from the FHA
insurance program, the anticipated HUD conveyance, and the pending Quiet title Act
proceeding in this Court, cannot be adequately enforced in a state justice court that lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate competing federal interests.” ECF No. 1 at 5.
A defendant may remove any civil action or criminal prosecution that is:
1. Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of
the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; or
2. For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
inconsistent with such law.”
28 U.S.C. § 1443. “Supreme Court precedent applying Section 1443(1) requires litigants
to satisfy two elements: (1) the allegedly denied rights must arise under a federal law
3 Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff and Defendants are citizens of Texas, and therefore,
there is no diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ECF No. 1, 1-1.
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‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality;’ and (2) the litigant
was ‘denied or cannot enforce’ the specific civil rights in state court.” Williams v. Lawson,
No. 6:25-CV-384-ADA-DNM, 2026 WL 562720, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2026),
adopted, No. 6:25-CV-384-ADA-DNM, 2026 WL 594793 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2026)
(quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792–94 (1966)). “[B]road constitutional claims
do not satisfy the first prong of the Rachel test.” Id. (quoting Louisiana v. Wells, No. 14–
00056–BAJ–RLB, 2015 WL 1276713, at *5 (M.D. La Mar. 19, 2025) (citing State of Ga.
v. Spencer, 441 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1971), Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1983))). Section 1443(1) “has consistently been construed narrowly to require strict
satisfaction of both the ‘civil rights’ element and the ‘enforcement’ element intrinsic within
it.” Id. (quoting Smith, 717 F.2d at 194). “The second section of Section 1443 “confers a
privilege of removal only upon federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with
or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil
rights.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	City 	of 	Greenwood 	v. 	Peacock, 	384 	U.S. 	808, 	824 	(1966)).
Consequently, this second section does not support removal by private parties like
Defendant. See id. (citing City of Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 824).
There is no basis for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
Plaintiff’s claims should be sua sponte remanded to the Justice Court of Harris County,
Precinct 4, Place 1.
The 	Parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. C IV. P.
72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude review of factual findings or legal
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conclusions, except for plain error. Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir.
2017).
Signed on July 8, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
________________________________
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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